Medical confidentiality in the context of crime prevention and criminal prosecution : a comparative study. by Michalowski, Sabine
Medical Confidentiality in the Context of 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Prosecution 
A Comparative Study 
Sabine Michalowski 
Submitted for a Doctorate of Philosophy 
Law Department 
March 2000 
Summary 
Medical confidentiality is widely recognised as a concept worth protecting. 
Problems arise, however, when medical confidentiality conflicts with interests that 
are equally regarded as important, such as the interests of justice; the interest in 
criminal prosecution; the interest in crime prevention; or defence rights. In order to 
develop convincing and workable criteria to balance the competing interests in case 
of a conflict, the different interests at stake must be clearly defined, and their 
respective importance assessed. Different ethical approaches to the balancing 
process will be introduced, followed by an analysis of the law of four legal systems, 
France, Germany, the UK and the u.s. 
AIl four legal systems protect medical confidentiality by the means of private law, 
but only Germany and the U.S. protect medical confidentiality as part of the 
constitutional right to privacy. In France and Germany, a breach of medical 
confidentiality by a physician amounts to a criminal offence. Regardless of these 
differences, all systems agree that medical confidentiality serves both the privacy 
interests of the patient, and the public interest in protecting public health. 
Fundamental differences materialise with regard to the recognition of medical 
privilege, which is recognised in France, Germany, and some States in the U.S., but 
is rejected by other States in the U.S. and by the UK. While in the U.S., defence 
rights are regarded as more important than medical confidentiality, the same is not 
true for France and Germany. All systems agree that medical confidentiality can be 
outweighed by the interest in preventing a crime that might cause serious harm to a 
third party, but the criteria according to which the competing interests are 
balanced, differ. 
Based on a comparison of the different approaches, criteria for a consistent and 
morally justified resolution of the conflicts between medical confidentiality and the 
competing interests will be suggested. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Medical confidentiality is a principle which lies at the very heart of the physician-
patient relationship and is relevant to all areas of medical law. It is universally 
recognised as a value worth protecting, and there is widespread agreement that 
physicians should not, in principle, announce to the world that which the patients 
have confided in them. This principle was already recognised by the Hippocratic 
Oath which provided that: 
'Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance 
on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not to be noised abroad, I will 
keep silence thereon, counting such things to be as sacred secrets. ' 
The concept of medical confidentiality is now an integral part of International 
Conventions, such as the Declaration of Geneva of 1994, and an obligation to 
maintain medical confidentiality is imposed on physicians by the rules of their 
profession. Many legal systems guarantee the protection of medical confidentiality 
in various ways. At the European level, the importance of medical confidentiality 
was recently confIrmed by the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, and by the Data Protection Directive 1995 addressing the particular 
threats to the confIdentiality of personal (including medical) data which are being 
processed by automatic or non-automatic means. 
Despite the general agreement that medical confidentiality should, in principle, be 
guaranteed, opinions differ when it comes to explaining why exactly medical 
confidentiality should be protected. Is medical confidentiality mainly protected in 
the interests of the patient, and if so, how, exactly, can the patient's interest in 
medical confidentiality be defined? Or is medical confidentiality mainly protected in 
the interests of the physician? The physician's job may be made much easier if 
he/she has the right to refuse any disclosure of confidential patient information, as 
many patients will only be willing to reveal all information necessary for diagnosis 
and treatment if they can rely on the physician's silence. Alternatively, is medical 
confIdentiality mainly protected in the public interest, as patients might for example 
be deterred from seeking medical advice and treatment if they fear the disclosure of 
their medical secrets? It can easily be seen that the answers to these questions are 
of more than academic relevance, as the approach adopted towards different 
problems in the context of medical confIdentiality depends largely on the interests 
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the respective legal systems are aiming to protect. If, for example, the main 
emphasis were to be placed on the protection of the physician's interests, it would 
be sensible to give the physician discretion in deciding whether or not to disclose 
certain confidential patient information, regardless of the wishes of the patient. If, 
on the other hand, medical confidentiality is mainly protected to pay heed to the 
interests of the patient, the existence or absence of the patient's consent to 
disclosure would have a decisive role to play. If the public interest were to be the 
most significant consideration behind the protection of medical confidentiality, the 
scope and limits of such protection would mainly depend on an analysis of how 
these interests could best be secured. 
As with many other areas in which there is a general consensus that a particular 
interest deserves protection, the principle of medical confidentiality is 
uncontroversial as long as it does not conflict with other interests. Such conflicts 
can frequently arise where the physician holds confidential patient information 
which may be relevant for the purposes of crime prevention or criminal 
prosecution. A physician may, for example, receive information in confidence that 
the patient has committed a serious crime, or that the patient intends to commit a 
serious crime. It is also possible that the physician holds confidential information 
that would exonerate a person who is accused in criminal proceedings, or at least 
assist that person's defence. In these cases, the interest in medical confidentiality 
competes with a number of other interests: that of finding the truth in the course of 
criminal proceedings; the general public interest in crime prevention and criminal 
prosecution; the interests of parties who are wrongly accused in criminal 
proceedings; and with defence rights. To resolve such conflicts of interests, a 
balance must be struck to decide which is to prevail. In other words, it must be 
decided whether medical confidentiality is important enough to justify the 
recognition of a medical privilege, that is, the physician's right or even obligation 
to maintain the patient's confidences in the context of criminal proceedings and of 
crime prevention. 
A balancing test can only be carried out satisfactorily if the interests at stake and 
their respective value are clearly defmed. Therefore, the weight to be accorded to 
the principle of medical confidentiality as well as the importance of countervailing 
interests will have to be assessed. Different methods will be used to achieve this 
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purpose. While this thesis is mainly concerned with a legal analysis, it cannot be 
overlooked that the law in the area of medical confidentiality is largely based on 
policy considerations and ethical principles. For a critical assessment of the law's 
approach to medical confidentiality in general, and to the protection of medical 
confidentiality in the context of crime prevention and criminal prosecution in 
particular, it is essential to introduce philosophical principles which justify or even 
demand, the legal protection of medical confidentiality. It is also necessary to 
examine philosophical approaches to the conflict of interests underlying medical 
privilege. This is particularly important in the context of a comparative study, since 
moral conflicts are the same in all legal systems, and philosophical debate considers 
these problems in an attempt to find a universally acceptable moral solution, 
detached from the constraints of anyone legal system. 
With regard to the legal analysis, a comparative approach will be adopted, as a 
look across the border can indicate different ways of dealing with the same 
problem. The comparative analysis of different approaches to a universal problem 
will help to identify the strengths and weaknesses of different legal approaches, and 
to develop a more objective and satisfactory attitude towards the problem of 
medical privilege. Four different legal systems will be analysed to make a 
meaningful comparison possible. Two common law systems (UK and U.S.) and 
two civil law systems (France and Germany) will be examined to see whether and 
how the fundamental differences between those two types of legal systems 
influence the approach in the area under examination. At the same time, two 
systems providing constitutional protection for privacy (U.S. and Germany) will be 
compared with two systems that do not provide such protection (UK and France). 
These differences among the legal systems under examination will help to identify 
those factors influencing the approach towards the protection of medical 
confidentiality in general, and to the resolution of conflicts between medical 
confidentiality and other interests. Given its importance for three of the four legal 
systems under examination, the relevant law of the European Union and of the 
Council of Europe will also be examined briefly. 
A comparative study faces many problems, not the least of which is that of how to 
structure the outline of the different legal systems so as to make a comparison 
possible, without losing the authenticity of each legal system. Different possibilities 
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exist to achieve this goal. It would be possible to divide the subject into different 
problems, and to examine and compare the law of the different legal systems with 
regard to the approach adopted towards that particular topic. While this structure 
would have the advantage of a problem-based analysis, it would also entail 
significant disadvantages. Even though all legal systems are faced with similar 
problems and therefore have to consider comparable conflicts, they all start from 
very different premises. The legal protection of medical confidentiality in France, 
for example, is mainly based on the provisions of the Criminal Code, and the 
conflicts arising are mostly dealt with by the provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. The approach is thus determined by principles and concepts of criminal 
law. The same is partly true for Germany, with the considerable difference that 
medical confidentiality is also protected by the Constitution, so that the provisions 
of the Criminal Code and of the Code of Criminal Procedure have to be interpreted 
in the light of constitutional principles. In the U.S., medical confidentiality equally 
has a strong constitutional basis which has widely influenced the legal approach 
towards medical privilege. However, medical confidentiality is not protected by 
substantive criminal law, but rather by particular statutes conferring privilege and 
providing very detailed provisions expressly regulating many of the conflicts 
between the interests behind medical confidentiality and the interests of justice. In 
the UK, on the other hand, the protection of medical confidentiality is a creature of 
case-law and has been mainly developed in the context of private law actions for 
breach of confidence. It is therefore based on private law principles and concepts. 
While these differences would complicate a problem-based approach, this would 
not, in itself, provide sufficient justification for dismissing an otherwise valuable 
method of comparative analysis. However, the problem-based approach has been 
rejected here for other reasons. 
The protection of medical confidentiality, as well as the resolution of the different 
conflicts arising in the context of criminal proceedings and crime prevention, 
require a balancing of competing interests. To understand how the different legal 
systems approach the balancing test, it is essential to undertake a detailed analysis 
of the law of each legal system, and in particular of the interplay of different legal 
provisions and concepts. German law, for example, cannot be understood by 
isolating the problem of medical privilege, as the scope and application of medical 
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privilege by German courts depend on constitutional principles and on the interplay 
between medical privilege and the protection of medical confidentiality by the 
provisions of the Criminal Code. This example demonstrates that each legal system 
must be explained as a whole. Without such an approach, solutions to specific 
problems cannot be meaningfully outlined and discussed. Only on the basis of such 
an examination of each legal system can a comparative analysis be performed. 
Moreover, every legal system has its particular problems and emphasises different 
points. Consequently, a problem-based analysis would often give a distorted 
picture by giving inadequate attention to the peculiarities of each system. 
The examination of each legal system will adopt, as far as practicable, the same 
structure, in order to facilitate the subsequent comparative analysis. The analysis of 
each legal system will be divided into two parts. The first part of each of these 
chapters will examine, the way in which the interest in medical confidentiality is 
protected by the respective legal system. In particular, the scope of protected 
information will be discussed, that is, for example, whether the protection is limited 
to confidences patients expressly communicate to their physician, or whether 
everything the physician learns in the course of the physician-patient relationship is 
covered by medical confidentiality. The legal mechanisms used to guarantee this 
protection will also be looked at, for example by examining whether medical 
confidentiality is protected by private law and/or criminal law provisions; whether 
it is a constitutional right; and what remedies are available in case of a breach of 
medical confidentiality. 
The second part of these chapters will concentrate on the particular problems of 
medical privilege. Different questions will be discussed, such as the question of 
whether the physician has a right to refuse to give testimony in court regarding 
confidential patient information, and whether he/she may even be under a duty to 
refuse to give testimony. The conflicting interests in the context of criminal law 
and criminal proceedings will be identified. This part will main focus upon the 
public interest in criminal prosecution; the interests of a person who is wrongly 
accused in criminal proceedings, be it the physician or a third party; the interest in 
the guarantee of defence rights, in general; and the interest in crime prevention. 
The approaches of the different legal systems to a resolution of a conflict between 
these interests and the interest in medical confidentiality will be examined and the 
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policy reasons behind these approaches will be discussed. The specific problem of 
medical records and other confidential material relating to the patient will also be 
introduced. In this context, it is of particular importance whether the police can 
lawfully seize such material for the purpose of criminal prosecution, whether it 
must be made available as evidence in criminal proceedings, and whether the 
physician has the right voluntarily to submit material to the police or the court for 
the purpose of criminal prosecution. While an attempt will be made to raise the 
same issues for all legal systems, this will not always be appropriate. Frequently, a 
problem which is of particular importance for one legal system and is therefore 
discussed in great detail, does not cause any specific difficulties in another legal 
system and therefore does not merit detailed attention. 
The ethical and legal analyses will be followed by comparative reflections. Selected 
legal problems that were introduced in the preceding chapters will be discussed, 
and the solutions promoted by different legal systems will be evaluated. The main 
emphasis will be placed upon a comparison of the practical solutions reached in 
each legal system, rather than upon theoretical differences in approach. This is 
important for an assessment of whether or not apparent similarities will lead to 
similar results, and apparent differences to different results. Comparative and 
ethical reflections will be combined in order to develop workable and ethically 
justifiable criteria to resolve the conflicts between medical confidentiality, on the 
one hand, and the interests in criminal prosecution, defence rights and crime 
prevention, on the other. 
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Chapter 2. Medical confidentiality and medical privilege - ethical 
perspectives 
Medical confidentiality is the term commonly used to describe the concept that all 
communications taking place in the course of the professional relationship 
between physicians and their patients must be confidential. Medical privilege, on 
the other hand, refers to the specific situation that physicians are exempted from 
giving testimony in court with regard to confidential patient information, from 
submitting medical records of their patients, and from disclosing confidential 
patient information for the purposes of crime prevention. When trying to answer 
the general question of whether and to what extent the law should protect medical 
confidentiality, and the more specific question of whether or not medical privilege 
should be recognised, the importance of policy considerations is obvious. 
Particularly with regard to medical privilege, where a conflict of interests must be 
resolved, the solutions favoured in different legal systems are, at least to some 
extent, based on respective value systems. The outcome of legal disputes will 
therefore in great measure be determined by the significance accorded to the 
different interests at stake. Even though in the context of the legal debate, values 
are rarely expressed with reference to philosophical thought, it is nevertheless 
clear that the policy decisions, though often only intuitively, reflect philosophical 
ideas and ethical principles. Legislatures, courts and legal scholars have had 
recourse to ethical principles when developing and delineating the law in this 
area. A critical analysis of legislation, case-law and legal argumentation regarding 
the scope and limits of the legal protection of medical confidentiality and medical 
privilege therefore requires that some attention be paid to philosophical 
considerations about the value of medical confidentiality. 
In the context of medical ethics, two theories are of particular importance: the 
utilitarian and the deontological school of thought. While it is conceded that a 
discussion of these two theories by no means conveys the full spectrum of 
philosophical debate in this area, any attempt to summarise all different 
philosophical schools with regard to their attitude towards medical confidentiality 
would far exceed the scope of this work. Mason and McCall Smith remind us that: 
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'Contemporary medical ethics is a tapestry in which an array of philosophical 
theories interweave with one another.' I Therefore, it is both inevitable and 
justified to concentrate on the main strands by focusing on utilitarian and 
deontological ethics. In contemporary medical ethics, the traditional deontological 
approaches to some extent have been extended by rights-based and principle-
based approaches which will therefore also be introduced. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to resolve the conflicts between the different 
ethical approaches or the inconsistencies inherent in each of them. Rather, its 
purpose is to establish the theoretical background necessary for a comparative 
analysis of the law. Ethical thought can be used as a tool for an assessment of the 
law as it stands. In particular, it can assist in the examination of whether the 
balancing of interests performed in each legal system and the results achieved can 
be justified by reference to the predominant ethical theories. As the balancing of 
interests depends largely on ethical and policy considerations, ethical reasoning 
can contribute to a more coherent approach to the balancing process, an important 
attribute in this area of law. 
1. Introduction to different theories 
1.1. Utilitarianism 
For utilitarians, an action is right not because it is inherently good, but rather 
because it maximises 'utility', that is it produces the maximal positive value, or 
the best consequences. So-called 'act-utilitarianism' focuses on the utility of every 
action and holds that actions are right if they promote the best consequences in the 
individual case. This means that an agent must assess the consequences of hislher 
acts in a specific situation before pursuing a course of action. 'Rule-
utilitarianism', on the other hand, is based on more general considerations when 
concentrating on the consequences of a rule, rather than on the consequences of an 
individual act. For a rule-utilitarian, the right act is that which is in accordance 
with a rule that conforms with the principle of utility, i.e. a rule that is thought to 
achieve the best consequences for an indeterminate number of cases. To abide by 
such a rule is more important than to achieve the best result in a particular case. 
1 Law and Medical Ethics, at S. 
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This is because it is thought by rule-utilitarians that the good that may result from 
a certain course of action in an individual case may lead to bad consequences in 
an unpredictable number of cases, if to achieve the good result, a good rule must 
be disregarded. A rule-utilitarian, when deciding on a course of action, will 
therefore be guided by general rules that are based on the principle of utility. 
Bentham and Mill. the early promoters of the principle of utilitarianism, defined 
utility exclusively by reference to pleasure and happiness,2 notions which are not 
unambiguous in their meaning. More recent utilitarians have recognised additional 
values such as autonomy.3 
The principle of utility could be summarised as a principle of striving for the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number. It claims to be objective, in that the 
determination of whether or not an act or a rule is good or bad depends on a 
calculation of the pain and pleasure thereby caused. If the pleasure outweighs the 
pain, then the act or rule is good. However, utilitarian theory is faced with the 
problem of how to decide what are good or bad consequences and how to measure 
what are the best consequences to be achieved. If the good ofa rule or an act is to 
be decided according to its consequences, this presupposes an antecedent system 
of judging and ranking consequences, and thus a pre-existing 'vision of the 
good,.4 Another problem which will become apparent in the context of medical 
confidentiality and medical privilege is that of whether only certain and direct 
consequences are to be taken into account, or whether and to what extent possible 
long-term or indirect consequences might weigh in the cost-benefit analysis. 
1.2. Deontological theories 
1.2.1. A duty-based approach 
Deontological theories focus on the rightness or wrongness of an act in itself. 
They are not concerned with the consequences an act may have, but rather with 
identifying those features of the act which make it morally acceptable, and they 
suggest that some acts have an intrinsic value. According to Kant, for example, 
an agent acts morally only when acting from a sense of duty. This makes it 
2 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, at 11- t 3; Mill, 
Utilitarianism, at 59. 
3 Griffin, Well-Being: Its Measurement and Moral Importance, at 67. 
4 Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics, at 46. 
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necessary to identify the duties of the individual. Kant promotes that the 
individual ought to behave as if the behaviour were to become a universal law, so 
that only an act that passes the test of universalisability qualifies as a moral act. S 
Another important feature of Kantian ethics is that it is immoral to use others 
merely as a means to an end. Rather, every person must be treated as an end in 
him/herself, and have his/her integrity as an individual respected.6 One important 
problem medical ethics, based on Kantian views, would have to face is how to 
resolve conflicts of interests. As a person's duties are absolute, according to Kant, 
there is no room for conflict resolution or for the balancing of two competing 
duties. Given the realities of medical practice where conflicts frequently arise, this 
approach is ineffectual for practical medical ethics.7 
Other deontologists have tried to overcome this problem. Ross, for example, who 
argued that 'if there are things that are intrinsically good, it is prima facie a duty 
to bring them into existence rather than not to do so, and to bring as much of them 
into existence as possible,' nevertheless recognised that a conflict of these duties 
may arise. According to him: 
'When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in which more than one of 
these prima facie duties is incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the 
situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) 
that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent on me than any other; 
then I am bound to think that to do this prima facie duty is my duty sans 
phrase in the situation.' 8 
Ross, like Kant, defines morality in terms of obligations. But unlike Kant, he 
acknowledges that duties are not absolute and can be overridden by more urgent 
duties, depending on an assessment of all the circumstances in a given case. Even 
if it avoids the absoluteness of Kantian obligations, this theory nevertheless raises 
two fundamental problems. First, how is one to determine which of the competing 
duties is the more urgent one and therefore the duty that will prevail in a given 
conflict of duties? More importantly, there is the problem of the moral 
justification of which duties are to be regarded as prima facie duties. Ross 
identifies three qualities that are intrinsically good: virtue, knowledge and 
pleasure. However, even though he attempts to give a moral justification of this 
5 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, at 44. 
6 Ibid., at 52-53. 
7 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 60-62; Davies, Textbook on Medical 
Law, at 6. 
8 Ross, The Right and the Good, at 16-29. 
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particular choice of values, for those who do not share his particular value system 
the determination of certain acts or values as intrinsically good seems to be no 
more than the announcement of personal preferences,9 a criticism that can be 
made equally of other deontological approaches. 
1.2.2. A principle-based approach 
In contemporary medical ethics, more and more writers have come to realise the 
inadequacies of traditional ethical theories. In addition to the particular problems 
inherent to each theory, there is the fundamental problem that monistic theories 
that are based on a particular vision of the good can only be regarded as binding 
by those who share the same basic beliefs, and do not deliver sufficient moral 
justification to be convincing to every individual in a pluralistic society. 10 
Furthermore, traditional ethical theories are so complex, and the full 
understanding and application of any of them requires such an immersion in 
philosophical ideas, that professionals who are faced with ethical conflicts, such 
as medical practitioners or lawyers, will frequently not have an adequate 
philosophical background to approach these conflicts on the basis of the particular 
ethical theory which suits them best. Nor would such an approach necessarily be 
justifiable, given the possibility that their patient may have a completely different 
set of beliefs. I I Therefore, rather than trying to develop a comprehensive ethical 
theory, an alternative approach could start from the assumption that workable 
medical ethics should be based on what Beauchamp and Childress call common 
morality or shared beliefs. One advantage of this approach is that it is possible to 
assert that certain beliefs are shared by rival ethical theories.12 Therefore, 
principles which are acceptable to the adherents of rival moral theories could be 
developed on the basis of these beliefs, without any need first to resolve the 
fundamental philosophical disagreements about the very basis of moral 
justification, separating them. 13 This approach emphasises and combines the 
strengths of different moral theories when searching for justifiable ethical 
principles to be used as guidelines for the resolution of conflicts of interests. It 
9 Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics, at 65. 
10 Ibid., at 65-66. 
11 Schl5ne-Seifert, 'Medizinethik', in: Nida-Rnmelin (ed.) Angewandte Ethik, at 564. 
12 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at toO. 
13 Ibid., at 22. 
12 
acknowledges that moral principles and practical experience are interdependent 
and that a constant mutual assessment of principles and experience is needed to 
develop new and to improve existing principles and approaches. Once principles 
are thus derived from common morality, they will be prima facie binding, but can 
be overridden by other principles. Beauchamp and Childress concede, however, 
that some conflicts may not be amenable to a resolution by a reference to 
principles. 14 
This approach, of course, raises the problem of which interests can be identified 
as being recognised by common morality. While Engelhardt, for example, only 
works with two principles, permission and beneficence,15 and holds that the 
principle of permission is the principle on which all moral authority is based,16 
Beauchamp and Childress identify four principles, autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice, without giving one of them precedence over the other. 17 
1.2.3. A rights-based approach 
Rights-based theories rest on the assumption that morality primarily aims at 
protecting the interests of individuals, and that rights are the most effective 
instrument to achieve such protection. If an interest is given the status of a right, 
the individual has an enforceable claim that his/her interest not be violated. 
According to Ronald Dworkin, a prominent promoter of the rights-based approach 
to ethics, to talk of a right means to give an individual interest, in principle, 
priority over collective goals. Individual rights are thus 'trumps' which cannot be 
restricted in order to pursue ordinary public or community interests: s This is 
because the concept of individual rights only makes sense if rights cannot be 
overridden simply by referring to some potential utilitarian gain, as individual 
rights would then not confer any special protection. Moreover, rights cannot be 
infringed in the interest of the majority, unless there is a case of special urgency, 
as individual rights are of particular importance to achieve the protection of the 
most wlnerable, a purpose which would be completely undermined if majority 
interests could routinely outweigh these rights. However, the language of rights 
14 Ibid., at 122-124. 
1.5 Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethies, at 119. 
16 Ibid., at 69. 
17 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 38. 
18 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 92 and 191. 
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with its emphasis on the interests of the individual, cannot avoid the problem that 
even rights may have to yield when they are in conflict with other, more important 
rights, either of third parties or of the public.19 Thus, rights-based theories need to 
decide which right has to yield and which right will prevail in case of conflict, It 
should also be noted that the abstract recognition that an individual's interests 
should sometimes have the force of a right says nothing about which interests are 
important enough to justify the recognition of a right. Rights-based moral theories 
are thus confronted with problems similar to those faced by duty-based ethics. 
2. Autonomy, privacy and confidentiality 
2.1. Principle of autonomy 
While most contemporary moral theories accept the importance of the principle of 
autonomy and agree that the individual's autonomy deserves protection, the exact 
scope and meaning of autonomy is far from clear. Autonomy means self-rule, 
which indicates that autonomy refers to a person's ability of self-determination, 
that is to determine his/her acts and life plan. Autonomy thus understood 
presupposes freedom from controlling influences and a capacity to make one's 
own decisions. If these conditions are met, a person is an autonomous agent. 
According to some moral theories, autonomy is an intrinsic value and as such 
deserves protection. Deontological theories state that every individual is under the 
obligation to respect the autonomy of others;20 the principle-based approach 
regards the principle of autonomy as one of the fundamental principles of medical 
ethics;21 and according to rights-based theory, the autonomous agent even has a 
right that his/her autonomy be respected.22 However, while some utilitarians 
recognise that respect for autonomy may promote happiness,23 utilitarian thought 
nevertheless predominantly maintains that autonomy only requires respect as long 
as this will produce the best possible consequences, so that according to utilitarian 
theory, autonomy is only of instrumental value. 
Respect for autonomy is required in different ways. The individual must be given 
19 Ibid., at 191 -194. 
20 See, for example, Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, at 52-53. 
21 See, for example, Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 38. 
22 See, for example, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 277. 
23 Griffin, Well-Being: Its Measurement and Moral Importance, at 67. 
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space to make autonomous decisions and, consequently, respect for autonomy 
dictates the principle of non-interference with the individual's autonomous affairs. 
Positive action may also be required, as the individual will often only be able 
meaningfully to exercise his/her autonomy with the assistance of others or of the 
state. According to the terminology of Kant, respect for autonomy demands that 
others are treated as ends in themselves, rather than being reduced to other 
people's means.24 In the light of the growing importance of personal autonomy, 
this thought has since developed from the mere prohibition to treat people as a 
means to a requirement that people must be assisted in achieving their ends and in 
developing their capacity as agents.2S It has been argued that to respect an 
autonomous agent requires at a minimum to acknowledge that person's right to 
hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values, beliefs 
and preferences.26 
2.2. Privacy 
When looking at the use of the term privacy by courts and by different writers, it 
can easily be seen that the term is not given a single meaning, but is used to 
describe different phenomena. The importance of the right to privacy was already 
emphasised by Warren and Brandeis in an influential article published in 1890.27 
When the notion of a right to privacy first emerged, the main focus lay on the 
protection of the individual from unwarranted disclosure of private information. 
However, this perspective is too narrow, as privacy refers to the entire private 
sphere of the individual, so that a person's privacy could be defined as the 
inaccessibility of this person's private sphere to others. In that respect, privacy 
refers to the physical as well as to the mental sphere as it includes a person's body 
and bodily products, but also a person's thoughts, and intimate and confidential 
reiationships.28 This includes, but is not restricted to, the protection of personal 
information. In the context of contemporary medical ethics, the concept of privacy 
is said to embrace four different categories of cases: (1) informational privacy 
regarding access to personal information; (2) physical privacy regarding access to 
24 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, at 52-53. 
2$ Herman, (1984) 94 Ethics, at 601; O'Neill, (1989) 72 Monist, at 354-355. 
26 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 125. 
27 Warren, Brandeis, (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review, at 193-220. 
28 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical EthiCS, at 408. 
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persons and personal space, a category of privacy that requires, for example, that 
medical treatment of a competent patient is not administered without the patient's 
consent; (3) decisional privacy regarding personal choices, which excludes 
governmental and other third-party interference with such intimate decisions as 
health care and family planning; and (4) proprietary privacy regarding the 
appropriation and ownership of interests in human personality.29 In the context of 
a study of medical confidentiality, the first and third privacy categories are of 
particular importance. 
It is now widely recognised that privacy is closely linked with autonomy.30 
Privacy is said to be one aspect of the principle of autonomy, as without privacy, 
the guarantee of personal autonomy would be incomplete.31 With regard to the 
individual's interest in informational privacy, the connection between privacy and 
autonomy focuses on the concept of control over personal information. 
Informational privacy goes beyond the interest that no information be spread 
about the individual. It additionally justifies a feeling of security because the 
individual is in control of hislher private and intimate information. Respect for 
privacy is essential for developing a sense of self and personhood, as the 
individual needs private space to develop and formulate autonomous 
preferences.32 Control over personal information is thus of fundamental 
importance to individuals. It not only enables persons to avoid the shame of 
having embarrassing intimate information disclosed publicly, but it also ensures 
that they can engage in unconventional behaviour without having to fear negative 
consequences. Thus, if the principle of autonomy is recognised and respected, 
then the privacy of the individual must equally be protected, as it must be left to 
the individual's autonomous choice whether, to whom and to what extent to 
disclose personal information.33 Informational privacy could thus be defined as an 
expression of the right to self-determination in respect of personal information, as 
the individual retains control over what will be known about himlher.34 However, 
it is important to stress that informational privacy is not mainly concerned with 
29 Allen, 'Genetic privacy: emerging concepts and values', in: Rothstein, Genetic Secrets, at 33. 
30 See, for example, Westin, Privacy and Freedom, at 33-34; Fried, 'Privacy (A moral analysis)" 
in: Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, at 219; Henkin, (1974) 
Columbia Law Review, at 1425; Gostin, (1995) 80 Cornell Law Review, at 513-514. 
31 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 410. 
32 Gostin, (1995) 80 Cornell Law Review, at 514. 
33 Bok, Secrets, at 120. 
34 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 190. 
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shielding potentially embarrassing facts from public scrutiny. Rather, privacy is 
valuable regardless of how the information is viewed by others, as it does not aim 
at protecting the content of information, but rather at giving the individual the 
power to control the extent to which others can participate in his/her life. 35 Or, to 
express this thought differently, the unwanted disclosure of private data can in 
itself cause harm, so that respect for a person's privacy can be seen as a 
recognition of the desirability that the individual should be protected against the 
insult to dignity and the lack of respect for the person such unwanted disclosure 
might entail.36 Another important aspect of privacy is to guarantee intimate 
relationships. Only if individuals are secure in the knowledge of their privacy will 
they be comfortable to share their confidences with others, and without privacy, 
intimate human relationships could thus not develop.37 This is significant for the 
physician-patient relationship, as privacy protection gives the individual the space 
to form a confidential relationship with his/her physician in which he/she can 
disclose medical secrets without the fear that such confidences will be disclosed 
beyond that relationship. 
Decisional privacy is also linked to the principle of autonomy, as the principle of 
autonomy includes the right to decide what will happen to one's person and one's 
body.38 This category of privacy is important for the physician-patient 
relationship, as without privacy, the patient would not have the opportunity to 
choose freely whether or not to seek medical advice and treatment and to make 
autonomous health care decisions without giving up the privacy of all information 
thus made known to the physician. 
For deontologists who see privacy as a part of the principle of autonomy, privacy 
is a fundamental right which is closely linked to the dignity of human persons. 39 
Utilitarians also value privacy, but for different reasons. For them, privacy does 
not possess any intrinsic value. However, it is acknowledged that privacy 
promotes personal development and fosters personal or intimate relationships. 
Privacy is thus said to be of instrumental value in achieving certain personal 
goals. In the context of the physician-patient relationship, the benefits of privacy 
3' Orentlicher, "Genetic privacy in the patient-physician relationship'. in: Rothstein, Genetic 
Secrets, at 79. 
36 Gostin, (1995) 80 Cornell Law Review, at 490. 
37 Francis. (1982) 8 JME, at 135. 
38 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical EthiCS, at 410. 
39 Francis. (1982) 8 JME, at 141. 
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protection are that it enhances autonomy, prevents embarrassment and promotes 
effective communication between physician and patient. It therefore promotes 
health and thereby happiness. Thus, utilitarians recognise that privacy may be 
important for its consequential effects.4o 
2.3. Medical confidentiality 
Although medical confidentiality and privacy are closely linked, some writers 
stress that they are distinct concepts. Privacy refers to the general interest that the 
private sphere be shielded from unwanted access. Confidentiality, in contrast, 
presupposes a relationship of confidence in which certain private information is 
disclosed or in which a person is given access to one's private sphere. Such a 
relationship exists where the person who is given access to the private sphere of 
another makes a promise of keeping all such information confidential, or where 
the person is under an obligation, legal or ethical, not to disclose the other 
person's secrets.41 If this distinction between privacy and medical confidentiality 
is accepted, medical confidentiality concerns a small part of privacy in that it 
deals with access to the patient's private sphere in the context of the physician-
patient relationship. If understood in this way, a claim for medical confidentiality 
can only exist in the confined setting of the physician-patient relationship. 
However, as information related to a person's physical or mental health is 
regarded as private, confidential medical information is already protected by the 
general right to privacy. The right to privacy in its connection with the right to 
personal autonomy also protects intimate personal relationships, so that the right 
to privacy includes the right to form a relationship with one's physician and to 
protect this relationship as private. This raises the question of whether, in the 
context of the physician-patient relationship, the particular protection of medical 
confidentiality can add anything to the general privacy protection. Some argue 
that additional protection lies in the fact that confidentiality imposes an obligation 
on the person who obtained information in confidence not to disclose this 
information.42 
40 Gostin, (1995) 80 Cornell Law Review, at 514. 
41 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 420; Gillon, (1985) 291 BMJ, at 
1635. 
42 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 418 and 423-424. 
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What, then, are the moral justifications for a protection of medical confidentiality? 
It could be argued that the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship 
does not deserve any protection, as patients usually voluntarily grant their 
physicians access to their private sphere and thereby voluntarily surrender some 
degree of privacy. Warwick, for example, argues that confidentiality is not a 
necessary component of the physician-patient relationship, but that the physician's 
obligations to maintain the patient's confidences and the patient's expectation of 
medical confidentiality are rather only artificially created by the physician's 
promise to that respect. Without this promise, the moral justification for medical 
confidentiality would disappear. As the argument goes, privacy considerations 
cannot justify medical confidentiality, as the patient has a free choice between 
keeping his/her medical secrets to himlherself by not revealing them to the 
physician and by not allowing the physician to examine hirnlher, or choosing to 
disclose such information, thus giving up privacy protection. According to 
Warwick, it is acceptable that patients must thus decide between privacy and 
health interests, as 'their health is sacrificed in good cause - that of their 
individual autonomy', and as 'it would seem that ill-health may be a reasonable 
price to pay for the maintenance of autonomy. ,43 However, it is submitted that this 
argument is not convincing, as it is based on a too narrow view of personal 
autonomy. As was already explained, autonomy protects the self-determination of 
autonomous agents and requires respect for their free and voluntary choices. One 
important feature of respecting the individual's autonomy is that the private 
sphere be protected from unwanted access as well as from interference with 
personal choices. At least personal autonomy in the form of decisional privacy is 
inadequately protected by the model suggested by Warwick. While without 
medical confidentiality, the individual still has a choice between privacy and 
health, the argument neglects the point that free and autonomous health-care 
decisions are one important expression of the person's privacy and autonomy. 
Thus, rather than achieving the alleged purpose of strengthening the patient's 
autonomy, this opinion gives the patient no more than a choice between 
exercising one element of autonomy to the detriment of the other, which is not 
necessarily the best way to enhance autonomy. 
43 Warwick, (1989) JME, at 184. 
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One justification for the protection of medical confidentiality is thus based on the 
premise that it seeks to guarantee respect for a patient's autonomy and privacy 
when entering a professional relationship with a physician.44 Physicians and 
psychotherapists incessantly emphasise the importance of frankness and candour 
in the course of the medical encounter both for the purpose of a correct diagnosis 
and for the purpose of effective treatment. A patient who seeks medical or 
psychological help will regularly have to reveal intimate personal information to 
the physician or psychotherapist, and whenever a patient allows a medical or 
psychological examination to take place will he/she necessarily grant the 
physician or psychotherapist access to hislher personal sphere. Only if the patient 
can rely on medical confidentiality and knows that the information will not be 
accessible to third parties or the state beyond the therapeutic relationship, will the 
patient be free to seek medical or psychological advice and treatrnent.45 Only then 
~ill the patient have a true choice, as he/she then does not have to sacrifice one 
aspect of hislher autonomy and privacy for another. An element of trust is 
therefore said to be essential in order for patients to feel secure when confiding 
their secrets in the physician. 46 Given the close link between the concept of 
medical confidentiality and the principles of privacy and autonomy, some of the 
arguments listed in support of a right to privacy equally justifY the recognition of 
medical confidentiality, and many writers, when trying to give a moral 
justification for the protection of medical confidentiality, content themselves with 
the statement that medical confidentiality is based on the patient's privacy 
interests which are protected as part of the principle of autonomy.47 Others specify 
this further. Siegler, for example, argues that medical confidentiality serves a dual 
purpose. First, it acknowledges respect for the patient's sense of individuality and 
privacy, as the patient's most personal physical and psychological secrets are kept 
confidential in order to avoid shame and vulnerability. Secondly, medical 
confidentiality plays a role in improving the patient's health care. As Emson 
explained the interplay between autonomy, privacy and medical confidentiality: 
44 Siegler, (1982) New England Journal of Medicine, at 1519. 
4S Kottow, 'Stringent and predictable medical confidentiality', in: Gillon, Principles of Health 
Care Ethics, at 475. 
46 See, for example, Siegler, (1982) New England Journal of Medicine, at 1519; Orentlicher, 
'Genetic privacy in the patient-physician relationship'. in: Rothstein. Genetic Secrets, at 84; 
Gostin, (1995) 80 Cornell Law Review, at 511. 
47 See, for example, Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 190. 
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'In the contemporary ethics of Western societies primacy is accorded to 
autonomy, to the right of the patient to dispose of his or her own body 
according to personal wishes. Various rights devolve from this and 
confidentiality is one of them; the right to autonomy includes the right to 
privacy. The patient, disclosing all freely to the physician, has the right to have 
the privacy of this information respected by the confidentiality afforded to it.,48 
Deontologists who accept the significance of the principle of autonomy will 
usually assert that respect for medical confidentiality is necessary in order to 
achieve the protection of autonomy and privacy in the health care setting. 
For utilitarians, medical confidentiality only deserves protection if, on balance, 
such protection has beneficial consequences. What, then, are the beneficial 
consequences that can be promoted by respecting medical confidentiality? The 
main justification for the principle of medical confidentiality voiced by utilitarians 
is that confidentiality is thought to encourage patients to disclose fully their 
symptoms and all confidential and intimate information needed by the physician 
in order to make a diagnosis and to provide effective medical advice and 
treatment. Gillon summarised the beneficial consequences resulting from a 
protection of medical confidentiality as people's health, welfare, the overall good 
and overall happiness. All of these consequences are more likely to be attained if 
doctors are fully informed by their patients which in tum is more likely if 
physicians will not disclose their patient's medical secrets to the state or third 
parties.49 As the value of medical confidentiality depends on the consequences the 
respect for such a principle might entail, the utilitarian justification accordingly 
rests on the assumption that without a guarantee of medical confidentiality, large 
numbers of patients would fail to make sufficient disclosure, thereby endangering 
their own, as well as public, health. Empirical proof would therefore be needed to 
decide whether or not medical confidentiality is a principle worth protecting. 
However, no empirical evidence exists to support this assumption, and it is rather 
questionable whether most patients are even aware of the physician's legal and 
ethical obligations in the area of medical confidentiality.so Utilitarian philosophers 
nevertheless seem to agree that the mere possibility of deterring a patient from 
seeking adequate medical advice and treatment is a sufficient justification for the 
principle of medical confidentiality, given the significance of individual and 
48 Emson, (1988) JME, at 87. 
49 Gillon, (1985) 291 BMJ, at 1635. 
50 Shuman, (1985) 39 Southwestern Law Journal, at 664-665. 
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public health. 5 1 Some utilitarians emphasise, in additio~ that medical 
confidentiality promotes the creation and maintenance of socially valuable 
relationships. 52 Medical confidentiality would then have to be protected because 
of the societal value of the physician-patient relationship and the potential injury 
to that relationship if its confidentiality were not protected. In her summary of the 
utilitarian view, Hogan states that this theory, which she calls public function 
theory, is not concerned with the individual suffering that a failure of the 
relationship might cause, but that it focuses instead on the societal harm caused by 
such a failure.s3 It is problematic whether utilitarians will also accept that medical 
confidentiality deserves protection because it enhances patient autonomy and 
privacy. Utilitarians rarely seem to discuss this question. It is submitted that it is 
not at all evident that a utilitarian perspective would dismiss this consideration, as 
a course of action that promotes the individual's autonomy could arguably 
promote happiness. Gillon introduces this idea when stating that patients who 
decide to disclose confidential information to their physicians despite a lack of 
medical confidentiality might feel anxious and unhappy at the prospect of their 
secrets being made known. 54 
Deontological and utilitarian approaches to medical confidentiality are not 
mutually exclusive. Nor is it true that every writer who attempts to find a moral 
justification for the recognition of the principle of medical confidentiality adheres 
to either a pure deontological or a pure utilitarian approach. Instead, many writers 
borrow deontological and utilitarian thoughts and combine elements from both 
philosophies in order to explain the importance of medical confidentiality. Thus, 
writers who stress the overriding importance of medical confidentiality for an 
adequate protection of the patient's autonomy and privacy sometimes equally 
acknowledge that medical confidentiality also lies in the public interest. It is 
argued, for example, that without medical confidentiality, society will deter 
precisely those patients from seeking medical advice and treatment whom it is 
trying to bring under contro~ for example people displaying deviant and possibly 
dangerous behaviour, or persons suffering from illnesses such as venereal 
31 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 188. 
32 Weisberg, (1978) 30 Stanford Law Review, at 971. 
n Hogan, (1989) 30 Boston College Law Review, at 420-421. 
,S4 Gillon, (1985) 291 BMJ, at 1635; see also 'Developments in privileged communications', 
(1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1555. 
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diseases, that may be regarded as embarrassing. 55 It is also argued that public 
health can best be promoted if medical confidentiality is upheld and people are 
therefore encouraged to seek medical advice and treatment.56 Sissela Bok suggests 
that medical confidentiality rests on four premises: (1) individual autonomy over 
personal information; (2) the legitimacy of sharing personal secrets and the 
assumption of respect for intimate relationships; (3) respect for a promise of 
confidentiality; and (4) the utility of professional confidentiality for individuals 
and society. 57 While the first three justifications are based on deontological 
thought, the last consideration clearly refers to utilitarian theory. 
It can be seen that in spite of the significant conceptual differences between the 
deontological and the utilitarian approaches to medical confidentiality, both have 
much in common. Neither regards the principle of medical confidentiality as an 
intrinsic value. Rather, both approaches regard medical confidentiality as no more 
than a means to achieve a morally valuable end. 58 Both agree that medical 
confidentiality serves important functions in that it enhances patient frankness. 
For the purpose of establishing an initial justification for medical confidentiality, 
the differences between the two approaches do not seem overly important. This, 
however, will not necessarily be true in the context of developing a moral 
justification for the recognition of medical privilege. 
3. Medical privilege 
In the context of medical privilege, the principle of medical confidentiality must 
be reassessed in the light of the conflict between the principle of medical 
confidentiality, on the one hand, and the interests of justice, on the other hand. 
Thus, while the different moral theories introduced above agree that the protection 
of medical confidentiality is, in principle, morally justified, this does not 
necessarily imply that medical confidentiality is an absolute principle that must be 
upheld under all circumstances and at all costs. 
55 Kottow, 'Stringent and predictable medical confidentiality', in: Gillon, Principles of Health 
Care Ethics, at 478. 
56 Vickery, (1982) 82 Colorado Law Review, at 1435. 
S7 Bok, Secrets, atlI9-122. 
S8 Gillon, (1985) 291 BMJ, at 1635. 
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3.1. Medical confidentiality and the administration of criminal justice 
Medical privilege protects medical confidentiality in the context of judicial 
proceedings, in that physicians are exempted from the general obligation to give 
testimony in court. A testimonial privilege thus demonstrates the value accorded 
to the principle of medical confidentiality, as it gives medical confidentiality 
precedence over the countervailing interests of justice.~9 The recognition of 
medical privilege accordingly expresses the idea that the possible impairment of 
the interests of justice is a price worth paying for the protection of the 
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship.6o As the resolution of a 
conflict of interests is typically based on policy considerations, it is interesting to 
analyse the problem of medical privilege from a philosophical perspective to 
develop a better understanding of the ethical concerns at issue. 
Criminal proceedings aim at reaching a just decision as to the guilt or innocence 
of a person who is accused of having committed a criminal offence. To achieve 
this purpose, it is essential that the truth be established in criminal court, and this 
is most likely if all relevant evidence is made available to the court. Medical 
privilege, in contrast with exclusionary rules, aims at the exclusion of evidence, 
not for the purpose of enhancing the truth-finding function of criminal 
proceedings, but rather for extra-judicial purposes.61 Seen in this light, testimonial 
or communication privileges such as the privilege of a physician or a 
psychotherapist conflict with the smooth operation of the criminal justice system 
As privileges result in withholding evidence from the factfmder, they can lead to 
grossly incorrect results and as a consequence, miscarriages of justice may 
occur.62 The question must therefore be asked: 
'whether acknowledgement of privilege in respect of confidential 
communications to members of the medical profession is defensible on the 
basis of considerations of policy which are sufficiently compelling to relegate 
the negative effect of exclusion of relevant evidence in judicial proceedings. ,63 
59 Vickery, (1982) 82 Colorado Law Review, at 1435. 
60 Peiris, (1984) 33 ICQL, at 301. 
61 Hogan, (1989) 30 Boston College Law Review, at 418-420. 
62 Snyder, (1990) 65 Tulane Law Review, at 200-201. 
63 Peiris, (1984) 33 ICQL, at 306. 
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Only if the ethical analysis shows 'that there is something of merit that requires 
protection in these communications, something more valuable than the needs of 
''the law",64 can medical privilege be morally justified. 
3.1.1. Utilitarian approaches 
From a utilitarian point of view, the costs of medical privilege for criminal 
proceedings seem clear: if medical privilege is recognised, certain information 
would not be available to the court for the purpose of criminal proceedings if the 
physician invokes medical privilege and refuses to give testimony. The main 
benefit arising from medical privilege, on the other hand, is that it encourages 
communication between patient and physician. 
From a utilitarian perspective, the recognition of a medical privilege depends on 
the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis which must examine to what extent medical 
privilege causes the loss of relevant information, and whether or not this potential 
loss is outweighed by the rationale behind granting medical privilege. As both 
medical confidentiality and the efficient administration of criminal justice can 
promote good consequences, it must therefore be decided which of the two 
interests should prevail in case of a conflict, that is which of the two interests 
promotes greater happiness. Sometimes the utilitarian approach conversely 
focuses on the minimisation of harm, and medical privilege would then only be 
justified if the possibility of disclosure of confidential information did in fact deter 
patients from diVUlging to their physicians all information that is necessary to 
obtain adequate medical advice and treatment, and if the harm inflicted by such 
disclosure outweighed the harm thereby prevented.6s No empirical evidence exists 
in support of the view that medical confidentiality promotes the physician-patient 
relationship. It is rather doubtful whether patients are aware of the applicable law 
of privilege and consider that law before consulting with a physician.66 Indeed, 
empirical studies seem to suggest that patients do not necessarily know whether or 
not their legal system endorses medical privilege, and what exceptions to such 
64 Oppenheim, The Medical Record as Evidence, at 619. 
65 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 192; see also Wigmore, Evidence 
in Trials at Common Law, § 2380, at 829-830. 
66 Shuman, (1985) 39 Southwestern Law Journal, at 664-665. 
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privilege are recognised.67 Some utilitarians consequently argue that without such 
evidence, medical privilege cannot be justified. This opinion rests on the 
assumption that it is certain that a privilege will impair the fact-finding function of 
judicial proceedings, while it is not at all established whether and to what extent 
the physician-patient relationship will be harmed by compelled disclosure of 
confidential medical information in court. It is followed that medical privilege 
cannot be justified given the uncertainty of the benefits thereby obtained, and 
given the costs its recognition entails.68 
Other utilitarians come to a different result when proposing that the outcome of 
the cost-benefit analysis should not be determined generally and for all cases, but 
should be performed on a case-by-case basis, depending on the harm inflicted by 
disclosure, on the one hand, and the significance of the potential loss of evidence, 
on the other. It has been argued that, in principle, medical privilege is not highly 
significant for the physician-patient relationship as most patients will disclose the 
same information to a physician whether or not a privilege exists.69 However, 
even if most communications were made to physicians in the absence of medical 
privilege, it is possible that some communications would then not take place. On 
the other hand, not all litigation would suffer from the recognition of medical 
privilege.7o Therefore, even if in most cases the balance did strike in favour of 
disclosure, a different result might be reached in cases in which the information 
the disclosure of which is sought is not of particular relevance to the proceedings. 
In such cases, the costs of privilege would not be high. If little or no relevant 
evidence is lost, and if the physician-patient relationship were seriously impaired 
by disclosure, the overall balance would lead to a recognition of medical privilege 
in that particular case. While there is a presumption in favour of disclosure,71 
exceptional circumstances may thus occur in which the protection of medical 
confidentiality in criminal court is more important than the interest in the 
administration of justice . 
The utilitarian approaches to medical privilege that have been introduced thus far 
start from the premise that in principle, the interests of justice should prevail over 
67 Snyder, (1990) 65 Tulane Law Review, at 172. 
68 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 2380, at 829-830. 
69 Watson, (1992) 71 Nebraska Law Review, at 1131. 
70 Saltzburg, (1980) 66 Virginia Law Review, at 619 note 74. 
71 Ibid., at 648. 
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the interest in medical confidentiality. However, this opInIon IS not 
uncontroversial among utilitarians. It has, for example, been argued that the value 
of promoting open relations between patients and their doctors outweighs the cost 
of judicial decisions that are reached without a full disclosure of all relevant 
facts.72 Thus, even though medical privilege entails high costs in that it creates a 
risk of miscarriages of justice, the protection of the confidentiality of the 
physician-patient relationship is viewed by some as important enough to justify 
incorrect results in individual cases, as society cannot afford to deter people from 
seeking medical advice and treatment.7J For the health of the community, 
'medical treatment is so valuable that few would lose it to prevent facts from 
coming to light in court. ,74 
With regard to the special case of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it is 
sometimes suggested that the cost-benefit analysis differs from that to be 
performed in the context of the ordinary physician-patient relationship, as 
frankness is even more important for the psychotherapist-patient relationship. 
Without the patient's willingness to share openly even hislher most secret 
thoughts and feelings with the psychotherapist, effective psychotherapy would be 
impossible. Also, the matters discussed in psychotherapy, for example drug abuse, 
sexual problems or violent tendencies will frequently make the patient particularly 
anxious about later courtroom disclosures.75 Among physicians, psychotherapists 
are therefore particularly adamant that medical confidentiality should be 
respected.76 If accepted, these special features would give medical confidentiality 
more weight in the context of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, as the costs 
of a disclosure by a psychotherapist would then be higher than the costs a 
disclosure by a physician would entail. However, it has been countered that no 
72 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
privileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-8; see also Lewin v Jackson 
108 Ariz. 27 (1972), at 31; Leritz v Koehr 844 S.W.2d 583 (Mo Ct App 1993), at 584; In re CP 
563 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind 1990), at 1278; State v Sypult 304 Ark. S (1990); Clark v District Court 668 
P.2d 3 (Colo 1983), at 8; State v Mincey 141 Ariz. 425, at 439. 
73 Snyder, (1990) 65 Tulane Law Review, at 201. 
74 Chafee, (1943) 52 Yale Law Journal, at 609; see also Peiris, (1984) 33 ICQL, at 304. 
75 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
~rivileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-9 to 7-10. 
6 Advisory Committee's notes on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, (1972-73) 56 FRO 
183, at 242. 
27 
psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in the UK and some parts of Canada, and 
that no evidence points to adverse consequences for effective therapy.77 
It can be seen that utilitarian thought does not result in a clear and unequivocal 
attitude towards medical privilege. Rather, the outcome of the utilitarian cost-
benefit analysis largely depends on the weight accorded to the benefits and harms 
following from a recognition or a rejection of medical privilege. As the cost-
benefit analysis seems to be based on empirical evidence, the utilitarian approach 
conveys the impression of a certain objectivity. However, it should be borne in 
mind that the utility of medical privilege is not supported by any empirical 
evidence. It is difficult to assess the consequences of this lack of empirical 
evidence for utilitarian theory. Does it necessarily mean that medical privilege is 
not beneficial for the physician-patient relationship, and for the patient's and the 
public welfare? More importantly, are the benefits arising from a rejection of 
medical privilege really as certain as frequently purported? Arguably, the costs of 
a medical privilege are not necessarily equal to the value of the evidence thereby 
excluded from judicial proceedings, as some evidence presumably exists only 
because a privilege encouraged its creation.78 There is at least a possibility that 
without medical privilege, the communications between patient and physician 
might change,19 so that without medical privilege, the physician might not obtain 
the information the disclosure of which is sought in court. The unavailability of 
such evidence can then not be regarded as a cost of medical privilege. Thus, any 
assessment of the costs of medical privilege must take into account the extent to 
which people would communicate in the absence of the privilege and depends on 
the same empirically unverified factor that determines the benefits flowing from 
the privilege. Therefore, even if the proponents of medical privilege fail to offer 
empirical proof in support of their assumption that medical privilege promotes 
patient frankness and ultimately individual and public health, the costs that 
privileges purportedly impose on the truth-fmding function of the courts are just 
as uncertain as the asserted benefits. The whole basis of the utilitarian approach is 
thus problematic and not very helpful in the context of medical privilege, as 
neither the costs nor the benefits of medical privilege are amenable to empirical 
77 Shuman, Weiner, (1982) 60 North Carolina Law Review, at 895. 
78 'Developments in privileged communications" (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1513; see 
also Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, at 49 for the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship .. 
79 Saltzburg, (1980) 66 Virginia Law Review, at 602. 
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proof. Absent empirical proof supporting the cost-benefit analysis, the analysis 
does not weigh the objective consequences of rules or acts, but rather merely the 
presumed consequences. As the different opinions among utilitarians show, the 
importance accorded to certain consequences, and the assessment of what is 
harmful, what is beneficial and how to balance harm and benefits in case of a 
conflict largely depends on the value attached to the different interests at stake. 
The case-by-case approach to medical privilege that has been suggested by some 
utilitarians is also problematic. If the patient cannot be certain whether in hislher 
individual case the balance will be struck in favour of or against disclosure, the 
main purpose of medical confidentiality according to utilitarian thought, i.e. to 
encourage the patient to receive medical treatment and to disclose all relevant 
information to the physician, can hardly be achieved.8o 
3.1.2. Deontologieal approaches 
According to the deontological approach, the disclosure of confidences revealed 
in, certain relationships is regarded as wrong because it would violate the patient's 
privacy and autonomy. Medical privilege is then the legal device through which 
these interests can be protected in the context of judicial proceedings. But does 
this necessarily mean that medical confidentiality is important enough to outweigh 
the public interest in truth-fmding in criminal proceedings? For deontologists, the 
patient's privacy interests are important enough to justify a presumptive right 
against disclosure. Understood in this way, medical confidentiality has the status 
of a prima facie right which has to be respected unless weightier considerations 
justify an exception. This means that medical confidentiality must be protected 
even in criminal court provided that this interest is not exceptionally overridden 
by a more important right or interest.sl Accordingly, the recognition of a medical 
privilege requires a value judgment, as it must be decided whether medical 
confidentiality or the interest in the unhindered administration of criminal justice 
is the more important interest and therefore deserves prevalence in case of 
conflict. As deontologists do not place great weight on the consequences of value 
80 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
privileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges. vol. 2, at 7-10; Thomas-Fishburn, 
(1990) 61 University of Colorado Law Review, at 194 regarding the attorney-client privilege; 
Gurfein, (1981) 49 Fordham Law Review, at 733 also regarding the attorney-client privilege. 
81 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 191-194. 
29 
decisions, the value judgment that needs to be made does not depend on empirical 
evidence, but rests, instead, on moral beliefs. If privacy is regarded as the 
overriding interest, medical privilege is morally justified, and the potential 
exclusion of relevant evidence is then 'merely a secondary and incidental feature 
of the privilege's "vitality"',82 but does not influence the value judgment as such. 
It is striking that for most deontologists the outcome of the value judgment in the 
context of medical privilege so clearly turns in favour of a recognition of medical 
privilege that hardly any attempts are made to justify such a result. Rather, it 
seems sufficient justification to stress the importance of medical privilege for the 
patient's autonomy and privacy,83 and to state that the threat to the ascertainment 
of truth resulting from the recognition of medical privilege is not too high a price 
to pay for the preservation of medical confidentiality.84 However, given the 
absence of a moral justification of medical privilege that goes beyond stressing its 
importance for privacy and autonomy, it is difficult to predict with certainty how 
the conflict between medical confidentiality and the interests in the administration 
of criminal justice will be approached in specific cases. It has been argued, for 
example, that exceptions to medical privilege should be made where the 
prosecution of serious crimes is at stake,85 at least if medical information is likely 
to be central to a successful prosecution, as in most drunk. driving and child abuse 
cases. While a presumption exists in favour of protecting the patient's privacy, the 
proposed exception would ensure that information is available to the courts where 
the loss of information entails particularly high costS.86 This argument combines 
deontological and consequential elements, as it justifies exceptions to medical 
confidentiality on the basis of the consequences of a recognition of medical 
privilege, rather than on the basis that the conflicting interests, here the interest in 
the prosecution of serious crimes, outweighs the interest in medical 
confidentiality. It seems to suggest that interests do not necessarily have a fixed 
value, but rather that the value of an interest must, in case of conflict, be 
determined with reference to all the circumstances of the individual case, 
including the consequences of the value decision. This approach, while making it 
82 Shuman, (1985) 39 Southwestern Law Journal, at 664. 
83 Krattenmaker, (1973) 62 Georgetown Law Journal, at 90. 
84 Louisell, Crippin, (1956) 40 Minnesota Law Review, at 414. 
8' Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
l'!'ivileges'. in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-35. 
'Developments in privileged communications', (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1553. 
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possible to adopt a more fine-tuned balancing test, is nevertheless problematic, 
unless criteria are developed to make it subject to reasoned decisions and to 
exclude arbitrariness. 
One attempt to argue generally against the recognition of medical privilege in 
criminal proceedings was made by Sissela Bok who argued that with regard to 
criminal prosecution, medical confidentiality must be weighed against interests of 
social justice and restitution.87 According to her, medical confidentiality must find 
its limits where it contradicts the very respect for persons and for human bonds 
that it was meant to protect.88 The validity of this argument is questionable. 
Where confidences of victims or other third parties are concerned, it cannot be 
said that the patient has disregarded the respect owed to others and thereby 
forfeited his/her claim to medical confidentiality. However, even where the breach 
of confidence harms the criminal offender, this argument is problematic, as it is 
not the maintenance of medical confidentiality that disregards the respect owed to 
others,89 but rather the alleged acts of the patient. The argument also presupposes 
that the accused did in fact disregard the values behind a protection of medical 
confidentiality, which is impossible to know in the course of criminal 
proceedings, as the guilt of the accused will only be established at their very end. 
David Black seems to be right when stating that: 
'Most people might see the disclosure of confidential information for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution as a matter of degree, giving preference to 
autonomy for trivial offences, but becoming skewed to non-maleficence in case 
of terrorism or other serious crime .• 90 
This demonstrates the main problem of the deontological approach towards 
medical priVilege. that is the difficulty of how to resolve conflicts of interests, as 
generally agreed upon criteria for establishing priorities among the conflicting 
interests or for determining when generally accepted priorities must give way to 
extreme interests do not seem to exist.91 Rather, the outcome of the balancing 
exercise seems to depend to a large extent on personal preferences and intuition. 
The rights-based approach promoted by Ronald Dworkin avoids this problem in 
the context of medical privilege, as the interests behind criminal prosecution are 
87 Bok, Secrets, at 131. 
88 Ibid., at 135. 
89 Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics, at 337. 
90 Black, • Absolute Confidentiality?', in: Gillon, Principles of Health Care Ethics, at 487. 
91 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 195. 
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societal, rather than individual interests. Given that individual rights cannot 
normally be outweighed by communal interests,92 medical confidentiality would 
have to be given prevalence over the interest in criminal prosecution, and the 
recognition of medical privilege would seem to be the logical conclusion of 
acknowledging a right to medical confidentiality. 
With regard to the special case of psychotherapist-patient privilege, it has been 
argued that such communications deserve more protection than those between 
patients and physicians, as matters disclosed in psychotherapy are often much 
more personal than matters discussed in the course of consultations for physical 
illnesses.93 Therefore, the patient's privacy interests are said to have more weight 
in the context of the psychotherapist-patient relationship.94 Others reject this 
distinction, as physicians today cannot focus solely on one aspect of a person's 
problems, either physical or psychologica~ as the increase in psycho-somatic 
illnesses clearly demonstrates.95 The same need for trust would then exist in both 
relationships. Given that confidentiality is protected mainly to respect the 
patient's autonomy, the distinction also seems to overlook that it should be left to 
the patient to determine which information, whether physical or psychologica~ 
he/she regards as particularly sensitive and in need of most protection. 
3.2. Medical privilege and the interests of third parties 
Another conflict which frequently arises is that between medical confidentiality, 
on the one hand, and the protection of third parties, on the other. In the context of 
medical privilege, this may embrace cases in which the patient threatens to inflict 
harm on third parties, and cases in which physicians hold confidential information 
that might be beneficial to a person who is accused in criminal proceedings. 
Many argue that the disclosure of confidential patient information aimed at 
preventing a criminal offence is justified, at least where it may help prevent 
violent crime. For utilitarians, a justification of disclosure seems at first sight 
rather compelling, as the prevention of violent crime averts significant harm from 
92 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 92 and 191-194. 
93 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
fJivileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-9 to 7-10. 
Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, at 49. 
9' Saltzburg, (1980) 66 Virginia Law Review, at 621. 
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the potential victim as well as from society, while most utilitarians regard the 
harm prevented by the maintenance of medical confidentiality as uncertain. 
However, some writers nevertheless question this approach, arguing that it is 
difficult to assess whether more lives will be saved by disclosure than by respect 
for medical confidentiality, as violent patients could be deterred from seeking 
medical and, in particular, psychological advice and treatment.96 This, once more, 
brings to light the problem of how to weigh uncertain and long-term costs and 
benefits. Engelhardt, for example, argues that: 
'The fact that a particular disclosure of a patient's dangerousness could have 
saved the life of a particular third party should not obscure the fact that a 
general rule requiring disclosure may in fact lead to the deaths of more 
individuals. ,91 
And Kottow equally opposes the utilitarian argument that disclosure would 
produce the better consequences in such cases. According to him, a violation of 
medical confidentiality results in certain harm, as it brings suspicion into the 
physician-patient relationship, thereby undermining patient frankness and 
lowering the standard of medical care. At the same time, it seems impossible to 
perform an adequate risk assessment and to predict with sufficient certainty the 
harm caused by the threat of violent behaviour. First, there is a possibility that 
threats of violence issued by patients may never materialise. How can the 
physician or psychotherapist assess whether the risk is real, potential or 
fictitious?98 The threat may only be the expression of a patient's violent fantasy in 
the course of psychotherapy. Secondly, it was argued that if disclosure for the 
purpose of crime prevention were allowed, this would not necessarily help to 
avert harm, as preventive arrest is not lawful, and as other preventive measures 
will often not be available to ensure that the threat may not be carried out.99 Also, 
if individual freedom were regarded as a benefit, the outcome of the cost-benefit 
analysis in such cases may not be so obvious, given that the breach of medical 
confidentiality to avert a hypothetical danger would then entail a certain 
infringement of individual freedom 100 Therefore, it was argued that as long as a 
plausible risk-benefit analysis is lacking, the utility of disclosure is not sufficiently 
96 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 193. 
97 Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethies, at 339. 
98 Kottow, (1986) JME, at 120. 
99 For a critical view see Adshead, (1995) 311 BMJ, at 1619. 
100 Kottow, 'Stringent and predictable medical confidentiality', in: Gillon, Principles of Health 
Care Ethics, at 477. 
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demonstrated so as to justifY a breach of confidentiality.IO) Others, in contrast, 
argue that the imponderability of the harm prevented or caused by a disclosure 
should not prevent the physician from nevertheless attempting to assess the value 
of the interests at stake in every given case.102 
Deontologists also frequently hold disclosure to be justified where it can prevent 
violent crime. This attitude is mainly based on two arguments. First, it is often 
argued that an individual's bodily integrity and life are more important values 
than privacy, so that the balancing of the competing interests would come down in 
favour of disclosure. IO) However, the conflict could also be regarded differently. 
If medical confidentiality promotes a patient's decisional privacy, in that it gives 
the patient the freedom to make autonomous health care decisions, then medical 
confidentiality serves the patient's interest in bodily integrity. The overriding 
importance of the competing third party interest is then no longer obvious. When 
others argue that the third party interests should at least prevail where there is a 
risk of serious harm which could not otherwise be prevented,104 this shows, again, 
that consequences of actions can be of importance for the balancing of interests. 
While the patient's autonomy interests may be more important than the avoidance 
of a very remote risk of slight impairments of a third party's bodily integrity, the 
outcome of the balancing test might change where the risk is less remote and the 
potential harm more serious, as the weight of the interest harmed by non-
disclosure might be influenced by the potential consequences of non-disclosure. 
Others focus on the fact that the interest to be impaired by disclosure is the 
patient's interest in privacy and autonomy. It is argued that a person's autonomy 
is limited by the autonomy of others and can therefore not go as far as putting 
others at risk of bodily harm or even risks to their lives. lOS 'Just as no one is 
granted autonomy when it comes to doing violence to others, so there is no reason 
to concede such autonomy and control for plans to do so, once divulged.' 106 
Engelhardt suggests a different approach when emphasising that the patient's 
dangerousness is not increased by the fact that a physician knows about it and that 
101 Ibid., at 475. 
102 Emson, (1988) JME, at 90. 
103 Shuman, (1985) 39 Southwestern Law Journal, at 667; Turkington, (1989) 34 Villanova Law 
Review, at 888; Watson, (1992) 71 Nebraska Law Review, at 1144. 
104 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 426. 
10' Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 194-195. 
106 Bok, Secrets, at 128-129. 
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the physician's silence does not injure the potential victim. ,o7 However, this 
argument seems to miss the point, as it does not assess the value of the different 
interests at stake, but rather exclusively concentrates on the question of whether or 
not additional injury is caused by the fact of non-disclosure. This, however, 
cannot be a further requirement if the third party's interest outweighs that of the 
patient. 
With regard to the conflict between medical confidentiality and defence rights, the 
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis would probably come down in favour of 
disclosure. It is fair to say that the costs of medical privilege would be an 
impairment of the defence rights of the accused, which might lead to unjust 
results, and, in the worst case, to a criminal conviction of an innocent person. 
Given that most utilitarians favour disclosure even where medical confidentiality 
merely conflicts with the interests in the administration of criminal justice, the 
reasons supporting disclosure are even more compelling where the defence rights 
of an accused are at stake. However, those utilitarians who think that a 
miscarriage of justice is not too high a price to pay for the protection of medical 
confidentiality would probably equally argue in favour of medical privilege where 
confidentiality conflicts with defence rights. From a deontological perspective, all 
depends on the weight accorded to the competing interests, and it is highly likely 
that most deontologists would argue in favour of disclosure, as the accused's 
freedom, an interest of very high rank, is at stake. 
4. Strict confidentiality? 
Utilitarians mostly promote the view that medical confidentiality should only be 
protected as long as a cost-benefit analysis favours this protection, and 
deontologists usually argue that medical confidentiality can sometimes be 
outweighed by other interests of overriding importance. Thus, both philosophical 
schools agree that medical confidentiality is not an absolute principle that will 
prevail under all circumstances and trump all other interests. Such relativist views 
of medical confidentiality make it necessary to define exceptions to the general 
principle and thereby create their own problems. From a utilitarian perspective 
which argues that medical confidentiality is needed to promote frankness in the 
107 Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethies, at 337. 
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physician-patient relationship and which therefore rests on the assumption that 
without medical confidentiality, a patient may be reluctant openly to reveal all the 
information that enables the physician adequately to advise and treat the patient, 
every exception to the principle risks to undermine its very purpose. If the patient 
knows that the privilege is fraught with exceptions, he/she may react by 
withholding information or by avoiding therapy, just as if no privilege existed at 
all, as the reassuring function of a privilege loses its value if exceptions are 
admitted. 108 
From a deontological perspective, pleas for an absolute confidentiality could 
equally be made. If the principle of medical confidentiality were subject to 
exceptions, the patient's autonomy would be undermined. Where a patient is 
enticed to frankness by the assurance that hislher confidences will be kept secret, 
and that he/she will therefore keep control over confidential information that was 
shared with the physician, it seems unfair to alter the initial conditions of the 
physician-patient relationship on the grounds that the content of the information 
requires disclosure, once the act of confiding has occurred. 109 
However, it was seen that in some situations, it would be equally, if not more 
problematic strictly to adhere to medical confidentiality, as this would not be 
justifiable under any moral theory. Even Kottow who is frequently quoted as the 
promoter of an absolute nature of the principle of medical confidentiality 
therefore concedes that the principle cannot be absolute, but should only be 
respected as far as possible. llo However, if exceptions cannot be avoided, they 
should at least be clearly and publicly established, so that every patient knows in 
advance what to expect. III To achieve this, it was suggested that physicians 
should inform their patients at the beginning of every professional encounter of 
the limits to medical confidentiality.112 More importantly, exceptions should not 
only be stated but also be morally justified, in the view of achieving some kind of 
social consensus as to which exceptions would or would not be acceptable. I 13 
108 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
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5. Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated the similarities of and differences 
between the utilitarian and the deontological approaches to medical 
confidentiality. Both approaches accept that medical confidentiality is important. 
While utilitarians justify the importance of the principle by reference to the 
consequences of its recognition, deontologists argue that medical confidentiality is 
a value to be protected because it is closely linked with personal autonomy and 
privacy. From these different starting points, both theories provide an initial 
justification for the principle of medical confidentiality. However, the differences 
in approach come to light in the context of medical privilege, where conflicts of 
interests must be resolved. While according to the utilitarian approach, in case of 
conflict it must be positively demonstrated that medical confidentiality produces 
better consequences than disclosure, the deontological approach starts from a 
presumption in favour of medical confidentiality, and each exception to this 
principle must be justified by the overriding importance of the value which 
outweighs medical confidentiality. Consequently, the protection awarded to 
medical confidentiality according to deontological thought is much stronger than 
its protection by utilitarian theory, as pursuant to the deontological approach, 
every exception to medical confidentiality requires a careful justification, while 
for utilitarians, it is the protection of medical confidentiality that must be justified. 
This fundamental difference may explain why, in the context of medical privilege, 
most utilitarians favour disclosure while most deontologists favour the 
maintenance of medical confidentiality. 
Both theories have their strengths and weaknesses. Utilitarianism has to face the 
problem that consequences can frequently not be determined with any certainty, 
particularly not in the area of medical confidentiality and medical privilege, where 
a variety of factors interact. A theory that decides on right and wrong according to 
the consequences of acts or rules will hardly be able to produce satisfactory 
results where these consequences cannot be adequately determined. More 
importantly, however, it is problematic that the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis 
favours the best consequences, which seems to require value judgments about 
right and wrong independent of the consequences themselves. If happiness is the 
only value that is accepted, this is rather vague and can be subject to many 
different interpretations, as it is neither clear whether the focus should lie on 
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individual or societal happiness, nor what exactly is meant by happiness in the 
first place. Therefore, utilitarian theory is not free from the reproach that its 
results in case of conflict resolution are arbitrary, depending on the personal 
preferences of the respective philosopher. Utilitarian thought as applied by many 
of its promoters has the additional problem that it seems to be too heavily focused 
on communal interests to the detriment of individual freedom. 
Deontological theory promotes individual freedom by emphasising the intrinsic 
value of personal autonomy and privacy. However, this approach also seems to be 
of limited value for the resolution of moral conflicts, as the judgment on the 
hierarchy of values seems to be based on personal preferences, and not on a 
coherent system of morally justified considerations. While the importance of 
autonomy is clearly established, neither the value of conflicting interests, nor 
guidelines on how to balance competing values are determined with sufficient 
clarity to assist with the resolution of moral problems. What, for example, should 
be the place of general considerations of welfarel14 in the context of the 
deontological balancing exercise? And should consequences of a decision be 
completely omitted from the balancing process? If so, how can the value of 
conflicting interests be determined in a given case if the consequences of the 
decision for each interest cannot be taken into account? If, on the other hand, 
consequences can be of importance for the outcome of the balancing process, this 
could be seen as some limited convergence of deontological and utilitarian 
thought. The two approaches could also be brought more closely together if 
happiness or beneficial consequences were understood as including individual 
freedom. At least in liberal societies, individual freedom is of overriding 
importance not only for the individual concerned, but also for a democratic 
society as such. Utilitarian analysis would then have to accommodate personal 
autonomy and privacy when assessing the costs and benefits of certain acts or 
rules. l1s 
In the light of the inadequacies of both theories, it is hardly surprising that neither 
has succeeded in presenting a satisfactory framework for the resolution of all 
conflicts of interests. Nancy Moore has therefore rightly remarked that: 'Given the 
114 For the importance of welfare considerations in the context of criminal law and criminal 
~rosecution see. for example, Ashworth. Principles o/Criminal Law, at 30-31. 
IS 'Developments in privileged communications', (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1555. 
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difficulties in applying both utilitarian and deontological theories, it is obvious 
that philosophers have by no means solved the problems now confronting the 
medical profession.' 116 This is not to say that reference to moral theory will not be 
useful for an analysis of the law regarding medical confidentiality and medical 
privilege, as ethical principles can provide valuable assistance in formulating 
policy considerations. 1 17 The principal questions arising in the context of medical 
privilege, that is whether or not medical confidentiality is important enough to 
outweigh conflicting interests in the context of judicial proceedings, are moral, 
not legal questions. Accordingly, they cannot be addressed without reference to 
the moral principles introduced in this chapter. 
116 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 196. 
117 Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 10. 
39 
Chapter 3 - Medical confidentiality and medical privilege in European law 
1. Protection of Medical Confidentiality 
1.1. European Convention on Human Rights 
Given that the European Convention on Human Rights has an impact on three of 
the legal systems under examination, it is important to look into the protection the 
principle of medical confidentiality receives under the Convention. The relevant 
article of the ECHR which might embrace the protection of medical 
confidentiality is Art.8 which states that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
With regard to the scope of the right to private life, the European Commission on 
Human Rights stated in Application No. 6825174: 1 
'The right to respect for ''private life" is the right to privacy, the right to live as 
far as one wishes, protected from publicity.' 
This rather general delineation of the scope of the privacy right under Art.8 ECHR 
was clarified in DVO v Belgium2 where the Commission stated that: 
'The disclosure of improper discovery by third persons of facts relating to 
physical condition, health or personality may undoubtedly interfere with the 
applicant's privacy and private life.' 
Even though the ECJ's interpretation of the ECHR is not binding, it seems worth 
mentioning that the ECl has confirmed that Art.8 ECIIR awards the right to keep 
one's health condition secret.3 It is thus clear that Art.8 ECIIR protects health 
related information from compelled disclosure. This, however, does not answer 
the question of whether the protection awarded by Art.8 ECHR embraces 
information that the patient has confided in the physician or which the physician 
observed in the course of hislher profession, as in such a case, the patient 
voluntarily releases private medical information from his/her personal sphere by 
disclosing it to a third party. In Niemitz v Germany,4 the European Court of 
Human Rights stated to that effect that: 
1 Decision of 18 May 1974. 
2 Application No. 7654176, 1 March 1979. 
3 Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR 1-2575, para. 23; Case C-404/92P X v 
Commission [1994] ECR 1-4737, para. 17. 
416 December 1992, Series A, No.251-B. 
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'The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive 
definition of the notion of ''private life". However, it would be too restrictive to 
limit the notion to an "inner circle" in which the individual may live his own 
personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world 
not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise 
to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings. 'S 
In that case, the Court had to decide whether the search of a law firm violated the 
lawyer's right to private life under Art.S(I) ECHR and came to the conclusion that 
it did. Thus, the mere fact that someone has communicated information to a third 
party does not exclude this information from the protection of 'private life' and 
the lawyer's interest in the secrecy of hislher files is now protected by Art.S(I) 
ECHR. But does this mean that the physician-patient relationship is equally 
protected by Art.S ECHR? This question was, for example, at issue in MS. v 
Sweden. 6 In that case, the Court had to decide whether a patient's medical records 
were protected from disclosure to the Social Insurance Office by Art.S ECHR. 
The European Court of Human Rights emphasised that the medical records in 
question contained highly sensitive and personal information about the applicant, 
including information about an abortion, and that these records were protected 
under Art.8 of the Convention.7 This case thus seems to suggest that the 
protection of medical records is warranted if the information concerned has a 
particularly sensitive and personal character. A broader discussion of the 
protection of confidential medical information took place in Z v Finland. 8 In that 
case, the Court was concerned with the compatibility of court orders with Art.8 
ECIIR. The court orders at issue forced the physicians of the applicant to give 
evidence in court regarding the applicant's medical condition, inter alia relating to 
her IIIV infection, and ordered the seizure of the applicant's medical records. The 
Court held that: 
'The protection of personal data, not least medical data, is of fundamental 
importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and 
family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Respecting the 
confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention. It is crucial not only to respect the sense 
of privacy of a patient but also to preserve his or her confidence in the medical 
S Ibid., para. 29. 
6 Decision of 27 August 1991, European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions, (1997) No.44. 
7 Ibid., at para. 26. 
8 Decision of25 February 1997, (1998) 25 E.H.RR 311. 
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profession and in the health services in general. Without such protectio~ those 
in need of medical assistance may be deterred from revealing such information 
of a personal and intimate nature as may be necessary in order to receive 
appropriate treatment and, eve~ from seeking such assistance, thereby 
endangering their own health and, in the case of transmissible diseases, that of 
the community. The domestic law must therefore afford appropriate safeguards 
to prevent such communication of disclosure of personal health data as may be 
inconsistent with the guarantees in Article 8 of the Convention.'9 
The Court went on to stress the particular sensitivity of information relating to a 
person's IllY status and concluded that interferences with the protection of the 
confidentiality of such information can only be compatible with Art.8 EClIR if 
justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. 10 This decision thus 
confirms the view that the extent of protection awarded to personal medical data 
depends on the sensitivity of the information in question. The particular 
significance of the decisio~ however, lies in the fact that it discusses the reasons 
behind the protection of medical data by Art.8 ECHR. According to the Court, the 
protection is based on the patients' interest in keeping their health information 
secret, so that the individual's interest in the secrecy of sensitive personal data is 
obviously regarded as an interest worth protecting. In additio~ the patient's 
confidence in the members of the medical profession is guaranteed. This 
demonstrates that the protection goes beyond the patient's interest in secrecy, as 
this interest could be achieved simply by not forcing the patient to reveal his/her 
medical secrets to a physician. Given that the right to private life guarantees the 
development of relationships with others, the relationship between physician and 
patient itself receives protectio~ and it is recognised that this relationship may be 
adversely affected if the physician is forced to disclose confidential patient 
information to the state. The Court goes even further in acknowledging that the 
protection of medical data is also based on the patients' health interest, as patients, 
without a guarantee of confidentiality, may be deterred from seeking medical 
advice and treatment. The reasons thus far summarised demonstrate that the 
protection of medical confidentiality is based on deontological considerations that 
the patient's informational and decisional privacy deserve respect. However, the 
Court also stresses that community interests are at stake, as public health may be 
adversely affected if patients with transmissible diseases do not seek medical 
9 Ibid., at para.95. 
10 Ibid., at para.96. 
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advice or treatment. This demonstrates that the protection is also based on 
utilitarian concerns. 
In Z v Finland the Court went beyond an interpretation of Art. 8(1 ) ECHR as 
protecting the individual from state interference, as the state is not merely 
prevented from forcing the individual to disclose medical information. The Court 
rather in addition stated that Art.8 ECHR imposes an obligation on the state 
appropriately to protect medical information the patient confided in the 
physician. I I However, given the limited amount of European case-law on 
questions of medical confidentiality, it is not at all clear to what extent 
confidential medical information is protected by Art.8 ECHR.12 
1.2. European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
It should be noted that medical confidentiality is now also protected under 
Art.l0(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, stating 
that: 
Everyone has the right to respect for private life in relation to information 
about his or her health. 
It thus expressly guarantees the right to respect of medical confidentiality. 
However, the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine has yet to 
come into force, and it therefore currently only enjoys 'persuasive rather than 
legal authority. 
1.3. Data Protection Directive 95/46IEC 
In 1995, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union issued 
the Data Protection Directive the twofold aims of which are identified in Art. I as 
protection of fundamental individual rights and freedoms, particularly the right to 
privacy with regard to the processing of personal data, on the one hand, and the 
prevention of barriers to the free flow of personal data between Member States, on 
the other. The provisions of the Directive apply to the processing of personal data 
II This view has recently been confirmed in Bolta v Italy, 24 February 1998, (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 
241, at para. 34. 
12 For a discussion of the impact of Art.8 ECHR on the physician-patient relationship, see 
Hondius, (1997) 4 EJHL 361-388. 
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by automatic means, and to non-automatic processing of data that form part, or 
are intended to form part, of a filing system (Art.3). This means that medical 
records are protected under the Directive, regardless of whether they are 
computerised or part of a manual filing system that meets the definition of 
Art.l(c). Medical data receive special protection under Art.8 which applies to data 
concerning the health of the individual. It has been suggested that the Data 
Protection Directive will have the effect that the processing of medical data, given 
their highly sensitive nature, is likely to be subject to particularly careful 
monitoring by the supervisory authorities.13 
2. Medical privilege 
The right to privacy under Art.8 ECHR is not guaranteed without limits. Art.8(2) 
ECHR rather qualifies that: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Given this rather extensive restriction of the right under Art.8(l) ECHR, it is 
important to analyse the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights to 
determine the impact of the ECHR on the question of medical privilege. 
2.1. Criminal prosecution 
In Z v Finland, 14 a case in which the Court had to assess the compatibility with 
Art.8 ECHR of court orders forcing the applicant's physicians to give evidence in 
court regarding the applicant's medical condition, including her IllV infection, the 
Court held that: 
'Such interference cannot be compatible with Article 8 of the Convention 
unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. ... At 
the same time, the Court accepts that the interests of a patient and the 
community as a whole in protecting the confidentiality of medical data may be 
13 Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, at 172. 
14 (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 371. 
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outweighed by the interest in investigation and prosecution of crime and in the 
publicity of court proceedings. 'I~ 
States will therefore not violate Art.8 ECHR when giving the interest in the 
investigation and prosecution of criminal offences prevalence over the interests in 
medical confidentiality, even though the interest in criminal prosecution is not 
explicitly mentioned in Art.8(2) EClIR. Consequently, a recognition of medical 
privilege giving the physician a right to refuse to give testimony in criminal court 
is not mandated by Art.8 ECHR. 
In Z v Finland, the physician's evidence served the purpose of establishing at 
what time X, who was accused of a number of sexual offences and who was found 
to be mv positive, had known of his infection, as this knowledge was essential 
for a conviction for attempted manslaughter in addition to a conviction for rape. 
Given that the applicant, X's wife, was also an mv carrier it was seen as 
important to find out at what time she became aware of her infection, as this could 
give some indication as to when the accused must have become aware of the risk 
of his own infection. With regard to the significance of the physician's evidence, 
the Court argued: 
'Their evidence had the possibility of being at the material time decisive for the 
question whether X was gUilty of sexual offences only or in addition of the 
more serious offence of attempted manslaughter in relation to two offences .... 
There can be no doubt that the competent national authorities were entitled to 
think that very weighty public interests militated in favour of the investigation 
and prosecution of X for attempted manslaughter in respect of all of the five 
offences concerned and not just three ofthem.'16 
Thus, even in cases in which the physician's testimony in criminal court was not 
necessary for the prosecution of an offender as such, but rather only for the 
prosecution for more serious offences, this interest is still regarded as possibly 
outweighing the interest behind the protection of medical confidentiality. The 
Court then emphasised the exceptional circumstances under which Finnish law 
allows for ordering the physician to give evidence (only in connection with 
serious criminal offences for which at least 6 years of imprisonment was 
prescribed) and that the questioning took place in camera, that all relevant files 
were ordered to be kept confidential, and that all those involved in the 
1 ~ Ibid., paras 96-97. 
16 Ibid., para. 102. 
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proceedings were under a duty to treat the information as confidential. This led 
the Court to conclude that: 
'The various orders requiring the applicant's medical advisers to give evidence 
were supported by relevant and sufficient reasons which corresponded to an 
overriding requirement in the interests of the legitimate aims pursued. [The 
Court] is also satisfied that there was a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between those measures and aims.' 17 
It is also interesting to note that the Court saw no reason to question the extent to 
which the applicant's physicians were ordered to give evidence, as this was a 
matter to be primarily decided by the national authorities. The Commission had 
taken a different stance and questioned the proportionality of the measures on this 
ground, arguing that even if the violation of the privacy right was, in principle, 
justified, the measures were not proportionate, as no attempt was made to limit the 
disclosure of confidential information. 
It thus seems fair to say that medical confidentiality is not protected under Art.8 
ECHR from disclosure by the physician in the course of criminal proceedings. In 
that respect, Art.1 0(1) European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
does not add any protection, as according to Art 26(1) of the Convention: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of the rights and protective 
provisions contained in this Convention other than such as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, 
for the prevention of crime, for the protection of public health or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Art.10(1) can be restricted under the same circumstances as Art.8(1) ECHR. And 
the Explanatory Report points out with regard to Art.1 0(1) that a breach of 
medical confidentiality would for example be justified in order to identify the 
author of a crime. This result was reached with reference to the ~xception relating 
to the prevention of crime. However, it is submitted that the identification of the 
author of a crime relates to the investigation and prosecution of an offence already 
committed, and not to the prevention of a future crime. 
The Data Protection Directive provides in Art.l3 that the Member States may 
adopt exceptions to the obligations and rights created by the Directive for the 
purpose of detection and prosecution of criminal offences. 
17 Ibid., para. 105. 
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2.2. Conflicting defence rights 
If a State decides to recognise medical privilege, a conflict between medical 
confidentiality, on the one hand, and defence rights of an accused person, on the 
other hand, may arise. Art.6 ECHR guarantees the right to fair trial and, as part of 
that right, specifies certain rights of the defence. However, Art.6 ECHR does not 
award the right to examine witnesses regardless of existing privilege provisions. 
Rather, it mainly aims at protecting the principle of equality of arms, which means 
that 'each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case in 
conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent.'18 Thus, 
a medical privilege which prevents the defence but also the prosecution from 
examining the physician about confidential patient information and which bars 
access to medical records does not violate Art.6 ECHR. 
2.3. Crime prevention 
Art.8(2) ECIIR, Art.26 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
and Art.13 Data Protection Directive allow for exceptions to the protection of 
medical confidentiality for the purpose of crime prevention. However, no clear 
guidelines are given concerning the possible extent and application of this 
exception, as long as the principle of proportionality is not disregarded. 
2.4. Conclusion 
It can be seen that in the area of medical confidentiality and medical privilege, the 
European Convention on Human Rights provides some fundamental protection of 
medical confidentiality under Art.8(1), but in Art.8(2) gives the States a broad 
discretion with regard to exceptions to this principle. A recognition of medical 
privilege is not mandated by the Convention. The provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and of the Data Protection 
Directive similarly express the attitude that exceptions to the protection of privacy 
and medical confidentiality are admissible for the purposes of criminal 
prosecution and crime prevention. 
18 Foucher v France [1998] 25 E.H.R.R. 234, 18 March 1997, para. 34. 
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Chapter 4 - Medical confidentiality and medical privilege in France 
1. Protection of medical confidentiality 
1.1. Medical confidentiality as a fundamental right 
Two possible sources for awarding medical confidentiality the status of a 
fundamental right must be examined: the French Constitution. and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
1.1.1. Constitutional right 
The French Constitution does not provide expressly for constitutionally 
guaranteed privacy rights. The French Constitutional Court (Conseil 
Constitutionnel), however, has stressed in various decisions that the Preamble to 
the 1958 Constitution, together with the Declaration of 1789 and the Preamble to 
the 1946 Constitution. guarantees individual civil liberties. It is therefore now 
well-established that certain individual liberties enjoy constitutional protection. In 
a decision concerning the constitutionality of a statute giving the police broad 
rights to search vehicles, the Constitutional Court held for example: 
'Considering that individual freedom constitutes one of the fundamental 
principles guaranteed by the laws of the Republic, and proclaimed in the 
Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, and confIrmed by the Preamble to the 
Constitution of 1958; 
considering that Art.66 of the Constitution. in reaffirming that principle, 
entrusts its safeguard in the judicial authorities. ,1 
Art.66 of the Constitution of 1958 states that: 
No person may be detained arbitrarily. 
The judiciary, the guardian of individual liberty, ensures respect for this 
principle in circumstances provided for by law. 
One could therefore think that the constitutional protection of individual liberties 
is limited to the specifIc situation of detention. The constitutional protection 
awarded to individual freedom would then not include a guarantee of a general 
right to privacy. According to a commentary to this decision. 2 however, the 
Constitutional Court adopts a broad interpretation of individual liberty which 
1 Conseil Constitutionnel12 January 1977, AIDA 1978,215; see also the decision of 16 July 
1971, Rec. 29. 
2 Favoreu, Philip, Les Grandes Decisions du Conseil Conslilulionnel, at 346. 
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includes the protection of private life. This interpretation is supported by a 
decision3 of the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of a 
statutory provision giving fiscal agents, assisted by police officers, rights of 
search and seizure in the course of the investigation of tax offences. In that case, 
the Constitutional Court stated: 
'Considering that ... such investigations can only be carried out in accordance 
with art.66 of the Constitution which entrusts all aspects of the safeguard of 
individual liberty and, in particular, those concerning the inviolability of the 
home, in the judiciary.' 
The constitutional protection of individual freedom goes thus beyond safeguards 
in the case of detention, and includes rather protection of individual liberty as 
such. However, given the rather general nature of constitutional protection of 
individual liberty, it has long been debated whether privacy and medical 
confidentiality are constitutionally protected. Some authors have argued that the 
provisions of the French Criminal and Civil Codes dealing with the protection of 
privacy and of medical confidentiality demonstrate that privacy and medical 
confidentiality should be included in the guarantee of individual freedom. Those 
provisions are thus seen as a means to delineate the scope of the constitutional 
protection of individual rights.4 Jean Rivero, on the other hand, characterised the 
Act of 17 July 1970, introducing Art.9 of the Civil Code, the right to respect for 
one's private life, as introducing a freedom right not recognised by the existing 
constitutional texts . .s He thus seems to suggest that the specific protection of 
private life, and therefore the protection of medical confidentiality, is not based on 
a constitutional principle, but rather achieved through ordinary law. This view is 
also endorsed by Eva Steiner who argues that the Declaration of 1789 does not 
protect the rights set out in Art.S ECHR6 However, in 1995, the Constitutional 
Court held that privacy is a constitutional principle.' Even though the Constitution 
does not explicitly mention the right to privacy, it is now nevertheless regarded as 
having constitutional rank. 8 This coincides with a change in the French 
constitutional debate which only recently recognised the notion of fundamental 
329 December 1983, Rec. 67. 
4 Favoreu, Philip, Les Grandes Decisions du Conseil Constitutionnel, at 346. 
5 Les Libertes Publiques, Tome 1, at 153. 
6 'France', in: Gearty (ed.), European Civil Liberties and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, A Comparative Study, at 281. 
7 Decision of 18 January 1995, Rec. 170. 
8 Picard, 'The right to privacy in French law', in: Markesinis (ed.), Protecting Privacy, at 75-76. 
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rights.9 It is not clear whether medical confidentiality also benefits from the 
protection of privacy as a fundamental right. Given the rather narrow scope of 
constitutional review and constitutional protection of fundamental rights in 
general, it seems of limited relevance whether medical confidentiality receives 
constitutional protection. The main effect of constitutional protection of medical 
confidentiality would be that new parliamentary legislation would then have to 
accord with that principle in order to be constitutional. In addition, French courts 
could then control the compatibility of executive acts with this constitutional 
principle. 
1.1.2. European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights was ratified according to Act 73-
1227 of 31 December 1973 and published by decree of 3 May 1974. Once an 
international treaty is ratified and published, it is incorporated into domestic law. 
In 1981 France accepted the individual right of petition to the Commission. So 
what, exactly, is the status of the ECHR in France? Art.55 of the Constitution of 4 
October 1958 states that international conventions are of higher rank than 
ordinary statutes. IO According to the Nicolo decision of the Conseil d'Etat, II the 
highest French Court dealing with administrative matters, international 
conventions are not only superior to domestic law enacted prior to their 
ratification, but they are also superior to subsequent national legislation. In its 
Confederation nationale des associations familiales catholiques decision, 12 the 
Conseil d'Etat applied this principle to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, stating that all legislation, whether enacted prior or subsequent to the 
ratification of the ECHR, must be in accordance with the Convention. Even 
though superior to ordinary statutes, international treaties nevertheless do not have 
constitutional status, and judicial review examining the compatibility of the 
challenged statute with an international treaty will be exercised by ordinary 
courts, not by the Conseil ConstitutionneI. I3 This means that French judges who 
9 See various articles in AJDA 1998, numero special -Ies droits fondamentaux. 
10 Art.SS: Traites et accords internationaux, regulierement ratifies ou approuves, ont, des leur 
publication, une autorite superieure a celie des lois, sous reserve, pour chaque accord ou traite, de 
son application par I'autre partie. 
II 20 October 1989, R.190. 
12 Conseil d'Etat 21 December 1990, R.369. 
13 Rivero, Les Liberles Publiques, Tome I, at 150; Turpin, Droit Conslitulionnel, at 109. 
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cannot review the constitutionality of legislation, can control the compatibility of 
a parliamentary statute with the ECHR.14 
1.2. Protection under criminal law 
In France, the discussion of the duty to medical confidentiality mainly focuses on 
the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (code penal), as in French law, a 
breach of the duty to medical confidentiality is a criminal offence (art.226-13 
Criminal Code). This criminal offence was first laid down in art.378 Criminal 
Code of 1810. Art.378 old Criminal Code stated that: 
Physicians, surgeons and other health officers as well as pharrilacists, midwives 
and all other persons being by their status or their profession or by their 
temporary or permanent position depositories of secrets confided in them, 
when revealing these secrets outside those cases in which the law obliges or 
authorises such a denunciation, will be punished with imprisonment of one 
month to six months and a fme of500 F to 15,000 F.IS 
Most members of the medical profession were thus expressly mentioned in art.378 
as being under a duty, sanctioned by criminal law, to maintain medical 
confidentiality. Art.378 old Criminal Code was replaced by art.226-13 when the 
new Criminal Code came into force in 1994. In the new Criminal Code, the 
provision was formulated differently. Art.226-13 new Criminal Code states that: 
The disclosure of any secret information confided in a person in connection 
with hislher social position or profession or on the grounds of a temporary 
office or mission, will be punished with imprisonment of one year and a fine of 
F 100,000.16 
The new provision no longer expressly states that it applies to the members of the 
medical profession. However, it is difficult to imagine that judges would exclude 
those professionals who had been listed in art.378 old Criminal Code from the 
category of persons that have secrets confided in them on the grounds of their 
14 Steiner, 'France', in: Gearty (ed.), European Civil Liberties and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, A Comparative Study, at 281. 
IS Art.378 old Criminal Code: 
Les medecins, chirurgiens et autres ofliciers de sante, ainsi que les pharmaciens, les sages-femmes 
et toutes autres personnes dCpositaires, par etat ou profession ou par fonctions temporaires ou 
permanentes, des secrets qu'on leur contie, qui, hors Ie cas oil la loi les oblige ou les autorise a se 
porter denonciateurs, aUTont revele ces secrets, seront punis d'un emprisonnement d'un mois a six 
mois et d'une amende de 500 a IS 000 F. 
16 Art.226-13: 
La revelation d'une information a caractere secret par une personne qui en est depositaire soit par 
etat ou par profession, soit en raison d'une fonction ou d'une mission temporaire, est punie d'un an 
d'emprisonnement et de 100000 F d'amende. 
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status or their profession, as required by art.226-13 Criminal Code:7 Thus, under 
the new Criminal Code, medical professionals are still under a duty to maintain 
medical confidentiality the contravention of which can give rise to a criminal 
conviction. 
For art.226-13 Criminal Code to apply, different requirements have to be fulfilled. 
First, the revelation must refer to 'information confided in a person in connection 
with his/her social position or profession or on the grounds of a temporary office 
or mission' (art.226-13 Criminal Code). In this respect, art.226-13 Criminal Code 
and art.378 old Criminal Code adopted a similar approach, so that case-law 
developed under the old Criminal Code, establishing that the obligation to medical 
confidentiality was not limited to what the patient had confided in the physician, 
but rather also included everything the physician heard, saw or observed in the 
course of the exercise of his/her profession)8 is still valid. This clarification of the 
extent of the protection of medical confidentiality is based on the view that it 
seems appropriate to protect confidential patient information in cases in which the 
patient has not expressly shared hislher secret with the physician, but the 
physician still, on the grounds of his/her profession, gained knowledge of 
confidential information concerning his/her patient. The Cour de Cassation, the 
highest French court in civil and criminal matters, for example had to decide a 
case in which a physician, acting in his capacity as adviser of an insurance 
company, had obtained access to the hospital records of a road accident victim 
and later revealed the content of those records to his employer. The Court held 
that the physician's revelation of the victim's confidential medical information to 
the insurance company violated medical confidentiality. Even though the victim 
had not confided any medical information in the physician, the physician had 
gained access to the medical records by presenting himself as a member of the 
medical profession. The Court argued that the patient's medical confidences had 
therefore come to the physician's knowledge in the course of exercising his 
profession and concluded that he was thus under an obligation not to reveal what 
he heard, saw or inferred, even in the absence of confidences made by the 
patient. 19 Another example is a case in which a physician who happened to be at 
the site of a road accident applied first aid to an accident victim and later 
17 Chomienne, Guery, ALO.199S.comm.85. 
18 See, for example, 17 Mai 1973, Ch. crim., 0.1973.583; 23 January 1996 Ch. crim., Bull. 0°37. 
19 17 Mai 1973, Ch. crim., 0.1973.583. 
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submitted the medical certificate regarding the victim's injuries to the police. 
According to the court, in doing so, the physician violated his duty to 
confidentiality.2o Even though the patient had not confided any medical 
information in the physician, the physician, in his capacity as a medical 
practitioner, obtained some knowledge about the patient's health condition, and 
thus the patient's intimate sphere. This expansion of the scope of medical 
confidentiality was also approved by legal scholars21 and seems uncontroversial. 
Some welcome this approach on the grounds that if the patient's trust in the 
physician is protected where the patient expressly confides in the physician, the 
same principle should be applied to the situation that he/she allows the physician 
to obtain information and to draw certain conclusions by examining the patient.22 
However, this view rests on the assumption that medical confidentiality depends 
on the patient's express wishes and comes into existence only by virtue of a 
patient's consent to a medical examination. But the example of the accident 
victim demonstrates that this would leave unconscious and also incompetent 
patients who are not in a position to give their consent to a necessary medical 
examination, unprotected. The approach adopted by French courts thus seems to 
be based on the consideration that a patient's confidences should be protected 
regardless of how the physician has come to know them, as long as this 
knowledge was gained in a professional capacity. This points at a desire either to 
protect the confidences of the patient as such and thus the patient's privacy, and/or 
at a desire to protect the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. 
The information must have come to the knowledge of the person bound by the 
professional secret in relation with the exercise of hislher profession. This raises 
the question of whether a distinction must be made between confidential 
information obtained directly during the exercise of the medical profession, and 
confidential information otherwise obtained. With regard to the comparable 
situation of a priest, it has been argued, for example, that information confided in 
a priest was only acquired in the course of the exercise of hislher profession and 
protected by his/her obligation to confidentiality if it was confided in himlher in 
hislher role as a priest, but not, for example, if it was confided in himlher by a 
20 14 February 1952, JCP.l952.1I.7030. 
21 See for example Ugal, JCP. 1948.11.414 I; Veron, Droit Penal Special, at 134. 
22 Rassat, D. 1 989.chron. 107. 
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friend at a social gathering.23 Others reject this distinction as unworkable, as in the 
example of the priest, it seems impossible to establish whether or not the secret 
was shared with this friend on the grounds of hislher role as a friend, and/or that 
of a priest. For the physician, this means that it is controversial whether or not 
medical information confided in a physician outside the formal framework of 
his/her professional activity is protected by the obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality. 
In addition, the fact revealed by the physician must be a secret. An interpretation 
of the notion 'secret' encounters two different problems: (1) does all information 
gathered by the physician in the course of his/her profession necessarily qualify as 
a secret, or does the information have to be of particular sensitivity to deserve 
secrecy? And (2) does information merely qualify as secret as long as only the 
physician knows about it, or is it still a secret even though it might have become 
known, partly or even in its entirety, to third parties outside the physician-patient 
relationship? With regard to the first aspect of the question of secrecy, different 
approaches have been suggested. Some have argued that the information must 
have a certain quality to it to be considered confidential. Savatier, for example, 
voiced the opinion that the admission of a patient to a hospital has nothing secret 
about it and is therefore not protected by the obligation to medical 
confidentiality.24 But others, to the contrary, argue that the very fact that the 
patient has consulted a physician must be covered by medical confidentiality,25 as 
often the mere knowledge that a patient has attended a certain medical practice as 
well as the frequency of attendance may allow for conclusions as to the purpose 
behind the visits, and to the medical condition of the patient and the illness he/she 
is suffering from. 26 Another argument brought forward in favour of limiting the 
scope of protected information is that only information which in itself has a 
medical aspect deserves confidentiality. Thus facts without medical significance 
which every person without any medical knowledge could have observed in the 
same way as the physician, such as the destruction of a will in the room of a 
patient, would then not be protected as confidential.27 Others object, however, that 
all information obtained in relation with the exercise of the medical profession 
23 Ch. crim. II May 1959, D.1959.312. 
24 Savatier, JCP. I 970.11. 16306. 
25 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Pra/iciens de la Sante, at 44. 
26 Pradel, Danti-Juan, Droit penal Special, Tome III, at 232. 
27 Reboul, JCP.1950.l.825. 
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should be kept secret, regardless of whether the information has medical aspects 
or not,28 as the distinction between medical and non-medical information will 
sometimes be very difficult to make. Also, it is possible that some information 
that very obviously does not have a medical aspect, such as the place of refuge of 
a fugitive crirninaI in need of medical care,29 will be made known to the physician 
exclusively for the purpose of enabling hirnlher to exercise hislher profession and 
treat the patient. Even though the information is therefore not as such related to 
the medical condition of the patient, it was nevertheless obtained by the physician 
in the course of hislher profession, and the trust placed in the physician when 
revealing this information was based on the patient's medical needs. Some argue 
that the changes in the perception of illness which led to the situation that an 
illness in itself is no longer perceived as something shameful that has to be hidden 
from everybody, require a new definition of medical confidentiality, in that it no 
longer seems appropriate for the duty of medical confidentiality to embrace all 
information relating to the patient's health, even though most medical information 
will not have anything secret attached to it from the patient's point ofview.3o But 
others object that while the perception of illness might have changed, even a 
benign illness that according to most people does not have anything indecent 
attached to it, can nevertheless have an aspect that the patient might want to hide 
for personal reasons, for example the way in which he/she contracted the illness.31 
With regard to the second requirement of a secret, i.e. the question whether 
information can still be regarded as secret even if it is public knowledge, the 
Courts have decided in several cases that it does not matter that the information 
had already been made public before any disclosure by the physician because a 
physician's revelation will often serve as confirmation of what until then was only 
a rurnour,32 and the physician's disclosure can add a scientific basis to the 
knowledge of the public. In one case, a physician who had been threatened by a 
patient over the telephone brought charges, stating that the patient was mentally ill 
and had aggressive tendencies. According to the physician, these tendencies had 
manifested themselves for example in the fact that the patient had often threatened 
his wife. The Cour d'appel of Lyon held that these revelations violated the 
21 Savatier, 0.1957.445. 
29 Example given by Savatier, ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ryckmans, Meert-Van de Put, Les Droits et les Obligations des Medecins, Tome I, at 131. 
32 23 January 1996 Ch. crim., Bull. n037; Veron, Droit penal Special, at 134. 
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physician's duty to maintain medical confidentiality, as the patient's aggressive 
tendencies, though notorious, were discovered by the physician only in the 
exercise of his profession.33 And in another case regarding the obligation of a 
police officer to maintain the professional secret, the Cour de Cassation held that 
the obligation applied even to facts that, in all likelihood, were already publicly 
known.34 
To comprehend art.226-13 Criminal Code and the scope and limits of medical 
confidentiality, it is essential to understand whose interests medical confidentiality 
is aiming to protect. As was already indicated, the French Criminal Code does not 
award protection against the revelation of every confidence; rather, only 
information confided in the members of certain professions is protected by 
criminal law. The reason behind this concept is clear: the confidence placed in so-
called necessary confidants, i.e. persons to whom the individual must in some 
situations reveal confidential information, is seen as important enough to deserve 
special protection,lS even protection by the means of criminal law. However, it is 
not at all clear why this confidence is important enough to justify special 
protection. While it is widely accepted that medical confidentiality exists in the 
interest of the patient,36 it is controversial how exactly the patient's interests can 
be determined. Some argue that the duty of medical confidentiality protects the 
interests of those who, when in need of having recourse to the service of someone 
else, confide information in himlher which they would have kept to themselves 
but for the need to inform the professional whose help they are seeking.37 There 
seems to be widespread agreement that the patient has an interest in being assured 
that the physician will never reveal any confidential patient information without 
the patient's consent,38 as otherwise the patient might not feel confident to share 
all relevant information with his/her physician.39 For some, this interest is merely 
psychological: patients would fmd it undesirable to see their medical secrets 
33 17 January 1980, CA Lyon, Gaz. Pal. 1981.2.491. 
34 8 February 1994. Gaz. Pal. 1 994.somm.298. 
3S 19 November 1985, Bull nO 364; Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science criminelle et de droit 
rcenal compare 1978, 237-256. 
6 Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 251; Mazen, 
Le Secret Professionnel des Praticiens de 10 Sante. at 42; Rassat. O.1989.chron.1 07. 
37 Gulphe. 0.1947.109. 
38 Ugal. JCP.1948.I1.4141; Savatier. 0.1957.445. 
39 Albucher. JCP.1954.I1.81 07; Combaldieu, 0.1967.122. 
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revealed.40 Others argue that the patient's interest in hislher bodily integrity is 
concerned, as patients, when holding back essential information, 41 endanger the 
efficiency of their medical treatment. Some authors suggest that the right to 
medical confidentiality is part of the patient's personality rights which protect the 
individual's private and intimate sphere.42 They argue that the patient's interest in 
medical confidentiality is comparable to the interest in one's own picture, voice 
and letters, and they conclude that everybody has the right to consider his/her 
health and all health related information as confidential. The fact that art.226-13 
CriminaI Code is part of the book on 'crimes and misdemeanours against the 
individual', and within that book part of the chapter on 'offences against the 
personality', also supports the view that the right to medical confidentiality is part 
of the personality rights.43 If that is accepted, it follows that an individual who is 
obliged to reveal intimate details when seeking the advice and help of a medical 
practitioner should not have to fear indiscretion and a violation of hislher private 
and intimate sphere.44 Art.226-13 CriminaI Code could then be seen as imposing 
an obligation on the physician that corresponds to the patient's right under Art.9 
Civil Code to keep hislher medical information secret.4S It has also been suggested 
that the principle of medical confidentiality, in addition to a protection of the 
patient's privacy rights, aims at respect for the patient's dignity.46 All these 
considerations seem of deontological, rather than utilitarian origin, as they are not 
concerned with the consequences of a lack of medical confidentiality, but rather 
recognise that medical confidentiality must be protected in order to guarantee the 
patient's informational and decisional privacy. 
With regard to the question of whether the principle of medical confidentiality 
also intends to protect the individual physician or the medical profession as such, 
again many different opinions are voiced. Some infer from the wording of art.378 
old Criminal Code that the physician is only the depository of the patient's secret, 
and that therefore not the physician, but only the patient can be the master of 
40 Honnorat, Melennec, JCP.1979.1.2936. 
41 Gulphe. 0.1947.109. 
42 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Praticiens de 10 Sante, at 28; the same, Gaz Pal 1981.2.491 ; 
Melennec, Gaz. Pal. 1980.doct.145. 
43 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Pra/iciens de 10 Sante, at 27. 
44 Thouvenin, Juris-Classeur Penal - ancien code penal, Art.378, note 1. 
4S Mazeau, Chabas, Le~ons de Droit Civil- Les Personnes, Tome I, vol. 2, at 394-395. 
46 Flecheux, JCP. 1982.11. 19721 ; Memeteau, Gaz.Pal 1996, 754-759, at 755. 
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confidential medical information referring to himlher.47 In the domain of medical 
confidentiality, physicians would then only have duties, but not rights.48 Many 
argue, however, that the members of the medical profession have themselves an 
interest in the maintenance of medical confidentiality, as the exercise of their 
profession would be seriously impaired if patients, when not being sufficiently 
assured of confidentiality, would hold back important information.49 Physicians 
could then no longer efficiently fulfil their professional tasks, so that without a 
protection of medical confidentiality, the interest in the functioning of the medical 
profession would be adversely affected.50 Another argument is that since the 
members of the medical profession see confidentiality as a sacred duty,51 they 
accordingly have an interest in not being forced to reveal confidential patient 
information. 52 
In addition, some refer to the interests of the members of the patient's family in 
the protection of their intimate sphere as well as in their honour and reputation.53 
Also, for many authors, society as a whole has an interest in the protection of 
medical confidentiality. 54 This view is mainly promoted by those who fear that 
without medical confidentiality, patients would no longer openly reveal all their 
medical secrets to their physicians, a consequence which could have an adverse 
effect on public heaIth,55 as efficient medical treatment would then no longer be 
guaranteed.56 They argue that the protection of medical confidentiality mainly lies 
in the public interest, as the criminal offence of revealing confidential information 
is not a 'delit prive', but a charge can rather be brought directly by the public 
prosecutor,57 even if no individual feels harmed and is interested in pressing 
charges.58 Others, however, question whether medical confidentiality really has 
any significance for the patient's readiness to receive medical advice and 
treatment, as no evidence supports the view that in countries without protection of 
47 Savatier, JCP. 1967.11. 1 5126. 
48 Melennec, Gaz. Pal. 1980.doct.14S. 
49 Gulphe, 0.]947.109. 
so Combaldieu, 0.1967.122. 
51 Albucher, JCP. 19S4.II.8 107. 
52 Roujou de BoubCe, Bouloc, Fancillon, Mayaud. Code Penal Commente, at 399. 
53 Albucher, JCP.1954.II.8107; Combaldieu, 0.1967.]22. 
54 Combaldieu, 0.]967.122. 
55 Gulphe, 0.1947.109. 
56 Honnorat, Melennec, JCP.1979.1.2936; Savatier, Auby, Savatier, Pequignot, Traite de Droit 
Medical, at no 304. 
57 Gulphe, 0.1947.]09. 
58 Ryckmans, Meert-Van de Put, Les Droits elles Obligations des Medecins, Vol. 1, at 131. 
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medical confidentiality the patient's behaviour in this respect differs from that of a 
French patient. S9 This debate equals the utilitarian discussion of whether or not 
sufficient evidence exists to justify the assumption that a protection of medical 
confidentiality produces beneficial consequences. Moreover, the public interest 
could be affected if one accepts that the right to respect for one's private life is a 
general principle that lies within the public interest,60 as society has an interest in 
the protection of the individual and of the freedom of the individua1.61 Another 
approach suggests that society as a whole has an interest in preserving the 
physician's discretion with regard to the protection of the individual and the 
healthiness of the social climate.62 It could be argued that the mere fact that 
medical confidentiality is protected by a criminal provision shows that the 
legislator considers the principle as being in the public interest.63 Understood in 
this way, the protection of medical confidentiality in the public interest is justified 
by reference to deontological considerations in saying that the public has an 
interest in preserving individual interests that are worth protecting. At the same 
time, it could also reflect utilitarian thought, if it were accepted that the promotion 
of individual privacy as such produces beneficial consequences. 
To summarise, the predominant opinion promotes the view that the protection of 
medical confidentiality by the Criminal Code is mainly guaranteed in the interests 
of the patient, which are identified as the interest in keeping confidential medical 
information secret, the interest in bodily integrity, and respect for human dignity. 
However, some argue that medical confidentiality mainly or additionally aims at 
protecting the interests of the physician or of the medical profession, the interests 
of the patient's family and the interests of society as a whole. 
'9 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Praticiens de la Sante, at 22 and 28. 
60 Mazen, Gaz Pal 1981.2.491. 
61 Ibid" at 26. 
62 Mazen, Le secret professionnel des praticiens de la sante, at 26. 
63 Flecheux, JCP.1982.II.l972 I; Mazen, Gaz Pal 1981.2.491. 
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1.3. Protection under private law 
1.3.1. Article 9 Civil Code 
The right to the protection of one's private life as guaranteed under art.9 Civil 
Code, is also of importance in the context of medical confidentiality. According to 
art.9 Civil Code: 
Everybody has the right to respect for his private life. 
Courts can, without prejudice to the reparation of damage suffered, prescribe all 
measures, such as sequestration, seizure and others, suitable to prevent or stop an 
attack on the inviolability of the private life. In case of urgency, these measures 
can be ordered by temporary injunction. 64 
Art.9 Civil Code was introduced by an Act of 17 July 1970 as a reaction to new 
threats to the inviolability of private life, for example through new technologies.65 
It enables the courts to protect a person's private life by measures such as 
injunctive relief, sequestration of printed material etc. so as to prevent the 
violation of an individual's private life.66 Under this provision, every person has 
the right to control the dissemination of personal information and to exclude 
others from his/her private sphere of life.67 This includes the protection of the 
secrecy of one's health condition and of personal medical information.68 Thus, a 
patient can apply for an injunction to prevent a violation of his/her medical 
confidences. 
1.3.2. Obligation under contract and tort law 
In French law, the physician-patient relationship is usually governed by contract 
law. The physician is then under a contractual69 duty to maintain medical 
confidentiality, and the legal consequences will be dealt with by art.1147 Civil 
64 Art.9: Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privee. 
Les juges peuvent, sans prejudice de la reparation du dommage subi, prescrire toutes mesures, 
telles que sequestre, saisie et autres, propres a empecher ou faire cesser une atteinte a l'intimite de 
la vie privee; ces mesures peuvent, s'i1 ya urgence, etre ordonnees en ref ere. 
6$ Rivero, Les Libertes Publiques, Tome 2, at 85. 
66 See for example Cour d' Appel Paris, 13 March 1996, JCP.1996.22632, a decision regarding the 
distribution of the book Le grand secret revealing details of the late President Mitterand's medical 
condition. 
67 Mazeau, Chabas, Lefons de Droit Civil- Les Personnes, Tome 1, vol. 2, at 397. 
68 Rivero, Les Libertes Publiques, Tome 2, at 77. 
69 Honnorat, Melennec, JCP.1979.1.2936; Savatier, Auby, Savatier, Pequignot, Traite de Droit 
Medical, at 303; but according to Anzalec, Gaz Pal 1971.113, the obligation to medical 
confidentiality is not based on a contract, but is rather a legal obligation based on 'l'ordre public'. 
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Code, which allows for compensation for any loss, including non-pecuniary loss, 
suffered as a consequence of the breach of a contractual duty. In principle, a 
violation of medical confidentiality by a physician could also constitute a tortuous 
act under art.1382 Civil Code and thereby give rise to a claim for damages under 
tort law. However, in French law, contractual and delictual responsibility cannot 
co-exist. 70 A case in which compensation is at issue is either governed by the 
principles of contract law or by the principles of tort law. This means that in the 
case of a breach of a contractual obligation, delictual responsibility for the same 
act is excluded.7• Given that the physician's obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality is usually based on the contract existing between physician and 
patient, it follows that a breach of that duty can normally only give rise to a claim 
for compensation under contract law, but not for compensation under art.1382 
Civil Code. A claim for compensation under tort law is normally only available if 
there is no contract between the patient and the physician, for example in the case 
of a medical examination of an accident victim by a physician at the site of the 
accident. It should be noted that in civil matters, French courts often do not 
specify the provision the successful action was based upon, but rather justify their 
decisions by a general reference to the different Civil Code provisions mentioned. 
It thus seems as if arts 9, 1147, 1382 Civil Code, and art. 226-13 Criminal Code 
are being used to deduct the general principle that medical confidentiality is 
legally protected.72 
1.4. Professional obligation 
The Code of Medical Ethics 1995 (code de deontologie medicale) issued by the 
medical profession states in art.4(l): 
The professional secret established in the interest of the patient is imposed on 
every physician according to the conditions stated by law. 
Thus, a French physician is under an ethical duty to maintain medical 
confidentiality. The scope of this obligation is specified in art.4(2) Code of 
Medical Ethics stating that: 
The secret covers everything that came to the knowledge of the physician in 
70 Terre, Simler, Lequette, Droit Civil, Les Obligations, at 681. 
71 Ch. civ. 20 May 1936, 0.P.1936.1.88; S.1937.1.321; Ch. Civ., 9 June 1993, JCP 1994.1122264. 
72 Agostini, 0.1996, ehron.58. 
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the course of his professio~ that is it not only covers what was confided in 
him, but also what he has see~ heard or understood. 
The extent of protection awarded medical confidentiality under the professional 
regulations therefore coincides with the legal protection as developed by the 
courts. 
1.5. Summary 
Even if the protection of confidential medical information could be seen as part of 
the constitutionally protected right to personal freedom. this protection would 
only be of limited effect, given the narrow system of constitutional protection of 
fundamental rights in France. Protection of confidential medical information in 
accordance with Art.8 ECHR is guaranteed and every court can control the 
compatibility of statutes and executive acts with that prOVISIOn. Medical 
confidentiality is also protected under private law, and injunctive relief is 
available where a violation of this interest is to be feared. Compensation can be 
claimed under art.1147 Civil Code for a violation of the contractual obligation of 
medical confidentiality, or, in the absence of a contract between physician and 
patient, under art.1382 Civil Code. Physicians are also under an ethical obligation 
to respect their patients' medical secrets, and the violation of that obligation can 
give rise to disciplinary sanctions. The strongest protection of medical 
confidentiality, however, is achieved by the means of criminal law, as a violation 
of the obligation to maintain medical confidentiality by the physician is a criminal 
offence under art.226-13 Criminal Code. 
2. Medical privilege 
Given that the physician is under an obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality, the question arises of whether this principal obligation also exists 
in the context of criminal proceedings, or whether in this particular area the 
interest in medical confidentiality will have to yield to other interests of 
overriding importance. 
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2.1. General and absolute obligation 
Where a conflict between medical confidentiality and other interests arises, one 
must be clear about the value of the physician's obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality in order to be able to resolve the problem. In this context, it is 
important to introduce the concept of the 'general and absolute' nature of medical 
confidentiality which is a fundamental feature of the French approach to medical 
confidentiality. The formula of the 'general and absolute' nature of the principle 
of medical confidentiality is mainly promoted by criminal courts. The Chambre 
criminelle of the Cour de Cassation, for example, stated in its decision of 22 
December 1966 that the duty to maintain confidentiality as imposed on physicians 
by the provisions of the Criminal Code, is general and absolute and that no one 
can relieve the physician from it. 73 
Several arguments are listed in favour of this approach. Combaldieu, for example, 
promotes the view that even though there can sometimes be good and even 
imperative reasons for revealing the secret, it is still true that every exception 
bears the risk that the duty will be annihilated. He continues that a case by case 
rather than an absolute approach would have the inconvenience of blurring the 
content of the duty to maintain confidentiality. Combaldieu concludes that it is 
preferable to declare the obligation to be of a general and absolute nature, as this 
concept, though being rigid and inflexible, nevertheless has the merit not only to 
rely on tradition and precedents, but also to regulate the behaviour in a precise 
manner.74 It has also been argued that a relativist concept of medical 
confidentiality is dangerous for physicians, because it leaves them with a choice 
of whether or not to reveal the secret; if this choice does not find the approval of 
their judges, they risk a conviction and disciplinary sanctions. Accordingly, it has 
been maintained that physicians who fmd themselves confronted with a criminal 
provision must know where they stand and need a rule that leaves no room for 
doubts.7s The theory seems partly to be based on the rather pragmatic view that 
medical confidentiality, being imposed as an absolute duty, has been of surprising 
efficiency and has been rigidly respected by physicians.76 While this interpretation 
73 D.1967.122; this formula was used more' recently by the Cour de Cassation on 7 March 1989, 
Bull nO 109 and on 8 February 1994, Gaz. Pal. 1994.somm.298. 
74 Combaldieu. 0.1967.122. 
75 FlocheuxJCP.1982.I1.19721. 
76 Monzein, 0.1984.chron.9. 
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of the 'general and absolute' formula thus suggests that the principle of medical 
confidentiality should always prevail without allowing for any exceptions, others 
object that this concept is too rigid, as it can sometimes lead to results that are 
contrary to morals or to the requirements of justice. 77 A different approach has 
therefore been suggested, submitting that the theory of an absolute secret does by 
no means imply that the secret cannot be revealed under any circumstances. 
Rather, according to this approach, the theory of the general and absolute 
obligation merely entails that the secret can only be revealed in accordance with 
the general principles of law and within the framework of the known legal 
justifications.78 Thus, medical confidentiality, while deserving absolute 
protection, could nevertheless in some cases be outweighed by overriding 
interests. 
Others reject the theory of the absolute nature of medical confidentiality 
altogether and argue that the relative nature of the medical secret is confirmed by 
legislation imposing on the physician a duty to disclose certain sensitive health 
information, for example with regard to venereal diseases.79 If exemptions are 
possible, it is argued, the secret cannot be absolute. 
It will be seen below how the concept of the general and absolute nature of the 
obligation to maintain medical confidentiality influences the approach towards the 
different conflicts arising in the context of criminal proceedings. 
2.2. Relation between the obligation to medical confidentiality and the 
obligation to give testimony 
In criminal proceedings, the testimony of a witness is an important means to 
achieve the purpose of such proceedings: rmding the truth and ensuring that the 
offender will be convicted without risking a wrongful conviction of the innocent. 
This interest, which is sometimes called the interest of justice, is undoubtedly a 
public interest. 80 Therefore, art. I 09 Code of Criminal Procedure creates a duty for 
every citizen to give testimony in court. But the provision contains an exemption 
for those persons who are under an obligation of professional confidentiality, the 
77 Anzalec, Gaz. Pal. 1971.113. 
78 Rassat, 0.1989.chron.107. 
79 Le Roy, 0.1963.280; Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
80 Gulphe, 0.1947.109. 
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violation of which is punishable under arts.226-13 and 226-14 Criminal Code. 
Art.I09 states: 
Every person who was subpoenaed to be heard as a witness is under a duty to 
appear, to swear an oath, and to testify, subject to the dispositions ... of 
arts.226-13 and 226-14 Criminal Code.sl 
In the case that a physician is called to give testimony concerning confidential 
patient information, a conflict between the public interest in finding the truth and 
the interest in medical confidentiality arises. As art.226-13 Criminal Code 
(obligation to medical confidentiality) and art. 1 09 Code of Criminal Procedure 
(obligation to give testimony) impose conflicting duties, it is important to 
establish how this conflict should be resolved. Should the physician always give 
testimony, as finding the truth in criminal proceedings is more important than 
upholding medical confidentiality? Alternatively, should the physician always 
refuse to give testimony, as medical confidentiality is more important than finding 
the truth? Or should the physician have the choice to decide the conflict in every 
individual situation according to the facts of the case and the dictates of hislher 
conscience? 
Different answers to these questions have been provided. As art. I 09 Code of 
Criminal Procedure expressly exempts persons who are under an obligation to 
pro fessional confidentiality from the obligation to give testimony, art. I 09 must be 
interpreted as imposing a general duty on a physician to give testimony in court 
when called as a witness only if the interrogation does not involve confidential 
information protected by the duty to medical confidentiality.82 Under art.109, the 
physician is thus not under an obligation to give testimony in court with regard to 
confidential patient information. This, however, leaves the question of whether it 
follows that the physician is not allowed to give testimony, or whether it only 
means that the physician, while under no obligation to give testimony, can choose 
to do so and will then be exempt from hislher duty of medical confidentiality 
under art.226-13 Criminal Code. Art. I 09 Code of Criminal Procedure is mostly 
interpreted so as to prohibit any testimony that might violate the obligation to 
8\ Art.I09: 
Toute personne citee pour etre entendue comme temoin est tenue de comparaitre, de preter serment 
et de deposer, sous reserve des dispositions •.. des articles 226-13 et 226-14 du Code penal. 
82 Damien, Gaz Pal. 1982.doct. 136. 
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maintain medical confidentiality.83 As art. I 09 exempts the physician from the 
obligation to give testimony, while art.226-13 does not provide for an exemption 
in the case of testimony in court, the legislator has clearly demonstrated how to 
resolve the conflict between the two competing duties. According to this 
interpretation, a physician who decides to give testimony in court will thereby 
commit the criminal offence of art.226-13, unless, exceptionally, a legal 
justification in his/her favour applies. Some suggest that case-law leaves the 
physician a choice between the two obligations,84 though it must be said that there 
are no cases directly on this point.8S Rather, the existing case-law refers to the 
question of whether the physician has the right or even the obligation to give 
testimony if the patient has consented to the revelation of confidential 
information.86 In that situation, the courts took the stance that it was up to the 
physician to choose which obligation to fulfil in the particular case. Given the 
rather narrow scope of this case law, it is thus not at all clear whether the courts 
would give the physician a choice between giving testimony or maintaining 
medical confidentiality where the patient has not consented to the revelation. It is 
submitted that the courts will reject giving the physician discretion to decide 
whether or not to testify, as such an approach would run counter to the 'general 
and absolute' nature of medical confidentiality as proclaimed by French courts. 
It can be seen that the debate in France mainly concentrates on finding a coherent 
approach to the interplay between art.226-13 Criminal Code and art. I 09 Code of 
Criminal Procedure. As the provisions do not seem to leave much scope for 
interpretation, it is not surprising that no reference is made to ethical principles. 
2.3. Defence rights of the physician 
A special problem arises if the physician is accused of professional irregularities 
and wants to testify about confidential patient information to exonerate 
himlherself. In such a case, we are no longer merely concerned with a conflict 
between the interest in medical confidentiality and the general public interest in 
establishing the truth in criminal proceedings. Rather, in addition to the latter, the 
13 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Practiciens de la Sante, at 130; Vouin, Droit Penal Special, 
at 367 . 
... Chomienne, Guery, ALO.1995.comm.85; Rassat, Droit penal Special. at 381. 
I~ Loiret, La Theorie du Secret Medical, at 162; Vouin, Droit penal Special, at 367. 
86 See for example 8 May, 1947,0.1947.109; 5 June 1985, Bull N° 218. 
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physician's interest in the unobstructed exercise of his/her defence rights is at 
stake. Given the importance of defence rights as fundamental human rights,87 
there is wide agreement that the physician's defence rights outweigh the interest 
in medical confidentiality.s8 In a case in which a physician was accused of 
medical malpractice leading to the death of a patient, and where the physician 
submitted to the court photos which he had taken in the course of the medical 
examination and which were useful for his defence, the court for example held 
that: 'one cannot deny defence rights to anybody, and this fundamental freedom 
cannot be limited by the principles relating to medical confidentiality. ,89 
In the famous case of the 'King of the Gypsies', the court went even further. In 
that case the leader of a gypsy community had manipulated two female members 
to make them act as follows: after having had car accidents, they misled their 
physicians as to the seriousness of their resulting medical condition and, as a 
consequence, the physicians certified serious and persistent medical problems. 
The drivers who had caused the accidents were then asked to pay high amounts of 
damages. When the grave errors made by the physicians were discovered, they 
were, in the course of criminal proceedings against the community leader, asked 
for an explanation. The physicians indicated that they had been influenced by 
statements made by persons who were close to the victims and by the victims' 
simulations. The Cour de Cassation held that: 
'The Court of Appeal was right to state that even though the duty of 
confidentiality was a strict principle, it could not prevent the physician who 
was turned into the accessory of a fraud because he delivered a wrong medical 
certificate from clearing himself in the course of judicial proceedings 
concerning this fraud, by revealing the details that had led to the delivery of the 
medical certificate at issue. This is particularly true given that art.160 Criminal 
Code makes the delivery of a certificate falsely certifYing the existence of 
illnesses a criminal offence,.90 
Some commentators thought the Court's decision was justified, given that the 
physicians could not otherwise have cleared themselves from the suspicion of 
having participated in the fraud.91 Others went even further and argued that the 
87 Champeil-Oesplats, 0.1995.chron.323. 
88 See for example Oamien, Le Secret Necessaire, at 36; Decheix, 0.1983.chron.133; Mazen, Le 
Secret Pro/essionnel des Practiciens de la Sante, at 147; Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234; Reboul, 
JCP.1950.l.825; Thouvenin, Le Secret Medical etl'ln/ormation du Malade, at 99-100. 
89 26 October 1951, CA Douai (4e Ch. corr.) Gaz.PaI1951.2.425. 
90 20 December 1967,0.1969.309. 
91 Lapointe, 0.1969.309. 
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case concerned a physician who was being attacked in court or at least seriously 
threatened to be attacked, and that therefore the principle of respect for defence 
rights applied which allows the accused to reveal in court all information 
necessary for his defence.92 However, in this case the physicians were not accused 
of any illegal or unprofessional conduct, as they were asked for the explanation in 
the course of criminal proceedings against third parties where they were heard as 
witnesses. It was also clear from the outset that the physicians had acted in good 
faith. In this case, it is thus rather difficult to justify the result by reference to the 
physician's defence rights which were not affected. The decision suggests that the 
simple eventuality of a charge being brought against a physician is sufficient to 
justify a disregard ofart.226-13 Criminal Court.93 
As could be seen, the courts based their decisions on rather general considerations 
regarding the conflict between the interest in medical confidentiality and the 
physician's interest in defending himlherself when accused in criminal 
proceedings, without any reference to the legal basis of a possible justification. 
Nevertheless, a short examination of the applicability of legal justifications seems 
in order. French law mainly offers two different legal justifications that could 
apply in this context, the first of which is that of self-defence (legitime defense), 
set out in art. 122-5 Criminal Code: 
A person who, in the face of an unjustified attack against himself or a third 
party, commits, at the same time, an action commanded by the necessities of 
self-defence or the defence of a third party, is not responsible in criminal law, 
unless there is disproportionality between the defence measures employed and 
the seriousness of the attack.94 
And the necessity defence (etat de necessite) as regulated by art. 122-7 Criminal 
Code, applies under the following conditions: 
A person who, in the face of a present or imminent danger to himself, a third 
party or an object, commits an action necessary to safeguard the person or the 
object, is not responsible in criminal law, unless there is disproportionality 
between the measures employed and the seriousness of the threat.9S 
92 Rassat, O. 1989.chron. 107. 
93 Lapointe, 0.1969.309. 
94 Art. 122-5: N'est pas penalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiee 
envers elle-meme ou autrui, accomplit, dans Ie meme temps, un acte commande par la necessite de 
la legitime defense d'elle-meme ou d'autrui, sauf s'iI ya disproportion entre les moyens de 
defense employes et la gravite de I'atteinte. 
~ Art. 122-7: N'est pas penalement responsable la personne qui, face a un danger actuel ou 
imminent qui menace elle- meme, outrui ou un bien, accomplit un acte necessaire ala sauvegarde 
de la personne ou du bien, saufs'it y a disproportion entre les moyens employes et la gravite de la 
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The opinions are split as to whether the prerequisites of self-defence will be 
fulfilled where criminal charges are brought against a physician and the physician, 
as part of his/her defence, discloses confidential patient information. Self-defence 
presupposes an aggression emanating from the victim who only suffers a wrong 
because he/she tried to harm another. In the case of a disclosure of confidential 
medical information, this means that the secret may only be revealed in cases of 
an attack emanating from the patient, and only to the extent necessary for the 
refutation of such an attack.96 Moreover, it will frequently be difficult to allege 
that the charge against the physician was unjustified, another prerequisite of self-
defence, so that in many cases, the requirements of the justification of self-
defence will not be fulfilled.97 
It has also been argued that the necessity defence can be invoked as it justifies 
revelations limited to what is necessary in the social interest, and it seems to be 
the most appropriate defence, as it is the most flexible one.98 The supporters of 
this view suggest that the harm caused by the physician when revealing 
confidential information is not punishable because he is trying to avert a more 
serious danger from himself. However, the requirement of an immediate and 
imminent danger can sometimes cause a problem Some argue that this 
requirement will often not be met as the simple threat of a prosecution does not 
constitute an imminent danger.99 Others, in contrast, argue that the requirement of 
an imminent danger is obviously fulftIled, given that in such a situation the 
physician is exposed to harm 
The problem at hand does not fit neatly into the framework of the legal 
justifications recognised by French law. This is why the courts and most legal 
writers have never referred to the justifications known in criminal law; they 
always restrict themselves to confirming that the right to defend oneself is a 
fundamental right outweighing medical confidentiality,l°O without trying to 
establish the prerequisites of either self-defence or necessity. However, two 
principles are here in conflict with each other: if confidentiality were given 
priority over the right to defend oneself, it would mean to accept the risk that an 
menace. 
96 Honnorat, Melennec, JCP.1979.1.2936. 
97 Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 252. 
98 Pradel, Danti-Juan, Droit Penal, Tome III, at 241; Rassat, D. 1989.chron. 107. 
99 Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 252. 
100 See, for example, Monzein, D.1984.chron.l07. 
69 
innocent person who was not given the possibility to exculpate hirnlherself might 
be convicted, or to give a guilty person the prerogative of not having to take 
responsibility for his/her actions. But to give the physician's defence rights 
priority over medical confidentiality would constitute a crack in the secret and a 
disloyalty on the part of the physician. It is thus difficult to find a solution. Some 
have tried to reconcile and optimise both interests, by stating that it seems normal 
not to deny a physician defence rights, i.e. rights enjoyed by everybody else; but 
that this does not mean that the physician can divulge everything and under all 
circumstances. Rather, the revelation must be strictly limited to the needs of the 
defence. lol It has also been suggested that the physician can only reveal the secret 
once an action is started against him, and only if the action was commenced by 
the patient, as it is only the patient, master of the secret, who can relieve the 
physician from his/her duty to maintain medical confidentiality.102 This last 
opinion can only be understood against the background of the theory that the 
confidence belongs to the patient and cannot be revealed against the patient's 
wishes, but that a revelation is possible with the patient's consent. If the patient 
accuses the physician of an irregularity, some writers suggest that the patient 
should not be allowed to invoke medical confidentiality, as he/she has dragged 
his/her medical secrets into the public sphere. 103 But it is not clear whether this 
consideration is limited to civil litigation, or whether it also applies to criminal 
law, as it is then not the patient, but the public prosecutor who brings charges. It 
has also been suggested that the impact of the breach of confidentiality could 
possibly be mitigated by conducting in chamber proceedings. 104 
The resolution of this conflict of interests can be viewed differently. Some say 
that the interests of the physician can never legitimise an exception from medical 
confidentiality, even where the silence requires heroic efforts, as only the law can 
provide for exceptions to the principle of confidentiality, and as such exceptions 
can only be justified with reference to the protection of overriding public interests. 
Therefore, in the absence of such express legislative exceptions in favour of the 
physician's defence rights, no breach of medical confidentiality by the physician 
101 Anzalcc, Gaz. Pal. 1971.113. 
102 Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
103 Mazen, Gaz. Pat. 1981.2.491; lIonnorat, Melenncc, JCP.1979.1.2936; Peytel, Gaz. Pat. 
1952.2.doctr.13; different Monzein, D.1984.chron.9. 
104 Loiret, La Theorie du Secret Medical, at 121-122. 
70 
would be justified. lOS A medical practitioner cannot legitimately breach the 
professional secret on the grounds of trying to avoid moral harm, e.g. protecting 
his professional integrity or honour, or to avoid a criminal conviction. 106 This is 
how the conflict has sometimes been decided in the past, when some courts held 
that the physician, when being accused of a criminal offence, did not have the 
right to reveal confidential information necessary for his defence. 107 Others do not 
go this far but argue instead that only revelations for the mere purpose of avoiding 
potential liability or for any other reason with regard to purely economic interests 
of the physician should be punished. lOS 
Another opinion states that the physician generally has the right to defend 
him/herself in court with regard to accusations made by his/her patient without 
being bound to maintain medical confidentiality, as the opposite conclusion would 
violate the rights of the parties to court proceedings.109 The principle of defence 
rights has a legal foundation in art.171-1 Code of Criminal Procedure and in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. As a fundamental right, defence rights 
justifY a violation of the medical secret. I 10 
It can be seen that many different theories are promoted with regard to the 
question of whether or not the physician's defence rights outweigh the patient's 
interests in medical confidentiality. While the courts have adopted a very broad 
interpretation of defence rights and even justifY a disclosure whenever the 
physician is asked to give an explanation for potential misconduct, the positions 
of legal scholars mainly fall into three different categories. For some, defence 
rights always trump medical confidentiality, and this seems so clear that the 
promoters of this view did not perceive any need to justifY their view other than 
by referring to the human rights status of defence rights. This, however, can 
hardly be a sufficient explanation, given that medical confidentiality is equally 
protected as a fundamental human right, for example by the European Convention 
on Human Rights. For defence rights to outweigh medical confidentiality, it 
would therefore be necessary to present reasons why defence rights are of higher 
value. Others take the opposite view and argue that the physician's defence rights 
I~ Savatier, Auby, Savatier, Pequignot, Traile de Droit Medical, at 304. 
106 Legal, JCP.1948.II.1582. 
107 Trib corr. d' Amiens, 12 March 1902,0.1902.2.493; CA d' Aix, 19 March 1902, 0.1903.2.451. 
108 Anzalec, Gaz. Pal. 1971.113. 
109 Mazen, Gaz. Pal. 1981.2.491. 
110 Thouvenin, Le Secret Medical etl'lnjormation du Malade, at 99-100. 
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can under no circumstances justify a disclosure of confidential patient 
information. This opinion is based on the rather formalistic view that the Criminal 
Code does not expressly provide for an exception to the principle of medical 
confidentiality where it is in conflict with the physician's defence rights. Again, 
this opinion is difficult to justify on that basis alone, as it is at least arguable that 
in some cases the breach of medical confidentiality could be justified by the legal 
justifications of self-defence or necessity, or by overriding fundamental interests 
of the physician. Given that under French law, in such cases two fundamental 
interests clash, the third approach which suggests some balancing seems most in 
line with traditional legal principles. However. such a balancing approach would 
require an identification of the conflicting interests involved as well as of their 
respective values. The discussion as outlined above seems to suggest that such an 
analysis or any agreement on the outcome of such a balancing is lacking, and that 
most writers rather base their arguments on personal preferences and values, 
without any reference to ethical principles and theories. 
It is interesting to note that the solutions suggested to resolve the conflict seem to 
be detached from the theories of the absolute or relative nature of the medical 
secret. Some try to analyse the problem in accordance with the different theories, 
stating that if medical confidentiality were based on the intention to protect the 
trust the public invests in the medical profession, it is a rule of l'ordre public and 
the secret is absolute, so that it has to be respected even if the physician's silence 
harms hislher own or the patient's interests. If: on the other hand, medical 
confidentiality aimed to protect the patient who has confided medical secrets in 
hislher physician, the rule would exist in the private interest of the patient, and the 
secret would be relative The patient could then relieve the physician from the 
obligation, III but without such consent, a breach of confidentiality would not be 
justified. According to this analysis, both the theory of an absolute nature of the 
medical secret and the theory ofa relative nature of the medical secret would thus 
come to the result that the physician's defence rights cannot outweigh medical 
confidentiality. However, there is one decisive difference between the relativist 
and the absolutist approach, in that according to the theory of the relative nature 
of the medical secret, the patient's consent would allow the physician to use 
III Rassat, Droit penal Special, at 376. 
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confidential medical information for his/her defence, while this would not be 
possible under the theory of the absolute nature of the medical secret. 
It follows from this debate that the courts, when allowing the physician's defence 
rights to outweigh the obligation to medical confidentiality, seem to contradict 
their own view of the absolute nature of the duty to maintain medical 
confidentiality. I 12 
2.4. Effects of the patient's consent 
Situations can arise in which a physician is called as a witness and in which the 
patient consents to the revelation of hislher confidential medical information by 
the physician in court. The patient may be the accused and may want to prove 
certain medical facts beneficial to hislher defence, or the patient could be the 
victim of a criminal offence and may want the physician to give testimony 
regarding hislher injuries. Even if the patient is neither accused of having 
committed a crime nor victim of a criminal offence, medical information 
concerning this patient can still be important for the outcome of a criminal case 
and the patient might want it to be available to the court through the testimony of 
his/her physician. Two questions can arise in this context: (I) can the patient 
validly relieve the physician from his/her obligation to medical confidentiality so 
as to enable the physician to give testimony with regard to confidential patient 
information without being subjected to the punishment laid down in art.226-13 
criminal code; and (2) if question 1 is answered in the affIrmative, can the 
physician invoke medical confidentiality and deny a revelation of confidential 
patient information if the patient has consented to or even required that 
revelation? 
With regard to the question of the effect of the patient's consent, opinions are 
split. To understand the debate, it seems important to mention that in French 
criminal law, consent of the victim normally does not provide a legal justification 
for the criminal offence. The reason behind this is that criminal law does not 
primarily intend to safeguard individual interests, but rather aims at maintaining 
the social and public order, even though this may indirectly promote individual 
112 20 December 1967, D.l969.309; see also Damien, Le Secret Necessaire, at 36. 
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interests. lll However, in respect of a criminal offence protecting interests that are 
at the free disposition of the victim, the victim's consent omits one of the 
constituent elements of the crime, so that the criminal offence cannot be 
committed where the victim has consented to it. 114 Thus, if medical confidentiality 
were at the free disposition of the patient, the patient's consent could have the 
effect of negating one constituent element of the offence of art.226-13 Criminal 
Code. If, on the other hand, medical confidentiality were not at the free 
disposition of the patient, the patient's consent could not relieve the physician 
from the obligation of medical confidentiality, and a physician, revealing 
confidential patient information with the patient's consent, would still be guilty of 
the criminal offence under art.226-13 Criminal Code. The attitude of the criminal 
courts is clear: 
'The duty to maintain confidentiality, established and sanctioned by art.378 
[old Criminal Code] to guarantee the confidence necessary for the exercise of 
certain professions, is imposed on physicians as a duty in relation with their 
position, it is general and absolute and no one can relieve the physician from 
it.,m 
French courts have made it clear that the notion of 'no one' includes the patient 
hirn/herself, so that the physician's obligation to medical confidentiality is not at 
the disposition of the patient. The patient therefore does not have the right to 
relieve the physician from his/her duty to medical confidentiality. An important 
consequence of the principle of the general and absolute nature of the obligation 
to maintain medical confidentiality is therefore that the criminal offence of breach 
of secrecy can be committed even if the patient gave his/her consent to the 
physician's disclosure. In this respect, the criminal courts do not make any 
distinction between cases in which the patient was accused in criminal 
proceedings and called the physician as a defence witness, and all other cases 
including those in which the patient was the victim of a criminal offence. 
In its decision of 8 May 1947, the Cour de Cassation had to decide the case of a 
physician who refused to give testimony in court with regard to observations 
already laid down in a medical certificate that had been handed out to the victim. 
III Stefani, Levasseur, Bouloc, Dro;t Penal General, at 318. 
114 Ugal, JCP.1948.II.4141; Mazen, Gaz. Pal.198 1.2.491; Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science 
criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 246. 
m See, for example, 8 May 1947, JCP.1948.I1.4141; 22 December 1966,0.1967.122; 7 March 
1989, Bull n° 109 ; 16 December 1992, Bull n° 424; 8 February 1994, Gaz. PaI.1994.somm.298. 
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In that case, a physician was called by the parents of a girl, victim of an indecent 
assault, to examine their daughter. Upon the parents' request, he delivered a 
medical certificate with regard to his diagnosis and findings, but refused to give 
testimony in court with regard to the same observations. The Cour de Cassation 
held that given the general and absolute nature of the physician's obligation to 
medical confidentiality, he did not have to give testimony even though the 
victim's parents had consented to the revelation. I 16 This was confirmed in a recent 
decision in which the Cour de Cassation decided that a physician who had 
examined a rape victim under the age of fifteen, was, when being called as a 
witness to give testimony with regard to the diagnosis and the medication 
prescribed, free to decide whether or not to give testimony even though the victim 
or the victim's parents had consented to the revelation. 1I7 Critics of these 
decisions argue that if the requested testimony is no more than a repetition of 
observations contained in a medical certificate, the physician should not be 
allowed to refuse to give testimony with regard to the same facts on the grounds 
that he/she was bound by an obligation to medical confidentiality,1I8 particularly 
bearing in mind that the patient has a right to demand the delivery of such a 
certificate.119 It seems here that different problems are being mixed up: the 
critique seems to be based on the assumption that the information in such a 
situation is no longer secret, rather than supporting the view that the physician is 
under an obligation to give testimony where the patient has relieved him/her from 
his/her duty to medical confidentiality. 
Another case the Cour de Cassation had to decide was that of a woman who was 
accused of having stabbed her husband to death. She called her treating physician 
as a defence witness and gave her consent to a revelation of the confidential 
details regarding her medical treatment. When the physician refused to give 
testimony, invoking his obligation to medical confidentiality, the court repeated 
its formula of the general and absolute nature of the obligation to maintain 
medical confidentiality and concluded that the patient's consent to the revelation 
could not relieve the physician from this obligation. 120 In yet another decision in 
which a physician was called as a defence witness and in which the accused 
116 JCP.1948.11.4141. 
117 16 December 1992, Bull nO 424. 
118 Legal, JCP.1948.IIAI41. 
119 Savatier, JCP.I1.1 5 126. 
120 22 December 1966,0.1967.122. 
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patient had consented to the physician's testimony about confidential medical 
facts, the Cour de Cassation stated that : 
'The court cannot determine for the physician in which cases the revelation of 
confidential information is appropriate. Consent of the accused cannot be seen 
as a justification taking away the criminal nature of a revelation of confidential 
information. The refusal of the instance court to force a physician called as a 
defence witness by the accused to give testimony with regard to confidential 
information referring to the accused, when the physician invoked the medical 
privilege, was a correct application of the law. The principle that medical 
confidentiality is general and absolute ... applies to everybody without any 
distinction between witnesses of the prosecution and witnesses of the 
defence. ,121 
An analysis of this decision shows that the Cour de Cassation again confirmed the 
principle of the general and absolute nature of the medical secret, and that it 
inferred from this principle that medical confidentiality cannot be at the 
disposition of the patient, so that the patient cannot validly relieve the physician 
from this obligation. More importantly, however, the first sentence of the quote 
could be read as giving the physician a choice to decide whether or not to give 
testimony in a situation in which the patient has consented to a revelation of 
his/her confidential medical information and even requested the revelation for 
his/her defence. Thus, the court seemed to indicate that a revelation would under 
these circumstances not be regarded as a violation of the principle of medical 
confidentiality, but that the decision whether or not to give testimony was rather 
exclusively in the hands of the physician. Legal scholars approving of this case 
law and trying to explain the reasoning behind it argued that as the protection of 
medical confidentiality is not exclusively based on the interest of the patient, it 
follows that the patient cannot have the right to relieve the physician from an 
obligation that is imposed on him/her in the public interest. 122 If the obligation to 
medical confidentiality exists in the public interest of protecting the confidence of 
the public in the secrecy of the medical profession, it does not seem appropriate 
that the patient can relieve the physician from his/her obligation to confidentiality, 
as potential patients could be worried when seeing a physician reveal confidential 
patient information in COurt. 123 But how can it then be explained that the physician 
is given the choice between maintaining confidentiality and disclosure? It must 
121 5 June 1985, Bull nO 218. 
122 Combaldieu, D.1967.122. 
123 Rassat, D.1989.chron.107. 
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certainly be more worrying for patients if it is left to the physician to decide 
whether or not to disclose information. 
Another argument supporting the view that the patient's consent cannot relieve 
the physician from hislher duty to confidentiality is that valid consent must be 
informed and freely given. Therefore, one can only validly relieve someone from 
a duty of confidentiality with regard to a secret the content of which one knows 
perfectly well. However, sometimes, for humanitarian reasons, the physician will 
not reveal the whole truth to the patient so that the patient who relieves the 
physician from hislher duty to confidentiality cannot fully appreciate the range of 
this consent. 124 But this problem could be avoided if the physician, when relieved 
by hislher patient from the duty to medical confidentiality, interpreted this 
authorisation as only including what is known to the patient.12S It should also be 
noted that this rather paternalistic argument loses a lot of force when bearing in 
mind that the patient has a right of access to hislher medical records, and a right to 
be informed by the physician about hislher medical condition. 
Yet another worry of the opponents of the patient's right to relieve the physician 
from hislher obligation to medical confidentiality is that it would follow from 
such a right that a patient's refusal to consent to a revelation could raise 
suspicions regarding his/her guilt. As a consequence, a patient might feel forced 
into waiving hislher right to medical confidentiality and allow a revelation just to 
avoid negative conclusions a court could draw from his/her reluctance to consent 
to disclosure. 126 Others, admitting this risk, demand that the courts and the law 
ensure that the patient be free from any pressure to consent to a revelation of 
hislher medical confidences. They suggest that in situations where the patient is 
the accused, only the patient him/herself but not the prosecution should have the 
right to call the physician as a witness. To deny the accused patient to call the 
physician as a witness, it is argued, would be a violation of hislher defence rights. 
If: on the other hand, the prosecution or a third party could call the physician as a 
witness, this would subject the patient to an inadmissible dilemma: either to refuse 
consent to the revelation, which could give rise to suspicions on the part of the 
judge or the jury, or to relieve the physician from the obligation of medical 
124 Combaldieu. 0.1967.122; Mazen. Le Secret Professionnel des Practiciens de la Sante. at 57. 
125 Fename, 0.1988.106; Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Practiciens de la Sante. at 91. 
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confidentiality to avoid this risk, thus exposing himlherself to a revelation of 
information which was covered by a promise of secrecy.127 It is submitted that the 
problem could also be resolved by clarifying that the patient's right not to consent 
to a revelation of confidential medical information by his/her physician is 
guaranteed by the right to silence, and that no negative conclusions may be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. 
A totally different argument brought forward is that even if as a result of the 
patient's consent, the criminal offence of breach of confidence disappeared and 
the confidant, who decided to speak, could not be penalised, consent would 
nevertheless not free the physician from the moral duty to medical confidentiality. 
The supporters of the view that this moral dilemma justifies the physician's 
refusal to give testimony submit that only the physician, in accordance with 
his/her conscience, can judge whether or not to give testimony, and that, as a 
consequence, the patient's consent cannot force the confidant into a breach of 
his/her silence. 128 When called upon to give testimony, the physician must assess 
the patient's interests according to his/her conscience. If his/her testimony 
conforms with these interests, the physician should give testimony under the 
twofold condition that free and voluntary consent of the patient is given and that 
in the given case medical confidentiality exclusively promotes a private interest. 
In the opposite case, the physician has to remain silent. 129 However, the whole 
argument seems dubious. The possible moral dilemma evoked here seems to stem 
from a very paternalistic view of the physician's role, as it implies that the 
physician knows better than the patient what the patient's interests are. 
For those who support the opinion that medical confidentiality is a principle that 
aims at protecting the interests of the patient, the patient's consent to a revelation 
of confidential medical information is of the utmost significance. Some argue that 
if the patient has consented to the revelation, it is no longer punishable because 
the revelation no longer concerns a confidential fact. 130 According to this view, 
consent of the master of the confidence omits one of the prerequisites of the 
incrimination, the existence of a secret. As the patient can always reveal his/her 
confidential facts, the patient is the master of his/her medical confidences and the 
127 Savatier, JCP.II.1S126; Savatier, Auby, Savatier, Pequignot, Traite de Droit Medical at 303. 
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only judge of his/her interests. The interest in medical confidentiality is therefore 
at the free disposition of the patient.13l Thus, it seems logical to recognise that it 
lies with the patient alone to release the physician from the obligation to medical 
confidentiality,,32 To interpret art.226-13 Criminal Code so as to stand in the way 
of the physician's testimony is contradictory, as the provision only sees the 
physician as a trustee of the patient's secret so that it should follow that the patient 
has the right to require from the physician respect for the ownership of his/her 
confidence. 133 Some therefore conclude that the patient's consent not only 
authorises the physician to reveal confidential information, but also obliges 
him/her to do so, so that the physician no longer has the right to refuse to give 
testimony once the patient has consented to the revelation. 134 According to this 
view, once the master of the secret has consented to the revelation, there is no 
longer a duty to confidentiality, and not even a right to maintain medical 
confidentiality, as there is no longer a secret to be silent about. The professional 
can only refuse disclosure as long as the constituent elements of the criminal 
offence are fulfilled. 13S This approach has also been adopted by a civil court that 
decided on 7 June 1955: 
'The considerations justifying the general and absolute nature of the medical 
secret as being in the public interest apply to the relations between the 
physician and everybody apart from the patient, so that they cannot be invoked 
with regard to the physician-patient relationship.' 136 
The civil chamber of the Cour de Cassation and also the Conseil d'Etat recognise 
that the patient may give consent to a disclosure of his/her own medical secrets by 
the physician. To prove medical facts in front of these courts, the patient can 
either produce a medical certificate or call the physician as a witness who then 
does not have the right to hide behind medical confidentiality.13' 
The decisions of the criminal courts have the effect that medical confidentiality is 
turned directly against the patient instead of working in his/her favour. Not only 
does this application of the provisions protecting medical confidentiality deny the 
patient any autonomous decision regarding his/her confidences. Also, this case-
131 Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 246. 
132 Legal, JCP.1948.1I.4141; Savatier, Auby, Savatier, Pequignot, Traite de Droit Medical, at 303. 
133 Savatier, JCP.ll.l 5 126. 
134 Fenaux, 0.1988.106. 
I3S Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 249-251. 
136 Trib. civ. de la Seine, D.1955.588. 
137 Honnorat, Melennec, JCP.1979.1.2936. 
79 
law stands in direct conflict to the case-law that upholds the physician's defence 
rights. Thus, the Cour de Cassation has denied the patient the right to prove his 
own secrets with the help of the physician, while allowing the physician to defend 
hirnlherself by revealing someone else's confidences. Given the fundamental 
value of defence rights, it is surprising that the promoters of the general and 
absolute nature of medical confidentiality seem to think that the interests thereby 
protected are not adversely affected if the physician reveals the secrets to defend 
him/herself, but that the assessment changes dramatically where the patient wants 
to defend himlherself with the help of the physician. If medical confidentiality is 
mainly aimed at a protection of the patient's privacy or health care interests, it is 
difficult to see a good reason for denying the patient the right to compel the 
physician to testify in favour of the accused patient regarding the patient's own 
medical secrets. The patient's privacy and health care interests may rather be 
adversely affected where the physician reveals the patient's medical secrets in 
his/her own defence. If medical confidentiality intends to protect the public 
interest in promoting health, then again it is difficult to see how society or 
individual patients could lose their trust in the secrecy of members of the medical 
profession where they disclose confidential information with the patient's consent. 
Again, the situation may be rather different where the physician makes the 
disclosure for the purpose of defending himlherself in criminal court. And if 
medical confidentiality aims to assist the physician in fulfilling his/her role, as 
without a guarantee of confidentiality, patients may be reluctant to seek advice 
and help or fully to reveal the information necessary for effective treatment, it is 
again difficult to understand how this interest can be harmed where the physician 
discloses secrets with the patient's consent. The only possible reason behind the 
courts' rulings seems to be the paternalistic view that physicians know better than 
their patients when to disclose confidential facts and when to refrain from doing 
so. If this were true, it would make sense to give the physician the choice between 
protecting medical confidentiality even where the patient has waived his/her 
interest in keeping the information secret, while the patient should not be in a 
position to compel the physician to disclose medical secrets. It has been argued, 
however, that one can expect from the physician, in addition to caring for the 
body of the patient and to not harming the patient by indiscreet revelations, to 
protect the patient when at risk and therefore to serve, if need be, as the patient's 
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witness with regard to the patient's secrets. If the confidence is turned against the 
patient, this constitutes a real breach of trust on the part of the physician. 138 Some 
have thus concluded that the case-law very clearly demonstrates the inhuman and 
inadmissible consequences of attaching a 'general and absolute' nature to the 
medical secret. 139 The case-law mainly creates two problems: it applies different 
standards to the defence rights of the physician and to those of the patient, and it 
disregards the patient's right to decide whether hislher medical secrets should be 
kept confidential or be disclosed.1 40 
2.5. Obligation to disclose certain inrormation 
Under certain circumstances, citizens are under a legal obligation, the 
contravention of which constitutes a criminal offence, to disclose certain facts to 
the judicial or administrative authorities. In the context of criminal proceedings, 
three different situations can be of relevance: disclosure for the purpose of crime 
prevention, disclosure in cases of child neglect and abuse, and disclosure of 
information regarding the innocence of a person who is under arrest or was 
convicted for a crime. Where a physician has received such information in the 
course of exercising hislher profession, a conflict between the obligation to 
disclose and the obligation to maintain medical confidentiality arises. 
2.5.1. Crime prevention 
Art.434-1 Criminal Code determines the circumstances under which the non-
disclosure of information for the purpose of crime prevention amounts to a 
criminal offence, in stating that: 
A person who has information about a crime the commission of which can still 
be prevented or the effects of which can still be limited, or the authors of which 
are likely to commit future crimes that could be prevented, and does not inform 
the judicial or administrative authorities will be punished with three years of 
imprisonment and a fine ofF 300 000 .... 
131 Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
139 Savatier, JCP.Il.15126; see also Mazen, Le Secret Pro/essionnel des Pracliciens de la Sante, at 
90; Merle, Vitu. Traite de Droit Criminel, at 183. 
140 Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234; Waremberg-Auque, Rewe de science criminelle et de droit penal 
compare 1978, at 249-251. 
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The persons subjected to the professional secret by art.226-13 are exempt from 
the dispositions of the fIrst paragraph.141 
It can thus be seen that every citizen is, in principle, under an obligation to 
disclose information about a criminal offence to the police if its commission, its 
effect or the commission of future crimes can be averted. The Criminal Code 
provision introducing this obligation, however, expressly exempts physicians 
from this duty to disclose. What, then, is the relationship between the obligation to 
maintain medical confIdentiality, on the one hand, and the obligation to disclose, 
on the other hand? Given that Art.434-1 Criminal Code exempts the physician 
from the obligation to disclose, while art. 226-13 Criminal Code does not exempt 
the physician from the obligation to maintain medical confIdentiality where a 
disclosure is necessary for the purposes of crime prevention, one could think that, 
similar to the conflict between art.226-13 Criminal Code and the obligation to 
give testimony in criminal court under art. I 09 Code of Criminal Procedure, there 
is no real conflict of duties and the obligation of medical confIdentiality from 
which no exemption applies should therefore prevail. However, this is not the 
solution suggested for this partiCUlar conflict. In 1973, the Secretary of Justice, 
when asked about the application of art.62 old Criminal Code (which laid down 
an obligation to disclose information for the purposes of crime prevention and in 
cases of child abuse), declared that: 
'The legislation wanted to leave it to the person bound by the secret to decide, 
according to his conscience, which conduct to adopt in every individual case, 
and to decide whether the obligation to disclose justifIes or does not justify the 
revelation of confIdential information. An imperative solution could, in some 
cases, put at risk the necessary trust in those who receive secrets or 
confIdences, and, in other cases, prevent the denunciation of facts that 
endanger third parties or the patient himself.' 142 
However, art.62 old Criminal Code did not exempt physicians from the general 
obligation to disclose, so that the situation differed from the current situation in 
that under the old Criminal Code, there was in fact a proper conflict of duties for 
which a solution had to be found. In his report for the Assemblee Nationale, 143 
Fran~ois Colcombet nevertheless voiced the opinion that under the new regime of 
141 Art.434-1: Le fait, pour quiconque ayant connaissance d'un crime dont it est encore possible de 
prevenir ou de limiter les effets, ou dont les auteurs sont susceptibles de commettre de nouveaux 
crimes qui pourraient etre empeches, de ne pas en informer les autorites judiciares ou 
adminstratives est puni de trois ans d'emprisonnement et de 300 000 F d'amende. 
142 Quoted from Chomienne, Guery, ALD.l995.comm.85. 
143 JOAN 26 September 1991, at 2244. 
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arts.434-1, 434-3 and 434-11 Criminal Code it was still desirable to leave the 
professional the choice to decide according to his/her conscience, in every 
individual case, which conduct to adopt. At the moment, in the absence of case-
law regarding the conflict between the two obligations under the new Criminal 
Code, it is difficult to assess whether or not the courts would agree and give the 
physician the free choice between the obligation to maintain the patient's 
confidence and the obligation to disclose. It is submitted that the only consistent 
solution would be to accept the legislator's decision that the obligation of medical 
confidentiality to which no exemption was adopted, should have prevalence over 
the obligation to disclose information for the purpose of crime prevention. Any 
disclosure would then be assessed according to the normal criteria, that is it would 
have to be established whether or not a criminal justification applies. 
With regard to disclosure for the mere purpose of criminal prosecutio~ it was 
argued that it cannot be the role of the physician to hand the patient over to the 
police, whatever his/her crime. Every individual must have the possibility of 
receiving medical treatment without having to fear to be denounced to the police 
by his/her physician. 144 If the physician holds information regarding the 
consequences of a crime that has already been committed, he/she has to maintain 
confidentiality. 145 
2.5.2. Child abuse 
Art.434-3 Criminal Code imposes an obligation on every citizen to disclose 
information about abuse of children or other vulnerable person to the relevant 
authorities. Ag~ there is an exemption from this obligation for medical 
professionals. The provision states as follows: 
A person who has knowledge about ill treatment of or hardship inflicted on a 
child of less than fifteen years of age or on a person who is not able to take care 
of himlherself because of hislher age, illness, handicap, physical or mental 
defect, or pregnancy, and does not inform the judicial or administrative 
authorities will be punished with three years of imprisonment and a fine of F 
300000. 
144 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Praticiens de 10 Sante, at 121. 
145 Pr d a cl, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
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The persons subjected to the professional secret by art.226-13 are exempt from 
the dispositions of the first paragraph, unless otherwise stated by law. 146 
This provision must be seen together with art.226-14 Criminal Code which lists 
certain situations in which a physician is free to disclose confidential information 
without being subjected to the punishment foreseen in art.226-13. Art.226-14 
states to that effect that: 
Article 226-13 is not applicable in cases where the law requires or authorises 
the disclosure of the secret. In addition, it is not applicable: 
1. to a person who informs the judicial, medical or administrative authorities of 
any abuse or neglect which has come to hislher knowledge and which was 
inflicted upon a minor of less than 15 years or upon a person incapable of 
protecting himlherself on the grounds of hislher age, or physical or mental 
condition. 147 
The conflict relating to the competing obligations of disclosure and of maintaining 
confidentiality is thus different from the conflict between the obligation to 
disclose for the purpose of crime prevention and the obligation of medical 
confidentiality, as the physician is here exempted from both obligations. In this 
situation, it can thus not be said that the obligation to maintain confidentiality was 
regarded as more important by the legislator, and that any disclosure of 
confidential patient information related to child abuse will constitute a violation of 
the duty of confidentiality. All authors who have discussed the conflict between 
arts.226-14 and 434-3 Criminal Code seem to agree that in this case of a real 
conflict of duties, one should refer to the case-law concerning the provisions of 
the old Criminal Code148 and leave the physician the choice as to which obligation 
to fulfil in each case.149 This approach has been confirmed by the Cour de 
Cassation in its decision of 8 October 1997:50 Thus, if the physician decides to 
146 Art,434-3: Le fait, pour quiconque ayant eu connaissance de mauvais traitements ou privations 
infliges a un mineur de quinze 80S ou a une personne qui n'est pas en mesure de se proteger en 
raison de son age, d'une maladie, d'une infrrmite, d'une deficience physique ou psychique ou d'un 
etat de grossesse, de ne pas en informer les autorites judiciaires ou administratives est puni de trois 
ans d'emprisonnement et de 300 000 F d'amende. 
Sauflorsque la loi en dispose autrement, sont exceptees des dispositions qui precedent les 
r.ersonnes astreintes au secrets dans les conditions prevues par l'article 226-13. 
47 Art.226-14: L'article 226-13 n'est pas applicable dans les cas ou la loi impose ou autorise la 
revelation du secret. En outre, iI n'est pas applicable: 
1. A celui qui informe les autoritesjudiciares, medicales ou administratives de sevices ou 
privations dont it a eu connaissance et qui ont ete infliges a un mineur de quinze ans ou Ii une 
personne qui n'est pas en mesure de se proteger en raison de son age ou de son etat physique ou 
psychique. 
148 See, for example, 28 February 1963, CA Aix en Provence, Gaz. Pal. 1963.2.122. 
149 Rassat, Droit Penal Special, at 380. 
ISO Bull. n0 329. 
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disclose confidential inforrnatio~ he/she will not commit the offence under 
art.226-13; and if he/she decides to remain silent, he/she will not commit the 
offence of breaching an obligation to disclose under art.434-3. While disclosure 
serves as a justification for a violation of confidentiality, the obligation of 
confidentiality serves as a justification for non-disclosure. lSI Some reach this 
conclusion by interpreting art.226-14 Criminal Code as giving an authorisation to 
reveal inforrnatio~ not an order to do so, so that the physician remains free to 
decide according to hislher conscience whether to speak up or to keep quiet. IS2 
The decision of giving the physician the free choice between the two competing 
obligations has been explained by arguing that it is the sole solution that is in 
conformity with the intention of the legislator and that it is justified by the 
concern to avoid that the authors of these cruelties not consult a physician for fear 
of risking a prosecutio~ thus not seeking medical treatment for the victim. On the 
other hand, it must be borne in mind that it is in the interest of the victim that the 
physician has the right to intervene if he/she thinks that it is necessary.IS3 
2.5.3. Protection of the innocent 
Another obligation to disclose information exists m the following situation. 
Art.434-11 Criminal Code states: 
A person who has evidence of the innocence of a person who is under arrest for 
investigation or has been convicted for a crime or misdemeanour, and 
voluntarily refrains from immediately informing the judicial or administrative 
authorities will be punished with three years of imprisonment and a fine of F 
300000 .... 
The persons subjected to the professional secret by art.226-13 are exempt from 
the dispositions of the first paragraph. ls4 
The legal situation regarding the conflict between medical confidentiality, on the 
one hand, and the interests of someone who is under arrest for investigatio~ or 
has been convicted for a criminal offence he/she did not commit, is similar to that 
151 Roujou de Boubee, Bouloc, Fancillon, Mayaud, Code Penal Commente, at 767. 
152 Pradel, Oanti-Juan, Droit Penal, Tome III, at 237 and 239; Veron, Droit Penal Special, at 135. 
153 Roujou de Boubee, Bouloc, Fancillon, Mayaud, Code penal Commenle, at 404-405. 
IS4 Art.434-11: Le fait pour quiconque connaissant la preuve de I'innocence d'une personne 
detenue provisoirement oujugee pour crime ou del it, de s'abstenir volontairement d'en apporter 
aussitot Ie temoignage aux autorites judiciares ou administratives est punis de trois ans 
d'emprisonement et de 300 000 d'amende .•.• 
Sont egalement exceptees des dispositions du premier alinea les personnes astreintes au secret 
dans les conditions prevues par l'article 226-13. 
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of the conflict between medical confidentiality and disclosure for the purpose of 
crime prevention. While the physician is exempt from the obligation to disclose 
information to protect the innocent person, he/she is not for that purpose exempt 
from the obligation of medical confidentiality. Therefore, here again the 
preference of the legislator for medical confidentiality seems unequivocal and 
does not seem to leave the physician any choice. ISS However, while the courts did 
not as yet have to deal with that question, most scholars agree that the balancing 
of the interests involved very clearly favours the interests of the innocent and that 
the obligation to maintain medical confidentiality cannot be used as a justification 
for the criminal offence of refusing to give testimony in favour of an innocent 
person Prade!. for example, argued in his commentary to a decision involving the 
professional secret of social workers that the only situation in which social 
workers do not have a choice but rather have to give testimony is where their 
testimony would allow to establish the innocence of a person unfairly detained or 
convicted. IS6 Even those promoting the view that exceptions to the principle of 
medical confidentiality can never be justified by the countervailing interests of 
third parties, not even where silence requires heroic efforts, submit that the only 
exception acceptable for the benefit of an overriding public interest is the situation 
where the· physician breaches medical confidentiality in favour of an innocent 
who was wrongly detained and suggest that in such a case, the physician is under 
no duty to medical confidentiality.IS7 Some distinguish: if the patient is the real 
perpetrator, the revelation is less acceptable than where the perpetrator is a third 
party, given that a disclosure is then particularly harmful to the patient and, 
accordingly, cannot be justified. ISS On the other hand, it has been conceded that 
the physician'S silence manifestly violates good morals and l'ordre public and that 
in order to reconcile the competing interests, the physician would have to disclose 
those facts establishing the innocence of the detainee, without exposing the 
identity of the real perpetrator, at least where the patient objects to the 
denunciation of the real perpetrator. IS9 This solution may not always lead to 
satisfactory results, as the physician's allegation is then not amenable to any 
proof. 
ISS Rassat, Droit Penal Special, at 381. 
156 Pradel, 0.1978.354; see also Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Praliciens de la Sante, at 131. 
IS7 Savatier, Auby, Savatier, Pequignot, Traite de Droit Medical, at 306. 
ISS Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
IS9 Anzalec, Gaz. Pal. 1971.113. 
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The opinions voiced with regard to the resolution of the conflict between the 
protection of the innocent and the medical secret of a patient seem hardly 
convincing. First, most of the arguments ignore the fact that the physician is not 
under conflicting legal obligations which allow for a balancing of interests to take 
place. Secondly, the discussion shows that most commentators are not entirely 
clear about the value of the conflicting interests at stake. While it is 
understandable, though not academically convincing as long as no reasons are 
presented, that some people may value the freedom of a wrongly accused person 
more than medical confidentiality, it is difficult to comprehend why it makes a 
difference whether or not it is the patient who committed the crime for which the 
innocent person is wrongly detained. This view seems to be based on the fear that 
the physician-patient relationship may be harmed more where the physician 
denounces the patient than where the physician denounces a third person who 
stands outside of the physician-patient relationship. But it is submitted that this 
does not necessarily have to be the case, as the patient may be as interested in 
protecting a close friend or relative from criminal prosecution as in hislher own 
protection. This solution also seems to suggest that the reason behind medical 
confidentiality is neither the patient's interest in controlling the dissemination of 
confidential personal information, as this interest is as affected where the patient 
is the perpetrator than where the perpetrator is a third person. Nor can the interest 
protected be the public interest in encouraging patients to seek medical treatment 
to enhance public health, as again, the interest the physician has violated is the 
same in both cases. It could only make a difference who committed the offence if 
medical confidentiality were to protect the physician from having to breach 
medical confidentiality where the disclosure might harm the patient. This 
demonstrates a rather paternalistic approach as it is then not the patient who 
decides what will or will not harm him/her. It is submitted that if one is of the 
opinion that the interests of the innocent are more important than the interests in 
medical confidentiality, and that French law leaves scope for a balancing of 
interests to take place, it cannot make a difference whether the patient or someone 
else committed the offence. 
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The offence of Art.434-11 must be committed voluntarily, which presupposes 
perfect knowledge of the innocence of the accused.160 
2.6. Admissibility of the physician's testimony 
Courts usually recognise that if the physician's testimony constitutes a breach of 
the duty to confidentiality, it must be disregarded:61 Thus, if the physician 
surpasses the limits of a permissible revelation, the judge can neither accept it as 
evidence nor use evidence already collected this way, as a classic principle of 
criminal law excludes all evidence acquired in an illegitimate way. 162 
Nevertheless, in a decision of 15 December 1942, the Cour de Cassation accepted 
medical testimony of a physician because the accused had not voiced any 
opposition to the interrogation of the witness in the course of the preliminary 
proceedings. 163 
Not every statement made by a witness who is under an obligation to medical 
confidentiality violates art.378 and entails the nullity of the record of the 
statement and of the proceedings. Rather, this consequence only applies if the 
statement consists of the revelation of protected information. l64 
2.7. Search for and seizure of medical records 
The search for and seizure of confidential patient documents are governed by the 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to art.56 Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the domicile of third parties to the crime under investigation 
can be searched by officers of the criminal investigation department for papers, 
documents and other objects relating to the incriminating facts. Helshe is, 
however, under the obligation to observe all measures necessary to ensure that the 
professional secret be respected. Given that this provisions is aimed at searches at 
the residence of persons, it is difficult to imagine that it will frequently be of 
relevance in cases ofa search for a physician's medical records. 
160 Roujou de Boubee, Bouloc, Fancillon, Mayaud, Code Penal Commente, at 779-780. 
161 Legal, JCP.1948.II.l 582. 
162 Prade\, JCP.1969.1.2234; Thouvenin, Le Secrel Medical ell 'Information du Malade, at 117-
1\8. 
163 Thouvenin, ibid. 
164 15 September 1987, JCP.1988.II.21047. 
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The Code also contains provisions specifically designed to regulate the search of a 
physician's surgery. Thus, art.56-1 Code of Criminal Procedure states in 
paragraph 2: 
A search in a surgery ... is executed by a magistrate in the presence either of a 
responsible member of the professional order or organisation to which the 
person concerned belongs, or of his representative. 16S 
And art.97 Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
If, in the course of the investigation, there is a good reason to search for 
documents, subject to the needs of the investigation and to the respect, if 
relevant, for the obligation laid down in paragraph three of the preceding 
article, the examining magistrate or the officer of the criminal investigation 
department determined by him are the only persons who have the right to take 
knowledge of the content before conducting the seizure. 166 
Art.96(3) Code of Criminal Procedure to which art.97 refers states: 
However, [the examining magistrate] is under the obligation first to observe all 
reasonable measures to ensure that the professional secret be respected. 167 
The legal situation can thus be outlined as follows: If access to confidential 
medical information is sought in the course of police investigations, the police can 
seize confidential medical documents outside the physician's surgery under the 
conditions mentioned in art.56, i.e. only persons of a certain status can read 
through the confidential papers and documents. Also, the officer, before 
performing the search and seizure, must take all measures necessary for the 
respect of the medical secret (art.56(3». But it is difficult to know what exactly 
these measures consist of. If search and seizure take place in a surgery, art.56-1 
applies, and the operation must be executed by a magistrate in the presence of a 
member of the professional organisation the physician belongs to. If access to 
confidential medical documents is sought in the course of investigations of the 
examining magistrate, he/she is under the obligation to observe all measures 
necessary for the respect of professional confidentiality (art.96(3», and the 
examining magistrate himlherself or the officer of the criminal investigation 
165 Art.56-l: Les perquisitions dans Ie cabinet d'un medecin ... sont effectuees par un magistrat et 
en presence de la personne responsable de I'ordre ou de I'organisation professionnelle a laquelle 
appartient I'interesse ou de son representant. 
166 Art.97: Lorsqu'il y a lieu. en cours d'information, de rechercher des documents et sous reserve 
des necessites de I'information et du respect, Ie cas echeant, de I'obligation stipulee par I'alinea 3 
de l'article precedent, lejuge d'instruction ou I'officier de policejudiciare par lui commis a seulle 
droit d'en prendre connaissance avant de proceder a la saisie. 
167 Art.96(3): Toutefois, il a I'obligation de provoquer prealablement toutes mesures utiles pour 
que soit assure Ie respect du secret professionnel et des droits de la defense. 
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department specifically determined by hirn/her are the only persons who have the 
right to read through the confidential documents before conducting the seizure. 
Thus, confidential medical documents can be seized in the course of 
investigations by the police or by the examining magistrate, and the relevant 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, apart from making special 
provisions as to who can conduct the search and examine the material, do not 
protect such information from state access through search and seizure. 
Of course, if confidential patient records can be seized and used in the course of 
criminal investigations, the state will thereby violate the principle of medical 
confidentiality. The problem mainly arose in three different situations: (I) the 
investigation was either directed against the patient, and the examining magistrate 
sought access to confidential medical documents of the accused patient to 
establish the truth and to use it as evidence against hirn/her; (2) the patient was not 
the accused, but the victim, and confidential medical information was needed as 
evidence against the accused; (3) or the investigation was directed against the 
physician, and access to confidential patient information was needed in the course 
ofthis investigation, mainly with regard to fraud or tax offences. 
Some case-law sheds light on the courts' attitude towards the seizure of 
confidential medical documents of the accused. In the case of a man who was 
accused of having killed his wife and who pretended that he had lost 
consciousness during the efforts of saving her from drowning and who had been 
hospitalised immediately after the event, the examining magistrate had ordered 
the seizure of the hospital records to establish whether the accused had in fact 
been unconscious, or whether he· had only simulated unconsciousness. With 
regard to the question of the lawfulness of the seizure, the Court held that: 
'Under the circumstances, the seizure does not constitute a violation of the law 
or of defence rights. The duty to confidentiality does not prevent the examining 
magistrate from the seizure of all documents or objects needed to establish the 
truth. The Eowers of the examining magistrate under art.8t Code of Criminal 
Procedure 1 8 are in principle unrestricted.' 169 
168 Art.81: The examining magistrate conducts, in conformity with the law, all investigative acts he 
thinks are necessary to establish the truth. (Lejuge d'instruction procede. conformement a la loi, a 
tous les actes d'information qu'it juge utiles a la manifestation de la verite.) 
169 24 April 1969, JCP 1970.lI.16306. 
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This holding very clearly demonstrates the attitude of French courts which is 
generally approved of by legal scholars.170 As the Code of Criminal Procedure 
does not restrict the examining magistrate's rights to search for and seize 
confidential medical documents, courts refuse to read these limitations into the 
code. However, the Court of Appeal of Aix en Provence somewhat mitigated the 
effects of this case-law. An examining magistrate had, after the refusal of hospital 
directors to hand over the list of women who had stayed in the gynaecological 
clinic, himself collected these lists for the purpose of investigating women for 
illegal abortions. The examining magistrate did not have a more specific suspicion 
against the women than the fact that they had attended a gynaecological clinic. 
The Court held that the examining magistrate had illegally obtained information 
which was outside the scope of his mission, as not every woman staying in a 
gynaecological clinic has necessarily had an abortion. More importantly, the court 
continued that the examining magistrate was under an obligation to undertake all 
measures necessary to respect the professional secret and that this obligation was 
violated when the magistrate proceeded despite the legitimate objections to the 
seizure voiced by the hospital directors on the grounds of medical 
confidentiality. 171 
In a decision regarding confidential medical information of a victim rather than of 
the accused, the Cour de Cassation has held that judges, when introducing hospital 
records as evidence in court, necessarily expose facts that are covered by medical 
confidentiality. Therefore, instead of introducing the records as such, the court 
argued that it would be more protective of medical confidentiality if judges gave 
medical experts who have to examine the injured person the mandate to examine 
the hospital records. l72 This case-law has been criticised. Melennec, for example, 
stated that the court does not have the power to authorise a medical expert to 
consult the medical records of his/her colleagues, as a simple mission of expertise 
could then result in circumventing the principle of medical confidentiality, as well 
as the safeguards provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to him, 
the only solution for a judge who wants access to confidential documents would 
therefore be a seizure of the documents.173 Pradel suggests a different approach, 
170 See for example Chappart, D.1969.637. 
171 28 February 1963, CA Aix en Provence, Gaz. Pal. 1963.2.122. 
172 20 January 1976, Bull n° 23; 16 November 1976, Bull nO 327. 
173M I e ennec, Gaz. Pal. 1980.doct.l45. 
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arguing that the procedure promoted by the courts can be lawful, but only if 
limited to situations in which the court could also obtain the information directly 
from the treating physician. Under those circumstances, it is argued, the recourse 
to an expert is justified because the magistrate does not have the technical 
knowledge to assess the evidence. However, Pradel limits these restrictions to 
cases in which medical information of someone other than the accused is 
concerned, as he thinks that if the investigation is directed against the patient, 
search and seizure are always legitimate.174 However, no principles seem to 
support this view. 
The approach adopted toward searches for and seizures of confidential patient 
records seems to depend largely upon the interpretation of art.96(3) Code of 
Criminal Procedure. This article could be interpreted as supporting the argument 
that an invocation of medical confidentiality against measures by the examining 
magistrate restricts hislher powers, given that he/she is under an obligation to take 
all necessary preliminary measures to guarantee respect for medical 
confidentiality. But this is not how art.96(3) is normally understood. Instead, that 
provision is interpreted to impose upon the examining magistrate the restriction 
that a search of a physicians' practices can only lawfully be performed in the 
presence of a member of the Medical Council, but not as prohibiting all searches 
in surgeries. This interpretation is widely accepted. as many agree that in order to 
establish the truth, the examining magistrate must be able to have recourse to all 
means the law puts at hislher disposal. Therefore, no restrictions on the examining 
magistrate's powers that were not mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
should be tolerated.17s Chappart came to the same conclusion, arguing that the law 
does not guarantee absolute protection of medical confidentiality. and that the 
necessity to determine the truth justifies an exception from that protection. 176 
Others also agree, stating that even though the search of surgeries is sometimes 
met with indignation, it is difficult to argue that the protection of medical 
confidentiality by the Criminal Code could be interpreted so as to allow for an 
impairment of the interests of criminal justice. According to this view. if medical 
confidentiality were to prevail over the interests of justice, medical confidentiality 
174 Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
175 Thouvenin, Le Secret Medical et I'Information du Malade • at 118-119. 
176 Chappart, D.1969.637. 
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would be placed above the law, when it is the law that has institutionalised the 
medical secret in the first place. 117 
It can be seen that in the realm of investigative measures under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, a balancing of the interest in medical confidentiality, on the 
one hand, with the interests of justice, on the other hand, is performed, and that 
the predominant opinion very clearly favours the interests of justice. This is rather 
surprising when compared to the situation of a physician's testimony in criminal 
court. As outlined above, where the physician's testimony regarding confidential 
patient information is sought in criminal proceedings, the law has exempted the 
physician from the obligation to testify. This demonstrates the legislator'S view 
that in case of a conflict between the obligation to testify in the interests of justice, 
and the obligation to keep the medical secret, the latter prevails. The Criminal 
Code thus contains a value decision favouring the interest in medical 
confidentiality over the interests of justice. In the light of this, the above-
mentioned arguments that the interests in medical confidentiality cannot outweigh 
the interests of justice is inconsistent and unconvincing. 
Another consideration sometimes mentioned is that confidential patient records 
could not be seized, the physician would be given too much power, as with regard 
to confidential information exclusively known to the physician, it would then be 
up to him/her to decide whether or not truth-finding is possible in the specific 
case.
178 As the argument goes, the interests of society, and the interests of the 
individual imperatively request that criminal justice can be accomplished. 
However, it is also in the interest of society and the individual that the powers of 
the examining magistrate are strictly confined to those granted by the law. These 
two imperatives are reconciled, in that while search and seizure are possible in 
physicians' surgeries, rigid safeguards apply. The physician cannot object to the 
search and seizure in his/her surgery. The judge, however, cannot indiscriminately 
seize all confidential records he/she finds, but the seizure must rather be limited to 
that which is necessary in the circumstances. Waremberg-Auque has argued, 
however, that the right to establish the truth cannot prevail over medical 
confidentiality, as the search for the truth can never legitimise the use of unfair 
177 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Pra/iciem de la Sante, at 144; Melennec. Gaz. Pal. 
1980.doct.145. 
178 Thouvenin. Le Secret Medical et l'Information du Malade , at 135. 
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means of collecting evidence. The interests of justice and of society can never 
paralyse the exercise of primordial human rights such as the right to medical 
confidentiality. 179 
In cases in which the investigation is directed against the physician, slightly 
different considerations apply. In one case, a physician had tried to use medical 
confidentiality to escape accountability by unnecessarily entering non-
anonymised patient data into medical records so that, besides the facts relevant for 
bookkeeping, they also contained the name and the diagnosis of the patients. 
When asked to make his records available, he refused to do so, invoking his 
obligation to medical confidentiality. The Court decided that the seizure of the 
records or the examination of the records by tax officers did not constitute the 
revelation of confidential medical information.180 In his commentary, Savatier 
reasoned: 
'The secret belongs exclusively to the patient, as do all other details of his 
intimate life. The court seems to have misjudged the respect owed to the 
autonomous freedom of the patient who is the only master of his confidences 
when allowing a revelation of the confidences to the administration and the 
court as a consequence of a concealment by the physician, even though it was 
unlawful. In this context, the physician's behaviour is of little importance. One 
should not treat medical confidentiality as being dependent upon the sanctions 
which the physician is trying to avoid, given that the confidence which is part 
of the patient's intimate sphere, does not belong to the physician, but rather to 
the patient, and given that it is based on the public interest. Confidences are 
therefore not sufficiently protected by ensuring that they will only be revealed 
to the closed circle ofadministrators.'181 
Savatier continued that the boundaries of the medical secret should be 
insurmountable, and that the judge should reject the admission of medical records, 
denying that tax fraud committed by the physician could justifY a different 
approach. He concluded that the prosecution should always refuse to collect as 
evidence those documents that refer to confidential patient information, as 
medical confidentiality requires that the patient be given the guarantee that his 
confidences, when revealed to a qualified confidant, will never be transmitted to 
any third party. Strangely, in the end Savatier nevertheless approved of the 
outcome of the decision because the information at issue did not concern the 
179 Waremberg-Auque, Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 253 and 
256. 
180 II February 1960, JCP.1960.II.1l604. 
181 Savatier, JCP.1960.II.11604. 
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patient's intimate sphere. Pradel suggests a different approach. According to him, 
if a seizure of confidential information takes place in the course of an 
investigation directed against the physician, the right to seizure is uncontested, but 
it is limited where the patient has expressly requested that hislher data will not be 
revealed, as search and seizure must stop in front of the intimate sphere the 
protection of which is a right of the patient. As search and seizure can only be 
effected where it is essential for the investigation, they should only be allowed 
under exceptional circumstances.182 Melennec, on the other hand, argued that it is 
obvious that a physician cannot invoke medical confidentiality to cover his/her 
own irregularities, as medical confidentiality was not introduced for the benefit of 
the physician, but rather as a right aimed at the protection of the patient's 
personality rights. 183 It is submitted that this argument can only justifY a seizure of 
confidential patient records where the patient has consented to this measure, as 
otherwise the patient's personality rights are at risk. 
Another question is whether a physician can voluntarily submit medical 
certificates containing confidential patient information. In that respect, it has been 
decided on 14 February 1952 that: 
'With the exception of cases in which a physician acts as an expert witness, he 
cannot, without failing his professional obligation, deliver a medical certificate 
containing observations about his patient's condition to a third party, given that 
the patient is the only person who can legitimately claim the issuance of a 
medical certificate about his condition to use it according to his own wishes. 
Therefore, a physician who applies first aid to an accident victim and then 
delivers the medical certificate regarding the victim's injuries to the police 
station in charge of the inquiry violates his obligation to medical 
confidentiality.' 184 
When comparing case-law with regard to the physician's testimony in court with 
that concerning the seizure of confidential patient information, it seems justified 
to observe that art.96 Code of Criminal Procedure gives the judge the possibility 
to circumvent the prohibition of forcing the physician to give testimony in court, 
by seizing the relevant patient records instead. As has already been discussed, this 
difference in approach cannot satisfactorily be explained with reference to the 
prevalence of the interests of justice in general. However, it is possible that it is 
182 Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
183 Me\ennec, Gaz. Pal. 1980.doct.145. 
184 JCP.1952.I1.7030. 
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based on the thought that the interest in medical confidentiality is affected more 
seriously when the physician is forced to testify in court, as this involves an active 
participation of the physician in the disclosure of the medical secret, while in the 
case of a seizure of medical records, the state obtains access to pre-existing 
records by the use of compulsion, so that it is at least arguable that the harm done 
to the physician-patient relationship differs in the two situations under 
examination. This could also explain why medical records can be seized, but the 
physician cannot voluntarily hand over the very same records without committing 
a criminal offence. This protects the physician rather than the patient, as the 
physician does not actively have to breach the medical secret, while the patient's 
medical information is still available through the means of search and seizure. 
2.S. Summary and conclusion 
The Courts as well as the majority of legal writers promote the view that the 
physician's obligation to maintain medical confidentiality is absolute and that no 
one can exempt the physician from that duty. However, the protection of medical 
confidentiality is not as absolute as it may seem. First, the law itself has created 
exemptions from the physician's obligation to keep the patient's medical secrets. 
Art.226-14 Criminal Code, for example, provides for an exemption in cases of 
child abuse and the abuse of other vulnerable persons. Where the physician 
obtains knowledge of such abuse in the course of his/her profession, he/she is free 
to decide whether or not to report hislher findings or to maintain medical 
confidentiality. With regard to the physician's role as a witness in criminal court, 
art.109 Code of Criminal Procedure exempts the physician from the obligation 
imposed on all citizens to give testimony in court. Thus, the legislator has clearly 
demonstrated that in case of a general conflict between the interest in medical 
confidentiality and the interests of truth-finding in criminal procedures, the 
interest in medical confidentiality prevails. Therefore, the physician is only 
allowed to testify in criminal court where a legal justification applies to justify the 
breach of medical confidentiality. However, the situation is entirely different 
where the physician's defence rights are at stake. In that case, the courts and the 
predominant opinion among legal scholars give the physician the right to breach 
medical confidentiality, as defence rights are regarded as more important than 
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medical confidentiality. It is interesting that the discussion only focuses on the 
defence rights of the physician, while the defence rights of the patient or of third 
parties are not considered. With regard to the patient, the situation is dominated 
by the view that the patient cannot, by giving consent to the physician's 
testimony, relieve the physician from the obligation to medical confidentiality. As 
the physician's obligation to maintain medical confidentiality is absolute, no one, 
not even the patient can relieve the physician from this obligation. Therefore, the 
patient's consent will not have the effect of negating the physician's criminal 
responsibility for a breach of medical confidentiality. As case-law shows, this is 
so even where the patient wants to use the physician's testimony for defence 
purposes. Thus, medical confidentiality is more important than the patient's 
defence rights, but not more important than the physician's defence rights. 
Arts.434-1, 434-3, and 434-11 Criminal Code create obligations to disclose 
information about crimes the effects of which can still be prevented or mitigated, 
about the innocence of a person under arrest or already convicted, and about child 
abuse. All three provisions contain an exemption from this obligation for 
physicians. In the case of child abuse, the physician is thus neither under an 
obligation to maintain medical confidentiality, as art.226-14 Criminal Code 
contains an exemption from that duty in such a case, nor under an obligation to 
disclose the information. The physician is then given a choice as to which 
. obligation to fulfil in the individual case. In the cases of disclosure for the purpose 
of crime prevention or protection of an innocent detainee, the physician is under 
an obligation to maintain medical confidentiality, as no exemption applies, but not 
under an obligation to disclose. While this would seem to make clear the 
legislator's intention to demonstrate the priority of medical confidentiality, this is 
not the conclusion drawn by legal writers. The predominant opinion rather 
promotes the view that the physician should be allowed to decide which 
obligation to fulfil, and that a breach of one of the obligations should be justified 
by the conflicting obligation the fulfilment of which caused the breach. It can be 
seen that while the patient cannot relieve the physician from the obligation to 
maintain medical confidentiality, the physician's conscience decision can justify a 
breach of this obligation in case of certain conflicts. 
Where a patient's medical records are sought in the context of criminal 
investigations, the physician is not allowed to hand them over to the police 
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voluntarily. However, they are not exempt from search and seizure. The sole 
protection medical confidentiality receives in that context is that some safeguards 
apply to make sure that only certain designated persons can seize and take 
knowledge of such records. It is interesting to contrast the almost unlimited 
powers to seize medical records with the fact that the physician cannot even be 
forced to testify in criminal court at the patient's request. This means that the 
patient's medical records can be used by the prosecution against the patient. 
Where the prosecution's case is thus based on the patient's confidential medical 
information, the patient cannot compel the physician· to testify in order, for 
example, to gIve explanations of hislher notes that may be favourable to the 
accused patient. 
It is interesting to note that statutory law very clearly outlines the obligations of 
the physician, including, in most cases of conflict, which obligation should 
prevail, and that it is always, with the exception of cases of child abuse, the 
obligation of medical confidentiality that is given precedence. However, courts as 
well as legal scholars are far from accepting this approach. Indeed, the 
predominant interpretation of these statutes confers upon the physician the power 
to decide how to reconcile the conflict between fundamental individual and public 
interests, even though these conflicts have been addressed by the legislator. Case-
law as well as the academic discussion point towards a very paternalistic approach 
to the physician'S role in the physician-patient relationship as well as in society. 
Only where the physician thinks that the particular physician-patient relationship, 
the reputation of the medical profession or the interests of society demand that in 
a given case the respect for medical confidentiality is more important than the 
competing interests of justice, will the patient's confidences be protected. On the 
other hand, where the patient does not have an interest in keeping his/her medical 
information secret and therefore authorises the physician to disclose such 
information, this decision will not bind the physician and the physician remains 
free to decide whether or not disclosure is the best approach to adopt in that 
specific situation. 
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Chapter 5 - Medical confidentiality and medical privilege in Germany 
1. Protection of medical confidentiality 
1.1. Medical confidentiality as a fundamental right 
1.1.1. Protection under the German Constitution l 
The right to medical confidentiality is not expressly guaranteed by th German 
Constitution (Basic Law - BL); neither is the right to privacy. However, the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the highest German 
court dealing exclusively with constitutional questions, inferred the constitutional 
protection of personality rights, including the right to privacy, from Arts 2(1) and 
1(1) BL, stating as follows: 
Art.2(l) BL 
Everyone has the right to the free development of his personality, insofar as he 
does not violate the rights of others or the constitutional order or the moral 
law.2 
Art.l(1) BL 
The dignity of the human person is inviolable. It is the duty of all state 
authority to have regard to it and to respect it. 3 
The Federal Constitutional Court argued that freedom of self-determination as 
guaranteed by Art. 2( 1) BL could only be exercised effectively if the state 
refrained from interfering with the private sphere of the individual. The Court also 
stressed the importance of respecting the individual's intimate and private sphere 
to preserve hislher human dignity. This reference to Art. 1(1) BL considerably 
strengthens the protection of the personality right, as human dignity is accorded 
the highest value under the German Basic Law. According to the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the personality right following from Art. 2(1) in conjunction 
with Art. 1(1) BL protects every individual's interest that certain personal and 
1 The translation of Federal Constitutional Court decisions is partly based on Michalowski, 
Woods, German Constitutional Law, at 117-119. 
2 Art.2{l): Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Pers6nlichkeit, soweit er nicht die 
Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmllBige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz 
verst6Bt. 
3 Art.t(l): Die WUrde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schntzen ist 
Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt. 
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intimate information be kept secret and need not be disclosed. As the Court held 
in its Personal Diary Decision:4 
'The personality right as protected by Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) 
BL guarantees in principle the right of the individual to decide himlherself 
when and to what extent to disclose personal facts, a right which follows from 
the principle of autonomy.'s 
With regard to the question of what information is protected by the personality 
right, the Federal Constitutional Court included, inter alia, medical records6 and 
medical-psychological reports.' In its Medical Records Decision,S the Federal 
Constitutional Court explained the operation of the constitutional protection of the 
right to privacy as follows: 
'The Basic Law grants every individual an inviolate sphere of private life 
which is free from state encroachment. The constitutional tenet for respect of 
the intimate sphere of the individual is based on the right to the free 
development of one's personality which is guaranteed by Art.2(1) BL. When 
determining the content and scope of that right, the fact that, according to 
Art.1(1) BL, human dignity is inviolate and must be protected by all state 
authority must be taken into consideration. '" However, not the entire private 
sphere falls under the absolute protection of the basic right under Art.2(1) in 
tandem with Art. 1(1) BL. The individual as a part of a community rather has 
to accept state interventions which are based on an overriding community 
interest under strict application of the principle of proportionality, as long as 
they do not affect the inviolate sphere of private life,'9 
The Federal Constitutional Court has thus developed a system whereby the private 
life of the individual is divided into different spheres, and the extent of protection 
awarded to the individual's private life depends on the sphere affected by the state 
intrusion. While the intimate sphere of the individual is inviolate, and can thus not 
be intruded upon by the state under any circumstances, other spheres of private 
life, though constitutionally protected, are open to restrictions if the intervention 
aims at the protection of an overriding community interest. To understand the 
degree of constitutional protection awarded to medical confidentiality, it is thus 
important to know which sphere within the realm of private life confidential 
medical information belongs to. The Federal Constitutional Court clarified this 
point in the above-cited decision by holding that: 
4 BVerfGE 80, 367 (1989). 
5 Ibid., at 373; see also the National Census Case, BVerfGE 65, 1,42 (1983). 
6 BVerfGE 32, 373 (1972). 
7 BVerfGE 89, 69 (1993). 
S BVerfGE 32, 373 (1972). 
9 Ibid., at 379. 
100 
'As medical records contain statements regarding the case history, the 
diagnosis and therapeutic measures, even though they do not concern the 
inviolate intimate sphere, they nevertheless concern the private sphere of the 
patient. As such, they are protected against state access by the basic right of 
Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1 (1) BL. This applies in particular to 
knowledge of the patient's medical condition that the physician gained in the 
course of his professional duty and which he laid down in writing. It is not 
important whether these notes refer to illnesses, ailments or problems the 
disclosure of which would incriminate the patient, would otherwise embarrass 
him or would be detrimental to his social reputation. Rather, the wish of the 
individual to keep free from the view of third parties such highly personal 
matters as the assessment of his physical condition by a physician in general 
deserves protection.' 10 
The personality right thus not only guarantees that the individual does not have to 
disclose embarrassing or detrimental information, but further respects the interest 
of the individual to keep all personal information to himlherself. This is very 
important, as it demonstrates that the constitutional protection of medical 
confidentiality in Germany aims to protect the patient's interest in keeping private 
information to him/herself, regardless of the information's content. The protection 
thus guarantees the patient's autonomy in deciding which private information to 
disclose or not to disclose. Even the fact that the patient is suffering from a cold, 
normally not in itself giving rise to any embarrassment of the patient, is protected 
by the patient's privacy right, as it is up to the patient to decide whether or not to 
disclose this information to anyone. In the more recent Medical-Psychological 
Reports Decision, II the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide a case in which 
the complainant's ability to drive motor vehicles was at doubt after he had been 
caught smoking cannabis. The Road Traffic Authority threatened that his driving 
licence be withdrawn unless he agreed to a medical-psychological examination 
and submitted a report to the effect that his ability to drive a motor vehicle was 
not diminished. In that case, the Federal Constitutional Court summarised the 
protection awarded by the personality right as follows: 
'This right protects generally against the collection and transmission of results 
regarding [a person's] medical condition, mental condition or character .... 
This protection is the more intense, the closer the data are linked with the 
person's intimate sphere which, as an inviolate sphere of private life, requires 
respect by and protection against all state authority .... The report requested by 
the Road Traffic Authorities presupposes the collection of intimate details 
10 Ibid., at 379-380. 
II BVerftiE 89, 69 (1993). 
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which are protected by the personality right. This not only applies to the 
medical part of the examinatio~ but even more so to its psychological part.'12 
Given that the requested report would have included the personal and medical 
history of the perso~ the Federal Constitutional Court concluded that its content 
was even more closely linked with the patienCs intimate sphere than purely 
medical diagnoses and therefore received even stronger protection by Art. 2(1) 
and Art. 1 (1) BL. It can thus be seen that even though all medical information is 
protected from unwanted disclosure by the personality right, the extent of 
protection depends on the content of the informatio~ particularly on the degree of 
intimacy of the relevant information. 
The privacy right protects the private sphere from state interference. This 
guarantee protects the individual against forced disclosure of medical information. 
In additio~ as the protection of medical records shows, it extends to the 
protection of medical information entrusted to the physician. It could of course be 
argued that entrusting information to a third party always carries a risk of 
disclosure, and that protection of confidential personal information can therefore 
only be ensured as long as the individual keeps this information to himlherself. It 
would then follow that a patient who confides certain medical secrets in hislher 
physician would lose the protection of the privacy right by the very fact of this 
disclosure to the physic~ a third party. The Federal Constitutional Court, 
however, rejected this view, arguing that: 
'The right to respect for the private sphere imposes limits on the state even 
where the individual communicates with others. There is often an irrefutable 
need to attend representatives of certain healing and counselling professions. 
Efficient help can frequently only be expected if the individual totally reveals 
himself and makes them accessories of private areas of his life. On the other 
hand, he has an interest that those facts will not come to the knowledge of third 
parties. The principal preservation of this interest in secrecy is the necessary 
prerequisite for the trust, which he must place in the physician for his own 
sake, and it is also the basis for the successful work of those whose help he 
requires. Otherwise he would only have a choice between accepting a 
disclosure of his private sphere or to do without proper treatment and advice.' 13 
In another decisio~ the Federal Constitutional Court added that: 
'All the professions [listed in S. 53(1)(3) Code of Criminal Procedure] have in 
common that their exercise typically includes services which can be 
12 Ibid., at 82-83. 
13 BVerfGE 33, 367, 375-376 (1972). 
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characterised as individual advice in personal. legal. financial and economic 
matters or as immediately serving the health of the human person (counselling 
and healing profession). Such services - more frequently and more intensely 
than other professional activities - touch upon areas in which confidentiality 
interests of the individual which are worthy of protection must be respected. 
They are, therefore, particularly dependent upon awarding the client or patient 
who enlists their help the opportunity to confide in them freely, openly and 
without inhibition, without having to fear the disclosure of the facts and 
circumstances that the other party finds out in the course of his profession. '14 
Also: 
'A person seeking medical treatment must and can expect that everything the 
physician learns about his medical condition in the course of exercising his 
profession will remain secret and will not come to the knowledge of 
unauthorised persons. Only then can the trust which forms part of the basic 
prerequisites of medical action, as it increases the chances of healing and 
therefore - on the whole - serves the purpose of maintaining efficient medical 
welfare services, be created between the patient and the physician. 'IS 
An analysis of this case law shows that according to the Federal Constitutional 
Court, the state does not have to respect the confidentiality of all information an 
individual confides in other people regardless of the circumstances. In the context 
of certain professional relationships including the physician-patient relationship, 
however, the state must respect the individual's interest in keeping confidential 
information he/she has entrusted to the members of certain professions, given that 
the individual, when in need of professional help, would otherwise have to fear 
the open disclosure of all relevant information, if for example medical records 
could be seized or the physician be forced to give testimony in court regarding the 
patient's confidential medical records. The cited case law reveals that the Federal 
Constitutional Court is trying to preserve a variety of interests when upholding 
medical confidentiality. First and foremost, the patient's autonomy is protected by 
this interpretation of the right to privacy. In a situation in which the patient needs 
medical treatment, patient autonomy would be curtailed were the patient reduced 
to a choice between seeking treatment and risking disclosure of confidential 
information, or foregoing medical treatment. Different from other situations in 
which the individual reveals intimate details to a third party without any particular 
need to do so, here the patient must confide this information in a third party in 
order to preserve hislher interest in physical or mental integrity. Under such 
14 BVertDE 38, 312, 323 (1975). 
IS BVertDE 32, 373, 380 (1972). 
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circumstances, the state would drastically infringe upon the patient's right to 
safeguard hislher interests if medical confidentiality were not upheld. The interest 
of the patient in controlling the disclosure of personal information is also 
protected. Accordingly, medical confidentiality is protected to safeguard the 
individual's informational and decisional privacy, and the considerations on 
which the constitutional protection is based are mainly deontological. At the same 
time, the members of the medical profession have an interest in the protection of 
medical confidentiality, as in the view of the Federal Constitutional Court, 
without such a guarantee they would not be able to exercise their profession 
effectively. In addition, there is the public interest in preserving public health, as 
there is a fear that without medical confidentiality, patients might refrain from 
seeking medical advice and treatment, thus putting their own health and possibly 
that of others at risk. This could also have adverse consequences for society. 
Therefore, under the German Basic Law the state has to respect the confidentiality 
of the physician-patient relationship as a constitutional value. 
How exactly does this constitutional recognition of the confidentiality of a 
patient's medical information impact on the physician-patient relationship? It is 
important to note that all state organs, but not citizens, are bound by the basic 
rights. 16 It follows that physicians are not under any constitutional obligation to 
maintain the confidences of their patients. However, all state activity, including 
parliamentary legislation, must comply with constitutional principles. 
Consequently, given that the state is under a constitutional obligation to protect 
medical confidentiality, it follows that the law governing the physician-patient 
relationship must conform to this constitutional tenet. 
1.1.2. European Convention on Human Rights 
In Germany, the ECHR came into force on 3 December 1953. The competence of 
the European Court on Human Rights (Art.46 EClIR) and of the Commission to 
receive individual petitions (Art.25 EClIR) were recognised in 1955. According 
to the pre-dominant opinion, the EClIR does not enjoy constitutional status, but 
rather merely has the status of ordinary law.J7 This means that the incompatibility 
16 BVerfDE 7, 198,204-205 (1958). 
17 JarassIPieroth, Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12a to Art. I. 
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of a statute with provisions of the ECHR cannot be challenged before the Federal 
Constitutional Court. However, the Federal Constitutional Court takes the stance 
that statutes and even the Basic Law itself must be interpreted in conformity with 
the ECHR, as long as such interpretation does not award less protection of the 
basic rights as would otherwise be awarded under domestic law. ls Statutes must 
be interpreted in the light of Germany's obligations under international law, 
regardless of whether the statutes came into force prior or subsequent to the 
relevant treaty. Given the extensive protection of basic rights under the Basic 
Law, it was long felt that the ECHR could only be of limited value in this area of 
law. However, the European Court of Human Rights in some cases came to the 
conclusion that Germany insufficiently protected certain Convention rights. In 
Niemitz v Germany,19 for example, the European Court of Human Rights had to 
decide a case regarding the search of a law firm in Germany that was based on a 
search warrant phrased in rather broad tenns. The Court came to the conclusion 
that a breach of Art.8(1) ECHR had occurred. In the same case, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court had declined to accept a constitutional complaint for 
adjudication on the ground that it did not offer sufficient prospect of success. It 
can thus be seen that in some cases, the protection awarded by the ECHR can be 
wider than that enjoyed under the Basic Law. Therefore, while medical 
confidentiality receives protection under Arts 2(1), 1(1) BL, recourse to the 
ECHR may nevertheless be useful in some cases in which the European Court of 
Human Rights awards more extensive protection than the Federal Constitutional 
Court. 
1.2. Protection under criminal law 
A very important provision in the context of the protection of medical 
confidentiality is s.203 Criminal Code which makes it a criminal offence for 
members of certain professions to breach their duty of confidentiality: 
8.203 - breach of private confidences 
(1) A person who, without authorisation, discloses a secret of another, namely 
a secret that belongs to the private sphere of life or a company or business 
18 See BVerfDE 74,358,370 (1987). 
19 (1993) 16 EHRR 97. 
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secret, that was confided in him or the knowledge of which he obtained in his 
capacity as 
1. physician, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist or member of any other healing 
profession the exercise or the use of the job title of which is subject to an 
education regulated by the state, 
2. professional psychologist in the possession of an academic degree that is 
recognised by the state ... 
will be punished with imprisonment of up to one year or with a fme.20 
Thus, physicians and members of the other health care professions listed in 
s.203(1) Criminal Code commit a criminal offence if they reveal patient 
confidences under the circumstances mentioned in s.203 Criminal Code. For 
s.203(I) Criminal Code to apply, the revelation must concern a secret. Facts are 
secret if they are only known to a limited number of people. If a rumour exists 
regarding the confidential fact, that is IT: for example, several people suspect that a 
patient might be infected with HIV, and if they gossip about this, the patient's 
HIV status is still considered a secret as long as those rumours are unconfirmed. 
The physician'S disclosure would then add credibility to the rumour.21 However, 
facts are no longer secret if they have been made known publicly.22 Information is 
only protected as a 'secret' by s.203 Criminal Code if the person the facts relate to 
has a reasonable interest in keeping it secret.23 But this requirement is interpreted 
extensively, to exclude only situations in which an interest in keeping facts secret 
seems totally arbitrary.24 It is therefore not necessary that the information is 
potentially embarrassing, but it is rather sufficient that the patient wants it to 
remain confidential. 
The physician must have learned about the secret in hislher position as a medical 
professional. S.203 Criminal Code expressly states that no distinction is made 
between the protection of facts that were confided in the physician, and facts the 
20 S.203: 
(1) Wer unbefugt ein fremdes Geheimnis, namentlich ein zum personlichen Lebensbereich 
gehorendes Geheimnis oder ein Betriebs- oder Geschliftsgeheimnis, offenbart. das ihm als 
1. Arzt, Zahnarzt, Tierarzt, Apotheker oder Angehorigen eines anderen Heilberufs, der fUr die 
Berufsausiibung oder die FUhrung der Berufsbezeichnung eine staatlich geregelte Ausbildung 
erfordert, 
2. Berufspsychologen mit staatlich anerkannter wissenschaftlicher AbschluBprilfung, ... 
anvertraut worden oder sonst bekanntgeworden ist, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe his zu einem Jahr oder 
mit Geldstrafe bestraft. 
21 RGSt 26,5,7 (1894). 
22 SchOnkeiSchrOder-Lenckner, StraJgesetzbuch Kommentar, 6 to s.203. 
23 OLG DUsseldorfJMBINW 1990,153. 
24 KG NJW 1992,2771; Schl>nkelSchrOder-Lenckner, Strajgesetzbuch Kommentar. 7 to s.203. 
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physician found out about in the course ofhislher profession. The protection is not 
restricted to medical facts. Thus, if a patient for example confides in the physician 
more general facts about his/her private life that are not directly linked to the 
patient's medical problem, these confidences are still protected by s.203, as they 
indirectly support the physician-patient relationship and help create the trust 
necessary for medical treatment.2S Facts are protected without having been 
confided in the physician by the patient, if they came to the physician's 
knowledge in the exercise of his/her profession. Thus, if a physician who was 
called to the home of a patient overhears a conversation between the patient's 
relatives, the obligation to medical confidentiality applies, as this knowledge was 
obtained by the physician in the course of his/her profession. Medical 
confidentiality is thus not only protected with regard to observations concerning 
the patient's health, but all other observations linked with the exercise of the 
medical profession are protected, too, so that for example information related to 
the car in which a patient came to the doctor, or to the identity of the person who 
accompanied the patient, is covered by medical confidentiality.26 The obligation 
of medical confidentiality begins with the initiation of the physician-patient 
relationship and embraces the name of the patient and the very fact that and why 
the patient saw the physician.27 Medical confidentiality not only encompasses 
secrets relating to the patient, but also secrets of third parties, if the physician 
gained knowledge of these secrets in the course of treating hislher patient. 
Therefore, if a physician is told by his patient that his wife is an alcoholic or that 
she is having an affair, this information is protected by medical confidentiality 
and a revelation will constitute a criminal offence under s.203 Criminal Code.28 
For a breach of medical confidentiality to be a criminal offence, the disclosure 
must be made without authorisation or legal justification. Thus, no criminal 
offence can be committed if the patient has waived his/her right to medical 
confidentiality, as medical confidentiality is only protected by the Criminal Code 
25 ScMnkeJSchrlXler-Lenckner, StraJgesetzbuch Kommentar, 14 to s.203. 
26 BGH NJW 1985, 2203, 2204. 
27 BGH NJW 1985,2203,2204; Gramberg-Danielsen, Kern, NJW 1998, at 2710; 
LaufslUhlenbruck-U1senheimer, Handbuch des Arztrechts, at 507; but see LO Oldenburg NJW 
1992, 1563, stating that the disclosure of data showing that a person had received dental treatment 
was not a violation of medical confidentiality. 
28 Milller-Dietz, 'Juristische Grund1agen und Dimensionen der Schweigepflicht des Arztes', in: 
Jung, Meiser, MUlier, Aktuelle Probleme und Perspektiven des Arztrechts, at 42. 
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as long as the person the information relates to, that is in most cases the patient, 
has an interest in keeping the information secret.29 
The opinions as to the purpose behind the protection of medical confidentiality 
and, in particular, behind s.203(1) no.l Criminal Code are split. While some argue 
that s.203(1) Criminal Code exclusively30 or at least mainly31 aims at the 
protection of the privacy rights of the individual, others support the view that the 
main purpose behind s.203(1) Criminal Code is the protection of the public 
interest in the general trust in members of the medical profession. Medical 
confidentiality, it is argued, is significant for society, given that if the patient 
cannot rely on the discretion of his/her physician, public health might be 
endangered as patients will then be reluctant to seek medical advice and 
treatment.32 There is thus a utilitarian argument favouring medical confidentiality. 
However, the privacy argument is more important. When the current version of 
s.203(1) Criminal Code was enacted in 1974, the legislator included it in a newly 
introduced chapter called 'Violation of the personal sphere of life and intimacy,' 
in which different provisions aiming at the protection of the personal sphere were 
brought together. This demonstrates that the legislative intent behind the 
protection of the professional secret was to guarantee the patient's personal and 
intimate sphere, and it underlines the significance attached to privacy.33 The 
Parliamentary debates also show that the legislative purpose behind s.203( 1) 
Criminal Code was the protection of the constitutional privacy interests of the 
patients guaranteed by Arts.2(1), 1(1) BL.34 This interpretation is also in line with 
the constitutional principles explained above. In addition, according to s.205(1) 
Criminal Code, the offence will be prosecuted exclusively upon request of the 
person concerned. This only makes sense if the provision is mainly aimed at the 
protection of the individual interests of the patient, as the protection of public 
interests that go beyond the interests of the individual cannot be left at the 
29 SchonkeiSchrOder-Lenckner, SlraJgesetzhuch Kommenlar, 22 to s.203. 
30 Leipziger Kommentar-lahnke, 14-15 to s.203; Nomos Kommentar-Jung, 3 to s.203; Ostendorf, 
JR 1981, at 448; Schilnemann, ZStW 90 (1978), at 57. 
31 BGH (Civil Senate) JZ 1994, 46; Bay ObLG NJW 1987, 1492, 1493; OLG Oldenburg NJW 
1992,758,759; Kreuzer, ZStW 100 (1988), at 804; Laufs, NJW 1975, at 1434; LaufslUhlenbruck-
Schlund, Handbuch des Arzlrechls, at 505-506. 
32 SchonkeiSchrOder-Lenckner, Slra/geselzhuch Kommentar, 3 to s.203. 
33 Laufs, NJW 1975, at 1433. 
34 BT-Drucksache 7/550, at 235. 
108 
discretion of the individual, but will rather normally be prosecuted ex officio.35 
While it can be seen that the argument that s.203(1) Criminal Code serves the 
protection of the patient's privacy rights is more convincing than the public health 
argument, the pre-dominant opinion in Germany supports the view that s.203(1) 
Criminal Code protects both the patient's privacy interest and the public interest 
in preserving public health.36 Accordingly, the pre-dominant opinion promotes a 
combination of deontological and utilitarian ideas. 
Since s.203 Criminal Code does not sanction the violation of secrets in genera~ 
but instead only applies to the members of the professions especially listed, it 
follows that the provision is not intended to protect the personal and intimate 
sphere comprehensively against any intrusion, but only awards protection against 
indiscretions committed by the members of certain professions. When trying to 
understand the reason behind the special protection awarded to confidences made 
within the physician-patient relationship, several considerations are possible. One 
could argue that the physician-patient relationship deserves particular protection, 
as patients place a special trust in physicians. However, this argument is 
problematic, as it cannot explain why s.203 Criminal Code applies, for example, 
to the relationship between a prison doctor and his/her patient, a relationship 
which is not necessarily based on any particular trust in the physician.31 It seems 
more convincing to explain the special protection by the need to reveal personal, 
intimate facts to a physician as otherwise effective medical treatment might not be 
possible. S.203 Criminal Code can thus be seen as a reaction of the criminal law 
to the protection of the patient's privacy interests under Arts 2(1), 1(1) BL. Given 
that the constitutional protection is only available against state intrusions, s.203 
Criminal Code adds to this protection by guaranteeing that the physician keeps the 
medical secrets of hislher patient. Without this additional safeguard, the protection 
of medical confidentiality would be incomplete, and the patient would still have to 
fear a disclosure of hislher medical secrets. The protection of medical 
confidentiality under s.203 Criminal Code can thus be seen as the protection of 
intimate facts that had to be revealed to a necessary confidant. It has been argued 
35 Kreuzer, ZStW 100 (1988), at 803-804; Ostendorf, JR 1981, at 446; Schmitz, JA 1996, at 772. 
36 See for example Bay ObLG NJW 1987, 1492, 1493; TrOndlelFischer-TrOndle, Sira/geselzbuch, 
1 b to s.203; Kreuzer, ZStW 100 (1988), 786, at 804; Ulsenheimer, Arztstrafrecht in der Praxis, at 
270. 
37 LaufslUhlenbruck-Schlund, Handbuch des Arztrechls, at 506. 
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that in addition to guaranteeing the privacy interests of the patient, s.203(1) 
Criminal Code also protects the interests the patient pursues when consulting the 
physician, i.e. the patient's health interests.38 
1.3. Protection under contract and tort law 
In German law, the physician-patient relationship is nonnally based on a contract 
for services (s.611 Civil Code).39 The physician's obligation to medical 
confidentiality is a contractual duty in the framework of this contract,40 and a 
violation of that obligation can result in an obligation to pay compensation, if the 
prerequisites of the remedy for breach of contract are satisfied. 
Medical confidentiality is also protected under tort law by s.823(1) and (2) Civil 
Code. 
S.823 (Duty to compensate for harm) 
(1) A person who intentionally or negligently injures the life, body, health, 
freedom, property or other right of another unlawfully is obliged to compensate 
the other for the harm arising therefrom. 
(2) The same obligation applies to a person who offends against a statutory 
provision which has in view the protection ofanother.41 
Under s.823(1) Civil Code, compensation for a violation of medical 
confidentiality is available if the revelation has caused economic or immaterial 
harm. Even though a violation of the right to privacy is not specifically listed in 
s.823(1) Civil Code as giving rise to a claim for compensation, the civil courts 
have interpreted the reference to 'any other rights' in s.823(1) Civil Code so as to 
include the right to privacy.42 This protection of the privacy right under private 
law was developed as a consequence of the constitutional protection of privacy. It 
is now well-established that infonnation about a person's health belongs to the 
38 Schmitt, Die Beriicksichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52, 53 StPO bei den 
auf Beweisgewinnung gerichteten ZwangsmajJnahmen, at 124. 
39 Palandt-Putzo, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, 18 to s.61 I. 
40 Timm, Grenzen der iirztlichen Schweigepflicht, at 37. 
41 8.823 (8chadensersatzpflicht) 
(1) Wer vorslitzlich oder fahrllissig das Leben, den K6rper, die Gesundheit, die Freiheit, das 
Eigentum oder ein sonstiges Recht eines anderen widerrechtlich verletzt, ist dem anderen zum 
Ersatze des daraus entstehenden Schadens verpflichtet. 
(2) Die gleiche Verpflichtung trim denjenigen, welcher gegen ein den Schutz eines anderen 
bezweckendes Gesetz verstofit. 
42 BGHZ 26, 349 (1958); BGH NJW 1965,685; BGHZ 39,124 (1963). 
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intimate sphere that is protected by s.823(1) Civil Code,43 so that an unauthorised 
breach of medical confidentiality amounts to a tort under that provision if the 
other prerequisites are equally present. Compensation under tort law is also 
available under s.823(2) Civil Code. The requirements of s.823(2) Civil Code are 
met in particular where the physician has violated s.203(1) Criminal Code, as the 
provisions of the Criminal Code are statutory provisions having in view the 
protection of another in the meaning of s.823(2) Civil Code. 
1.4. ProCessional obligation 
The duty to maintain medical confidentiality is a professional duty and as such is 
laid down in the Code of Medical Ethics issued by the medical profession. S.2 
Model Professional Regulations which formed the basis for the Codes of Medical 
Ethics of the different German States, provides that: 
(1) The physician has to keep silent about everything confided in him or having 
become known to him in the exercise of his profession. This includes written 
statements of the patient, patient records, x-rays and other examination 
results.44 
It can thus be seen that the professional duty is not limited to information which 
the patient expressly confided in the physician. A violation of the professional 
duty to respect patient confidentiality can give rise to disciplinary sanctions. 
1.5. Summary 
The constitutional protection of medical confidentiality as part of the personality 
right must be the starting point for any examination of medical confidentiality. 
Protected is the individual's interest in keeping personal medical information 
secret as well as the interest in being able to make an autonomous choice as to 
whether or not to disclose confidential information to the physician. In the light of 
this constitutional protection which is not all that different from the protection 
available under Art.8 ECHR, the impact of the ECHR in this area is rather limited. 
The constitutional protection has also strengthened the protection of medical 
43 BGH NJW 1988, 1984; Palandt-Thomas. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, 178 to s.823. 
44 S.2(1) Berufsordnung fUr die deutschen Arne: 
Der Arzt hat Ober das, was ihm in seiner Eigenschaft als Arzt anvertraut oder bekannt geworden 
ist, zu schweigen. Dazu gehl>ren auch schriftliche Mitteilungen des Patienten, Aufzeichnungen 
Ober Patienten, Rontgenaufnahmen und sonstige Untersuchungsbefunde. 
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confidentiality under private law, as in addition to an action in breach of contract, 
compensation for a violation of the right to medical confidentiality is also 
available under tort law according to the civil courts' interpretation of s.823(l) 
Civil Code, and, under certain circumstances also under s.823(2) Civil Code. The 
breach of medical confidentiality by the physician also amounts to a criminal 
offence. This offence exists mainly for the purpose of protecting the patient's 
privacy interests against disclosure by the physician, but also in the public interest 
of preserving public health. Finally, physicians are also under an ethical 
obligation to maintain medical confidentiality imposed by their professional 
authorities and the violation of that ethical duty can result in disciplinary 
sanctions. 
2. Medical privilege 
2.1. A physician's testimony in criminal court 
S.53 Code of Criminal Procedure providing for a medical privilege in criminal 
proceedings states as follows: 
(1) Also entitled to refuse testimony are 
1. priests ... 
2. criminal defence lawyers ... 
3 .... physicians, dentists, psychological psychotherapists, psychotherapists for 
children and juveniles, pharmacists and midwifes about what has been 
confided in them or what came to their knowledge in this capacity .... 
(2) The persons listed in subsection 1 Nos. 2 to 3b are not entitled to refuse to 
give testimony when they have been released from their obligation to remain 
silent.45 
The Code of Criminal Procedure in s.53 awards physicians the right to refuse to 
testify in court about confidential information obtained in the course of their 
profession. With regard to the interests behind medical privilege, the discussion in 
German law slightly differs from that in the more general context of medical 
confidentiality. This may at first sight be surprising, given that medical privilege 
45 S.53 
(1) Zur Verweigerung des Zeugnisses sind femer berechtigt 
I. Geistliche .. . 
2. Verteidiger .. . 
3. . .. Arzte, Zahnllrzte, Psychologische Psychotherapeuten, Kinder- und 
Jugendpsychotherapeuten, Apotheker und Hebammen Ober das, was ihnen in dieser 
Eigenschaft anvertraut worden oder bekanntgeworden ist .... 
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could very easily be understood as specifically protecting medical confidentiality 
in the context of criminal proceedings. It would follow that medical privilege 
serves exactly the same interests the obligation to medical confidentiality aims to 
protect, while in addition containing a particular value decision regarding the 
overriding importance of medical confidentiality when conflicting with the 
interests in criminal proceedings. However, the legal discussion in Germany is far 
from unanimous in accepting this view. Most authors as well as the courts 
recognise that the protection of the patient's privacy rights is at least one 
important interest behind granting medical privilege in criminal proceedings.46 
On the other hand, some arguments are submitted in support of the view that 
medical privilege might aim at different objectives than s.203(1) Criminal Code. 
A first argument focuses on the wording of s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure. The 
provision gives the physician the right not to testify in court when called as a 
witness with regard to confidential patient information, without imposing a 
corresponding obligation. It could be concluded that the protection of the patient's 
privacy interests cannot be the main concern behind medical privilege, as such 
protection could only be guaranteed effectively if the physician were placed under 
an obligation not to testify, rather than being given a choice between testifying 
and refusing to testify. Another argument that has sometimes been raised is that 
medical privilege contains a value judgment, giving the interest in maintaining 
medical confidentiality in the context of criminal proceedings precedence over the 
interests pursued by criminal proceedings. Therefore, some have argued that a 
patient's privacy rights cannot be the main concern behind medical privilege, as 
they are not important enough to override the interests of justice. The promoters 
of this view were of the opinion that only significant public interests can justify an 
infringement of the state interest in criminal prosecution, 47 and for them, the 
(2) Die in Absatz 1 Nr. 2 bis 3b Genannten dOrfen das Zeugnis nicht verweigern, wenn sie von der 
Verpflichtung zur Verschwiegenheit entbunden sind. 
46 BVerfDE 32, 373, 380 (1972); Baier, Strafprozessuale Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte auperhalb 
der Strafprozepordnung als Ergtinzung der §§ 52ffStPO, at 57; KIOhn, Der Schutz der 
Intimsphtire im Strafprozep, at 331; Rengier, Die Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte im geltenden und 
im kunjtigen Strafverfahrensrecht, at 15-16; Schmitt, Die Berocksichtigung der 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52, 53 StPO bei den auf Beweisgewinnung gerichteten 
Zwangsma.pnahmen, at 122. 
47 Lenckner, 'Arztliches Berufsgeheimnis', in: Gl>ppinger (ed.), Ant und Recht, at 161; Schmidt, 
NJW 1962, at 1747-1748; Steinberg-Copek, Berufsgeheimnis und Aufteichnungen des Arztes im 
Strafverfahren, at 14-15; WUrtenberger, 'Der Schutz des Berufsgeheimnisses und das 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Sozialarbeiters', in: Conrad, JahrreiB, Mikat, Mosler, Nipperdey, 
Salzwedel (eds.), Gediichtnisschriftfiir Hans Peters, at 926. 
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protection of the patient's privacy rights was merely an individual private, and not 
a public interest. It should be noted that this argument has been voiced before the 
Federal Constitutional Court strengthened the protection of privacy rights. At 
present, many argue that the protection of the individual's privacy rights is not 
just a private interest. Society, too, has an interest in the protection of individual 
freedom, so that the protection of fundamental rights lies in the public interest.48 
Others who argue that medical privilege cannot primarily be granted to protect the 
privacy interests of the patient because s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure should 
otherwise oblige the physician not to testify, infer that s.S3 was enacted in the 
interest of the medical profession. The Federal Constitutional Court has held that 
the medical profession is a profession the members of which must necessarily rely 
on medical confidentiality for an unfettered exercise of their profession, as it is 
typical for their profession that confidential information will be confided in 
them. 49 This holding has been used to argue that medical privilege is primarily 
granted in the interest of the members of the medical profession.50 Without 
medical privilege, the members of the medical profession could not exercise their 
profession successfully, so that medical privilege is recognised to guarantee the 
right to occupational freedom guaranteed by Art.12(1) BL.51 However, it is 
difficult to accept that the interests of members of the medical profession in the 
exercise of their profession are of such overriding importance that they should 
prevail over the state interest in criminal prosecution. More importantly, it should 
not be forgotten that the interests of the medical profession are in that respect only 
indirectly affected. The exercise of the medical profession can only be hindered 
by the non-existence of medical privilege if without medical privilege, patients are 
more reluctant to seek medical advice and less forthcoming with information that 
is essential for effective medical treatment. If that were the case, however, it 
48 See, for example, Haftke, GA 1973, at 67. 
49 BVertGE 38, 312, 323 (1975). 
so Rengier, Die Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte im geltenden und im kunjiigen Strafverfahrensrecht, 
at 13-14. 
5 I See Baier, Strafprozessuale Zeugn;sverwe;gerungsrechte aufJerhalb der StrafprozefJordnung als 
Erganzung der § § 52 fJ StPO, at 56. It should be noted that Baier promotes the view that medical 
privilege exists to protect the interests of the medical profession as well as the privacy interests of 
the patient. 
Art. 12(1) BL states that: 
All Germans have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work, 
study or training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a 
law. (Aile Deutschen haben das Recht, Beruf, Arbeitsplatz und Ausbildungsstl1tte frei zu wl1hlen. 
Die Berufsausiibung kann durch Gesetz oder aufgrund eines Gesetzes geregelt werden.) 
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would be unconvincing to argue that the indirectly affected medical profession 
deserves more protection than the directly affected privacy interests of the patient. 
It can therefore not be said that medical privilege primarily aims at the protection 
of the interests of the members of the medical profession. It is admitted, however, 
that historically medical privilege had the purpose to protect the physician from 
conflicts between the ethical duty to maintain medical confidentiality, and a legal 
duty to testify about confidential patient information.52 As physicians were 
traditionally obliged by the Hippocratic Oath to keep their patients' confidences, 
an obligation which at present forms part of several International Conventions, as 
well as of the codes of medical practice, the obligation to testify in court would 
put physicians in the position either to disregard their professional or their legal 
obligation. Thus, medical privilege is partly aimed at protecting physicians from 
this type of confliCt.53 Given that the disclosure of confidential patient information 
also amounts to a criminal offence under s.203 Criminal Code, it is fair to say that 
s.S3 Code of Criminal Procedure at least partly aims at enabling the physician to 
fulfIl this legal obligation in COurt.54 
Another aspect sometimes raised is that medical privilege serves the protection of 
the nemo tenetur principle which has constitutional rank and states that no one can 
be forced to incriminate him/herself. The argument is that freedom from self-
incrimination is circumvented if the patient's right not to testify with regard to 
confidential facts were undermined by then calling the physician to the witness 
stand and examine himlher about the same confidential facts.55 The strength of the 
argument is mitigated by the fact that s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure not only 
grants medical privilege with regard to a patient who is accused in criminal 
proceedings, but also with regard to patients who are for example victims of 
criminal offences. Freedom from self-incrimination cannot explain the existence 
of medical privilege in respect of confidential information concerning other 
persons than the accused. 56 
52 Schmitt, Die Benic/csichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52, 53 StPO be; den 
auf Beweisgewinnung gerichteten ZwangsmajJnahmen, at 131. 
'3 BGHSt 9, 59, 61 (1956). 
'4 L6welRosenberg-Dahs, StrafprozejJordnung, 1 to s.53; Welp, JR 1997, at 37. 
'5 Kl6hn, Der Schutz der Intimsphare im StrafprozejJ, at 330; Petry, Beweisverbote im 
Stra!proze,Precht. at 46. 
56 Schmitt, Die Benic/CSichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52. 53 StPO be; den 
au! Beweisgewinnung gerichteten ZwangsmajJnahmen, at 122. 
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As can be seen. s.53(2) Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the 
physician is no longer free to refuse to testifY in criminal court if the patient has 
released himlher from the obligation of confidentiality. German law is thus based 
on the premise that medical privilege is no longer justified if the patient has no 
interest in keeping hislher confidential information secret in the context of 
criminal proceedings. S.53(2) could support the impression that medical privilege 
only exists in the patient's interest, as it could be argued that the patient can only 
waive his/her own privacy rights, not the physician's or the state interest in 
maintaining confidentiality. This argument must fail, however. because the only 
interest either the patient, the physician or the state can have in the protection of 
medical confidentiality is that the doctor is not forced to disclose confidential 
information against the patient's wish. 57 Thus, where the patient has authorised the 
physician to testifY about confidential information, the physician is no longer in a 
moral conflict, and the state interest in respecting the privacy right of the patient 
and the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship to promote public 
health are no longer affected. 58 Where the patient has given consent to the 
disclosure of information by the physician. the doctor has no choice and must 
testifY.59 
It is thus recognised that medical privilege serves different purposes: according to 
case-law and the predominant opinion among legal writers, it protects the privacy 
rights of the patient, the professional integrity of the physician, the physician-
patient relationship and the public interest in respecting the individual's basic 
rights and in promoting public health. However, some conclusive remarks about 
the main purpose behind medical privilege seem appropriate. The different legal 
provisions and concepts in Arts. 2(1) and 1(1) BL, s.203(1) Criminal Code and 
s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure only add up to a coherent system if the medical 
privilege recognised by s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure is interpreted as a 
specification of the protection of medical confidentiality. The Federal 
Constitutional Court has held that: 
'As far as the right to refuse to testify concerns facts regarding the citizen's 
private sphere, the protection of the private sphere of the individual was 
57 Lenckner, NJW 1965, at 323; Petry, Beweisverbote im Strafprozej1recht, at 48. 
58 See also Schmitt, Die BerlJcksichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52, 53 StPO 
bei den auf Beweisgewinnung gerichteten Zwangsmaj1nahmen, at 133. 
59 Karlsruher Kommentar-Senge, 51 to s.53. 
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accorded precedence over the public interest in fully establishing the truth in 
criminal proceedings' .60 
The Federal Constitutional Court thus clearly took the stance that the interests 
outweighing the state interest in the administration of criminal justice in the 
context of professional privilege are the constitutionally protected privacy 
interests of the patient. Only this interpretation of the intention behind s.53 Code 
of Criminal Procedure is compatible with the purposes identified as underlying 
s.203 Criminal Code, and with the significance of the patient's right to privacy. 
Even though medical privilege may incidentally serve the interests of the 
members of the medical profession, and the public interest in the preservation of 
public health, the privacy interests of the individual patient lie at the heart of 
medical privilege and are the foremost value to be protected thereby. 
2.1.1. Invocation of medical privilege - right or obligation? 
If the privacy interests of the patient are one of the purposes underlying medical 
privilege, or even its main justification, it is rather surprising that, according to the 
predominant opinion of German courts and legal writers,61 physicians are said to 
have a discretion in deciding whether or not to testifY in court about confidential 
patient information. At first sight, this opinion seems convincing as it is in 
conformity with the wording of s.53 ('entitled to refuse testimony'). But such 
literal interpretation of s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure focuses on the physician 
and hislher protection from a possible conflict between the obligation of 
confidentiality and the obligation to testifY in court and therefore only makes 
sense if the protection of the physician's interests were the main purpose behind 
s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure, a view that has already been discussed and 
rejected above. If, as promoted here, the main purpose behind medical privilege is 
the protection of the patient's privacy interests, the literal interpretation of s.53 
Code of Criminal Procedure must be rejected. As the physician's testimony 
concerns confidences of the patient, the disclosure of this information cannot be 
left to the discretion of the physician, but can only lie within the discretion of the 
patient. It is therefore more consistent to interpret s.53 as imposing upon the 
60 BVerfGE 33,367,378 (1972). 
61 See, for example, BGHSt 9,59,61 (1956); 15,200,202 (1960); 42, 73, 76 (1996); Karlsruher 
Kommentar-Senge, 7 to s.53 with further references; KleinknechtlMeyer-GoBner, 
Strafproze'pordnung, 6 to s.53; LaufslUhlenbruck-Ulsenheimer, Handbuch des Arztrechts, at 511. 
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physician the obligation not to testify about confidential patient information 
without the patient's consent, rather than as giving the physician a choice between 
testifying and refusing to testify.62 Only this interpretation is consistent with s.203 
Criminal Code. As s.S3 Code of Criminal Procedure awards the right to refuse to 
testify, the unanimous opinion is that s.203 Criminal Code also applies to 
testimony in court. The fact that a physician discloses confidential information in 
the court room can, therefore, not in itself justify a breach of medical 
confidentiality.63 This means that a physician who exercises his/her 'right' under 
s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure and decides to give testimony about confidential 
patient information without the patient's consent commits the crime of breach of 
confidentiality under s.203 Criminal Code. 
To interpret s.S3 Code of Criminal Procedure as imposing an obligation on the 
physician not to give testimony only at first sight seems to contradict the wording 
of the provision. S.S3 Code of Criminal Procedure is phrased as awarding a right, 
rather than as imposing an obligation, because not all persons who are exempt 
from testifying in criminal court according to s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure are 
under an obligation to confidentiality imposed by s.203 Criminal Code. Priests, 
for example, can refuse to testify about penitents' confidences under s.S3 Code of 
Criminal Procedure, but they will not commit a criminal offence if they decide to 
make use of this discretion, as their profession is not listed in s.203 Criminal 
Code. Furthermore, the right to refuse to testify in court is broader than the 
obligation to maintain medical confidentiality under s.203(1) Criminal Code, as 
s.203(1) only protects 'secrets', while s.S3 Code of Criminal Procedure awards 
the right to remain silent even with regard to confidential patient information that 
does not qualify as a secret in the meaning of s.203(1) Criminal Code. The 
physician's 'right' under s.S3 could thus be interpreted as merely referring to the 
choice of whether or not to testify in court about confidential patient information 
that is not a secret protected by s.203(1) Criminal Code.64 This interpretation of 
s.S3 Code of Criminal Procedure avoids the unconvincing result of the 
predominant opinion that the physician can freely decide whether or not to testify, 
but when exercising this choice in favour of giving testimony, he/she will then be 
held liable under s.203 Criminal Code for breach of confidentiality. The 
62 Fezer, Strafprozej3recht, at 203. 
63 Roxin, Strafoerfahrensrecht, at 213. 
64 Welp, JR 1997, at 37-38. 
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predominant opinion. while pertaining to protect the physician, has the 
undesirable consequence that the physician is given a choice the exercise of which 
might result in a criminal prosecution. This opinion adds nothing to the protection 
of the physician. With regard to a possible conflict between the legal and ethical 
obligation to maintain patient confidences and the obligation to testifY, the 
physician is protected comprehensively by the existence of s.53 Code of Criminal 
Procedure which exempts the physician from the duty to give testimony in 
criminal court. If the physician in certain exceptional situations feels that the 
disclosure of confidential medical information in criminal court is desirable, for 
example where it may help a person who is wrongly accused in criminal 
proceedings, this conflict cannot be resolved with reference to the procedural 
provision of s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure, as the question of whether or not 
such a disclosure is permitted will have to be resolved according to the provisions 
of substantive law which decide questions of possible legal justifications. It thus 
seems more convincing to say that the physician does not have the free choice as 
to which information to disclose in court, but is rather bound by criminal law and 
can only reveal confidential information as long as the revelation does not amount 
to a criminal offence under s.203 Criminal Code.6s 
Even if the main purpose behind medical confidentiality were not the protection 
of the patient's privacy rights, but rather the protection of the public interest in 
promoting public health, or the physician's interest in the exercise of hislher 
profession. these interests are equally undermined if the physician has a choice as 
to whether or not to breach medical confidentiality in court. Only if s.53 Code of 
Criminal Procedure is interpreted as creating an obligation. rather than a right to 
refuse to testify, can consistency between s.203 Criminal Code and s.53 Code of 
Criminal Procedure be achieved. The interests behind medical confidentiality can 
only be satisfactorily safeguarded where the physician has no right to divulge the 
information without the patient's consent.66 
The whole discussion may seem somewhat theoretical, as it could be thought that 
from the point of view of the patient, it does not make any difference whether the 
physician is only under the general obligation of medical confidentiality imposed 
6S TrOndlelFischer-TrOndle, Strafgesetzbuch, 30 to s.203. 
66 Lenckner, NJW 1965, at 326; Schmitt, Die BerlJcksichligung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechle 
nach §§52. 53 SIPO bei den auf Beweisgewinnung gerichteten Zwangsmaj3nahmen, at 145. 
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by s.203 Criminal Code, or whether s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure creates an 
additional obligation for the physician not to testify in court, as long as s.203 
Criminal Code is applicable to evidence given as a witness in criminal 
proceedings. However, the different interpretations of s.53 Code of Criminal 
Procedure have an important impact on the admissibility of the physician's 
testimony. Criminal courts have taken the stance that as the physician has the right 
to testify, this testimony is admissible evidence, regardless of whether or not the 
disclosure in the specific case constitutes a criminal offence.67 This situation is 
problematic as it permits the admission of evidence that has possibly come about 
through the means of a criminal offence.68 The purpose of criminal proceedings, 
i.e. to restore peace and justice after the commission of a crime, will be reversed if 
the witness, in testifying, commits a new criminal offence and, consequently, an 
additional breach of peace and justice occurS.69 
2.1.2. Effects of the patient's consent 
According to s.53(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, the physician can no longer 
refuse to testify if the patient has waived hislher right to medical confidentiality 
and consented to disclosure. In such a case, no criminal offence under s.203 
Criminal Code will be committed by the physician if he/she discloses confidential 
patient information. What causes legal problems in this context is the question of 
who has the right to waive medical confidentiality, and under which conditions 
such a waiver is valid. With regard to the first question, the answer is easy where 
the confidential information at issue exclusively relates to the patient. In such a 
case, it is clear that only the patient can have the right to consent to the disclosure 
of confidential information. However, the problem is more complex where the 
information confided in the physician by the patient relates to a third party, for 
example where the patient tells the physician confidential details relating to 
his/her spouse. In such a case, some argue that only the person the information 
relates to has the right to relieve the physician from the obligation to medical 
67 BGHSt 9, 59, 62 (1956); 18, 146, 147 (1962); BGHR-Schweigeptlicht I zu StPO §53 (1995); 
Karlsruher Kommentar-Senge, 9 to s.53; USweiRosenberg-Dahs, StrafprozefJordnung, 11-14 to 
s.53; for a further discussion see Alternativkommentar-Kllhne, 3-6 to 8.53. 
68 For a discussion of the controversy see KleinknechtIMeyer-GoBner, StrafprozefJordnung, 6 to 
8.53 with further references. 
69 Freund, GA 1993, at 63-64; Lenckner, NJW 1965, at 327; Nomos Kommentar-Jung, 35 to 203; 
Roxin, Strajverfahrensrecht, at 213. 
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confidentiality.70 Even though there is no physician-patient relationship between 
the physician and the third party, the protection of s.203 Criminal Code still 
applies, as the physician has learned confidential information of another in the 
course of hislher profession, which is the case where the patient confides 
information relating to a third party in the physician.71 It seems rather surprising 
that a third party can consent to the disclosure of confidential information 
obtained by the physician in the course of a professional relationship with the 
patient, and that the patient, on the other hand, cannot validly consent to the 
disclosure of such information. Even if the third party's consent exclusively 
concerns his/her own secrets, it is difficult to reconcile this view with any of the 
purposes behind the protection of medical confidentiality. As no physician-patient 
relationship exists between the physician and the third party, the physician only 
owes the patient, but not the third party an obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality, and it is then difficult to accept that the third party can validly 
relieve the physician from an obligation not owed to hirnlher. The courts seem to 
share these doubts when stating that the third party can have no right that his/her 
confidential data be protected by someone else's physician, so that the patient's 
consent should be sufficient to waive medical confidentiality even with regard to 
information not relating to him/her.72 
Valid consent presupposes capacity. This capacity is not subject to any age limits, 
but rather exclusively refers to the ability to understand the general nature and 
scope of the act consented to and the faculty to assess the consequences of giving 
consent at least in a general manner.73 This means that for example an eleven-
year-old child could validly consent to the breach of medical confidentiality as 
long as it understands the general features of this waiver. Consent must also be 
given freely and voluntarily. Voluntariness is not excluded merely because the 
patient feels in a real dilemma and consents to the disclosure only to avoid an 
even more serious disadvantage. Rather, to exclude voluntariness, the patient must 
be under such pressure that he/she no longer has any meaningful choice between 
consenting and refusing to consent. 
70 Karlsruher Kommentar-Senge, 46 to 8.53; Goppinger, NJW 1958, at 243. 
71 OLG Hamburg NJW 1962,689,691. 
72 OLG KiSln NStZ 1983,412,413; ScMnkeiSchrOder-Lenckner, StraJgesetzbuch Kommentar, 23 
to 8.203; Gllppinger, NJW 1958, at 243. 
73 BGHSt 12,379,382 (1959); 23,1,4 (1969). 
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It is problematic whether the patient's consent is only valid with regard to 
information he/she is aware of, as it is possible that the physician has not fully 
informed the patient about his/her health condition. Thus, if a patient consents to 
the physician's testimony in court, he/she might not be able to predict the content 
of such testimony with certainty. The Higher Regional Court of Hamburg argued 
that it should be sufficient that the physician indicates the possibility that the 
patient might not be aware of the full extent of the physician's knowledge. If the 
patient then still consents to the disclosure, this consent is valid.74 
2.1.3. Criminal prosecution 
It has already been established that a physician who discloses confidential patient 
information either in court or in the context of police investigations commits the 
criminal offence of s.203(1) Criminal Code, except where a legal justification 
applies. Unless the patient consented to the disclosure, the most important legal 
justification applicable to cases of breach of the professional secret is the 
necessity defence. S.34 Criminal Code provides in that respect: 
'A person who commits an offence in present danger, that cannot be otherwise 
averted, to life, body, freedom, honour, property or another legal interest, in 
order to protect himself or another from that danger, does not act unlawfully if, 
on balancing the conflicting interests, particularly the legal interests concerned 
and the degree of the dangers to them, the protected interest significantly 
outweighs the interest impaired. This only applies insofar as the offence is an 
appropriate means to avert the danger.'7s 
For the necessity defence to apply in the context of a breach of medical 
confidentiality, the physician's disclosure of confidential patient information must 
be aimed at protecting the physician himlherself or a third party from a present or 
imminent danger. This means that the testimony cannot be justified if it is merely 
given for the purpose of criminal prosecution, as in that case, the danger has 
already materialised and there is no longer any present or imminent harm to an 
individual. Even where the most serious crimes are under investigation, the right 
74 OLG Hamburg NJW 1962, 689, 690. 
758.34 Rechtfertigender Notstand 
oWer in einer gegenw!lrtigen, nieht anders abwendbaren Gefahr fUr Leben, Leib, Freiheit, Ehre, 
Eigentum oder ein anderes Rechtsgut eine Tat begeht, urn die Gefahr von sieh oder einem anderen 
abzuwenden, handeIt nieht rechtswidrig, wenn bei AbwAgung der widerstreitenden Interessen, 
namentlieh der betroffenen Rechtsgiiter und des Grades der ihnen drohenden Gefahren, das 
geschfitzte Interesse das beeintrAehtigte wesentIich Uberwiegt. Dies gilt jedoch nur, soweit die Tat 
ein angemessenes Mittel ist, die Gefahr abzuwenden.' 
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of the victim was already violated and there is no longer a present danger as 
required by s.34.76 If the physician wants to testilY because he/she thinks that the 
perpetrator is likely to commit future crimes, a breach of confidence would under 
these circumstances not serve the purpose of prosecuting the relevant crime, but 
rather the purpose of crime prevention which is a different problem. The general 
risk that someone who has committed a crime might do so again is not sufficient 
to justify a breach of confidence under the necessity defence.77 
Another argument supports the finding that a breach of medical confidentiality 
cannot be justified under the necessity defence for the mere purpose of criminal 
prosecution. The legislature, when introducing the right not to testify, did not 
distinguish between different offences according to their seriousness, but rather 
awarded this right independent from the nature of the crime at trial. This means 
that the legislature, when resolving the conflict between the public interest in 
criminal prosecution and truth-finding, on the one hand, and the private and public 
interests in medical confidentiality, on the other hand, balanced the competing 
interests as required by s.34 Criminal Code and came to the conclusion that the 
interest in medical confidentiality outweighs the interests in criminal 
prosecution. 78 This means that a physician who breaches medical confidentiality 
in the interest of criminal prosecution does not protect an interest that significantly 
outweighs the interest impaired, as required by s.34 Criminal Code. In addition, 
the necessity defence only applies where the violation of medical confidentiality 
is an adequate means to achieve the intended purpose, i.e. to ensure criminal 
prosecution. It is often possible that the confidential information the physician can 
testify about will not in itself be sufficient for a successful prosecution, so that the 
requirements of the necessity defence would then not be fulfilled. 
As can be seen, the necessity defence is for various reasons not available as a 
legal justification for a violation of medical confidentiality when the physician 
gives testimony in court. Some authors find it hard to accept that as a 
consequence, a breach of medical confidentiality for the purpose of criminal 
76 Baumann, Weber, Mitsch, Sira/recht Allgemeiner Teil, at 332; Hafike, GA 1973, at 69. 
77 Leipziger Kommentar-Jahnke, 89 to s.203. 
78 BVerfDE 33367,378 (l972); Baier, Strafprozessuale Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte auflerhalb 
der Strafprozeflordnung als Erganzung der § § 52 ff SIPO, at 117; Hafike, GA 1973, at 69; 
Kramer, NJW 1990, at 1763; Ostendorf, DRiZ 1981, at 11; Schilling, JZ 1976, at 620; Steinberg-
Copek, Berufsgeheimnis und Aufzeichnungen des Antes im Strafverfahren, at 60; Sydow, Kritik 
der Lehre von den "Beweisverboten", at 115. 
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prosecution will always amount to a criminal offence. To avoid this result, it has 
been suggested that a justification of conflicting duties should be recognised so 
that in every case of a breach of medical confidentiality by a physician the duty to 
protect the intimate sphere of the patient should be balanced against the public 
interest in an effective administration of justice, an interest which is equally of 
constitutional rank as it follows from the constitutional principle of the rule of 
laW.79 This is, however, problematic. First, the physician is not under any legal 
duty to assist the state in the prosecution of crime. The only legal duty imposed on 
individuals in this context is the duty to give testimony in criminal court, an 
obligation from which s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure exempts the physician. It 
is thus incorrect to speak about a conflict of duties which could justify the breach 
of one of these obligations. It seems as if the promoters of the view that a breach 
of medical confidentiality can be justified by a conflict of duties rather have a 
conflict of interests in mind, when they argue that this justification should only 
apply to the prosecution of serious offences, as the public interest in such cases is 
said to outweigh medical confidentiality.80 Given that the legislator has not 
created any exemptions from the obligation to keep the medical secret for the 
purpose of assisting the prosecution of serious offences, there is no legal basis for 
such a balancing of interests outside of the necessity defence.81 
2.1.4. Testimony to establish the innocence of an accused 
A different problem arises where the physician has information about the 
innocence of an accused person, for example where the real perpetrator is a 
patient of the physician and has confessed his/her guilt to the doctor in the course 
of medical treatment, or where the physician has made observations regarding 
his/her patient's guilt. First, it should be noted that under German law, the accused 
does not have a right to compel the physician to give testimony in his/her favour, 
as such a right is barred by medical privilege, unless the accused is a patient and 
consents to the disclosure of hislher own medical secrets according to s.53(2) 
Code of Criminal Procedure. The only controversial problem is whether or not the 
physician would be allowed to testify voluntarily. In this situation, again, the 
79 LaufslUhlenbruck-Ulsenheimer, Handbuch des Arztrechts, at 514. 
80 Kohlhaas, GA 1958, at 74. 
81 Schmitz, JA 1996, at 953. 
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breach of confidentiality can only be justified if all requirements of the necessity 
defence are met. The first question therefore must be whether or not a present and 
imminent danger exists in such a scenario. This is not problematic where the 
innocent person has already been convicted and the punishment is currently being 
executed or its execution is imminent, but the danger is no longer imminent where 
the execution of punishment is already terminated, for example where a person 
who was wrongly convicted to imprisonment has been released. The danger is 
equally imminent where the proceedings have reached a stage approaching a 
conviction. The situation is problematic, however, if the evidence does not 
unequivocally point to the guilt of the accused, as it is then more difficult to 
decide at which point there is an imminent danger to the liberty of the wrongly 
accused. Even where a conviction is not imminent so that an imminent danger 
exists neither with regard to the assets nor with regard to the liberty of the 
innocent person, it could be argued that there is an imminent risk that he/she is 
subjected to unwarranted criminal prosecution. 
If the requirement of a present or imminent danger is met, the justification 
depends on the outcome of a balancing of interests, as the necessity defence only 
applies where the interests pursued with the criminal offence at issue outweigh the 
interests violated thereby. The criteria to be applied to the balancing process 
depend on whether the innocent is the patient, a third party or the physician 
himlherself. If the physician possesses confidential information about his/her 
patient which could establish the patient's innocence when being accused in 
criminal proceedings, for example information that the patient was in hospital 
when the crime was committed, or that a certain physical condition of the patient 
excludes himlher as the perpetrator, the physician's testimony to that regard can 
never be justified. This is because in such a situation, the patient, when wishing 
evidence to be made available to the court, could easily release the physician from 
his/her duty to confidentiality with the consequence that the physician, according 
to s.53(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, would then be obliged to testify. If the 
patient does not want to do this, either because he/she wants to protect a third 
party, or because he/she values privacy more than his/her liberty, it is not up to the 
physician to disregard the patient's preferences and to substitute hislher judgment 
for that of the patient. 
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If the physician's testimony could exonerate a third party wrongly accused in 
criminal proceedings, many scholars argue that the necessity defence should apply 
to justify a breach of confidentiality. They argue that the interests of the wrongly 
accused not to be convicted outweigh the interests of the perpetrator in the 
protection of hislher medical confidences.82 Others reject such a justification 
completely, because a doctor is bound only by the patient's well-being, without 
owing any obligation to a third party or to the public to prevent incorrect court 
decisions.83 This is not convincing, as in the context of the necessity defence, it is 
not important whether or not the physician has an obligation to protect the 
interests at issue. Once the physician has decided to violate medical 
confidentiality to protect the interests of an innocent third party, the only 
consideration can be whether the protected interest outweighs the violated 
interests as required by s.34 Criminal Code. In that respect, some argue that only 
issues of liberty rank higher than the maintenance of professional confidentiality 
so that a breach of confidentiality would only be justifiable where the accused is 
at risk of imprisonment. 84 The importance of the loss of money after a conviction 
to a fine will probably differ according to the special circumstances of each case 
and it is questionable whether financial interests can prevail over the privacy 
interests of the patient. However, other interests also have to be taken into 
account. A criminal conviction or even the threat of a criminal conviction can 
entail a loss of reputation as well as bring about consequences in respect of the 
exercise of certain professions. To decide whether or not a breach of 
confidentiality can be justified under s.34 Criminal Code, it thus has to be decided 
in each case whether these consequences affect interests of such overriding 
importance that the interest in medical confidentiality will have to yield. A case-
by-case approach seems thus most appropriate, and also conforms with the 
objectives of the necessity defence which aims at enabling a just and fair decision 
in a particular case. 
82 OLG Celie NJW 1965, 362, 363; Baier, StraJprozessuale Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte 
aufterhalb der Strafprozeftordnung als Erganzung der §§ 52 jfStPO, at 117; TrondleIFischer-
Trondle, StraJgesetzbuch, 31 to s.203; Dahs, Handbuch des Strajverteidigers, at 32; Flor, JR 1953, 
at 368-369, Leipziger Kommentar-Jiihnke, 90 to s.203; Schmitt, Die Berocksichtigung der 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52, 53 StPO bei den auJ Beweisgewinnung gerichteten 
Zwangsmaftnahmen, at 153; SchonkelSchrOder-Lenckner, StraJgesetzbuch Kommentar. 1 to s.203. 
83 Woesner. NJW 1957, at 692. 
84 MOiler, MDR 1971, at 970. 
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If it is the physician who is wrongly accused in criminal proceedings, in addition 
to the considerations made in the context of the prosecution of an innocent third 
party, the physician's defence rights are also at issue. Defence rights are of 
constitutional rank: and many argue that they must prevail over the interest in 
medical confidentiality.85 When others suggest that the physician must wait for a 
conviction before being allowed to reveal confidential information, 86 it should not 
be forgotten that the danger is already imminent before the actual conviction takes 
place, and that the physician's defence rights can no longer be exercised 
effectively once the conviction has occurred. This argument can thus not be 
sustained in the context of the necessity defence. 
2.1.5. Crime prevention 
Another question is whether a breach of confidentiality can be justified where 
there is a real risk that someone will commit a crime. In this context, it is first of 
all important to look at ss.138, 139 Criminal Code which impose an obligation to 
disclose to the relevant authorities information for the purpose of crime 
prevention. 
S.138 Criminal Code states that: 
(1) A person who has plausible knowledge regarding the plan or the carrying 
out of 
1. preparations for a war of aggression (s.80), 
2. high treason in the cases of ss.81 to 83(1), 
3. treason or an endangerment of the external security in the cases of ss.94 to 
96; 97(a) or 100, 
4. counterfeiting of money or bonds in the cases of ss.146, 151, 152 or 
counterfeiting of credit or bank: cards or of forms for Eurocheques in the cases 
ofs.152(a)(1) to (3), 
5. aggravated trafficking in human beings in the cases ofs.181(1) nos. 2 or 3. 
6. murder, manslaughter or genocide (ss.211, 212 or 220(a», 
7. an offence against personal freedom in the cases of ss.234, 234(1), 239(a) or 
239(b), 
8. robbery (ss.249 to 251 or 255) or 
85 BGHSt 1,366,368 (1951); KG JR 1985,161,162; Tri>ndleIFischer-Tri>ndle. StraJgesetzbuch. 
31 to 8.203; Leipziger Kommentar-Jlihnke. 83 to s.203; ScMnkeiSchrikler-Lenckner, 
StraJgesetzbuch Kommenlar, 33 to s.203. 
86 Systematischer Kommentar-Samson. 45 to s.203. 
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9. a criminal offence endangering the public safety in the cases of ss.306 to 
306(c) or 307(1) to (3), 308(1) to (4), 309(1) to (5), 310, 313, 314 or 315(3), 
315(b)(3) or 316(a) or 316(c) 
at a time when the commission of the offence or its consequences could still be 
averted, and omits timely to inform the authorities or the potential victim, will 
be punished with imprisonment of up to five years or with a fine. 
(2) Similarly will be punished every person who plausibly learns about the plan 
or the carrying out of an offence under s.129(a) [forming of a terrorist 
organisation] at a time when the commission can still be prevented and omits 
to inform the authorities immediately.87 
And s.139 Criminal Code states: 
(3) A person who omits to make a report on a relative, remains free from 
punishment if he seriously endeavoured to prevent him from committing the 
offence or to avert its consequences, unless the offence in question was 
1. murder or manslaughter (ss.211 or 212), 
2. genocide in the cases ofs.220(a)(I) No.1, or 
3. kidnapping (s.239(a)(1», hostage-taking (s.239(b)(I» or an assault on air or 
sea traffic (s.316(c)(1» by a terrorist organisation (s.129(a». 
Under the same conditions, a solicitor, criminal defence lawyer or physician is 
under no obligation to report that which was confided in him in his 
professional capacity. 88 
87 S.138 Nichtanzeige geplanter Straftaten 
(I) Wer von dem Vorhaben oder der Ausfilhrung 
I.einer Vorbereitung eines Angriffskrieges (§ 80), 
2. eines Hochverrats in den Fallen der §§ 81 bis 83 Abs. 1, 
3. eines Landesverrats oder einer Geflihrdung der liuBeren Sicherheit in den Flillen der §§ 94 bis 
96, 97a oder 100, 
4. einer Geld- oder Wertpapierflilschung in den Flillen der §§ 146,151, 152 oder einer Falschung 
von Zahlungskarten und Vordrucken filr Euroschecks in den Fallen des § 152a Abs. 1 bis 3, 
5. eines schweren Menschenhandcls in den Flillen des § 181 Abs. I Nr.2 oder 3, 
6. eines Mordes. Totschlags oder V6Ikerrnordes (§§ 211, 212 oder 220a), 
7. einer Straftat gegen die persl>nliche Freiheit in den FAllen der §§ 234, 234a, 239a oder 239b, 
8. eines Raubes oder einer rliuberischen Erpressung (§§ 249 bis 251 oder 255) oder 
9. einer gemeingefahrlichen Straftat in den FAllen der §§ 306 bis 306c oder 307 Abs. 1 bis 3, des § 
308 Abs. 1 bis 4, des § 309 Abs. Ibis 5, der §§ 310, 313, 314 oder 315 Abs. 3, des § 315b Abs. 3 
oder der §§ 316a oder 316c 
zu einer Zeit, zu der die Ausfilhrung oder der Erfolg noch abgewendet werden kann, glaubhaft 
erflihrt und es unterlABt, der BehOrde oder dem Bedrohten rechtzeitig Anzeige zu machen, wird mit 
Freiheitsstrafe bis zu runf Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft. 
(2) Ebenso wird bestraft, wer von dem Vorhahen oder der Ausfilhrung einer Straftat nach § 129a 
zu einer Zeit, zu der die Ausfilhrung noch abgewendet werden kann, glaubhaft erflihrt und es 
unterllil3t, der BeMrde unverzOglich Anzeige zu erstatten. 
88 S.139 Straflosigkeit der Nichtanzeige geplanter Straftaten 
(3) Wer eine Anzeige unterllil3t, die er gegen einen AngeMrigen erstatten mUBte, ist straffiei, wenn 
er sich emsthaft bemOht hat, ihn von der Tat abzuhalten oder den Erfolg abzuwenden, es sein 
denn, daB es sich urn 
1. einen Mord oder Totschlag (§§ 211 oder 212), 
2. einen Volkerrnord in den Flillen des § 220a Abs. I Nr.1 oder 
3. einen erpresserischen Menschenraub (§ 239a Abs. 1), eine Geiselnahme (§ 239b Abs. I) oder 
einen Angriff auf den Luft- und Seeverkehr (§ 316c Abs. 1) durch eine terroristische Vereinigung 
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Thus, while individuals are normally under an obligation to report all of the 
offences listed in s.138 (Criminal Code) for the purpose of crime prevention, 
physicians are under the more narrow obligation to report only those offences that 
are listed in s.139(3) Criminal Code, but do not have to report information 
regarding the other offences listed in s.138 Criminal Code as long as they 
seriously tried to prevent the commission of the offence or to avert its 
consequences. Even if these attempts fail, the physician cannot be held criminally 
liable for not reporting the planned commission of the offence. A physician who 
reports a planned criminal offence to the relevant authorities in accordance with 
hislher obligations under ss.138, 139 Criminal Code will not be liable for a breach 
of his/her obligation to medical confidentiality.89 For a small number of criminal 
offences, the legislator has thus made the decision that the interest in medical 
confidentiality is outweighed where such offences can be prevented by a breach of 
confidence. 
In all other cases, the conflict between medical confidentiality and crime 
prevention must be resolved according to the criteria of the necessity defence. The 
necessity defence can again only be invoked successfully if harm to other 
individuals is present or imminent, and even then only where the balancing of all 
interests involved points towards a precedence of the interest protected by the 
breach of confidentiality and no less intrusive means are available to prevent the 
commission of the crime. Danger is defined as a situation in which the likelihood 
with which the violation of a right can be expected exceeds the general risks of 
life.90 The 'imminent danger' requirement can be problematic. It is without doubt 
fulfilled, if the patient tells his/her physician that he/she will commit a crime the 
details of which are already specified. However, it is difficult to draw the line 
between an imminent danger and the mere possibility that the patient might 
commit a crime which is not sufficient to justify a breach of medical 
confidentiality under the necessity defence. It is thus questionable whether an 
imminent danger exists when the patient informs the physician about his/her 
intentions to commit a future crime without any specifications with regard to time, 
(§ 129a) 
handelt. Dnter denselben Voraussetzungen ist ein Rechtsanwalt, Verteidiger oder Arzt nicht 
verpflichtet anzuzeigen, was ihm in dieser Eigenschaft anvertraut worden ist. 
89 ScMnkeiSchrOder-Cramer, Sira/geselzbuch Kommentar, 23 to s.138. 
90 Jakobs, Allgemeiner TeN, at 415. 
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place, intended victims etc., or where the mental condition of the patient gives rise 
to general worries that the patient might commit a crime. While Lenckner would 
answer this question in the affirmative, as he argues that a danger in the meaning 
of s.34 exists in a situation in which the permanent dangerousness of a person 
could at any time lead to the commission of a criminal offence,91 in none of the 
above-mentioned cases exists a danger that exceeds the general risks of life. It is 
thus submitted that an imminent danger presupposes that the intention to commit a 
criminal offence or the dangerous mental condition are sufficiently specified. In 
most cases, even if the prerequisite of an imminent danger is met, the necessity 
defence will still not succeed, as a breach of medical confidentiality will often not 
be a suitable means to avert the danger, given that the disclosure of such 
information will only rarely prevent the commission of the crime. 
In those cases in which exceptionally all the prerequisites of the necessity defence 
are met, the success of the necessity defence depends on the outcome of a 
balancing exercise. The patient's interest in medical confidentiality has to be 
balanced against the interests of the potential victims and the state interest in 
crime prevention. Factors to be taken into account when balancing the competing 
interests are for example the seriousness of the intended criminal offence and the 
value accorded to the endangered rights. Thus, the result of the balancing test may 
be influenced by factors such as whether the patient intends to commit a serious 
assault with a weapon, or whether he/she merely wants to slap someone. It is also 
important whether there is a risk to the life of a third party, or a risk to property or 
financial interests, and whether the patient plans to cause considerable damage or 
whether he/she rather intends to steal some flowers. Given these rather vague 
considerations, the question arises whether some general criteria should be 
developed to facilitate the balancing exercise. One possibility could be to borrow 
the criteria provided by the legislator in ss.138, 139 Criminal Code for the conflict 
between the state interest in the prevention of certain serious crimes and the 
interest in medical confidentiality. It has been suggested that it follows from these 
provisions that the legislator values medical confidentiality more than the 
disclosure of intended crimes that are not listed in s.139. Some go even further 
and argue that the disclosure by the physician of an intended criminal offence can 
never be justified under the necessity defence unless the physician is under an 
91 ScMnkeiSchrlkler-Lenckner, StraJgesetzbuch Kommentar, 17 to 8.34. 
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obligation to disclose pursuant to ss.138, 139.92 However, it is rather problematic 
to interpret ss.138, 139 Criminal Code, the purpose of which is to create an 
obligation to disclose intended serious criminal offences, as excluding the 
application of the necessity defence which aims at the resolution of specific 
conflicts of interests and requires to take into account all the circwnstances of the 
individual case. The legislator is reluctant to impose obligations on the citizen, so 
that it does not seem appropriate to mterpret the rather narrow obligations 
imposed on the physician by ss.138 and 139 Criminal Code so as to limit his/her 
right to refer to the necessity defence in the case of a conflict between the 
obligation to maintain confidentiality and the necessity to prevent a criminal 
offence by the way of disclosure. Ss. 138, 139 should therefore not be seen as 
strict rules for the balancing process in the context of s.34 Criminal Code, but 
rather only as guidelines concerning the value of the rights protected by different 
criminal provisions. Consequently, the disclosure of criminal offences that are not 
listed in ss.138 and 139 Criminal Code will normally not be justified, but a 
justification of a breach of medical confidentiality under the necessity defence 
with regard to such offences remains possible under exceptional circwnstances.93 
2.2. Confidential material exempt from search and seizure 
Police access to confidential patient information is governed by s.97 Code of 
Criminal Procedure stating that: 
(l) Are exempt from seizure 
1. written communications between the accused and persons entitled to refuse 
to give testimony under 5.52 or s.53(1) number 1 to 3b; 
2. documents prepared by the persons listed in s.53(1) number 1 to 3b relating 
to information confided in them by the accused or relating to other information 
the right to refuse to give testimony refers to; 
3. other materia~ including the results of medical examinations, the right to 
refuse to give testimony awarded to the persons listed in s.53(l) number 1 to 
3b refers to. 
(2) These restrictions only apply if the material is in the custody of the person 
who has the right to refuse to give testimony .... The restrictions to seizure do 
not apply when the person who has a right to refuse to give testimony is 
suspected of aiding and abetting, of acting as an accessory after the fact, of 
92 Kielwein, GA 1955, at 231. 
93 ScMnke/Schr&Jer-Lenckner, StraJgesetzbuch Kommentar, 31 to s.203; 
MaurachlSchroederlMaiwald, Besonderer rei/I, at 293. 
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obstruction of criminal prosecution, or of handling or receiving of stolen goods 
94 
.... 
It can be seen that patient information is comprehensively protected, in that not 
only written patient communication and documents are exempt from seizure, but 
also other material the physician holds in confidence, which, for example, 
includes bullets removed from the patient's body.95 
S.97 Code of Criminal Procedure must be seen in the context of confidentiality 
protection. If the physician could be forced to hand over confidential patient 
materia~ the right not to testify in criminal court would lose much of its protective 
effect, as the information which is protected by s.53(1) Code of Criminal 
Procedure would then be available to the state by the means of seizure. S.97 Code 
of Criminal Procedure thus aims at preventing a circumvention of the physician's 
right under s.53(1) Code of Criminal Procedure to refuse to give testimony in 
criminal court about confidential patient information, 96 and the provision 
accordingly intends to guarantee the same rights s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure 
is designed to protect, i.e. mainly the privacy right of the patient.97 This conforms 
with the Federal Constitutional Court's holding that medical records, as they 
contain information on anamnesis, diagnosis and therapeutic measures, belong to 
the private sphere of the patient, and are protected by Art.2(1) and Art.1(I) BL 
against state access.98 In addition, s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure serves the 
protection of the physician's interest in an unimpeded exercise of his/her 
94 S.97: 
(1) Der Beschlagnahme unterliegen nicht 
1. schriftliche Mitteilungen zwischen dem Beschuldigten und den Personen, die nach § 52 oder § 
53 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 bis 3b das Zeugnis verweigern dUrfen; 
2. Aufzeichnungen, we\che die in § 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 bis 3b Genannten ober die ihnen yom 
Beschuldigten anvertrauten Mitteilungen oder Ober andere Umstllnde gemacht haben, auf die sich 
das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht erstreckt; 
andere Gegenstande einschlieBlich der arztlichen Untersuchungsbefunde, auf die sich das 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht der in § 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 bis 3b Genannten erstreckt. 
(2) Diese Beschr!lnkungen gelten nur, wenn die Genest!lnde im Gewahrsam der zur Verweigerung 
des Zeugnisses Berechtigten sind .•.• Die Beschrankungen der Beschlagnahme gelten nicht, wenn 
die zur Verweigerung des Zeugnisses Berechtigten einer Teilnahme oder einer BegOnstigung, 
Strafvereitelung oder Hehlerei verdachtig sind •... 
9S Karlsruher Kommentar-Nack, 14 to s.97. 
96 BVertGE 32, 373, 385 (1972); BGHSt 38, 144, 145 (1991); OLG Frankfurt StY 1982,64,65; 
Karlsruher Kommentar-Nack. 1 to s.97. 
97 BVertGE 44, 353,373 (1977); BVerfGE 32, 373, 380 (1972); Klohn, Der Schutz der 
Intimsphiire im Strafprozep, at 331; Lorenz, MDR 1992, at 315-316; Rengier, Die 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte im geltenden und im Icunftigen Strafverfahrensrecht, at 15-16; 
Schmitt, Die Beroc/csichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52, 53 StPO be; den auf 
Beweisgewinnung gerichteten Zwangsmapnahmen, at 122. 
98 BVertGE 32, 373, 380 (1972). 
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profession and in not having to contribute to the patient's criminal conviction.99 
Moreover, s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure aims at a protection of the 
confidential physician-patient relationship,100 and at promoting public health. lol It 
can thus be seen that the purpose behind s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure accords 
with the purpose behind s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure and s.203 Criminal 
Code. 
2.2.1. Protection of the accused 
S.97(1) and (2) Code of Criminal Procedure expressly refer to the protection of a 
patient who is accused in criminal proceedings. This gave rise to the controversial 
debate on whether only confidential information of an accused patient is protected 
from seizure, and how the non-accused patient can be protected. While a small 
minority of legal scholars argue that s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure not 
necessarily must be interpreted so as to apply exclusively to information relating 
to the patient who is accused in criminal proceedings,102 this view seems 
inconsistent with the express wording of s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure which 
only refers to the accused and does not mention the protection of other persons. IO) 
S.97 Code of Criminal Procedure thus leaves witnesses' or victims' confidential 
medical documents without protection from search and seizure. This is difficult to 
explain, given that the predominant opinion sees a protection of the patient's 
privacy rights as one, if not the most important rationale behind s.97 Code of 
Criminal Procedure. If s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure is designed to prevent a 
circumvention of s.53, this goal cannot be achieved if the protection is limited to 
accused patients, because s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure gives the physician a 
right not to testifY regardless of whether the confidential information concerns an 
accused, a witness or a third party not at all related to the criminal proceedings. 104 
99 BVerfDE 38, 312, 323 (1975); LO Koblenz MDR 1983, 779, with regard to the lawyer-client 
relationship; SchlUchter, Das Strafverfahren, at 289; Weyand, wistra 1990, at 5-6. 
100 LO KOln NJW 1959, 1598. 
101 Amelung, DNotZ 1984, at 198-199; Rengier, Die Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte im geltenden 
und im kun/tigen Slrafverfahrensrecht, at 22-23. 
102 Amelung, DNotZ 1984, at 207; Krekeler, NStZ 1987, at 201. 
10) OLO Celie NJW 1965, 362, 363; LO Hildesheim NStZ 1982, 394, 395; LO Hamburg NJW 
1990,780; LO Fulda NJW 1990,2946,2947; LOweIRosenberg-Schlifer, 3a to s.97; Schmitt, Die 
Berlkksichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§ 52, 53 StPO be; den auf 
Beweisgewinnung gerichteten ZwangsmajJnahmen, at 117; Welp, JZ 1974, at 423. 
104 Amelung, DNotZ 1984, at 207; Alternativkommentar-Ame1ung, 14-15 to s.97. 
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The restriction of s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure to the protection of 
confidential medical documents of an accused patient is thus inconsistent with 
s.s3 Code of Criminal Procedure and s.203 Criminal Code. 105 Some therefore 
argue that s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure only serves the purpose that evidence 
gained in the course of the confidential physician-patient relationship should not 
be used against the accused and relate this purpose to the privilege against self-
incrimination.106 If this were the purpose behind s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure, 
confidential material would have to be protected from seizure regardless of 
whether it is in the possession of the patient, or the physician. However. s.97(2) 
Code of Criminal Procedure clarifies that the protection from seizure only applies 
to material that is in the possession of the physician. 107 
It is difficult to accept that a victim's or other third party's interest in the 
confidentiality of medical information deserves less protection than the privacy 
interests of the accused. As a way around the insufficient protection of medical 
records of the non-accused patient from seizure under s.97 Code of Criminal 
Procedure, courts increasingly refer to constitutional principles as a basis for a 
prohibition to seize patient records. Under German constitutional law, every 
statute and every act by a state authority must be compatible with the provisions 
of the Basic Law. Given the constitutional protection of medical confidentiality 
and of medical records, the courts therefore have to examine whether the seizure 
of confidential patient information that is in the possession of a physician is 
compatible with the right to privacy. The Federal Constitutional Court held that 
there are different spheres of intimacy which deserve different degrees of 
protection. While the core of the intimate life of the individual is inviolate, private 
spheres outside of this core are also constitutionally protected. but can be subject 
to restrictions. If a state act violates the private sphere, a balancing between the 
interests pursued by the state and the privacy interest of the individual has to take 
place, and only if the state pursues a legitimate interest, which cannot be achieved 
by less intrusive means and which is not outweighed by the privacy interest, is the 
act compatible with the Basic Law. As medical records do not belong to the core 
lOS OLG Celie NJW 1965, 362, 363; LG Hildesheim NStZ 1982, 394, 395. 
106 Rudolphi, NStZ 1998, at 473; Welp, JZ 1974, at 423. 
107 Weinmann, 'Die Beschlagnahme von Gesch~ftsunterlagen des Beschuldigten bei 
Zeugnisverweigerungsberechtigten', in: Hanack, RieB, Wendisch (eds.), Festschriftfor Hans 
Diinnebier, at 208. 
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of the intimate sphere, but rather form part of the private sphere which can be 
restricted subject to the requirements mentioned, in the case of a seizure of 
confidential medical records the public interest in criminal prosecution must be 
balanced against the privacy interests of the patient. According to the Federal 
Constitutional Court the interest in the prosecution of a crime committed by the 
patient the confidential information relates to is, in principle, not sufficient to 
justify a violation of the privacy right. 108 Recent case law of the German Supreme 
Court, the highest court in criminal and civil matters, seems to suggest that this 
court now uses the constitutional balancing test for a broad interpretation of s.97 
Code of Criminal Procedure. In a case of rape in which the victim had consented 
to the physician's testimony regarding her physical examination after the event, 
and the defence wanted access to other medical records of the victim to establish 
that she had alcohol and psychological problems, the court rejected this motion on 
the grounds that it was not supported by a sufficient showing that the victim's 
medical records were material to the case. The Court continued: 
'The Senate can leave open the question of whether medical records which do 
not concern the accused but a witness, are in general protected by the 
prohibition of seizure under s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure and are therefore 
inadmissible in court ... or whether such a principal exemption from seizure 
which would correspond with the general right to refuse to testify under s.53 
Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be considered ... .109 Under the 
circumstances of this case, a seizure and use of medical records through 
procedural measures against the wishes of the victim and against the wishes of 
the physician must be ruled out ... as a disproportionate intrusion upon a 
particularly sensitive area of the private sphere.'lIO 
In another case, however, in which the regional court had decided that the seizure 
of a victim's medical records was unlawful as it disproportionately interfered with 
the victim's personality right, the Court disagreed and held that: 
'The prohibition of a seizure which is not unlawful according to the provisions 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure can follow directly from the Basic Law, if 
... it intrudes upon the constitutionally protected sphere and violates the 
principle of proportionality... . However, the intrusion upon the personality 
right of the person concerned by a seizure for the purpose of securing evidence 
is only disproportionate if the personality right outweighs the needs of effective 
criminal prosecution and crime prevention, following from the principle of the 
rule of law .... The patient's personality right does not necessarily exclude the 
seizure of third parties' medical records .... Rather, the seriousness of the 
108 BVerftJE 32, 373, 381 (1972). 
109 See also BGH NStZ 1998,471,472. 
110 BGH NStZ 1997, 562. 
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offence must be considered in the balancing process ... so that in cases of 
serious crime the seizure of third parties' medical records can be lawful.' II I 
The Court then excluded the seizure on other grounds. 
This case law is interesting as the Federal Supreme Court in both decisions left 
open the question of whether or not s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure protects the 
medical records of the non-accused patient. Given that until very recently, those 
who interpreted s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure as protecting the medical 
records of all patients were in a small minority, the express reference to this 
minority opinion and the statement that this controversy does not have to be 
decided in the specific case suggests that the minority opinion gains some weight 
with the courts. The case law also shows that the Supreme Court is willing to 
protect medical records of a victim at least as long as the materiality of their 
content was not sufficiently established by the defence. Furthermore, the Court 
now expressly holds that in the case of medical records ofa non-accused patient, a 
balancing test has to be performed. According to the Supreme Court the patient's 
personality rights will not automatically prevail over the state interest in criminal 
prosecution. Rather, the personality rights may have to yield in cases concerning 
the prosecution of serious offences. 112 The regional court of Hamburg, on the 
other hand, decided that where the privacy interest of a witness conflicted with the 
state interest in establishing facts which could potentially incriminate the accused, 
the privacy interest of the witness had to prevail and the seizure of the witness' 
medical records was unconstitutional, even though not prohibited under s.97 Code 
of Criminal Procedure.1I3 While the recent developments in the Federal Supreme 
Court's case law must be welcomed, it is nevertheless submitted that the 
protection awarded to medical records of non-accused patients does not go far 
enough and that the view of the regional court of Hamburg is to be preferred. If a 
patient's confidences are protected by the provisions of the Criminal Code, the 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by constitutional principles, and 
if in other cases of conflict between the right to medical confidentiality and the 
state interest in criminal prosecution for various reasons the latter has to yield, 
regardless of the seriousness of the offence under investigation, it seems 
inconsistent to allow the seriousness of the crime to be determinative in deciding 
111 BGH NStZ 1998,471,472. 
112 See also LG Fulda NJW 1990, 2946. 
IIJ LG Hamburg NJW 1990, 780, 781. 
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whether or not the medical records of a non-accused patient may lawfully be 
seized. Rather, the balancing process now performed by the courts should follow 
the principles outlined above in the context of a breach of medical confidentiality 
by the physician. 
Another problem sometimes arising in this context is that of whether or not the 
patient's interest in medical confidentiality outweighs the interest in an effective 
exercise of defence rights. The Higher Regional Court of Celle114 had to decide a 
case in which a physician was accused of negligently causing the death of a 
patient. The court held that the interest of the physician in presenting exonerating 
evidence should prevail over the privacy interest of the deceased patient. The 
court considered whether it was less intrusive and more appropriate to reconcile 
the competing interests by maintaining medical confidentiality and assuming the 
truthfulness of the assertions of the defence, but rejected this solution on the 
grounds that even if this procedure resulted in the acquittal of the physician, 
without full exploration of the evidence he would still be tormented by doubts as 
to whether his behaviour had contributed to the patient's death. While it is at least 
arguable that the interest of the accused in not being subjected to a criminal 
penalty without having the possibility of presenting exonerating evidence can be 
important enough to outweigh even the privacy interest of a patient, it is submitted 
that moral problems of the physician cannot be of higher value than 
constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights. 
Another problem in this context is caused by seizures of confidential patient 
records in the course of investigations against the physician, for example 
investigations for tax fraud or for medical malpractice. As s.97 Code of Criminal 
Procedure is only applicable where the patient is accused in criminal proceedings, 
in such a situation s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure will not provide any 
protection against search for and seizure of confidential patient records. I IS In its 
famous Memmingen decision, the German Supreme Court held that the seizure of 
patient records in the course of criminal investigations against a physician for 
illegal abortions was lawful. l16 In support of this view it has been argued that in 
such a situation the physician-patient relationship is no longer worthy of 
114 NJW 1965,363. 
115 Karlsruher Kommentar-Nack. 6 to s.97. 
116 BGHSt 38,144, 146 (1991). 
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protection, I 17 that otherwise the physician would be in the situation of abusing the 
confidential physician-patient relationship for committing crimes without having 
to fear discovery, and that in this particular situation the seizure of confidential 
patient records is therefore justified.l 18 It is submitted, however, that the 
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship is mainly protected to 
guarantee the patient's privacy rights and that those rights do not deserve less 
protection just because the physician has abused this relationship as a cover for 
criminal activities. 119 As a way around the fact that the physician does not have to 
fear discovery, the police could seek the patient's consent to the seizure ofhislher 
medical records, which will in many cases probably be given, particularly if a 
considerate use of these data were guaranteed. If, as already demonstrated, the 
patient's interest in medical confidentiality always outweighs the state interest in 
criminal prosecution, this must also apply to the criminal prosecution of 
physicians. 
It is submitted that the current legal situation regarding the application of s.97 
Code of Criminal Procedure to the seizure of medical records of non-accused 
patients needs cIarification, given that there is a lack of clear guidelines as to the 
operation of the balancing test and the weight to be accorded to the principle of 
medical confidentiality within that process. 120 The privacy rights of the patient 
who is not accused in criminal proceedings are thus not sufficiently safeguarded 
under present law. The situation needs to be changed, in that the restriction of the 
protection of s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure to the accused should be abolished, 
and all patients should be protected against disclosure of their confidential 
medical records for the mere purpose of criminal prosecution.121 This is the only 
way to reconcile the law with the objectives underlying s.97 Code of Criminal 
Procedure and to put an end to the existing inconsistencies between s.97 Code of 
117 SchlUchter, Das Strafverfahren, at 289. 
1\8 Weyand, wistra 1990, at 6. 
119 See also Lorenz, MDR 1992, at 316 who argues that the fact that the seizure violates the 
patient's privacy rights is an important factor in the context ofthe balancing exercise. 
120 For an example of how difficult it is for German courts to make sense of this confusing 
situation see most recently LG Bielefeld, StY 2000, 12, and the commentary by Samson, StY 
2000,55-56. 
121 See also Krekeler, NStZ 1987, at 201; Muschallik, Die Befreiung von der antlichen 
Schweigepj1icht undvom Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht im Strafproze,P, at 138; Schmitt, Die 
BerlJcksichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechle nach §§ 52,53 SIPO be; den auf 
Bewe;sgewinnung gerichlelen Zwangsma,Pnahmen, at 128. 
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Criminal Procedure and s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure and s.203 Criminal 
Code. 
2.2.2. Custody requirement 
S.97(2) Code of Criminal Procedure limits the protection of confidential medical 
documents to records that are in the possession of the physician, thus excluding 
medical documents that are in the possession of the patient himlherself. It follows 
that medical records of an accused patient cannot be seized at the physician's 
surgery, but a copy of the same documents can be seized when found in the 
patient's possession. It is difficult to find a justification for this restriction. One 
attempt to explain the rationale behind s.97(2) Code of Criminal Procedure is to 
say that if the medical records are no longer in the possession of the physician, the 
patient's privacy has already been invaded, so that it can no longer have the same 
weight in the balancing process. Even if this were the case where the medical 
records are in the possession of a third party, the privacy interests of the patient 
are not diminished by the fact that the confidential material is in the possession of 
the patient, rather than the physician. 122 The rationale behind the custody-
requirement seems to be that if protection is awarded to information obtained in 
the framework of a protected relationship, for example that of physician and 
patient, there is no longer a justification for this protection where the material has 
left the confidential context. Thus, where confidential material is no longer in the 
possession of the physician and third parties have access to this information, the 
purpose behind the protection of medical confidentiality can no longer be 
achieved, and, most importantly, the information is no longer confidential. But 
where the material is in the possession of the patient, it is still within the 
confidential setting of the physician-patient relationship, and it is as worthy of 
protection as if it were in the physician's possession.123 Of course one could object 
that s.97 Code of Crimirtal Procedure only wants to protect the physician-patient 
relationship insofar as it would be seriously undermined if the patient were to fear 
that all information given to the doctor, and no longer under the patient's exclusive 
122 Welp, 'Die Geheimsphlire des Verteidigers in ihren strafprozessualen Funktionen', in: 
Lackner, Leferenz, Schmidt, Welp, Wolff(eds.), Festschriftfur Wilhelm Gallas zum 70. 
Geburtstag; at 416, for the lawyer-client privilege. 
123 See also Schmitt, Die BerUcksichligung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§52, 53 StPO 
bei den auf Beweisgewinnung gerichteten Zwangsma'pnahmen, at 154-157. 
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control. might be available to the police. It could thus be said that patient 
documents in the hand of the patient do not need extended protection, as they are 
under the patient's control. But this leads to the unfortunate result that a physician 
must be conscious of the danger involved when handing documents or copies of 
documents over to patients. As the patient has a right of access to his/her medical 
records, this means that the doctor has to draft those documents very carefully. 
This could result in sketchy, incomplete or even inaccurate records, as physicians 
might want to ensure that the confidential information obtained will not leave the 
confidential sphere. To prevent these unfortunate results, it has been suggested 
that s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure should be interpreted so as to protect 
medical records from search or seizure regardless of whether they are in the 
possession of the physician or of the patient, as this is the only way to ensure that 
the inviolability patient's medical confidences is guaranteed.l24 Others, while 
being of the opinion that s.97(2) Code of Criminal Procedure does not leave room 
for such an interpretation, demand an amendment of the provision to this effect. 125 
2.2.3. Effect of the patient's consent 
Yet another question is that of the effect the patient's consent in the context of 
s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure. As the purpose behind s.97 Code of Criminal 
Procedure is to prevent a circumvention of s.S3 Code of Criminal Procedure, it is 
widely argued that medical documents are no longer exempt from seizure once the 
patient has consented to the physician's testimony in respect of confidential 
information, as according to s.53(2) Code of Criminal Procedure such consent 
excludes the physician's right to refuse to testify.126 Goppinger, however, argues 
that medical documents drawn up by the physician are not identical with the 
patient's confidences, as they contain the physician's observations, diagnosis etc., 
and concludes that the patient cannot validly make dispositions with regard to 
these documents. He therefore suggests that a seizure of confidential medical 
documents cannot be justified by reference to s.53(2) Code of Criminal 
124 Bandisch, NJW 1987, at 2201. 
125 Muschallik, Die Befreiung von der arz/lichen Schweigepflicht und vom 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrechl im Slrafprozep, at 138; Petry, Beweisverbote im Stra!prozeprechl, at 
53. 
126 OLG Hamburg NJW 1962,689,690; Karlsruher Kommentar-Nack, 5 to s.97. 
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Procedure. 127 But it is submitted that it should be the responsibility of the 
autonomous patient to make sure that he/she fully understands the implications of 
such a consent. 
2.2.4. The physician's right voluntarily to submit confidential material 
Another question is whether the physician is allowed voluntarily to submit the 
material protected by s.97 Criminal Procedure Code to the police or the court, a 
question which the predominant opinion answers in the affirmative. As according 
to the predominant opinion, the physician can freely decide to give testimony with 
regard to the patient's confidences, the same should apply to s.97 Code of 
Criminal Procedure which aims at preventing a circumvention of s.53 Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 128 The voluntary submission of medical records is seen as a 
waiver of the physician's right, and the material is admissible in court even where 
the doctor's behaviour constitutes a breach of confidence under s.203 Criminal 
Code,129 which will always be the case unless a legal justification applies. This 
approach must be rejected for the same reasons for which it has been argued that 
the physician does not have a right to decide to give testimony in court about 
confidential patient information. 
2.3. Summary and conclusion 
The situation in Germany is characterised by the attempt to create a coherent 
protection of privacy and medical confidentiality. The main problem consists in 
trying to interpret all the provisions relevant in this context coherently. As 
medical confidentiality is protected as part of the constitutional personality right, 
medical privilege equally serves this purpose, though it is argued that medical 
privilege additionally aims at protecting the physician's interest in the exercise of 
hislher profession and the state interest in preserving public health. However, the 
wording of s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure gives the physician the right, rather 
than imposing an obligation to refuse to testifY in criminal court. The predominant 
opinion concludes that it lies in the physician's discretion whether or not he/she 
127 Goppinger, NJW 1958, at 245. 
128 Karlsruher Kommentar-Nack, 2 to s.97. 
129 BGHSt 18,227,230; KleinknechtJMeyer-GoBner, StraJprozeJ3ordnung, 5 to s.97. 
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exercises this right. If the physician decides to give testimony, however, he/she 
will commit the criminal offence of breach of confidentiality, unless the patient 
has consented to the disclosure of the confidential information, or the 
prerequisites of the necessity defence are fulfilled. The predominant interpretation 
of s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure thus leads to the unconvincing result that the 
physician is given a choice the exercise of which will regularly amount to a 
criminal offence. Given the interplay of s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure with 
s.203 Criminal Code as well as the purpose behind medical confidentiality and 
medical privilege, it seems compelling to argue that no such right can exist and 
that the physician is rather under an obligation not to testify in criminal court. 
S.97 Code of Criminal Procedure further complicates the situation, in that it 
prohibits the seizure of medical documents, but restricts this protection to the 
patient who is accused in criminal proceedings and to material that is in the 
possession of the physician. As s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure intends to 
prevent a circumvention of s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure, it would seem 
consistent to interpret both provisions the same way and to extend the protection 
under s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure to all patients. The courts, while leaving 
open whether or not in the future they might be willing to interpret s.97 Code of 
Criminal Procedure extensively, instead adopt the approach that a seizure of 
medical documents relating to non-accused patients is admissible only subject to a 
balancing test which is based on the principles of constitutional law. Even if a 
seizure is not prohibited under s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure, it is thus only 
admissible if the privacy right is in the particular case outweighed by the 
competing interest. 
A breach of medical confidentiality can only be justified if a legal justification 
applies. The only justification sometimes available in cases of such a breach is the 
necessity defence of s.34 Criminal Code which requires, inter alia, that the 
interest promoted by the breach must considerably outweigh the interest which is 
thereby impaired. While this can never be the case where medical confidentiality 
conflicts with the interest in criminal prosecution, as the existence of a statutory 
privilege shows the legislative intent that the interest in medical confidentiality is 
prevalent, the situation can be different where medical confidentiality conflicts 
with the interest in crime prevention, with defence rights or with the interests that 
the innocent will not be prosecuted and convicted. The same principles and 
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considerations apply to the question of whether the physician IS allowed 
voluntarily to submit patient records to the police. 
While the legal system provides for a rather strict protection of medical 
confidentiality, it can be seen that there are many inconsistencies and that the 
existence of statutory provisions does not make a reference to broader principles 
and a balancing of interests superfluous. 
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Chapter 6 - Medical confidentiality and medical privilege in England 
1. Protection of medical confidentiality 
1.1. Protection of medical confidentiality as a fundamental right 
1.1.1. Constitutional right 
The UK does not have a Bill of Rights listing fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the individual and providing them with constitutional rank. The Interdepartmental 
Working Group Concerning Legislation on Human Rights, with Particular 
Reference to the European Convention described the English approach to the 
protection of basic rights as follows:) 
'The effect of the United Kingdom system of law is to provide, through the 
development of the common law and by express statutory enactment, a 
diversity of specific rights with their accompanying remedies .... The rights that 
have been afforded in this way are for the most part negative rights to be 
protected from interference by others, rather than positive rights to behave in a 
particular way. Those rights which have emerged in the common law can 
always be modified by Parliament. ' 
This means that in order to determine which individual rights are protected by the 
English legal system, reference must be made to the common law and to statutes.2 
As the protection of fundamental rights is thus left to the principles of ordinary 
law, it follows that neither privacy in general, nor medical confidentiality in 
particular, are protected as fundamental individual right of constitutional rank. 
1.1.2. European Convention on Human Rights and Human Rights Act 1998 
As the UK takes a dualist approach towards international law, the ratification of 
the ECHR by the UK did not in itself have the effect of making it part of domestic 
law.3 The Convention has not as yet been incorporated into national law and is 
therefore not directly applicable by English courts. A violation of Art.8 of the 
Convention by English legislation or administrative acts is therefore not 
actionable before an English court. In R v Khan, 4 for example, when deciding on 
I (1976-77) HL 81. 
2 Fenwick, Civil Liberties, at 1. 
3 Gearty, 'The United Kingdom', in: Gearty (ed.), European Civil Liberties and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, A Comparative Study, at 65. 
4 [1996] 3 All ER289. 
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the admissibility of evidence of a conversation that had been taped without the 
accused's knowledge, Nolan LJ stated: 
'The argument that the evidence of the taped conversation is inadmissible 
could only be sustained if two wholly new principles were formulated in our 
law. The first would be that the appellant enjoyed a right of privacy, in terms 
similar to those of art 8 of the convention, in respect of the taped conversation . 
... The objection to the first of these propositions is that there is no such right of 
privacy in English law.s ... Under English law, there is, in general, nothing 
unlawful about a breach of privacy.,6 
Both Browne-Wilkinson, LJ, and Nicholls, LJ, however, stressed that it was 
unnecessary for the court in that case to decide whether or not a privacy right 
existed under English law, as the result in that particular case would not have 
changed had such a right been recognised.7 Even though the rights guaranteed by 
the provisions of the ECHR are not applicable, courts frequently express the view 
that British law does not, in fact, contravene the Convention rights. In John v 
MGN Limite", for example, Bingham MR emphasised that: 
'The European Convention on Human Rights is not a free-standing source of 
law in the United Kingdom. But there is ... no conflict or discrepancy between 
art. I 0 and the common law: We regard art. I 0 as reinforcing and buttressing the 
conclusions we have reached and set out above. We reach those conclusions 
independently of the convention, however, and would reach them even if the 
convention did not exist.,9 
At present, therefore, the ECHR does not accord individual rights directly 
enforceable in English courts. However, the state is under an international 
obligation to respect the Convention rights and the Convention therefore has some 
impact on English case law. In Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers 
Ltd,IO for example, the Court of Appeal held that the courts must have regard to 
the implications of the ECHR if the case concerns a legal problem that has not 
been clearly resolved under English law. 
It remains to be discussed how the situation is going to change with the coming 
into force of the Human Rights Act 1998. In Art.8, the Act guarantees the right to 
respect for private and family life, stating that: 
5 Ibid., at 297-298. 
6 Ibid., at 301. 
1 Ibid., at 291 per Browne-Wilkinson, LJ, and at 302, per Nicholls, LJ. 
• [1996] 2 All ER 35 (CA). 
9 Ibid., at 58 
10 [1992] 3 WLR28. 
145 
(I) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
The text of Art.8 Human Rights Act 1998 is identical with Art.8 European 
Convention on Human Rights. As the Act will not come into force before the year 
2000, it has yet to be seen what impact it is going to have. ll Under s.2(I) Human 
Rights Act, in determining a question that has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right, a court must take into account decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights and opinions of the Human Rights Commission. Accordingly, it 
is likely that in the future, British courts will widely follow the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights with regard to the protection of Convention 
rights. In all likelihood, therefore, British courts will award medical 
confidentiality the same protection which the principle receives according to the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights to Art.8(I) ECHR. The 
expectation has been voiced that the Human Rights Act will result in the gradual 
recognition of a general right to privacy with horizontal effect. 12 This, of course, 
would be of particular importance for the principle of medical confidentiality, as it 
mainly arises in the relationship between physician and patient, rather than 
between the state and the patient. Only if the right to privacy is given horizontal 
effect will it impact on the physician-patient relationship. Given that at present, no 
right to privacy is guaranteed, the Human Rights Act will considerably strengthen 
the privacy rights of the individual. 
1.2. Criminal offence and statutory obligation 
In English law, the violation of the obligation to medical confidentiality is, in 
principle, not a criminal offence. Statutory duties of confidentiality are limited to 
special circumstances such as, for example, venereal diseases,13 abortion, 14 and 
some activities under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. IS A more 
general statutory regime concerning the processing of computerised data as well 
as of non-computerised data that are kept as part of a qualifying filing system is 
II For a discussion, see, for example, Hunt, (1998) Public Law 423-443; Laws, (1998) Public Law 
254-265; Lord Irvine of Lairg, (1998) Public Law 221-236; Klug, (1999) Public Law 246-273. 
12 Neill, 'Privacy: A challenge for the next century', in: Markesinis (ed.), Protecting Privacy, at 
21. 
13 S.2 NHS (Venereal Diseases) Regulations 1974. 
14 S.5 Abortion Regulations 1991. 
15 S.33 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
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provided by the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998, and the Act makes 
certain abuses of computerised and manual files containing personal data a 
criminal offence:6 Data related to a person's health receive particular protection 
under Schedule 3 of the Act. Under the first principle of data protection as laid 
down in Schedule 1, personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully, which 
excludes the processing of data to which an obligation of confidentiality applies. 17 
The Health Act 1999 makes it a criminal offence under certain circumstances 
without lawful authority to disclose information the Commission for Health 
Improvement has obtained in exercising its functions. 18 
1.3. Contractual obligation 
If the physician-patient relationship is based on a contract, the doctor is under a 
contractual obligation to maintain the patient's secrets19 and it must then be 
decided whether in the individual case disclosure amounted to a breach of contract 
giving rise to a claim for compensation. However, within the framework of the 
NHS, no direct contract between the physician and the patient is concluded, and a 
physician is therefore not under a contractual obligation to keep the medical 
confidences of an NHS-patient.2o However, some argue that an independent 
contract, to the effect that the physician owes the patient an obligation to maintain 
medical confidentiality, could exist between the physician and the NHS-patient 
and that the provision of information to the physician by the patient could be 
sufficient consideration.21 This view suggests that the provision of information is 
made primarily for the benefit of the physician, an interpretation that is difficult to 
sustain. It is therefore submitted that the mere disclosure of information cannot be 
regarded as adequate consideration for an independent contract about the 
confidentiality of medical information passed on to the physic ian. 22 Also, this 
concept would provide the patient only with rather limited protection, as it could 
only protect the information volunteered by the patient, without encompassing 
every observation made by the physician in the course of the physician-patient 
16 See, for example, 8.55 Data Protection Act 1998. 
17 Jay, Hamilton, Data Protection Law and Practice, at 47. 
18 S.24 Health Act 1999. 
19 Parry-Jones v Law Society and Others [1969] 1 Ch 1, at 9 per Diplock, U. 
~: Grubb, Pearl, (1986) Family Law, at 240. 
Montgomery, (1987) Family Law, at 101. 
22 Grubb, Pearl, (1986) Family Law, at 240. 
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relationship, unless one is prepared to argue that it is sufficient consideration that 
the patient allows the physician to make observations related to his/her private and 
intimate sphere in the course of the physician-patient relationship. Thus, as far as 
the relationship between physicians and NHS patients is concerned, the physician 
is not under any contractual obligation to respect the patient's confidences. 
However, where patients are seeking private health care which is normally 
provided within a contractual relationship, the contract includes the obligation to 
maintain medical confidentiality, and a breach of that duty could then give rise to 
the remedies for breach of contract. 
1.4. Common law duty 
In English law, the most important legal basis for the protection of medical 
confidentiality is the common law duty of a doctor to respect the confidences of 
his/her patient. This is surprising, given that English law does not recognise a 
general common law right to privacy. With regard to the protection of such a 
right, it has been said that: 'The protection afforded to privacy by English law is 
piecemeal, incomplete and indirect. There is no general right to privacy.'23 This 
view was recently confirmed in Kaye v Robertson24 per Glidewell LJ, when 
stating that: 
'It is well-known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and 
accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person's privacy. The 
facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of the desirability of 
Parliament considering whether and in what circumstances statutory provision 
can be made to protect the privacy of individuals. ,25 
And Bingham LJ stated in the same case: 
'The defendants' conduct towards the plaintiff here was "a monstrous invasion 
of his privacy" .... It is this invasion of privacy which underlies the plaintiffs 
complaint. Yet it alone, however gross, does not entitle him to relief in English 
laW.,26 
The only possibility for the plaintiff in such cases is therefore to demonstrate the 
prerequisites of one of the well-established rights of action in the domain of a 
violation of privacy, such as breach of confidentiality. An important case 
23 Bailey, Harris, Jones, Civil Liberties, at S 17. 
24 [1991] FSR62 (CA). 
25 Ibid., at 66. 
26 Ibid., at 70. 
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establishing the common law protection of confidences is Argyll v Argyll.27 In that 
case, the Duke of Argyll, the former husband of the Duchess of Argyll, had 
published, without her consent, articles revealing details of their married life. 
Ungoed-Thomas J analysed the existing case law in that area and came to the 
conclusion that: 
'These cases, in my view, indicate ... (2) that a breach of confidence or trust or 
faith can arise independently of any right of property or contract other, of 
course, than any contract which the imparting of the confidence in the relevant 
circumstances may itself create; (3) that the court in the exercise of its 
equitable jurisdiction will restrain a breach of confidence independently of any 
right at law. ,28 
This case thus demonstrates that the courts are willing to protect confidential 
relationships by referring, if need be, to the instruments of equitable relief. 
However, the question remained under what circumstances such legal protection 
should materialise. In Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd,29 Megarry J identified 
the prerequisites of a common law duty to maintain confidentiality as follows: 
'Three elements are normally required if, apart from contract, a case of breach 
of confidence is to succeed. First, the information itself, in the words of Lord 
Greene MR in the Saltman case [Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell 
Engineering Co Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 413, at 415] must "have the necessary 
quality of confidence about it." Secondly, that information must have been 
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, 
there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the 
party communicating it. ,30 
It seems sensible to look at the second requirement laid down in the Coco case 
first to establish whether the physician-patient relationship is normally of such a 
nature that it is safe to conclude that the physician is under an obligation to 
maintain the confidences of the patient. To that effect, Keith LJ held in Attorney 
General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and others (2)31 in the House of Lords that: 
'The law has long recognised that an obligation of confidence can arise out of 
particular relationships. Examples are the relationships of doctor and patient .... 
The obligation may be imposed by an express or implied term in a contract but 
it may also exist independently of any contract on the basis of an independent 
equitable principle of confidence.,32 
27 [1967J Ch 302. 
28 Ibid., at 322. 
29 [1969J RPC 41. 
30 Ibid., at 47. 
31 [1988J 3 All ER 545. 
32 Ibid., at 639. 
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And Donaldson MR held in the same case in the Court of Appeal : 
'The right can arise out of a contract. ... But it can also arise as a necessary or 
traditional incident of a relationship between the confidant and the confider, 
e.g. priest and penitent, doctor and patient, lawyer and client, husband and 
wife.,33 
Thus, the relationship between physician and patient was expressly mentioned as 
a relationship giving rise to a duty of confidentiality, independent from any 
contractual duty to maintain confidentiality. The reasons for the recognition of 
such a common law obligation can be inferred from the statement by GoffLJ that: 
'A duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the 
knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or 
is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential. with the effect that 
it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded from 
disclosing the information to others. ,34 
Given the wide-spread recognition of the principle of medical confidentiality, the 
physician can be said to have notice that the information imparted to him by the 
patient is confidential and should therefore not be disclosed to others. Thus, the 
physician is, in principle, under a common law duty to maintain patient 
confidences. 
To conform with the first requirement set out in Coco, it must be established 
whether the information has the necessary quality of confidence about it. As 
Greene MR put it in Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd 
(1948):35 
'The information to be confidential must ... have the necessary quality of 
confidence about it, namely it must not be something which is public property 
and public knowledge.' 
This means that the physician is only under a duty of confidentiality as long as the 
information this obligation refers to can still be regarded as confidential. While 
this seems to be a straightforward prerequisite of a duty of confidentiality, the 
interpretation of what is or is not public knowledge can prove difficult and 
controversial. Such a problem arose in Stephen v Avery. 36 In that case, the plaintiff 
had confided details of her sex life to the first defendant and the first defendant 
had disclosed this information to a newspaper. The court had to decide whether 
33 Ibid., at 595 (CA). 
34 Ibid, at 658. 
3' [1963] 3 All ER413, at415. 
36 [J988] 2 All ER 477, per Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C (Ch D). 
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the fact that the sexual conduct at issue was evidently known to the sexual partner 
of the plaintiff meant that it did not qualify as confidential information. The court 
held: 
'The mere fact that two people know a secret does not mean that it is not 
confidential. If in fact information is secret, then in my judgment it is capable 
of being kept secret by the imposition of a duty of confidence on any person to 
whom it is communicated. Information only ceases to be capable of protection 
as confidential when it is in fact known to a substantial number of people. ,37 
This holding seems to suggest that information does not lose its confidential 
character merely because it was confided in or known by a third party. Thus, the 
patient's medical information does not lose its confidential character by the fact 
that the physician gains knowledge of it, and it remains confidential even if the 
patient confides hislher medical secret in a limited number of people, for example 
close relatives or friends. Contrast the so-called Spycatcher case.38 In that case the 
question arose whether information that had become widely known to the public 
due to the defendant's disclosure, still had the necessary quality of confidentiality 
to it so that the confidant was still under an obligation to maintain confidentiality. 
In that case, a former member of the British security service, in breach of his duty 
of confidentiality, wrote his memoirs. After the book had been published in the 
US and had been disseminated in many countries, it was held with regard to 
whether the information still had the necessary quality of confidence: 
'The reason why the duty of confidence is extinguished is that the matter is no 
longer secret and there is therefore no secrecy in relation to such matter 
remaining to be preserved by the duty to confidence. It is meaningless to talk 
of a continuing duty of confidence in relation to matters disclosed world-wide. 
It is meaningful only to discuss the remedies available to deprive the 
delinquent confidant ... of benefits flowing from the breach, or in an 
appropriate case to compensate the confider. ,39 
And Goff, LJ equally stressed that: 
'The principle of confidentiality only applies to information to the extent that it 
is confidential. In particular, once it has entered what is usually called the 
public domain (which means no more than that the information in question is 
so generally accessible that, in all the circumstances, it cannot be regarded as 
confidential) then, as a general rule, the principle of confidentiality can have no 
application to it. ... The confidential information, as confidential information, 
37 Ibid., at 481. 
38 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and others (2) [1988] 3 All ER 545. 
39 Ibid., at 647, per Brightman, LJ. 
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has ceased to exist, and with it should go, as a matter of principle, the 
obligation of confidence. ,40 
Donaldson MR held in the Court of Appeal: 
'That which has no character of confidentiality because it has already been 
communicated to the world, i.e. made generally available to the relevant 
public, cannot thereafter be subjected to a right of confidentiality .... However, 
this will not be the case if the information has previously only been disclosed 
to a limited part of that public.,41 
The facts of this case were obviously rather extreme, in that the information had 
literally been published almost world-wide. Applied to the context of medical 
confidentiality, the holdings seem to suggest that once the patient's medical 
secrets have become the subject of wide-spread publication, they cease to be 
confidentia~ and the physician can then no longer be under a duty to keep this 
information to himlherself. But where to draw the line between information that is 
so widely known as to lose its confidential status and information that is only 
known to a limited part of the public and therefore still confidential? In Bunn v 
British Broadcasting Corporation and another,42 Lightman J had to decide a case 
in which the plaintiff sought an injunction to stop the disclosure of statements he 
had made during a police interview under caution. In the course of the criminal 
trial against the plaintiff, the judge's attention was drawn to the statement which 
the judge read to himself. Lightman J decided that even though the statement 
made by the plaintiff had enjoyed confidentiality, its confidential status had ended 
because the contents of the statement were already in the public domain. To that 
effect, he held that: 
'The reading of the statement by Phillips J in open court would appear to me to 
be sufficient for this purpose. I do not think that it is realistic to draw a 
distinction between a document which the judge reads and a document which is 
I read to the judge. The distinction is artificial today when it is a matter of taste 
for the individual judge whether he requires a document to be read or reads it 
himself (consider RSC Ord 24, r 14A). But in any event Mr Suckling, referring 
the judge to the statement, stated its substance (the element in it for which 
protection is sought in these proceedings) in open court. Whether or not the 
prosecution is over and a matter of the past and the restraint on publication 
lifted, any confidentialit1; expired when the contents of the statement were 
disclosed in open court.' 3 
40 Ibid., at 660-661. 
41 Ibid., at 595. 
42 [1998] 3 All ER 552 (Ch D). 
43 Ibid., at 557. 
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It must be questioned whether this holding is compatible with Donaldson's 
statement in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and others (2), as it is 
doubtful whether the fact that the substance of the statement was summarised in 
open court, means that it loses its confidential character. The information is then 
still only known to a part of the public, but not to the public in general. The fact 
that the judge has read the statement to him/herself can hardly be used to 
tenninate the confidential quality of the information. If the judge reads the 
confidential information to him/herself and it is not read to himlher in open court, 
only the judge takes actual knowledge of its content. As long as other members of 
the public do not obtain knowledge ofthe content of the statement, this can hardly 
suffice to say that the information is now known to the public. However, if this 
holding represents the law, it follows that as soon as reference to a patient's 
medical secrets is made in open court, this information loses its confidential 
quality. 
According to Goff, LJ, the duty of confidence applies neither to useless 
information, nor to trivia.44 In the medical context, the definition of trivial or 
useless information is not necessarily clear. Thus, some people may regard the 
information whether or not a patient has consulted a certain physician as trivial, 
but others might attach a different significance to the same information. 
Information referring to some illnesses, for example a simple cold, may seem 
trivial to some people and important enough to deserve confidentiality to others. 
And many people might accord significance to the mere fact that a specialist 
clinic, such as an abortion clinic or a clinic for venereal diseases, has been 
attended.45 
The third and last requirement formulated in the Coco decision was that the 
confidential information must have been used without authorisation and to the 
detriment of the confider. This clarifies two points. First of all, confidential 
information is only protected from unauthorised use. Thus, if the physician 
discloses confidential medical information with the patient's consent, there is no 
breach of the obligation to confidence. Secondly, the disclosure must be 
... Attorney General \I Guardian Newspapers Ltd and others (2) [1988] 3 All ER 545, at 659 . 
• , See R \I CardifJCrown Court, ex parte Kellam [1994] 16 BMLR 76, at 79-80. 
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detrimental to the confider. In Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and 
others (2),46 the court had to struggle with this requirement. Keith LJ argued: 
'It is worthy of some examination whether or not detriment to the confider of 
confidential information is an essential ingredient of his cause of action in 
seeking to restrain by injunction a breach of confidence. Presumably that may 
be so as regards an action for damages in respect of a past breach of 
confidence. If the confider has suffered no detriment he can hardly be in a 
position to recover compensatory damages. However, the true view may be 
that he would be entitled to nominal damages .... There may be no financial 
detriment to the confider since the breach of confidence involves no more than 
an invasion of personal privacy .... Information about a person's private and 
personal affairs may be of a nature which shows him in a favourable light and 
would by no means expose him to criticism. ... I would think it a sufficient 
detriment to the confider that information given in confidence is to be disclosed 
to persons whom he would prefer not to know it, even though the disclosure 
would not be harmful to him in any positive way. ,47 
The court thus adopted a broad interpretation of detriment, as no financial harm is 
required. Rather, the disclosure of confidential information in itself seems to be 
sufficient to establish some sort of detriment, as long as the confider had an 
interest in keeping the information secret, regardless of whether or not the 
information would shed a negative light on or embarrass the confider. 
After thus having established that medical confidentiality can be protected under 
the common law, the question arises of how to delineate the exact scope of an 
obligation to maintain medical confidentiality. In that respect, it may be helpful to 
refer to the words of Boreham J who stated in Hunter v Mann48 that: 
'The doctor is under a duty not to disclose, without the consent of the patient, 
information which he, the doctor, has gained in his professional capacity.' 
This holding suggests that the physician's obligation to maintain confidentiality 
not only encompasses information confided by the patient in the physician, but 
rather includes confidential information that came to the knowledge of the 
physician by any other means, for example the physician's own observations, as 
long as these observations were made in the course of the physician-patient 
relationship. The common law duty thus not only protects all information revealed 
to the doctor by the patient in the course of medical treatment, but the protection 
rather also includes observations made by the doctor in connection with the 
<46 [1988] 3 All ER 545. 
47 Ibid., at 639-640. 
48 [1974] 2 All ER 414, at 417. 
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treatment of a patient.49 This was confirmed by Bingham LJ in W v Egde/l, so when 
stating that: 
'We were referred, as the judge was, to the current advice given by the General 
Medical Council to the medical profession pursuant to s 35 of the Medical Act 
1983. Rule 80 provides: 
"It is a doctor's duty, except in the cases mentioned below, strictly to observe 
the rule of professional secrecy by refraining from disclosing voluntarily to 
any third party information about a patient which he has learnt directly or 
indirectly in his professional capacity as a registered medical practitioner ... " 
I do not doubt that this accurately states the general rule as the law now 
stands.'S) 
The position is less clear in respect of information the physician received outside 
of a physician-patient relationship, for example if the patient tells a physician 
hislher medical secrets at a social gathering. Kristina Stem argues in favour of an 
extension of the physician's obligation of confidence to such situations. 
According to her, there is a strong argument that any information about a patient 
which the doctor receives should be subject to a duty of confidentiality in order to 
maintain the essential relationship of trust upon which the effective provision of 
medical treatment depends. 52 This argument may have some value as long as a 
physician-patient relationship exists between the two parties. If, however, no such 
professional relationship exists, it is difficult to see how the physician can be 
under any duty of confidence by the force of his/her professio~ and how the 
disclosure of information confided in him at a party could undermine the trust 
governing a physician-patient relationship. 
If all of the above-mentioned criteria for a common law duty to maintain medical 
confidentiality are met, protection in case of a breach of such duty is available 
under equity as well as under tort law, and the patient can get injunctive relief or 
compensation. In 1981, the Law Commission issued a report on Breach of 
Confidences3 and recommended that the protection of confidence developed by 
the courts be strengthened by the introduction of a statutory tort of breach of 
confidence.s4 However, this recommendation has not been acted upon. 
49 See for example Gurry, Breach of Confidences, at 148; Kennedy, Grubb, Medical Law, at 639. 
~ [1990J 1 All ER 835. 
51 Ibid., at 849. 
52 'Confidentiality and Medical Records', in: Kennedy, Grubb (eds.), Principles of Medical Law, 
at 499. 
53 Cmnd. 8388. 
54 Ibid., at 103. 
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It should be added that no duty of medical confidentiality exists where the 
information directly refers to a crime, as there is no confidence in iniquitY5 and 
information about the commission of a crime therefore does not have confidential 
status. 56 This applies to past as well as to future crimes. S7 
Attention will now be drawn to the reasons behind the legal recognition of an 
obligation to maintain confidentiality. Most English courts that have had to 
discuss problems of confidentiality emphasised that the protection of 
confidentiality was granted in the public interest.58 In Attorney General v 
Guardian Newspapers Ltd and others (2)59 Keith, LJ put it as follows: 
'The right to privacy is clearly one which the law should in this field seek to 
protect. ... As a general rule it is in the public interest that confidences should 
be respected, and the encouragement of such respect may in itself constitute a 
sufficient ground for recognising and enforcing the obligation of confidence. ,60 
And Goff, LJ stated: 
'The existence of this broad principle reflects the fact that there is such a public 
interest in the maintenance of confidences that the law will provide remedies 
for their protection. ... The basis of the law's protection of confidence is that 
there is a public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by 
law .... In the case of private citizens there is a public interest that confidential 
information should as such be protected. ,61 
In the Court of Appeal, Donaldson MR had taken a similar stance: 
'There is an inherent public interest in individual citizens and the state having 
an enforceable right to the maintenance of confidence. Life would be 
intolerable in personal and commercial terms, if information could not be given 
or received in confidence and the right to have that confidence respected 
supported by the force of law. ,62 
According to the different holdings in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd and others (2), the protection of confidences is thus an important societal 
goal. However, the reasons behind the public interest in the protection of 
confidences are not formulated very clearly. One of the main considerations 
" Initial Services Ltd v Pullerill [1968] 1 QB 396, at 405 per Denning MR. 
$6 Gurry, Breach of Confidence, at 329. 
'7 Ibid., at 331 with further references. 
'8 See for example Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1984] 2 All ER417, at 422 per Stephenson U. 
'9 [1988] 3 All ER 545. 
60 Ibid., at 639-640. 
61 Ibid., at 658-660. 
62 Ibid., at 596. 
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seems to be that of fairness, as the protection of confidences lies in the public 
interest where the confider had a reasonable expectation and interest in keeping 
the relevant information secret, while the confidant knew that the information was 
disclosed to him/her in confidence. It is important to note that the protection of 
confidential information is not restricted to secrets that were disclosed in the 
course of certain professional relationships. Therefore, it seems fair to say that the 
general interest in keeping personal information that has been disclosed in 
confidence secret is the subject of protection and the value the law is aiming to 
protect. 
The more general point that the preservation of a person's confidences lies in the 
public interest was applied to cases specifically dealing with confidential medical 
information. In X v Y and others,63 a case concerning medical practitioners 
suffering from AIDS, Rose J held that: 
'Confidentiality is of paramount importance to such patients, including doctors . 
... If it is breached or if the patients have grounds for believing that it may be or 
has been breached they will be reluctant to come forward for and to continue 
with treatment and, in particular, counselling .... If treatment is not provided or 
continued the individual will be deprived of its benefit and the public are likely 
to suffer from an increase in the rate of spread of the disease. The preservation 
of confidentiality is therefore in the public interest.64 ... It is in the public 
interest that actual or potential AIDS sufferers should be able to resort to 
hospitals without fear of this being revealed, that those owing duties of 
confidence in their employment should be loyal and should not disclose 
confidential matters and that, prima facie, no one should be allowed to use 
information extracted in breach of confidence from hospital records even if 
disclosure of the particular information may not give rise to immediately 
apparent harm. ,65 
From this judgment, it becomes clear that the recognition of a public interest in 
preserving medical confidentiality is based on several considerations. According 
to Rose J, the public interest seems to rest on the supposition that without medical 
confidentiality, patients will be reluctant to seek medical advice and treatment. It 
follows that the absence of medical confidentiality would harm the individual's 
health. Society as a whole could then suffer the adverse consequences if the 
individual were discouraged to seek medical advice and treatment, as this might 
lead to a spread of disease. Medical confidentiality is thus based on utilitarian 
considerations. It is not entirely clear whether Rose J's holding also recognises 
63 [1988] 2 All ER 648 (QBD). 
64 Ibid., at 656. 
6S Ibid., at 660. 
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that the protection of the individual's health and privacy lie in the public interest, 
as the interests of the individual are not analysed separately, but rather only in 
their relation to the interests of society at large. However, the broad protection of 
confidences outside the medical context seems to suggest that the holding inXv Y 
and others is mainly aimed at providing some additional considerations to bolster 
the protection of confidential medical information, rather than at reducing the 
reasons behind that protection to the interests of society. Interpreted this way, 
confidential patient information is protected in the public interest in guaranteeing 
the confidentiality of relationships worthy of protection, which seems very closely 
related to general privacy considerations. 
Another case in which the patient's interest in medical confidentiality has been 
discussed is that of W v Egdell. 66 W had been detained for shooting and killing 
five people and for wounding two others. After ten years of detention, his 
solicitors instructed Dr. Egdell, a consultant psychiatrist, to examine W and report 
on his mental health with a view to using the report to support W's application to a 
mental health review tribunal to be discharged. In his report Dr. Egdell came to 
the conclusion that W should not be discharged because his long-standing interest 
in fIrearms and explosives caused a great danger for society. When the solicitors 
received the report, they did not forward it to the tribunal but withdrew W's 
application. Dr. Egdell then forwarded his report to the hospital where W was 
detained and the hospital, with Dr. Egdell's prompting, sent the report to the 
Secretary of the State who forwarded it to the tribunal. In that case, Rose J's 
statement in X v Y was embraced by the Court of Appea~ where Stephen Brown, 
P held that: 
'Of course W has a private interest, but the duty of confidence owed to him is 
based on the broader ground of public interest described by Rose J in X v Y'.67 
And according to Bingham LJ: 
'The decided cases very clearly establish (1) that the law recognises an 
important public interest in maintaining professional duties of confidence .... W 
of course had a strong personal interest in regaining his freedom .... So he had 
a personal interest in restricting the report's circulation. But these private 
considerations should not be allowed to obscure the public interest in 
maintaining professional confidences. The fact that Dr Egdell as an 
independent psychiatrist examined and reported on W as a restricted mental 
66 [1990] 1 All ER 835 (CA). 
67 Ibid, at 846. 
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patient under s.76 of the Mental Health Act 1983 does not deprive W of his 
ordinary right to confidence, underpinned, as such rights are, by the public 
interest. 68 
Counsel for W ... drew our attention to a number of features ... : 
(1) Section 76 of the Mental Health Act 1983 shows a clear parliamentary 
intention that a restricted patient should be free to seek advice and evidence for 
the specified purposes from a medical source outside the prison and secure 
hospital system. ... The examination may be in private so that the authorities do 
not learn what passes between doctor and patient. 
(2) The proper functioning of s.76 requires that a patient should feel free to 
bare his soul and open his mind without reserve to the independent doctor he 
has retained. This he will not do if the doctor is free, on forming an adverse 
opinion, to communicate it to those empowered to prevent the patient's release 
from hospital. ... 
(5) It is contrary to the public interest that patients such as W should enjoy 
rights less extensive than those enjoyed by other members of the public .... 
Of these considerations, I accept (1) as a powerful consideration in W's favour. 
A restricted patient who believes himself unnecessarily confined has, of all 
members of society, perhaps the greatest need for a professional adviser who is 
truly independent and reliably discreet. (2) also I, in some measure, accept, 
subject to the comment that if the patient is unforthcoming the doctor is bound 
to be guarded in his opinion. If the patient wishes to enlist a doctor's 
wholehearted support for his application, he has little choice but to be ... frank . 
... As to (5), I agree that restricted patients should not enjoy rights of 
confidence less valuable than those enjoyed by other patients save in so far as 
any breach of confidence can be justified under the stringent terms of r 
81 (g).'69 
This case also gives some interesting guidance for an analysis of the interests 
behind a protection of medical confidences. First, the holding makes it entirely 
clear that the fact that a patient has hislher own individual and private reasons for 
seeking the protection of hislher medical secrets does not mean that the patient's 
interest should be qualified as a private and not a public interest. Thus, the 
protection of the patient's private goals may very well be dictated by the public 
interest. In holding that the protection of the confidentiality of the physician-
patient relationship in the context of an examination under s.76 Mental Health Act 
1976 lies in the public interest, it becomes obvious that the public has an interest 
in the protection of some individual concerns, such as the concern that a person 
detained under the Act should have the possibility to seek independent medical 
advice. The public interest identified by Rose J in X v Y is of no relevance here, as 
the protection of medical confidentiality in the context of Egdell does nothing to 
68 Ibid., at 848-849. 
69 Ibid., at 851-852. 
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promote public health. There is thus a public interest in the fair and equal 
treatment of a person detained under the Act which requires the protection of 
medical confidences to enable this person to pursue his/her private interests of 
seeking a court order to be released. 
In the academic debate, it has been suggested that in the context of personal 
information, the paramount principle behind a protection of confidentiality seems 
to be the notion of privacy and the case-law was interpreted so as to allow a 
person to control the flow of personal information about himlherself.70 Medical 
confidentiality is said to empower the patient to make informed choices about 
matters vital to their life and health, thereby promoting the patient's health as well 
as his/her autonomy.71 The importance of general privacy considerations in the 
context of medical confidentiality has recently been stressed by the Court of 
Appeal in Source Informatics Limited,72 when Simon Brown, LJ argued in the 
context of the pharmacist-patient relationship that 'the concern of the law here is 
to protect the confider's personal privacy'; and: 
'If ... his only legitimate interest is in the protection of his privacy and if that is 
safeguarded, I fail to see how his will could be thought thwarted or his personal 
integrity undermined [by the anonyrnisation or the processing of anonyrnised 
medical information].' 
This seems to suggest that a wide range of privacy concerns, including the 
patient's autonomy, lie at the heart of the obligation to protect patient confidences. 
1.5. Professional obligation 
The duty of medical confidentiality is imposed on every physician as a 
professional duty. In 1995, the General Medical Council (GMC) issued guidelines 
on confidentiality which provide as follows: 
1. Patients have a right to expect that you will not disclose any personal 
information which you learn during the course of your professional duties, 
unless they give permission.73 
According to s.36 of the Medical Act 1983, the GMC has the power to impose 
disciplinary measures on a physician who was judged by the Professional Conduct 
70 Gurry, Breach o/Confidence, at 98. 
71 Boyd, (1992) 18 JME, at 173 and 178; Gillon, (1985) 291 BMJ, at 1636. 
72 Decision of21 December 1999, not yet published. 
73 Confidentiality: Guidance from the General Medical Council. 
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Committee as being guilty of serious professional misconduct. A breach of 
medical confidentiality can amount to serious professional misconduct and trigger 
disciplinary sanctions.'4 The guidelines issued by the GMC, though obviously 
possessing considerable authority among members of the medical profession, 
nevertheless do not have the force of law and therefore do not bind the courts 
which reserve the right to strike down professional regulations that are 
unreasonable.'s However, as can be seen, for example, from the statement of 
Bingham, LJ in W v Egdell, 76 the courts refer to those guidelines and, with regard 
to medical confidentiality, have decided that the rules set out by the GMC 
adequately reflect the law. The exact extent of the professional duty to maintain 
medical confidentiality is open to interpretation. It has been argued that the scope 
of that obligation varies in different areas of medical practice, as in some areas, 
for example in psychiatric medicine, confidentiality can be of greater importance 
than in general medicine.77 
1.6. Summary 
In English law, medical confidentiality is not protected as an individual 
fundamental right, and the protection awarded to medical confidentiality under 
Art.8 ECHR is not directly enforceable as the ECHR does not form part of 
domestic law. However, this situation will change with the coming into force of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates Art.8 ECHR into domestic law. A 
breach of medical confidentiality is, in principle, not a criminal offence. The main 
discussion of the protection of medical confidentiality takes place in the context of 
the common law duty to respect confidences. While privacy as such is not 
protected under English law, certain specific aspects of privacy, such as 
confidences, receive protection and the courts have developed a common law duty 
to keep confidences as long as there is an expectation of secrecy. Medical 
confidentiality forms part of this protection, and in case of a breach, injunctive 
relief or compensation are available. The courts mostly adopted a pragmatic 
approach towards actions for breach of confidence. Rather than trying to classify 
the action to make it fit into one of the existing categories of law, they made use 
74 Kennedy, Grubb, Medical Law, at 579. 
" Newdick. (1996) 3 EJHL, at 373. 
76 [1990J 1 All ER 835 (CA), at 852. 
77 McHale, (1989) 52 MLR, at 717. 
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of the existing categories such as contract, equity, property and torts to develop 
what Gurry describes as a sui generis action for breach of confidentiality.7s 
Medical confidentiality can also be protected by contract law, but only in the very 
limited situations in which a contractual relation between physician and patient 
exists. In addition, the medical profession has imposed an obligation on their 
members to maintain patient confidences, the violation of which may give rise to 
disciplinary sanctions. 
It is interesting to note that while the protection of medical confidentiality lies in 
the public interest, the legal protection of confidentiality was mainly developed in 
the area of private law to regulate conflicts between private parties. Thus, the state 
provides the individual with legal remedies where a breach of confidentiality has 
occurred or is about to occur, but does not react with the threat of criminal 
sanctions to a breach of the obligation of medical confidentiality, save under 
exceptional circumstances. 
It should be added that the protection of medical confidentiality has recently 
received a lot of attention through the report of the Caldicott Committee which 
had been established to review the transmission of identifiable patient information 
from one NIlS body to another.79 The provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 
also contain safeguards for confidential medical information with regard to the 
specific situation of processing of such information. These developments show 
the increasing concern for the protection of privacy. 
2. Medical privilege 
2.1. Medical privilege in criminal court 
The meaning of privilege was explained by Diplock U in Parry-Jones v The Law 
Society80 who stated that: 
'Privilege is irrelevant when one is not concerned with judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings because strictly speaking, privilege refers to a right to 
withhold from a court, or a tribunal exercising judicial functions, material 
which would otherwise be admissible in evidence.' 
78 Gurry, Breach o/Confidence, at 26 and 58. 
79 d www.oh.gov.uklconfiden.htm (1997). 
80 [1969] 1 Ch I, at 9. 
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Thus, the question of privilege can only arise in the context of judicial 
proceedings. The definition of privilege given by Diplock LJ already points to the 
problem that the existence of a privilege against disclosure of information in 
judicial proceedings will always conflict with the interest in an unimpeded 
administration of criminal justice. The decision to award a privilege can be said to 
contain a general pronouncement of how to balance these competing interests. In 
the words of the court in Grant v DownS:81 
'The existence of the privilege reflects, to the extent to which it is accorded, the 
paramountcy of this public interest over a more general public interest, that 
which requires that in the interests of a fair trial litigation should be conducted 
on the footing that all relevant documentary evidence is available.' 
Procedural law rests on the premise that the public interest in the administration of 
justice is the overriding consideration in the context of court proceedings.82 This 
interest is mainly specified as an interest that the truth be established in court 
proceedings, a purpose which can only be achieved if, in principle, all existing 
evidence is available to the court when making a decision.83 A privilege has the 
effect of undermining this principle by depriving the court of evidence that would 
otherwise be available. However, the interests in the administration of justice are 
not limited to the interest in finding the truth in criminal proceedings. Rather, they 
also include the unimpeded exercise of defence rights by the accused,84 and the 
interest in the dissipation of unfounded suspicions against the innocent. 8S 
Privilege can thus be seen as an exception to the general rule that in the context of 
court proceedings, the interests in the administration of justice are paramount, as 
the existence of a privilege indicates that in the situation to which the privilege 
applies, the interest in the administration of justice must yield to the interest that is 
protected by the privilege. Therefore, privilege is only granted in very exceptional 
cases in which it is felt that the conflicting interests at stake are of even higher 
rank than the public interest in the administration of justice.86 To decide whether 
or not to recognise a privilege in a given case, it is therefore of utmost importance 
to be clear about the conflicting interests and their respective values. The only 
81 [1976] 135 C.L.R 674, at 685 per Stephen, Mason and Murphy, JJ. 
82 Home Office v Harman [1983] I AC 280, at 308 per Kinkel U. 
83 See, for example, Campbell v Tameside Council [1982] 1 QB 1065 (CA), per Ackner U. 
84 See, for example, Re K and others (Minors) (Disclosure) [1994] 1 FLR 377 (FD), per Booth J; 
see also Corker, (1998) 38 Med. Sci. Law, at 138-141. 
8S In Re W(Minors) (Social Workers: Disclosure) [1999] 1 WLR205, at 215 per Butler-Sloss LJ. 
86 Cross and Tapper on Evidence, at 451-452. 
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privilege recognised in English law is that of the legal profession.87 It is felt that 
this privilege is justified as the protection of the confidentiality of the lawyer-
client relationship directly benefits the administration of justice. As the argument 
goes, a client might be inhibited in telling his/her lawyer the full truth unless 
he/she can be certain that the lawyer will treat the information imparted in himlher 
with the strictest confidentiality. This privilege therefore does not stand in direct 
conflict to the interests in the administration of justice, but is rather one aspect of 
this interest, just as the interest that the truth be established, and the House of 
Lords has even held that legal professional privilege is a fundamental condition on 
which the administration of justice as a whole relies. 88 Legal professional 
privilege accordingly does not reflect a decision that the confidentiality of certain 
relationships as such is more important than considerations of justice, but rather 
only demonstrates the conviction that justice can best be served by protecting the 
confidentiality of this particular professional relationship.89 The recognition of 
legal professional privilege is thus based on a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. 
English law does not, however, provide for a privilege for physicians in respect of 
the disclosure of confidential information obtained by them in the course of the 
professional relationship with their patients.9o Edgedale J held in Nuttall v Nuttall 
and Twynan91 that what a person said to his doctor in a professional consultation 
was not privileged and that the doctor in the witness box must either give 
evidence or be committed to be sent to prison for contempt of court. This does not 
necessarily mean, though, that the physician-patient relationship does not receive 
any protection from disclosure in criminal proceedings. But it means that the 
physician cannot, as a matter of right, refuse to give testimony in criminal court 
where the testimony concerns confidential patient information Boreharn J held in 
Hunter v Mann92 that although a doctor has no right to refuse the disclosure of 
confidential information in the course of judicial proceedings, in certain 
87 See, for example, Attorney-General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477 (CA), at 489 per Lord 
Denning. 
BB See, for example, R v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parte B [1996] AC 487 (HL), at 507 per 
Taylor, LJ; and at 510 per Nicholls U; see also Re D (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) [1995] 2 
FLR 687 (HL), at 512 per Mustill U. 
89 McHale, Medical Confidentiality and Medical Privilege, at 16-18. 
90 Attorney-General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477 (CA), at 489 per Lord Denning; Hunter v 
Mann [1974] 2 All ER 414-420, at 417 per Boreham J; Goddard v Nationwide Building Society 11986] 3 All ER 264, at 271 per Nourse U. 
I Nuttall v Nuttall and Twynan (1964)108 Sol J 605. 
92 Hunter v Mann [1974] 2 All ER414, at 417. 
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circumstances the judge may refuse to compel him to do so. And Wilberforce LJ 
held in British Steel Corp. v Granada Television Ltef3 that: 
'As to information obtained in confidence, and the legal duty, which may arise, 
to disclose it to a court of justice, the position is clear. Courts have an inherent 
wish to respect this confidence, whether it arises between doctor and patient ... 
or in other relationships .... But in all these cases the court may have to decide, 
in particular circumstances, that the interest in preserving this confidence is 
outweighed by other interests to which the law attaches importance. ' 
This raises the question of how this discretion to exclude evidence should be 
exercised. Can it be said that even evidence that is relevant and necessary for a 
decision in criminal court can be excluded merely on the grounds that the 
information the disclosure of which is sought was imparted in the physician under 
the cloak of confidentiality? The suggestion that confidentiality should be 
recognised as a separate heading of privilege was expressly rejected by the House 
of Lords in Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise (NO.2).94 In D v N.S.P.C.C.95 the House of Lords further 
developed the law in this area. Hailsharn LJ stated that confidentiality by itself did 
not give any ground for immunity,96 Diplock LJ confirmed that view and rejected 
the proposition that 'the basis of all privilege from disclosure of documents or 
information in legal proceedings is to prevent the breaking of confidence. ,97 
Simon LJ argued similarly: 
'I do not think that confidentiality of the communication provides in itself a 
satisfactory basis for testing whether the relevant evidence should be withheld. 
... It is undesirable that exclusion should be conferred by confidentiality 
irrespective of the public interest. ... For the reasons I have given I do not 
myself think that confidentiality in itself establishes any public interest in the 
exclusion of relevant evidence, but rather that it may indirectly be significant 
where a public interest extrinsically established (for example, provision of 
professional legal advice or effective policing) can only be vindicated if its 
communications have immunity from forensic investigation. ,98 
Edmund-Davies LJ balanced the interest in the administration of justice, on the 
one hand, and the interest in protecting confidentiality, on the other hand, and 
came to the following conclusion: 
93 [1980J 3 WLR 774, at 821. 
94 [1974J AC 405, at 433-434 per Cross U. 
9$ [1978] AC 171 (HL). 
96 Ibid., at 230. 
'TI Ibid., at 220. 
98 Ibid., at 237-239. 
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'It is a serious step to exclude evidence relevant to an issue, for it is in the 
public interest that the search for truth should, in general, be unfettered. 
Accordingly, any hindrance to its seekers needs to be justified by a convincing 
demonstration that an even higher public interest requires that only part of the 
truth should be told .... But it is established in our law that the mere fact that 
information is imparted in confidence does not, of itself, entitle the recipient to 
refuse disclosure of the identity of the informer .... Accordingly, it would be 
unthinkable to vest the judiciary with the power to exclude in its discretion 
evidence relevant to the issues in civil proceedings merely because one side 
wants it kept out and the judge thinks that its disclosure is likely to prove 
embarrassing. In other words, the exclusion of evidence always calls for clear 
justification .... No reported case supports the proposition ... that a judge is 
entitled to direct a doctor not to disclose information regarding his patient's 
health.' 99 
He emphasised that the physician-patient relationship cannot be treated as 
equivalent to the lawyer-client relationship and summarised the law as follows: 
'(I) In civil proceedings a judge has no discretion, simply because what is 
contemplated is the disclosure of information which has passed between 
persons in a confidential relationship (other than that of lawyer and client), to 
direct a party to that relationship that he need not disclose that information 
even though its disclosure is (a) relevant to and (b) necessary for the attainment 
of justice in the particular case. If (a) and (b) are established, the doctor or the 
priest must be directed to answer if, despite the strong dissuasion of the judge, 
the advocate persists in seeking disclosure .... 
(II) But where (i) a confidential relationship exists (other than that of lawyer 
and client) and (ll) disclosure would be in breach of some ethical or social 
value involving the public interest, the court has a discretion to uphold a refusal 
to disclose relevant evidence provided it considers that, on balance, the public 
interest would be better served by excluding such evidence .... 
(V) The mere fact that relevant information was communicated in confidence 
does not necessarily mean that it need not be disclosed. But where the subject 
matter is clearly of public interest, the additional fact (if such it be) that to 
break the seal of confidentiality would endanger that interest will in most (if 
not all) cases probably lead to the conclusion that disclosure should be 
withheld .... 
(VI) The disclosure of all evidence relevant to the trial of an issue being at all 
times a matter of considerable public interest, the question to be determined is 
whether it is clearly demonstrated that in the particular case the public interest 
would nevertheless be better served by excluding evidence.' 100 
It is thus clear that a physician is not exempt from giving testimony in criminal 
court simply on the ground that the information he/she is called to testify upon 
refers to confidential patient data, as the fact that the confidentiality of the 
physician-patient relationship is protected outside of court proceedings is not in 
99 Ibid., at 242-244. 
100 Ibid., at 245-246. 
166 
itself sufficient to override the competing interest in finding the truth. The judge's 
discretion to exempt the physician from the duty to give testimony seems to be 
subject to an analysis of the relevance and the value of the information in judicial 
proceedings. Thus, as lo~g as the physician's testimony is relevant and necessary 
to the proceedings, the judge cannot permit the non-disclosure of such information 
merely on the basis of its confidentiality, if the other side insists on full revelation 
of all relevant facts. According to Edmund-Davies LJ's opinion in D v N.S.P.c.c., 
even where information is relevant and necessary, the judge still has the discretion 
to direct non-disclosure if in addition to the confidentiality of the information, 
other reasons point towards on overriding interest in non-disclosure. D v 
N.S.P.C.C. was a case concerning public interest immunity, and in accordance 
with that decision, it seems now possible that a judge directs non-disclosure of 
confidential information if, besides the general interest in maintaining 
confidentiality, there is an additional interest, for example the public interest in 
protecting the informants of the N.S.P.C.C. so as to enable that organisation to 
function and effectively to protect children. Only the existence of such an 
additional public interest can achieve what confidentiality alone could not, namely 
to outweigh the public interest in the administration of justice. 101 Scarman LJ 
expressed this thought as follows: 
'The confidential nature of a document does not, by itself, confer ''public 
interest immunity" from disclosure. The confidential nature of a document or 
of evidence is no ground for a refusal to disclose the document or to give 
evidence, if the court requires it. I do not see the process of the decision as a 
balancing act. If the document is necessary for fairly disposing of the case, it 
must be produced, notwithstanding its confidentiality. Only if the document 
should be protected by public interest immunity, will there be a balancing act. 
And then the balance will not be between "ethical or social" values of a 
confidential relationship involving the public interest and the document's 
relevance in the litigation, but between the public interest represented by the 
state and public service, i.e. the executive government, and the public interest 
in the administration of justice. ... It does not follow that, because we are 
outside the field of public interest immunity, the confidential nature of the 
documents is to be disregarded by the court in the exercise of its discretionary 
power to order discovery of documents .... The factor of confidence ... militates 
against general orders for discovery and does impose upon the tribunal the duty 
of satisfYing itself ... that justice requires disclosure. ,102 
101 See also, for example, Campbell" Tameside Council [1982] 1 QB 1065 (CA). 
102 Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028 (HL (E)), at 1087-1089. 
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Thus, confidentiality of information the disclosure of which is sought in criminal 
proceedings does not as such give rise to a balancing of the interest in 
confidentiality and the interests of justice. Confidentiality is, however, protected 
as the courts should only order the disclosure of confidential information that is 
relevant to the case at issue. This is in line with the decision in A. G. v 
Mulhollanio3 where Lord Denning had tried to mitigate the effects of the lack of 
medical privilege by holding that judges will respect confidences and not direct a 
doctor to answer unless not only is it relevant, but in the course of justice it also is 
a proper and necessary question to be put and answered. Once the relevance of the 
information is established, however, the court no longer has any discretion to 
allow non-disclosure merely based on the confidentiality of the information. With 
regard to the protection of medical confidentiality in criminal proceedings, it can 
therefore be stated that neither the patient nor the physician have the right to insist 
on non-disclosure of confidential information, and that no protection exists for 
confidential medical information that is relevant and necessary for judicial 
proceedings. In such a case, not even a balancing exercise will be performed to 
decide on a case by case basis whether the interest in medical confidentiality or 
that in the administration of justice should prevail in the individual case. Rather, 
the interest in the administration of justice always prevails over the interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of medical information that is relevant and necessary for 
criminal proceedings. 
It is submitted that this conclusion is difficult to justifY. As the protection of 
medical confidentiality lies in the public interest, in all cases in which the 
disclosure of confidential medical information is sought in criminal court, two 
public interests are in conflict with each other and it is therefore difficult to see 
why the public interest in the protection of medical confidentiality can be 
outweighed without any balancing of interests taking place. However, given the 
courts' holdings, the only possibility to have medical information protected from 
disclosure in court proceedings would be to convince the courts that there is a 
public interest in the protection of such information that goes beyond the general 
interest in confidentiality and therefore deserves protection under the principles 
laid down in D v NS.P.C.C. 
103 [1963] 2 QB 477. 
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Even if confidential information is relevant and its disclosure necessary and no 
public interest immunity applies, confidentiality will still be protected as far as 
possible. In Taylor v Serious Fraud Office,104 it has been argued that it was a 
matter of fairness and justice that the privacy and confidentiality of those whose 
confidential information was needed in judicial proceedings, was not invaded 
more than absolutely necessary for the purposes of justice. Thus, only that part of 
confidential information that is relevant and necessary for the proceedings will 
have to be disclosed, and the information can normally not be used outside the 
judicial proceedings in which it had been revealed. 
Where does this leave the physician who is called upon to testify as a witness in 
criminal proceedings and who feels that hislher testimony would constitute a 
breach of the legal as well as of the ethical obligation to maintain the medical 
confidences of his/her patient? With regard to the legal obligation, the law was 
clearly stated by Diplock LJ in Parry-Jones v The Law Society: 105 
'What we are concerned with here is the contractual duty of confidence, 
generally implied though sometimes expressed, between a solicitor and client. 
Such a duty exists not only between solicitor and client, but, for example, 
between banker and customer, doctor and patient, and accountant and client. 
Such a duty of confidence is subject to, and overridden by, the duty of any 
party to that contract to comply with the law of the land. Ifit is the duty of such 
a party to a contract, whether at common law or under statute, to disclose in 
defined circumstances confidential information, then he must do so.' 
It is thus clear that the physician is only under an obligation to maintain the 
medical secrets of his/her patient as long as this obligation is not overridden by 
law. Given that the physician is under a legal obligation to give testimony in 
judicial proceedings and that this obligation is regarded as more important than 
the general obligation to respect medical confidentiality, when a physician is 
called upon to testify he/she is not faced with conflicting legal duties, but is rather 
only under the legal duty to give testimony, to which the legal duty to maintain 
medical confidentiality must yield. Thus, while a patient could obtain an 
injunction to prevent the physician from disclosing confidential medical 
information outside judicial proceedings,106 the same information is no longer 
protected from disclosure when it becomes relevant in the context of litigation. 107 
104 [1998] 3 WLR 1040, (HL (E», at 1049 per Hoffinann U. 
105 [1969] 1 Ch 1, at 9. 
106 See, for example, Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1986] 3 All ER 264, per Nourse U. 
107 W v Egdell [1990)1 All ER 835, (CA) at 848 per Bingham U; Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 
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However, this does not necessarily resolve a potential conflict between the legal 
obligation to testify and the ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality. In 
Hunter v Mann,108 Widgery LJ described the physician's situation as follows: 
'If a doctor, giving evidence in court, is asked a question which he finds 
embarrassing because it involves him talking about things which he would 
normally regard as confidential, he can seek the protection of the judge and ask 
the judge if it is necessary for him to answer. The judge, by virtue of the 
overriding discretion to control his court which all English judges have, can, if 
he thinks fit, tell the doctor that he need not answer the question. Whether or 
not the judge would take that line, of course, depends largely on the importance 
of the potential answer to the issues being tried.'109 
And in Garner v Garner, 110 the judge expressly recognised the conflict the 
obligation to testify would impose on the physician, but was confident that the 
physician would appreciate that 'in a Court of Justice there were higher 
considerations than those which prevailed with regard to the position of medical 
men.' It has also been argued that the good sense and tact of the judiciary have 
prevented the need of awarding privilege to medical practitioners11l and that the 
courts recognise the public interest in upholding confidential relationships and 
will therefore not lightly make a decision that could potentially damage the 
relationship or the reputation of a profession, particularly if no good purpose 
would be served thereby.112 One commentator even suggested that the de facto 
protection awarded by the courts goes so far that solicitors will normally not even 
attempt to get a court order compelling the physician to disclose confidential 
patient information, as such an undertaking is doomed to failure unless there is an 
overwhelming reason for seeking disclosure.113 There is thus a tendency to 
suggest that the interest in medical confidentiality is sufficiently, or even overly, 
protected by the discretion of the courts. The Criminal Law Revision Committee 
seems to have adopted the same position when it decided against recommending 
any extension of professional privilege to include the physician-patient 
relationshipl14 because it was regarded as unlikely that any difficulties would 
at 494; Matthews, (1981) 1 Legal Studies, at 93. 
lOB [1974] 2 All ER414 (QBD). 
109 Ibid., at 420. 
110 [1920] 34 The Law Times Report 196, per McCardie J. 
111 Anonymous, (1974) BMJ, at 391. 
112 Murphy on Evidence, at 386; see also McHale, Medical Confidentiality and Medical Privilege, 
at 15; but see Harvard, (1985) 11 JME, at 9, who argues that there is very little evidence that the 
courts are anxious to protect medical confidentiality. 
113 Samuels, (1986) 26 Med. Sci. Law, at 237. 
114 Eleventh Report, Cmnd 4991, para.272-276. 
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occur in practice. The Committee argued that a broad medical privilege allowing 
the physician to refuse to testifY in criminal court about every confidential aspect 
of the physician-patient relationship would be undesirable, as the interests of 
justice will often outweigh the public interest in medical confidentiality, for 
example where a physician obtained information about a criminal offence 
committed by his/her patient. Even in the case of the psychiatrist-patient 
relationship no privilege was recommended, as it was seen as unnecessary. May 
supports this analysis, arguing that in most cases the prosecution will not even be 
aware of the confidential information and therefore not be able to seek its 
disclosure. Even in cases in which the prosecution does know about this 
information, he thinks it unlikely that it will be attempted to compel the physician 
to give testimony. I IS 
However, it should not be forgotten that the courts' discretion largely rests on the 
question of the relevance and usefulness of the evidence, a consideration that is 
not likely to alter the physician'S perception of his/her ethical obligation. 
Accordingly, a physician, though under a legal obligation to give testimony, may 
nevertheless feel very strongly that he/she ought to uphold the principle of 
medical confidentiality,116 regardless of whether or not the evidence in question is 
relevant to the outcome of the proceedings. 
A possibility to exclude medical evidence could exist under s.78 PACE 1984 
which provides that: 
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution wishes to rely to be given if it appears to the court, having regard 
to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which evidence was 
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court should not admit it. 
lt could be argued that the admission of evidence that came about in the course of 
the confidential physician-patient relationship would adversely affect the fairness 
of the proceedings and should therefore not be admitted. In R v McDonald,II' the 
exclusion of a psychiatrist's report based on s.78 was rejected, but the Court 
nevertheless held that only on rare occasions or in exceptional circumstances 
IJ5 May, Criminal Evidence, at 13-43. 
116 See also Cross and Tapper on Evidence, at 496. 
117 [1991] Crim LR 122 (CA) per Stuart Smith U. 
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would the prosecution seek to adduce evidence of what a defendant had said to his 
doctor if the issue before the court was not a medical one. 
So far, the emphasis was placed on the position of the physician as a witness in 
criminal proceedings, and therefore on his/her oral testimony in criminal court. It 
must be added that in criminal proceedings, orders to produce documents can be 
made according to ss.31 and 32 Administration of Justice Act 1970. While special 
rules apply to protect confidential patient information from seizure in the course 
of police investigations,118 there are no statutory provisions protecting confidential 
medical records from production at the trial stage. This means that in addition to 
the physician's oral testimony about confidential patient information, confidential 
medical documents are also not protected against disclosure in court, as the same 
principles as outlined above apply. 
2.2. Public interest immunity 
Confidential medical information may sometimes fall within the domain of public 
interest immunity, and a balancing exercise must then be performed to decide 
whether or not relevant information is to be disclosed to the court. This question 
mainly arises in the context of wardship proceedings and proceedings under the 
Children Act 1989. Frequently, medical documents form part of such proceedings, 
for example where the children concerned were examined for possible child 
abuse, or the parents for potential medical problems, such as drug abuse, that 
might affect their ability to look after their children. Particularly in child abuse 
cases, criminal proceedings may follow and the evidence that was available to the 
wardship court, which often includes medical reports, may then be of the greatest 
relevance to the police or the court. However, public interest immunity applies to 
evidence obtained in wardship proceedings, and judges who have to decide 
whether or not to allow disclosure in such a case are faced with a situation in 
which the information the disclosure of which is sought is not only confidential, 
but in addition, non-disclosure is in the public interest. In such a case, the court 
must, in the exercise of its discretion of whether or not to permit disclosure, 
conduct a balancing exercise. The importance of confidentiality in wardship 
proceedings and the frankness which it engenders in those who give evidence to 
Jl8 Ss.9, II, 12 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
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the wardship court must be balanced against the public interest in seeing that the 
ends of justice are properly served by making available relevant and material 
information for the purposes of a criminal trial. l19 Several court decisions have 
made it clear that the balancing act is not only called for once criminal 
proceedings are taking place, but will rather also have to be performed where the 
police is seeking disclosure in the course of investigations with the view to a 
possible criminal trial. At the stage of police investigations, the public interest 
weighing in favour of disclosure was described as the 'public interest that requires 
that no obstacle be placed in the way of the police in the course of their criminal 
investigations. ,120 In Re C (A Minor),121 Swinton Thomas LJ called it: 
'the public interest in the prosecution of serious crime and the punislunent of 
offenders, including the public interest in convicting those who have been 
guilty of violent or sexual offences against children. There is a strong public 
interest in making available material to the police which is relevant to a 
criminal trial.' 122 
In that case it was also argued that the weight of the public interest depends, inter 
alia, on the nature and seriousness of the criminal offence at issue. In the words of 
the court: 
'This was a very grave crime involving the killing of a very small child. In 
those circumstances, the public interest in the administration of justice, by 
proper investigation and the prosecution of a crime of such gravity, are very 
weighty factors indeed favouring disclosure.' 123 
With regard to the specific questions at issue, i.e. the disclosure of medical reports 
and the father's admission that he had caused injuries to his daughter which had 
resulted in her death, the court came to the conclusion that: 
'The medical report and the medical evidence are of first importance in 
establishing the time of SC's death, which is crucial, and the manner in which 
her injuries were inflicted, which is also crucial. In preparing for trial and 
shaping their case, in particular in preparing their medical evidence, it seems to 
me to be of first importance that the prosecuting authorities should have 
available the medical evidence and know with precision the admissions that 
were made by the father.' 124 
119 Re D (Minors) (Wardship: Disclosure) [1992] 1 FCR 297 (CA), at 301-302 per Stephen Brown 
P; Re A (Care Proceedings: Disclosure of Information) [1996] 1 FCR 533 (CA), at 537 per Butler-
SlossU. 
120 In re S (Minors) (Wardship: Police Investigations) [1987] Fam 199, at 203 per Booth J. 
121 [1997] Fam 76 (CA). 
122 Ibid., at 85. 
123 Ibid., at 86. 
124 Ibid. 
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For the outcome of the balancing exercise, the seriousness of the criminal offence 
under investigation or prosecution seems to be a decisive factor. In the case of 
public interest immunity, the privilege of confidentiality is that of the court, not of 
the child, and the primary purpose of the privilege is to protect the court in the 
exercise of its paternal powers.125 Confidential medical information is only 
incidentally protected in the context of public interest immunity, and the fact that 
the information to be disclosed regards medical secrets does not, in the course of 
the balancing process, give more weight to the interest in non-disclosure. In most 
public interest immunity cases in the context of wardship proceedings in which a 
balancing exercise was performed, the balance came down in favour of disclosure 
where the evidence to which public interest immunity applied was relevant and 
material for criminal investigations or in criminal court. 
In cases in which the disclosure is sought as part of the defence,126 Mann LJ held 
in R v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Osman,127 a case in which public 
interest immunity was claimed to protect communications between the 
magistrate's court and the Home Office, and between the Home Office and other 
government departments: 
'Where the interests of justice arise in a criminal case touching and concerning 
liberty or conceivably on occasion life, the weight to be attached to the 
interests of justice is plainly very great indeed .... In those cases, which 
establish a privilege in regard to information leading to the detection of crime, 
there are observations to the effect that the privilege cannot prevail if the 
evidence is necessary for the prevention of a miscarriage of justice. No 
balance is called for. If admission is necessary to prevent miscarriage of 
justice, balance does not arise. ,128 
In one case of public interest immunity regarding the disclosure of confidential 
information relating to an abortion which enjoys special confidentiality under the 
provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 and the Abortion Regulations 1968, the court 
decided, however, that in case of a conflict between public interest immunity and 
defence rights, defence rights did not necessarily prevail. Rather, a balancing 
exercise would have to be performed which in that case led to a decision in favour 
12$ Re X. Yand Z (Wardship: Disclosure of Material) [1992] 1 FLR 84, at 86 per Waite J. 
126 Re D (Minors) (Wardship: Disclosure) [1992] 1 FCR 297 (CA), at 302-303 per Stephen Brown 
P; Peter Clowes and Others [1992] 95 Cr App R 440, at 453-454 per Phillips J; Re K and others 
(Minors) (Disclosure) [I994] 1 FLR 377 (FD), at 380-382 per Booth J. 
127 [1991] 1 WLR281 (DC). 
128 Ibid, at 288 and 290; see also Re D (Minors) (Wardship: Disclosure) [1992] 1 FCR 297 (CA), 
at 301-302 per Stephen Brown P. 
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of non-disclosure, as the court was of the opinion that the documents' value for 
the defence was only slim. 129 In Peter Clowes and Others,130 the judge held that 
the outcome of the balancing exercise depended on the gravity of the offence, so 
that disclosure upon request of the defendant would be more likely the more 
serious the offence with which he/she is charged. Court decisions in this area also 
seem to imply some materiality test. In R v K (DT) (Evidence),131 for example, a 
case in which a father applied for disclosure of a video tape of an interview which 
had taken place with a large part of the family in a hospital for therapeutic 
purposes, and in which the hospital raised public interest immunity, the court 
argued that: 
'The exclusion of the evidence without an opportunity of testing its relevance 
and importance amounted to a material irregularity .... This court recognises 
the hospital's legitimate concern that interviews which are conducted on a 
confidential basis for therapeutic purposes ought not, unless the interests of 
justice so require, to be disclosed outside the family circle of those who are the 
subject of the case conference and the service which is conducting it. However, 
where the liberty of the subject is in issue, and disclosure may be of assistance 
to a defendant, a claim for disclosure will often be strong. In the present case 
we decided that it was necessary for us to see the video, so as to be able to 
consider whether there was material which might have been of assistance to 
this appellant on his trial. ... We are quite satisfied, having done so, that 
nothing took place at the therapeutic case conference which was filmed on the 
video could have afforded assistance to the defence had it been ordered to be 
disclosed .... We are therefore satisfied that in this case it would not have been 
appropriate to order disclosure. After seeing the video there really would have 
been no meaningful balancing exercise for the judge to do, because there was 
no advantage for the appellant to balance against the claim of public interest 
immunity. . .. It would not be appropriate for us to order that it be disclosed, 
even for the purpose of allowing counsel to see it.' 132 
Another case in which the Court of Appeal explained how the balancing of 
interests in such cases operated was R v Keane. 133 It was again Taylor LJ who 
observed that: 
'If the disputed material may prove the defendant's innocence or avoid a 
miscarriage of justice, then the balance comes down resoundingly in favour of 
disclosing it. But how is it to be determined whether and to what extent the 
material ... may be of assistance to the defence? ... The judge has to perform 
the balancing exercise by having regard on the one hand to the weight of public 
129 Morrow, Geach and Thomas v D.P.P.: Secretary of State for Health and Social Security; 
British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1994] Crim. LR 58. 
130 [1992] 95 Cr App R 440, at 454 per Phillips 1. 
131 [1993] 2 FLR 181 (CA), per Taylor, LJ. 
132 Ibid., at 184-185. 
133 [1994] 1 WLR 746. 
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interest in non-disclosure. On the other hand, he must consider the importance 
of the documents to the issues of interest to the defence, present and potential 
... . Accordingly, the more full and specific the indication the defendant's 
lawyers give of the defence or issues they are likely to raise, the more 
accurately both prosecution and judge will be able to discuss the value to the 
defence of the material. ,134 
Public interest immunity will thus only in very rare cases protect confidential 
medical information from disclosure to the police or in criminal proceedings. 
Even where such information is protected by public interest immunity, if it is 
relevant and material for the purposes of criminal prosecution or a criminal trial, 
the balance will normally be struck in favour of disclosure. The materiality test 
seems to be less strict where the information is sought as part of the defence of 
someone who is accused in criminal proceedings. However, if the confidential 
medical information is not relevant and material, it is already protected as the 
courts will then normally uphold the confidentiality of the physician-patient 
relationship regardless of whether or not public interest immunity applies. Public 
interest immunity thus does not seem to award much additional protection to 
confidential medical information. 
2.3. Legal professional privilege 
Under certain circumstances confidential medical information may be protected 
against disclosure in the courtroom by legal professional privilege. If, for 
example, a medical examination takes place in order for the results to be used in 
litigation, the report of the physician will then be covered by legal professional 
privilege. The fact that communication between the physician and the solicitor 
had taken place is, as such, not protected by legal privilege. However, the 
physician's report to the patient's solicitor is privileged. In a case in which the 
defendant had been charged on counts of rape, incest and indecent assault, and a 
scientist had carried out a DNA test at the request of the defence solicitor on a 
blood sample provided by the defendant for that purpose, the Court of Appeal has 
held, for example, that the sample constituted privileged material and could 
therefore not be admitted in evidence without the defendant's consent. 13S Where 
confidential medical information is protected by professional legal privilege, it 
134 Ibid., at 751-752. 
135 R V R [1994] 1 WLR 758. 
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receives absolute protection from disclosure, as the House of Lords held in its 
controversial decision in R v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parte B.136 This 
absolute protection is based on the following considerations: 
'The principle ... is that man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, 
since otherwise he might hold back half the truth. The client must be sure that 
what he tells his lawyer in confidence will never be revealed without his 
consent. ... It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice 
as a whole rests .... Once any exception to the general rule is allowed, the 
client's confidence is necessarily lost. The solicitor, instead of being able to tell 
his client that anything which the client might say would never in any 
circumstances be revealed without his consent, would have to qualify his 
assurance. He would have to tell the client that his confidence might be broken 
if in some future case the court were to hold that he no longer had "any 
recognisable interest" in asserting his privilege. One can see at once that the 
purpose of the privilege would thereby be undermined .... But it is not for the 
sake of the applicant alone that the privilege must be upheld. It is in the wider 
interests of all those hereafter who might otherwise be deterred from telling the 
whole truth to their solicitors. For this reason, I am of the opinion that no 
exception should be allowed to the absolute nature of legal professional 
privilege, once established.' 137 
The House of Lords is thus of the view that only through the absolute protection 
of legal professional privilege which does not allow for any exception can its 
purpose be achieved. This is based on the utilitarian thought that the good 
consequences pursued with the protection of confidentiality can only be achieved 
if there is an absolute certainty that confidentiality will be upheld under all 
circumstances. Given that the protection of confidentiality in judicial proceedings 
is limited to legal professional privilege, the costs of an absolute privilege seem to 
be outweighed by the benefits flowing from confidentiality which is seen as a 
particularly important principle in the context of the lawyer-client relationship. At 
the same time, the view that only an absolute privilege can achieve its purpose is 
likely to stand in the way of any expansion of privileges to other confidential 
relationships, such as the physician-patient relationship. 
2.4. Police access to confidential medical information 
While at trial stage, English law does not make a distinction between documents 
and the oral testimony of a witness, so that a physician can be compelled to give 
136 [1996] AC 487. 
137 Ibid., at 507-509, per Taylor U; for a critique see, for example, Uglow, Evidence, at 207-208. 
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testimony in court as well as forced to submit confidential medical reports and 
other evidence, the situation is different at the pre-trial stage. As far as the 
physician's duty to disclose information to the police is concerned, the principle is 
laid down in Rice v Connolly: 138 there is no legal duty to assist the police and 
every individual has the right to refuse to answer questions put to himlher by a 
police officer. At pre-trial stage, therefore, the physician cannot normally be 
compelled orally to disclose confidential patient information. However, a few 
statutory provisions impose an obligation on every citizen to disclose information 
to the police. In the case of traffic offences, for example, s.168 Road Traffic Act 
1972 provides that everybody must, upon request by the police, provide any 
evidence he/she has which may lead to the identification of the driver involved. 
While physicians tried to argue that they should be exempt from this obligation 
given their duty to maintain the patient's confidences, the court in Hunter v 
Mann139 rejected this view. The Medical Defence Union interprets this provision 
as imposing an obligation to supply the name and address of the patient only, but 
is of the opinion that no medical information has to be disclosed.140 
Special provisions apply to state access to confidential medical documents in the 
course of police investigations. The police powers to search for and seize material 
in the course of a criminal investigation are governed by the provisions of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). The Act contains special 
provisions regarding state access to certain categories of confidential information. 
2.4.1. Definition of excluded material 
Under s.ll of the Act, personal records and human tissue and tissue fluid taken 
for the purpose of diagnosis or medical treatment are defined as excluded 
material. According to s.12, personal records are all documentary and other 
records concerning an individual who can be identified from them and which 
relate to, inter alia, his physical or mental health. This embraces patient records 
kept by doctors or hospitals. Even hospital records of patients' admissions and 
discharges are excluded material because they relate to the physical and mental 
health of persons who could be identified from them. This was explained in R v 
138 [1966] 2 All ER 649, at per Lord Parker CJ. 
139 [1974] 2 All ER414. 
140 Medical Defence Union, Confidentiality, at 7. 
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Cardiff Crown Court, ex parte Kellam,141 a case in which the police, in the course 
of investigating a murder, sought details from a psychiatric hospital about patients 
who were absent from the hospital on the day in question. The hospital had kept 
records of the patients' movements for the purposes of national insurance 
payments, so that the information was, in fact, available. Morland J argued as 
follows: 
'Section 11 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ... must be given 
[its] ordinary and natural meaning. ... The definition, in my judgment, is very 
widely drawn and embracing. The 'records relating to physical or mental 
health' are not confined to clinical, nursing or surgical notes or treatment. The 
definition is expressly directed to the identifiability of the patient from the 
record. Often records of admission and discharge from a hospital or clinic will 
reveal the aspect of health for which a person is a patient, e.g. mental or 
maternity hospital, VD clinic or accident and emergency department. Records 
relating to admission or discharge of a patient from a hospital or clinic exist 
solely because he is a patient. That applies equally to the secondary records in 
this case of authorised discharges or leaves of the patient. ... He is a patient 
because he is suffering or is suspected to be suffering from physical or mental 
ill-health. He is discharged either permanently or temporarily because either he 
has recovered his health or temporary discharge is therapeutic or nothing more 
can be done to help him. In my judgment the records of discharge sought in 
this case (and the same would apply to unauthorised absences) concern an 
identifiable patient, in his capacity of being a patient, and are related to his 
mental health and are therefore 'excluded material' as defined by s 11.' 142 
As objects removed from the human body, for example bullets, are not human 
tissue, they are not excluded material under the Act.143 If a crime victim is 
examined for forensic reasons and for example swabs and smears or blood 
samples are taken, this material is not being taken for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and is therefore outside the scope of excluded material. But 
it could be argued that this material is held in confidence by the doctor or hospital, 
thus being special procedure material under s.14 of the Act. 144 
Another requirement for qualifying as excluded material is that the material is 
held in confidence. Excluded material thus consists of confidential material which 
is held by a third party who would normally be in breach of an obligation of 
confidentiality when voluntarily submitting that material to the police. The seizure 
141 [1994] 16 BMLR 76 (QBD). 
142 Ib·d 1 ., at 79-80. 
143 Bevan, Lidstone, The investigation of crime, at 158. 
144 Ibid., at 158-159. 
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of such material is excluded because it would constitute an interference with 
contractual or ethical confidentiality obligations. 145 
2.4.2. Application for an order giving access to excluded material 
The police are not completely prevented from access to excluded material, but 
they have to comply with a certain procedure when seeking access to it. 
According to s.9(1) PACE, a circuit judge may, upon application by the police, 
issue an access order for the purpose of a criminal investigation if the conditions 
set out in Schedule 1, para.3 to the Act are met, i.e. there must be reasonable 
grounds to believe that excluded material can be found on the premises for which, 
prior to the enactment of s.9(2), the issuance of a search warrant would have been 
appropriate and available under a statutory provision. The effect of s.9(2) thus is 
that excluded material in regard to which, before the enactment of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a search warrant would have been available under a 
statute, is now available only where the specific conditions outlined in Schedule 1, 
para.3 of the Act regarding an access order are met. As the search warrant powers 
in existence before the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
did not refer to situations normally relevant to the physician-patient relationship, 
e.g. s.26 Theft Act 1968 referring to stolen goods, only in very rare cases will the 
conditions for issuing an access order be met as far as confidential patient 
information is concerned. R v Cardiff Crown Court, ex parte Kellam,146 for 
example, concerned an investigation for murder. As prior to the enactment of 
PACE, there was no statutory power for the police to obtain a search warrant in 
relation to a murder investigation, the disclosure of the excluded material to which 
the police sought access could not be compelled. Once it is established that the 
seizure concerns 'excluded material' and that the prerequisites of an access order 
are not met, there is no leeway as to a balancing of interests depending on the 
seriousness of the criminal offence under investigation. As Morland J explained: 
'Section 11 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ... must be given 
[its] ordinary and natural meaning. This is so even if the result may seriously 
impede police investigations into a terrible murder and allow a very dangerous 
man to remain at large and a real risk to others. Parliament defines 'excluded 
material', as a matter of public policy, presumably, because it considered that 
14S See Powell, Magrath, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, at 32-33. 
146 [1994] 16 BMLR 76 (QBD). 
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the confidentiality of records of identifiable individuals relating to their health 
should have paramountcy over the prevention and investigation of crime.' 147 
Given the broad interpretation of 'excluded material' in this decision, virtually 
every document that might be made in respect of a patient, be it clinical or 
administrative, is now covered by the Act. This outcome has been welcomed as 
reflecting Parliament's intention as well as being the most practical solution, 
given that it makes any distinction between different types of records held by 
physicians obsolete. 148 However, s.9(2) of the Act does not apply to statutory 
powers of search created after the 1984 Act unless the creating statute explicitly 
refers to it. It would, therefore, be possible to introduce new search powers 
regarding confidential patient information by enacting a statute authorising the 
search for such information in a certain context, for example medical records 
establishing drug abuse or gunshot wounds, if such a statute did not include a 
reference to the special procedure set out in PACE. 
An exception to the general rule of inaccessibility of excluded material is 
contained in Schedule7, para.3(5) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1989, which allows an application to a circuit judge for access to 
excluded material where the judge is satisfied that (a) a terrorist investigation is 
being carried out and that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation, and (b) that there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest that the 
material should be produced. It follows that, in the course of terrorist 
investigations, the police could get access to confidential patient information if all 
of the above mentioned requirements are fulfilled. But as far as police 
investigations for other than terrorist offences are concerned, confidential 
information held by a doctor will not be available to the police, since at least one 
of the prerequisites of an access order to obtain excluded material, i.e. the 
existence of pre-PACE powers to issue a warrant, will almost never be met. 
147 Ib·d 1 ., at 79-80. 
148 Grubb, [1994] Med L Rev, at 371. 
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2.4.3. Access to excluded material without court order 
Under certain circumstances, excluded material can be subject to search and 
seizure without prior application for an access order. Excluded material can be 
seized according to s.19 PACE in the course of the execution of a search warrant 
or post-arrest powers in any circumstances in which the police officer is lawfully 
on the premises. This means that where a police officer has obtained a warrant, 
he/she can seize excluded material, if the other requirements of s.19 are met. But 
it could be argued that almost no situations are conceivable in which the 
requirements of s.19(2) will be satisfied, as there must be reasonable grounds for 
believing that it is necessary to seize the material in order to prevent the material 
being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Therefore, s.19 PACE is only of very 
limited, if any, relevance in the context of the physician-patient relationship. 149 
Under s.32(2)(b) PACE, a police officer is allowed to search the premises on 
which the suspect was arrested or where he/she was immediately before the arrest 
provided that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of the offence 
for which he/she was arrested is to be found on the premises. If, therefore, a 
suspect is arrested when leaving the hospital after having been treated for injuries 
supposedly sustained while committing a serious arrestable offence, the police can 
legally seize the patient records of said suspect if they have reasonable ground to 
believe that the records will contain evidence that the suspect has committed the 
offence he/she is being arrested for. ISO 
Thus, in the situations governed by ss.19 or 32 respectively, the special protection 
provided for excluded material ceases to be effective. These exceptions give the 
police the possibility to circumvent the otherwise strict rules in respect of the 
accessibility of excluded material. They hardly seem to be compatible with the 
principle that excluded material is not accessible in the course of police 
investigations save in circumstances especially provided for by the 1984 Act and 
subject to careful considerations by circuit judges. It is particularly worrying that 
police officers are awarded the power to make a decision on the seizure of 
confidential and often sensitive material, and that they have to make this decision 
149 Ibid. 
150 Bevan, Lidstone, The investigation o/crime, at 164. 
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in situations which barely leave any time for a careful balancing of all interests 
involved. 
2.5. Voluntary disclosure by the physician 
Where the physician is called upon to give testimony in court, or where the 
disclosure of a physician's medical documents is compelled by a court order or 
they are seized under the provisions of PACE, the physician does not have a 
choice but rather must comply with the court order or tolerate the seizure, unless 
he/she is prepared to accept the consequences of disobeying the law. A different 
question altogether is whether or not it is lawful for the physician voluntarily to 
submit confidential patient records or to convey other confidential patient 
information to the police and/or the courts. Given that the physician is, in 
principle, under an obligation to maintain medical confidentiality, a voluntary 
disclosure would normally constitute a breach of confidentiality. However, in the 
context of criminal investigations and proceedings it is at least possible that in 
certain situations such a breach could be justified. Different possible justifications 
for a disclosure by the physician can be distinguished. 
2.5.1. Voluntary submission of medical records to the police 
It follows from the almost complete exclusion of confidential patient material in 
the hands of a physician from seizure that the question of whether the doctor has 
the right voluntarily to submit excluded material in the course of a criminal 
investigation is of particular importance to the police. The only English case 
directly on this point is R v Singleton. lSI In that case, the court had to decide 
whether a dentist could, without consent of his patient, voluntarily submit dental 
records to the police to assist with the investigation of a serious crime. As these 
records were excluded material under s.ll PACE, they could not have been 
lawfully seized by the police. The answer largely depends on an interpretation of 
the purpose behind the protection awarded by the provisions of PACE. If the 
special protection given to confidential medical records were intended to protect 
the private sphere of the patient, then only the patient could waive this protection, 
1.51 R v Singleton [1995] Crim LR 236. 
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and without the patient's consent, the physician would then not be allowed to 
hand the material over to the police. If, on the other hand, the holder of the 
information were to be protected, the physician holding confidential patient 
records would be protected and would then, accordingly, be in the position to 
waive the protection by voluntarily handing over excluded material to the police. 
According to the court in R v Singleton, s.ll PACE does not aim to protect the 
patient, but rather intends to protect the physician from the seizure of patient 
records. Consequently, the doctor has the right to waive the protection given to 
himlher. A voluntary disclosure of excluded material to the police was held to 
exempt the police from obtaining a s.9(2) order which would not have been 
available in R v Singleton because the requirements under PACE were not 
fulfilled. Unfortunately, the court did not explain the considerations on which this 
holding was based. Nevertheless, this case-law seems to be largely accepted.152 In 
favour of the court's approach, it has been argued that the seizure of excluded 
material is prohibited because it would interfere with the physician's contractual 
or ethical confidentiality obligations. ls3 This approach seems to imply that the 
confidentiality obligations of the confidence holder, rather than the confidentiality 
interests of the patient, should be protected against state interference. According 
to this view, while there is an interest in protecting the physician from search and 
seizure as long as he/she wants the confidential information to be protected, no 
such interest is involved where the physician voluntarily submits the material to 
the police, thereby waiving the interest in the confidentiality of the patient 
records. The courts have, in a different context, confirmed the interpretation of the 
relevant PACE provisions as serving the protection not of the patient's, but of the 
physician's interests in the maintenance of confidentiality in the physician-patient 
relationship, as courts have held that it is the person in possession of the material 
(the physician), not the suspect (the patient), who has to be notified of an 
application for an access order. 154 
ts2 See Feldman, Civil Liberties & Human Rights in England & Wales. at 454; Mason, McCall 
Smith. Law and Medical Ethics, at 206-207. 
IS) See Powell, Magrath, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, at 32-33. 
1S4 R v Crown Court at Leicester, ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions [1987] 3 All ER 654; R 
v Crown Court at Manchester, ex parte Taylor [1988] 2 All ER 769; Barc1ays Bank pic v Taylor 
(1989] 3 All ER 563 (CA), at 567. 
184 
Much can be said, however, for reading the relevant PACE provisions as 
protecting the right of privacy of the person the information relates to.155 The 
purpose of the new procedure was to improve the protection of confidential 
material. It follows that the procedure was not designed as a safeguard for the 
material holder, but rather for the individual's interests in his/her confidential 
information. This view is supported by an analysis of the interests balanced by the 
provisions on access to excluded material. In R v Crown Court at Lewes, 156 
Bingham LJ identified the different interests as follows: 
'The Police and Criminal Evidence Act governs a field in which there are two 
very obvious public interests. There is, first of all, a public interest in the 
effective investigation and prosecution of crime. Secondly, there is a public 
interest in protecting the personal and property rights of citizens against 
infringement and invasion. There is an obvious tension between these two 
public interests because crime could be most effectively investigated and 
prosecuted if the personal and property rights of citizens could be freely 
overridden and total protection of the personal and property rights of citizens 
would make investigation and prosecution of many crimes impossible or 
virtually so. The 1984 Act seeks to that effect a carefully judged balance 
between these interests and that is why it is a detailed and complex Act.,157 
If the PACE provisions are interpreted that way, it is difficult to argue that they 
are meant to protect the personal interests of the physician rather than those of the 
patient, as the information relates to intimate details of the patient's, not of the 
physician's life. ISS However, the conclusion that the physician who merely holds 
someone else's confidential information should not have any discretion 
voluntarily to submit such information to the police, given that the legislature has 
expressed its view that this information should be excluded from state access even 
in the situation of investigations for a serious criminal offence, does not logically 
follow from this interpretation. The Act only protects against state access through 
search and seizure, but does not envisage the situation of voluntary submission of 
excluded material by the physician. It therefore seems a better approach to argue 
that the question of whether or not the physician is allowed voluntarily to submit 
excluded material cannot be answered by an interpretation of the provisions of the 
Act, but must instead focus on whether or not a legal justification for the 
disclosure existed, a question which will be addressed below. Where this is not 
ISS Zuckerman, (1990) Crim LR, at 475. 
IS6 R. v. Crown Court at Lewes, ex parte Hill [1991] 93 Cr App R 60. 
IS71b'd 6 1 ., at 5-66. 
ISS Zuckerman, (1990) Crim LR, at 475. 
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the case, a doctor who by such an action breaches patient confidences may be 
liable to compensation under tort laW. 159 The only question that may be answered 
with regard to the purpose behind the provisions of PACE is the question of 
whether or not the police should be allowed to accept and use excluded material 
that was submitted by a physician. 
2.5.2. Disclosure for the purpose of criminal prosecution 
Where a physician has information which could be useful in the course of a 
criminal trial, but which is protected by the physician's obligation to medical 
confidentiality, a conflict between the interest of medical confidentiality, on the 
one hand, and the interests of justice, on the other hand, may arise. As was already 
examined above, in the context of criminal proceedings the conflict was decided 
in favour of disclosure, i.e. the interest in criminal prosecution does have priority 
where a physician is assumed to have information that is relevant and material for 
a criminal trial and is called upon to testify. In the context of excluded material 
under PACE, on the other hand, the protection of confidential material always 
prevails over the interest in prosecuting even the most serious criminal offence. It 
remains to be seen how the law deals with situations in which the provisions of 
PACE are not applicable and in which no court order is issued or sought to 
compel the disclosure of confidential information by the physician. This can, for 
example, become relevant where the physician holds information that may be 
material for the purposes of a criminal investigation or a criminal trial, but where 
the fact that the physician has such knowledge is unknown to the public 
authorities so that no court order can compel disclosure. The physician is then 
obviously not in any legal conflict, as he/she is under a legal obligation to 
maintain patient confidences, while there is no competing legal obligation to 
disclose confidential medical information. Thus, the possible conflict is of moral 
rather than of legal nature. The professional guidelines provided for an exception 
to the obligation of medical confidentiality where the disclosure is made for the 
purpose of public prosecution, as para. 81 (g) of the GMC's Blue Book stated that: 
Rarely, disclosure may be justified on the ground that it is in the public interest 
which, in certain circumstances such as, for example, investigation by the 
police of a grave or very serious crime, might override the doctor's duty to 
159 See Bevan, Lidstone, The investigation of crime, at 159. 
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maintain his patient's confidence. 
Thus, according to these guidelines, there would be no disciplinary action if a 
medical confidence was disclosed in the course of investigations into serious 
crimes, that is for the purpose of criminal prosecution. 160 However, the guidelines 
have since been changed, now stating that: 
Rarely, cases may arise in which disclosure in the public interest or in the 
interests of an individual may be justified, for example, a situation in which the 
failure to disclose appropriate information would expose the patient, or 
someone else, to a risk of death or serious harrn. 161 
The amended version no longer refers to the situation of criminal prosecution, as 
once a crime has been committed, there is no longer a risk of death or serious 
harm that could be averted by disclosure. However, there nevertheless seems to be 
wide agreement that the voluntary disclosure of confidential patient information 
by a physician should sometimes be justified for the purposes of criminal 
prosecution. Some have argued that a physician is expected to act according to 
his/her 'conscience as a citizen of standing' and that disclosure to the authorities 
of attendance resulting from firearm injuries, murder, armed robbery or offences 
against the State should therefore not pose any difficulties.162 The provisions of 
the Health Act 1999163 for the particular obligation of medical confidentiality 
created under the Act, provide for an exception for the purposes of the 
investigation of a serious arrestable offence. According to Schedule 5, Part I to 
PACE, serious arrestable offences are treason, murder, manslaughter, rape, 
kidnapping, incest with a girl under the age of 13, and indecent assault which 
constitutes an act of gross indecency. It thus seems fair to state that prosecution of 
criminal offences can justify voluntary disclosure of confidential patient 
information to the police by the physician, but only where the disclosure is 
necessary for the investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences, 
whereas the disclosure for the purpose of prosecuting less serious offences would 
not be justified.164 This leaves the problem of how to determine what is or is not 
an offence serious enough to justify disclosure. It should also be noted that such a 
160 See also Schutte, (1989) Journal of the Medical Defence Union, at 21; Anonymous, (1974) 
BMJ 399-400. 
161 GMC, Professional Conduct and Discipline: Fitness to Practise, 1993, rule 86. 
162 Marsden, (1992) 85 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, at 188. 
163 See, for example, s.24(6Xe). 
164 See also McHale, Medical Confidentiality and Medical Privilege, at 91; Taylor, Medical 
Malpractice, at 78. 
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distinction between different offences according to their seriousness stands in 
contradiction to the solution the law provides for disclosure in court, where the 
physician must testify regardless of the seriousness of the offence, and the 
solution favoured under PACE, where confidential material is excluded from 
police access regardless of the seriousness of the offence under investigation. S.29 
Data Protection Act 1998 which provides for exceptions from data protection 
provisions and principles where the data are processed for the purpose of the 
detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, does not 
distinguish between serious and less serious offences. 
The attitude of parts of the jUdiciary towards the value attached to privacy, on the 
one hand, and to the public interest in criminal prosecution, on the other hand, can 
be illustrated by a quote from R v Khan. 16S In that case, Nolan LJ observed that: 
'It would be a strange reflection on our law if a man who has admitted his 
participation in the illegal importation of a large quantity of heroin should have 
his conviction set aside on the grounds that his privacy has been invaded.' 166 
Even though this statement stems from an entirely different context, it 
nevertheless reflects the prevalent view that the interest in criminal prosecution 
normally outweighs the interest in privacy or confidentiality. It can therefore be 
concluded that it is very unlikely that the voluntary disclosure by a physician of 
confidential patient information that is relevant for the purpose of criminal 
prosecution will be found to violate the physician's obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality, at least where the crime at issue is not of total insignificance. 
2.5.3. Conflicting defence rights or interests of a person wrongly accused 
Another conflict that may occasionally arise is the conflict between medical 
confidentiality, on the one hand, and defence rights of an accused or the interests 
of a person who is wrongly under suspicion of having committed a criminal 
offence, on the other hand. Given that no medical privilege is recognised in 
criminal proceedings, the defendant can easily get access to confidential material 
that may be useful for his/her defence, as long as the relevance and materiality of 
the material can be established.167 It remains to be discussed, in the present 
16' [1996] 3 All ER 289. 
166 Ibid., at 302. 
167 For the specific problem of the production of confidential documents upon request of the 
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context, whether or not the physician is allowed to disclose confidential patient 
information where the defendant does not know of its existence and can therefore 
not demand disclosure, but where the physician nonetheless has information the 
disclosure of which may be of interest to the defence or to someone who is under 
suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. There is no case-law directly to 
this point. However, as case-law in other areas shows, most courts that had to 
balance confidentiality interests against defence rights argued that the defence 
rights of someone who is accused of an offence in criminal proceedings 
necessarily outweigh the interest in confidentiality.168 The reason behind this 
outcome of the balancing of interests is that the interests of the accused in hislher 
liberty are of a very high rank. 169 For a long time, courts even held that defence 
rights prevailed over the confidentiality interest underlying legal professional 
privilege.170 However, R v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parte B171 made it clear 
that even where the defence rights of an innocent person are concerned, the 
importance of legal professional privilege does not allow for any exceptions to the 
principle of non-disclosure. This seems to be a victory of utilitarian over 
deontological considerations. Nicholls LJ discussed the difficulties any balancing 
exercise would have to overcome: 
'The court would be faced with an essentially impossible task. ... How does 
one equate exposure to a comparatively minor civil claim or criminal charge 
against prejudicing a defence to a serious criminal charge? How does one 
balance a client's risk of loss of reputation, or exposure to public opprobrium, 
against prejudicing another person's possible defence to a murder charge? But 
the difficulties go much further. Could disclosure also be sought by the 
prosecution, on the ground that there is a public interest in the guilty being 
convicted? If not, why not? ... There is no evident stopping place short of the 
balancing exercise being potentially available in support of all parties in all 
forms of court proceedings. This highlights the impossibility of the exercise. 
What is the measure by which the judges are to ascribe an appropriate weight, 
on each side of the scale, to the diverse multitude of different claims, civil and 
accused under s. 66 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 see Corker, (1998) 38 
Med. Sci. Law 138-141. 
168 See, for example, Taylor v Serious Fraud Office (HL (E» [1998] 3 WLR 1040, at 1049 per 
Hoffinann U. 
169 See, for example, R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Osman [1991] 1 WLR 281 (DC), 
per Mann U; Vincent RaymondAgar [1990] 90 Cr App R 318 (CA), per Mustill LJ; TimothyJohn 
Hennessey and Others [1978] 68 Cr App R 419, per Lawton U; Mark v Beyfus [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 
494, per Lord Esher MR; see also Barnett, (1997) Fam Law, at 493. 
170 S 
ee, for example, R v Barton [1973] 1 WLR 115, at 118 per Caulfield J; R v Ataou [1988] 2 All 
ER 321 (CA), at 327. 
171 [1996] AC 487 (HL), per Lloyd U. 
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crimina~ and other interests of the client on the one hand and the person 
seeking disclosure on the other hand?' 172 
While this argument is interesting in that it sheds some light on the problems 
arising when having to balance competing interests the respective values of which 
are very difficult to ascertain and qualify, it should nevertheless be added that 
courts perform such balancing exercises in many different areas, and that the 
difficulties inherent in the exercise themselves do not seem to give sufficient 
weight to the conclusion that one of the two competing interests should be 
awarded absolute status so as to make any balancing of interests obsolete. Also, 
even Nicholls LJ would limit his statement to the conflict between legal 
professional privilege, on the one hand, and defence rights of a third party, on the 
other hand, but he is very unlikely to extend this principle to all cases of potential 
conflicts of interests. 
While the cases looked at so far can do no more than clarify the value that courts 
have attached to the different interests at stake, none of these cases concerned the 
voluntary disclosure of confidential information to assist an accused with hislher 
defence. A case which touches upon that question, though in the context of 
adoption proceedings rather than in the area of medical confidentiality, is Note Re 
an Adoption Application. I '3 In that case, an originating summons was brought ex 
parte by a local authority, acting as adoption agency. A few years after a 
schoolgirl'S child had been placed for adoption, she asserted that her stepfather 
had sexually abused her and he was charged with rape and other sexual offences. 
The prosecution case depended entirely on the girl's evidence. The stepfather's 
defence had been that the father of the child and the perpetrator of the offences 
had been a schoolfriend of hers. The stepfather was convicted and sentenced to a 
long term of imprisonment. He appealed and was allowed to apply for blood tests 
to establish whether or not he was the father of the baby. The local authority was 
required to look at their files in order to find out where the baby was. In doing so, 
the local authority found out that the account of the girl as to how she became 
pregnant was compatible with the stepfather's defence. The local authority sought 
the assistance of the court in deciding whether or not to disclose this information. 
Under Rule 53(3) Adoption Rules 1984, any person who obtains any information 
172 Ibid., at 511-512. 
173 [1990] I FLR 412 (FD), per Ewbank J. 
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in the course of: or relating to adoption proceedings shall treat that information as 
confidential and shall only disclose it if the disclosure is necessary for the proper 
exercise ofhislher duties. The court argued as follows: 
'The information which is now available may be relevant, in the interests of 
justice, in the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. In my judgment, a further 
disclosure of this information to the Attorney-General is necessary for the 
proper exercise of the social worker's duties. The Attorney-General will be 
able to decide to what extent the information should be passed on, either to the 
court or to any other person. I, accordingly, direct that the local authority 
should inform the Attorney-General of the circumstances of this case and of the 
information which is available in their files, for him to consider further.' 174 
In this case the court did not weigh the different interests, i.e. the interest in the 
confidentiality of adoption proceedings, on the one hand, and the interests of the 
wrongly convicted, on the other hand, but rather decided in favour of disclosure 
by interpreting the exception provided by the Adoption Rules in a very liberal 
way. However, this case is a very good example of the interests that can weigh in 
favour of a breach of confidentiality obligations. If the only possibility to 
exonerate the accused, or, in this case, the wrongly convicted, is to disclose 
confidential information relating to the offender or a third party, many will agree 
that it lies in the public interest to prevent a miscarriage of justice as well as in the 
accused's interest in freedom from unjust punishment that a breach of 
confidentiality for this purpose be justified. The importance of defence rights of 
the person accused in criminal proceedings was one of the main reasons for the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee to reject the introduction of medical 
privilege. 175 
2.5.4. Crime prevention 
The physician is under no obligation, and cannot normally be compelled to 
disclose confidential medical information for the purpose of crime prevention. 
Therefore, in the context of crime prevention, voluntary disclosure by the 
physician is of particular importance. The leading case dealing with the voluntary 
disclosure by a physician of confidential medical information for the purpose of 
crime prevention is W v Egdell.176 That case, which has already been discussed in 
174 Ibid., at 413. 
175 Eleventh Report, Cmnd 4991, para.272-276. 
176 [1990] 1 All ER 835 (CA). 
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a different context in this chapter,177 did not concern the disclosure of confidential 
patient information to the police. However, the decision nevertheless provides a 
detailed discussion of the different interests to be balanced where the physician's 
obligation to confidentiality conflicts with the public interest in the prevention of 
criminal offences, and the physician decides to disclose the relevant information. 
As Bingham LJ put it, the crucial question was how the balance should be struck 
between the public interest in maintaining professional confidences and the public 
interest in protecting the public against possible violence. According to Stephen 
Brown P, the balance came clearly down in favour of disclosure. The main reason 
for this was the number and nature of the killings W had committed, as they: 
'must inevitably give rise to the gravest concern for the safety of the public .... 
It is clear that Dr Egdell did have highly relevant information about W's 
condition which reflected on his dangerousness. In my judgement the position 
came within the terms ofr 81(g) of the General Medical Council's rules .... The 
suppression of the material contained in his report would have deprived both 
the hospital and the Secretary of State of vital information, directly relevant to 
questions of public safety .... The judge in fact based his conclusion on what he 
termed "broader considerations", that is to say the safety of the public. I agree 
with him. , 178 
Bingham LJ also made some interesting observations: 
'Counsel for W contended that ... there was ... no question of W's release, 
whether absolutely or conditionally, in the then foreseeable future .... I do not 
find these points persuasive. When Dr Egdell made his decision to disclose, 
one tribunal had already recommended W's transfer to a regional secure unit 
and the hospital authorities had urged that course. The Home Office had 
resisted transfer in a qualified manner but on a basis of inadequate information. 
It appeared to be only a matter of time, and probably not a very long time, 
before W was transferred. The regional secure unit was to act as staging post 
on W's journey back into the community. While W would no doubt be further 
tested, such tests would not be focused on the source of Dr Egdell's concern, 
which he quite rightly considered to have received inadequate attention up to 
then. Dr Egdell had to act when he did or not at all. There is one consideration 
which in my judgment ... weighs the balance of public interest decisively in 
favour of disclosure. It may be shortly put. Where a man has committed 
mUltiple killings under the disability of serious mental illness, decisions which 
may lead directly or indirectly to his release from hospital should not be made 
unless a responsible authority is properly able to make an informed judgment 
that the risk of repetition is so small as to be acceptable. A consultant 
psychiatrist who becomes aware, even in the course of a confidential 
relationship, of information which leads him, in the exercise of what the court 
considers a sound professional judgment, to fear that such decisions may be 
177s upra., 1.4. 
178 [1990] 1 All ER 835 (CA), at 846. 
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made on the basis of inadequate infonnation and with a real risk of consequent 
danger to the public is entitled to take such steps as are reasonable in all the 
circumstances to communicate the grounds of his concern to the responsible 
authorities. I have no doubt that the judge's decision in favour of Dr Egdell 
was right on the facts of this case. ' 179 
It is also interesting to note that Bingham LJ made reference to Art.8 European 
Convention on Human Rights. This is of particular significance, as his statements 
to that point may give an indication on how the Human Rights Act is likely to be 
interpreted by English courts. According to his Lordship, the situation in Egdell 
fell squarely within the exception envisaged by Art. 8(2), as Dr. Egdell's conduct 
was necessary in the interests of public safety and the prevention of crime.180 
To summarise the holding in Egdell, the court seems to suggest that disclosure 
may be made only to those to whom it is necessary to convey the infonnation in 
order to protect the public interest and that only a risk involving the danger of 
physical harm justifies disclosure.1 81 The very abstract danger that someone who 
committed crimes due to a certain psychological disposition might be dangerous 
in the future seems to be sufficient for the public interest justification to apply. 
Based on its decision in Egdell, the Court of Appeal held in Peter Michael 
Anthony Crozierl82 that a psychiatrist who was of the firm belief that a patient 
suffered from a psychopathic disorder and continued to be a danger to the public 
acted reasonably and responsibly when disclosing this infonnation, as the strong 
public interest in the disclosure of his views overrode his duty of confidence to the 
appellant. 
The approach adopted by the Court of Appeal was mostly welcomed. 183 Michael 
Jones,184 for example, in principle approved of the decision. He suggested, 
however, that the very wide scope of the public interest defence under Egdell 
should be limited. A possible limitation could be based on the requirement of a 
'real' risk of a danger to the public. However, the word 'real' leaves some scope 
for interpretation ranging from a probability of the risk to a mere possibility, the 
latter seemingly having been sufficient in Egdell. The interpretation the concept of 
'real' risk has received in Egdell does not do much to limit the scope of disclosure 
1791b'd I "at 852-853, 
ISO Ibid., at 853, 
181 Kennedy, Grubb, Medical Law, at 657, 
182 [1990] 12 Cr App R (S) 206. 
183 See, for example, Mason, McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, at 196-197. 
184 Jones, (1990) 6 PN 16- 24. 
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in the public interest. Given the facts of the case, there was no imminent risk of 
W's release, let alone any risk that he might harm anybody. And the disclosure of 
the diagnosis was no more than the opinion of one physician,18s and other reports 
would have been looked at before making a final decision on W's release. The 
mere fact that other doctors may not have focused on the same aspects of W's 
personality and may therefore possibly have come to a conclusion that differed 
from that of Dr Egdell seems hardly sufficient to justify a breach of the 
confidential relationship between patient and physician in this case. Another 
question in need of an answer is what exactly amounts to a danger to the public 
and here, in particular, whether or not a risk to a single individual would be 
sufficient to qualify as a danger to the public. It has been suggested that the risk to 
an individual should be enough to trigger the public interest defence, as the public 
has an interest in the protection of its members from violence which is affected by 
a real risk of danger to the bodily integrity of one individual. 186 It should also be 
noted that there must be a risk of 'physical' harm, and that a risk of non-physical 
harm would not be sufficient to justify disclosure.1 87 This case-law leaves the 
physician in the undesirable position of having to perform a risk assessment, 
especially as to whether or not the risk is real and whether or not it involves a 
danger to the public. Some commentators, while conceding that the result in 
Egdell may be right in that the public needs to be protected from potentially 
dangerous persons, nevertheless expressed some unease as to the casualness with 
which the court was prepared to disregard the confidentiality interests of the 
patient. 188 
Another case in which the court's decision was based on considerations that bear 
some similarity to those applicable to cases of voluntary disclosure of medical 
confidences in the context of crime prevention was Re C (A Minor) (Evidence: 
Confidential In!ormation).189 The former GP of a mother who had handed her 
child to social workers for adoption and then changed her mind one day before the 
hearing, had volunteered information relating to her addiction to sleeping pills and 
her inability to bring up the child. The Court of Appeal not only came to the 
conclusion that the affidavit should be admitted given its relevance to the 
185 Kennedy, Grubb, Medical Law, at 657. 
186 Jones, (1990) 6 PN, at 19. 
187 Kennedy, Grubb, Medical Law, at 657. 
188 McHale, (1989) 52 MLR, at 719. 
189 [1991] 2 FLR 478 (CA). 
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proceedings. Stephen Brown P also added that in his opinion, the doctor had not 
breached medical confidentiality when making her evidence available, as her 
behaviour was fully justified. 190 He did not, however, specify what considerations 
had led to this analysis, apart from the fact that the disclosure was restricted to the 
judicial setting and had not been made to the public at large. Mann U, in the same 
case, reasoned that: 
'Mr Kallipetis's argument was that the principle here involved was that where 
there is a public interest in protecting the confidentiality of the relationship 
between doctor and patient, that interest should only be set aside where it can 
be said, on balance, that the public interest in the achievement of justice 
overweighs the public interest in confidentiality. Such, it is said, is the situation 
even when the doctor's evidence is volunteered. Let it be assumed, and I do not 
decide, that such is the law in regard to the admission of a doctor's evidence 
which is relevant to an issue before the court. If it be the law, the judge who is 
asked to admit the evidence of the doctor in regard to treatment of his patient 
has to perform a balancing exercise. However, before undertaking the balance, 
he must consider whether the evidence which is proposed to be tendered would 
involve a breach of the duty of confidence which it is in the public interest to 
preserve. In this case, where the evidence is relevant to the future of the child, 
and the dissemination of the material is limited to those with an interest in its 
future, I have some doubt as to whether there would be a breach of dUty.'191 
Of course, again, the decision is of limited value in the context of voluntary 
disclosure for the purpose of general crime prevention, as the case concerned a 
risk to a specific child. However, it can be seen that the courts are likely to hold 
that a physician who discloses confidential medical information for the purpose of 
avoiding a risk to a child is either justified in breaching the obligation to maintain 
the patient's confidences, or will not even breach such duty thereby, as Mann LJ 
tried to argue in Re C. 
The General Medical Council's guidelines on professional confidence192 specify 
that: 
Rarely, cases may arise in which disclosure in the public interest may be 
justified, for example a situation in which the failure to disclose appropriate 
information would expose the patient, or someone else, to a risk of death or 
serious harm. 
It can be seen that the question of crime prevention as such does not expressly 
appear either in the relevant case-law, or in the professional guidelines. Rather, 
190 Ibid., at 483. 
191 Ibid., at 485-486. 
192 GMC, Professional Conduct and Discipline: Fitness to Practise, rule 86. 
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the focus always lies on the protection of either the public or individuals from 
certain risks, regardless of whether or not the risk thus created would amount to a 
criminal offence. Where such a risk can be identified, disclosure always seems to 
be justified. In Re S (Minors) (Wardship: Police Investigations),193 a case that 
arose in the context of wardship proceedings, and in which the police applied for 
leave of the court to permit disclosure to the police of the medical records and 
video recordings made by a child abuse clinic, Booth J specifically referred to the 
balancing of interests in cases of crime prevention when stating that: 
'The protection afforded to a child by the exercise of the wardship jurisdiction 
should not be extended to the point where it gives protection to offenders 
against the law and, indeed, offenders against the wards themselves. The court 
must take into consideration, as a matter of public policy, the need to safeguard 
not only its wards but other children against the harm they may suffer as the 
result of recurring crimes by undetected criminals. The likely outcome and its 
effects upon a ward of granting an application such as the police now make 
must be considered in each and every case. But when balanced against the 
competing public interest which requires the court to protect society from the 
perpetration of crime it could only be in exceptional circumstances that the 
interests of the individual ward should prevail. In this case, although the results 
may be far-reaching and unpleasant for these young and damaged children, 
their interests are secondary to that greater public need. I am satisfied that on 
the facts this application is wholly justified and that the police should have the 
leave they seek in respect of the medical records and video recordings now in 
the possession of Great Ormond Street Hospital.' 194 
In this case, the considerations of crime prevention and of criminal prosecution 
seem to be mixed up, as the argument is based on the thought that it is necessary 
to prosecute a person who has committed an offence in order to protect the public 
from the perpetration of crime. In its generality, this argument is problematic, as it 
can hardly be said that the fact that someone who committed past crimes and is 
still at large necessarily poses a real risk to individuals or society. 
Re V (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure),' Re L (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure)t9S are two 
cases which shed some light on the question of risk assessment and remoteness of 
risk. In Re L, the local authority wished to disclose to another local authority, in 
the area of which L now lived, the judge's finding that L posed a considerable 
threat to the children of single female adults with whom he might cohabit. L had 
previously been charged with counts of sexual abuse, and acquitted. In Re V, the 
193 [1987] Fam 199. 
194 Ibid., at 203-204. 
19S [1 999] 1 FLR 267 (CA), per Butler-Sloss, LJ. 
196 
local authority wished to disclose to the football league the judge's finding that 
W, who coached the junior teams at the local football club, had committed an 
indecent assault, and developed an unusual and unhealthy relationship with a 14-
year-old. Butler-Sloss argued that: 
'In Mr L's case ... it would be difficult to keep the information truly 
confidential if it is to be of use and its use might well be oppressive, unless a 
child was actually at risk .... [In the case of Mr W] For it to be effective they 
would presumably have to circulate some information to all clubs with which 
Mr W might be associated. . .. Almost inevitably it would have to be passed on 
probably to numerous people .... If the dissemination is to be effective, and 
possibly even if it is not effective, the information provided is likely to be 
oppressive and consequently unjust to Mr W. Those considerations illustrate 
the problem for the court when faced with an application to authorise 
disclosure of information in a case where the risk cannot be related to a 
particular child or children - because it is not known whether any, or which, 
children are actually at risk from time to time. ... The balance comes down 
firmly in favour of non-disclosure in each case.' 196 
It can thus be seen that the Court of Appeal was not prepared to hold that a risk 
the existence of which can mainly be inferred from the past behaviour of the 
person concerned, and which is not the least bit specified as to the potential 
victims, or any other features on how it might materialise, can be sufficient to 
justify the disclosure of confidential information. The two cases also show that 
proportionality considerations have a role to play in this context. Where, because 
of the vague nature of the risk, the interests of the individual that are affected by 
disclosure will have to be violated to a considerable extent, such a measure does 
not seem acceptable. 
While there seems to be widespread agreement that the disclosure of confidential 
medical information for the purposes of crime prevention should be justified 
under the conditions discussed above,197 the overriding importance of the interests 
protected by disclosure seems so obvious that only rarely an attempt is made to 
explain this view. In cases of crime prevention, it has been argued that a breach of 
confidentiality could be justified if this is the only way to protect another's 
autonomy. Thus, if medical confidentiality were mainly based on patient 
autonomy, a breach might be justified as that autonomy finds its limits in the 
196 Ibid., at 274. 
197 See also s.29 Data Protection Act 1998 which provides for an exception for processing of data 
for the purpose of crime prevention. 
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autonomy of others. 198 However, if medical confidentiality additionally or mainly 
served the public interest in preserving public health, it must be borne in mind that 
the breach of confidentiality to protect the integrity of one individual may harm 
society,199 a factor that was not at all considered by the courts. 
2.5.5. Child abuse 
The guidelines of the GMC provide that: 
Deciding whether or not to disclose information is particularly difficult in cases 
where a patient cannot be judged capable of giving or withholding consent to 
disclosure. One such situation may arise where a doctor believes that a patient 
may be the victim of abuse or neglect. In such circumstances the patient's 
interests are paramount and will usually require the doctor to disclose relevant 
information to an appropriate, responsible person or an officer of a statutory 
agency?OO 
The Medical Defence Union201 equally advises that where a healthcare worker has 
reasonable grounds to suspect child abuse the paramount responsibility is with the 
infant patient and that it is perfectly legitimate to supply information to the 
appropriate authorities to ensure that the child is protected. Thus in cases of 
suspected child abuse, the interest in medical confidentiality is outweighed by the 
interest in protecting the child. 
2.6. Summary and conclusion 
No medical privilege exists in criminal proceedings so that a physician who is 
called upon to testuy in a criminal court has no right to refuse to give testimony. 
This rejection of medical privilege is mainly based on the consideration that the 
interests of justice override any interest in confidentiality, unless this interest is 
supported by public interest immunity. Thus the fact that the maintenance of 
medical confidentiality lies in the public interest is not a sufficient reason for the 
recognition of medical privilege. It is very important to stress that an introduction 
of medical privilege into English law is widely seen as undesirable and 
superfluous, as many are of the opinion that medical confidentiality receives 
198 S ee, for example, Jones, (1990) 6 PN, at 22. 
199 Boyd. (1992) 18 JME, at 173 and 178. 
200 Professional Conduct and Discipline: Fitness to Practise, rule 83. 
201 Confidentiality, at 14. 
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adequate protection in criminal court, given that the courts have a discretion to 
exclude medical evidence where it is not relevant and material. There also seems 
to be some distrust in the desirability of creating a statutory privilege, pr<?bably 
partly based on the view that privilege necessarily relates to a conflict of interests. 
It is felt that such a conflict should not be resolved in a general and abstract 
manner, but that it should rather be left to the courts to balance the competing 
interests in the individual case?02 However, under current case-law the courts will 
only exercise any discretion to exclude medical evidence when it can be 
established that the evidence is neither relevant nor material to the case. 
Therefore, at present, not every case of conflict between the interests of justice 
and the interest in medical confidentiality calls for a balancing of the conflicting 
interests. Instead, it is clear that the interests of justice are automatically given 
precedence where the evidence is necessary for the trial. 
Confidential medical information can in rare cases be protected from disclosure in 
court by the concept of public interest immunity, notably where patient 
information which was disclosed in wardship proceedings is to be used for police 
investigations or criminal prosecution However, public interest immunity only 
very rarely adds anything to the protection of confidential medical information in 
court, as the courts are likely to override public interest immunity where the 
information the disclosure of which is sought is relevant or material for criminal 
prosecution purposes. Medical information can be protected by legal professional 
privilege, the only privilege recognised, where medical examinations took place 
or medical advice was sought as part of the defence strategy. 
Medical records that are not protected by public interest immunity or legal 
privilege must be produced in criminal court under the same conditions under 
which the physician has to give testimony and are thus normally only protected if 
the content is thought to be irrelevant or immaterial. Where the police seek access 
to medical records in the course of investigations, the provisions of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 apply. As medical records qualify as 'excluded 
material' police access to them is only possible where the conditions of an access 
order are met, which will only rarely be the case. Thus, in the course of police 
investigations, confidential medical material receives far-reaching protection 
which stands in stark contrast to the almost non-existing protection at trial stage. 
202 See, for example, May, Criminal Evidence, at 13-43. 
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This discrepancy may be based on the view that, in principle, the confidentiality 
of the physician-patient relationship is valued more than the interest in 
investigating and prosecuting crimes, so that the police cannot violate the interests 
protected by medical confidentiality in order to get access to information that may 
assist in their investigations. However, once a case has come to court, the interests 
involved slightly change. At stake is not only the interest in prosecuting a 
criminal, but also the interest in the integrity of the judicial system as such. If the 
court does not have all information at its disposal to establish the truth, 
miscarriages of justice may occur and the trust in the legal system may be thereby 
impaired. 
With regard to the question of whether the physician may voluntarily disclose 
confidential patient information to the police or the courts, different situations 
must be distinguished. Courts have decided that the physician is not prevented by 
the provisions of PACE voluntarily to hand over confidential patient records to 
the police. There is also wide-spread agreement that disclosure is justified for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution, at least where the information relates to serious 
criminal offences. Also, the physician will be justified in breaching medical 
confidentiality where the breach assists a person who is wrongly accused of a 
criminal offence, or where it assists the exercise of defence rights. Where the 
disclosure aims to prevent the commission of criminal offences, it will be justified 
if it helps avert a real risk of danger to an individual or society at large. The risk 
must be sufficiently specified, that is the mere possibility that a person who 
committed a criminal offence may continue to do so in the future will not provide 
enough justification for disclosure. 
As the law is entirely based on case-law, a case-by-case approach has been 
adopted so that it is difficult to identifY more general policy considerations 
underlying the decisions regarding the question of when medical confidentiality 
should be protected, and when it should yield to more important interests. It is 
striking that in the case of voluntary disclosure by the physician, which will 
normally violate hislher obligation of medical confidentiality, the question of 
possible legal justifications is mostly not regarded as very important. The 
justification usually applied, that is the public interest defence, is not carefully 
delineated and court decisions are mainly based on broad considerations of which 
interest seems more important in a given case. 
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Chapter 7 - Medical confidentiality and medical privilege in the U.S. 
1. Protection of medical confidentiality 
1.1. Constitutional protection 
The US Constitution does not expressly protect the right to privacy or the right to 
medical confidentiality. With regard to the protection of a general privacy right, 
the US Supreme Court had to struggle to find a constitutional basis for such a 
guarantee. As Justice Douglas stated in Griswold v Connecticut: 1 
'Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. . .. 
Various guarantees create zones of privacy .... The Fourth Amendment 
explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth 
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a 
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his 
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people." The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were 
described ... as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of 
a man's home and the privacies of life." We recently referred ... to the Fourth 
Amendment as creating a ''right to privacy, no less important than any other 
right carefully and particularly reserved to the people.",2 
Under the US Constitution privacy can thus be protected by different 
Amendments. 
1.1.1. Fifth Amendment (Self-Incrimination Clause) 
The relevant part of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows: 
Nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself. 
In Fisher v u.S.,3 the Supreme Court discussed whether the Fifth Amendment 
protected a person's privacy interests in general and rejected that interpretation of 
the Amendment on the following grounds: 
'It is true that the Court has often stated that one of the several purposes served 
by the constitutional privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination 
is that of protecting personal privacy .... But the Court has never suggested that 
1381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
2 Ibid., at 484-485. 
3425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
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every invasion of privacy violates the privilege. . .. The Framers addressed the 
subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment .... They did not 
seek in still another Amendment - the Fifth - to achieve a general protection of 
privacy but to deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-
incrimination. We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment loose from the moorings of 
its language and make it serve as a general protector of privacy .... Insofar as 
private information not obtained through compelled self-incriminating 
testimony is legally protected, its protection stems from other sources, the 
Fourth Amendment's protection ... or evidentiary privileges as the attorney 
client privilege. We adhere to the view that the Fifth Amendment protects 
against "compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure ot] private 
information. ",4 
According to the Supreme Court in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment does not protect 
privacy interests as such. S Instead, its application is limited to protecting the 
individual from being compelled to give evidence against him/herself. This was 
also discussed in Doe v U.S} where it was held that: 
'It is the "extortion of information from the accused", ... the attempt to force 
him "to disclose the contents of his own mind," ... that implicates the Self-
Incrimination Clause. ... It is consistent with the history of and the policies 
underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause to hold that the privilege may be 
asserted only to resist compelled explicit or implicit disclosures of 
incriminating information. ... These policies are served when the privilege is 
asserted to spare the accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly, his 
knowledge of facts relating him to the offence or from having to share his 
thoughts and beliefs with the Government.' 7 
And in Couch v U.S} it was explained that: 
'The basic complaint of petitioner stems from the fact of divulgence of the 
possibly incriminating information, not from the manner in which or the person 
from whom it was extracted. Yet such divulgence, where it does not result 
from coercion of the suspect herself, is a necessary part of the process of law 
enforcement. ,9 
The Fifth Amendment thus mainly protects a person from having to give 
testimonial evidence against him/herself. With regard to confidential medical 
facts, this means that the patient is only protected against the compelled 
production of confidential documents that may incriminate hirn/her. However, 
.. Ibid., at 399-401 per Justice White. 
, See also, for example, Siaies v Doe 465 U.S. 605 (1983), at 6 I 8 per Justice O'Connor, 
concurring ('The Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private 
papers of any kind. The notion that the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of papers originated 
in Boyd ... , but our decision in Fisher .•. sounded the death knell for Boyd.'). 
6487 U.S. 201 (1988). 
7 Ibid., at 211-213, per Justice Blackmun. 
8409 U.S. 322 (I 973). 
9 Ibid., at 329 per Justice Powell. 
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private documents that were voluntarily prepared are not protected under the Fifth 
Amendment, regardless of how private their content might be, as the Fifth 
Amendment only protects against having to create incriminating private 
documents, but not against state access to private documents that an individual 
had prepared without any state compulsion. lo Another court, while agreeing in 
principle, qualified this statement by arguing that in such a case the Fifth 
Amendment could only protect the contents of the papers 'where compelled 
disclosure would break the heart of our sense of privacy.' II Confidential medical 
information thus does not receive any specific protection under the Fifth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court nevertheless argued that the Fifth Amendment 
can indirectly protect the confidentiality of privileged relationships, as the 
privilege would be undermined if the person bound by the privilege could be 
compelled to produce evidence which would be protected by the Fifth 
Amendment while in the possession of the persons in whose interest the privilege 
was awarded. 12 For the physician-patient relationship, this only means that the 
physician cannot be compelled to produce confidential medical records that were 
protected from production while in the possession of the patient. However, the 
effects of this constitutional protection are rather limited, given that it depends on 
the existence of a physician-patient privilege which is not recognised under 
federal law,13 and given that only rarely will the requirements for Fifth 
Amendment protection be met in the person of the patient. 
10 See, for example, In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 1 F.3d 87 (2od Cir. 1993), at 92-93 
per Lumbard Circuit Judge; Senate Select Committee on Ethics v Packwood 845 F.Supp. 17 
(D.D.C. 1994), at 23 per Jackson, District Judge; In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas 144 F.3d 653 (10th 
Cir. 1998), at 663 per Stephen H. Anderson, Circuit Judge; In re: Grand Jury Witnesses 92 F.3d 
710 (8th Cir. 1996), at 712 per Loken, Circuit Judge; Aviation Supply Corp. v R.S.B.l Aerospace, 
Inc. 999 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1993), per Loken Circuit Judge; but see, on the other hand, U.S. v North 
708 F.Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1989), at 404 per Gesell, District Judge. 
II U.S. v Feldman 83 F.3d 9 (l st Cir. 1996), at 14 per Selya Circuit Judge; see also In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena 973 F.2d 45 (l" Cir. 1992), at 51 per Curiam. 
12 Couch v U.S. 409 U.S. 322 (1973), at 335-336 per Justice Powell; Fisher v U.S. 425 U.S. 391 
(1976), at 403-404 per White Justice. 
13 See for example Hancock v Dodson 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1992), at 1373 per Contie, Senior 
Circuit Judge; U.S. v Bercier 848 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1988), at 920 per McMillan, Circuit Judge; 
U.S. v Burzynski Cancer Research Insl 819 F.2d 130 I (5 th Cir. 1987), at 1311 per Rubin, Circuit 
Judge; U.S. v Meagher 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976), at 753 per Morgan, Circuit Judge. 
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1.1.2. Fourth Amendment (Unreasonable search and seizure) 
The relevant part of the Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. 
The protection of the privacy right available under the Fourth Amendment is 
limited to certain specific situations. As the Supreme Court stated in the leading 
case of Katz v US.: 14 
'The Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 
"right to privacy". That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain 
kinds of governmental intrusion .... But the protection of a person's general 
right to privacy - his right to be let alone by other people - is, like the 
protection of his groperty and of his very life, left largely to the law of the 
individual States.' 5 
It is thus important to note that the protection awarded under the Fourth 
Amendment is restricted in two ways. First, it is only directed towards protection 
against the state, but does not include protection against a privacy violation by 
other individuals. In the context of medical confidentiality, this means that 
medical information may be protected against state access, but not against 
voluntary disclosure by the physician. Secondly, the individual's privacy is not 
protected as such. Rather, the protection of privacy from governmental intrusions 
under the Fourth Amendment works as follows: 
'My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that 
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognise as "reasonable"" 16 
Given the widespread agreement among American courts that at least some 
aspects of medical confidentiality deserve constitutional protection as part of the 
privacy right of the individual,17 it is fair to say that a patient has an expectation 
14 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
15 Ibid., at 350-351 per Justice Steward. 
16 Ibid., at 361 per Justice Harlan; see also, for example, Smith v Maryland 442 U.S. 735 (1979), at 
740 per Justice Blackmun. 
17 See, for example, Whalen v Roe 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Behringer Est. v Princeton Medical 
Center 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J.Super.L. 1991); Caesar v Mountanos 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Falcon v Alaska Public Offices Commission 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. 
Dist. Branch v Ariyoshi 481 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979); Mann v University o/Cincinnati 824 
F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Schachter v Whalen 581 F.2d 35 (2nd Circuit 1978); U.S. v 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980); Woods v White 689 F.Supp 874 
(W.D. Wis. 1988); but see also, for example, Felber v Foote 321 F.Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970) in 
204 
that the medical confidences entrusted in the physician will remain confidential 
and that this interest must be recognised as reasonable. In principle, then, the 
Fourth Amendment protects the patient from unreasonable state intrusions in the 
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. There is not much case law in 
this area, so that it is difficult to delineate the exact scope of this protection. In 
State v Summers,18 for example, a case in which a police trooper, after learning 
that the defendant had obtained drug prescriptions from different physicians, had 
called several physicians and asked whether they knew the defendant and for 
which medical problem the drug had been prescribed, the court came to the 
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated, for: 
'Trooper Wiggin's actions did not constitute a search for purposes of the State 
Constitution. ... The physician-patient privilege does not apply to the 
information obtained here .... The legislature revoked the privilege in precisely 
the circumstances alleged here by providing that "information communicated 
to a practitioner in an effort unlawfully to procure a controlled drug, or 
unlawfully to procure the administration of any such drug, shall not be deemed 
a privileged communication." RSA 318-B:21 (1995).'19 
The court thus came to the conclusion that the protection under the Fourth 
Amendment was excluded because of the content of the State's privilege statute. 
This reasoning is probably based on the consideration that the limitations 
contained in the privilege statute destroyed any otherwise existing expectation in 
the confidentiality of this information. If this is the case, the protection of medical 
confidentiality under the Fourth Amendment is subject to ordinary State 
legislation. 
1.1.3. Fourteenth Amendment (Substantive due process) 
In contrast to the rather limited constitutional protection of certain aspects of 
medical confidentiality under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, broader 
protection is available under the Fourteenth Amendment, the relevant part of 
which provides: 
Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process oflaw. 
which constitutional protection of medical privilege was rejected. 
18 702 A.2d 819 (N.H. 1997). 
19 Ibid, at 821-822 per Johnson, Justice. 
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In Griswold v Connecticut,20 the Supreme Court decided that the right to privacy 
is protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
prohibits the States from abridging fundamental liberties. In Griswold, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting the use of 
contraceptive methods by and the prescription of contraceptives to married 
couples violated the right to privacy. As the right to privacy in the marital relation 
was recognised as a fundamental right, it was protected under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This view was later confirmed in the 
abortion case of Roe v Wade21 where Justice Blackmun held that: 
'This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 14th Amendment's concept 
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, ... is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy. ,22 
Justice Stewart in the same case outlined the constitutional protection of privacy 
in broader terms, when stating that: 
'The "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment 
covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights .... 
Several decisions of this Court make it clear that freedom of personal choice in 
matters of marriafe and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause.,2 
And Justice Douglas held: 
'Many [of the rights acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment] in my view 
come within the meaning of the term "liberty" as used in the 14th Amendment: 
... Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting 
marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception and the education and upbringing 
of children. ... Third is the freedom to care for one's health and person, 
freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion. ,24 
The constitutional right to privacy thus protects interests in secrecy as well as 
autonomy in personal matters. For this concept to apply in the area of medical 
confidentiality, it must be demonstrated that medical information is recognised as 
a personal matter deserving constitutional protection. The patient's privacy 
interest in his/her medical secrets was readily recognised by many American 
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
22 Ibid., at 153. 
23 Ibid., at 168-169. 
24 Ibid., at 210-211. 
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courts.2S In US v Westinghouse Electric Corporation,26 for example, a case 
concerning the powers of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NlOSH) to conduct health hazard investigations, and to be given access to 
a company's medical records of employees potentially affected by the substances 
under investigation, the Court argued: 
'There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which may 
contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of 
materials entitled to privacy protection. Information about one's body and state 
of health is a matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within 
the "private enclave where he may lead a private life". It has been recognised 
in various contexts that medical records and information stand on a different 
plane than other relevant material. ... This difference in treatment reflects a 
recognition that information concerning one's body has a special character.,27 
Thus, medical records as well as medical information in general can qualify as 
personal matters receiving constitutional privacy protection, but American courts 
seem to have developed a case by case approach to decide whether specific 
medical information is or is not constitutionally protected. In Woods v White28, for 
example, the court held that a patient had a privacy interest in his medical records 
containing details of his HIV status. And in Mann v University of Cincinnati, 29 the 
Court explained: 
'The student health services file ... includes Ms Mann's answers ... to the 
following inquiries: history of possible diseases; family history of diseases; ... 
age at time of first intercourse. ... Additional Student Health Services and 
University Hospital records contain documents relating to Ms Mann's medical 
treatment which ... occurred prior to the events alleged in this case. ... There 
can be no question that the aforementioned information is of such a private 
nature that a constitutional right to privacy exists. ,30 
This decision suggests that the privacy protection depends on the character of the 
information, so that medical information is constitutionally protected only if it is 
of a particularly private nature. Similar reasoning can be inferred from US v 
2' See, for example, Whalen v Roe 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Behringer Est. v Princeton Medical 
Center 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J.Super.L. 1991); Caesar v Mountanos 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Falcon v Alaska Public Offices Commission 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. 
Dist. Branch v Ariyosni 481 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979); Mann v University o/Cincinnati 824 
F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Schachter v Whalen 581 F.2d 35 (2nd Circuit 1978); U.S. v 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation 638 F.2d 570 (3n! Cir. 1980); Woods v White 689 F.Supp 874 
(W.O. Wis. 1988). 
26 638 F.2d 570 (3n! Cir. 1980). 
27 Ibid., at 577 per Sloviter, Circuit Judge. 
28 689 F.Supp. 874 (W.O. Wis. 1988), at 876 per Crabb, Chief Justice. 
29 824 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 
30 Ibid., at 1198-1199 per Steinberg, U.S. Magistrates Judge. 
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Westinghouse Electric Corporation.31 There, the Court had to perform a balancing 
exercise to decide whether or not the violation of privacy was justified in the 
particular case. The Court's considerations in that respect are important, as they 
give some indication as to the different degrees of privacy protection. According 
to the Court: 
'The factors which should be considered in deciding whether an intrusion into 
an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record requested, the 
information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent 
non-consensual disclosure ... the adequacy of safeguards to prevent 
unauthorised disclosure .... Westinghouse has not produced any evidence to 
show that the information which the medical records contain is of such a high 
degree of sensitivity that the intrusion could be considered severe or that the 
employees are likely to suffer any adverse effects from disclosure to NIOSH 
personnel. Most, if not all, of the information in the files will be results of 
routine testing, such as X-rays, blood tests, pulmonary function tests, hearing 
and visual tests. This material, although private, is not generally regarded as 
sensitive. ,32 
According to the Court in Westinghouse, the degree of protection thus depends, 
inter alia, on the degree of sensitivity of the medical information concerned, and 
the court suggests an objective test to determine the degree of sensitivity when 
arguing that certain routine examinations are not generally regarded as sensitive. 
The reasoning also suggests that the constitutional protection of privacy and 
therefore medical confidentiality aims at protecting the patient from the adverse 
consequences of disclosure rather than at protecting the patient's privacy interests 
as such. This seems to be in line with the decision in Falcon v Alaska Public 
Offices Commission33 which also discusses the scope of privacy protection 
attached to medical information: 
'The decisions both of this court and the United States Supreme Court clearly 
establish that certain types of information communicated in the context of the 
physician-patient relationship fall within a constitutionally protected zone of 
privacy. The nature and weight of a privacy interest in an individual's identity 
as a patient or client, however, presents a more difficult issue .... Where an 
individual visits a physician who specialises in contraceptive matters or whose 
primary practice is known to be giving abortions and the fact of a visit or 
rendering of services becomes public information, private and sensitive 
information has, in our view, been revealed. Even visits to a general 
practitioner may cause particular embarrassment or opprobrium where the 
patient is a married person who seeks treatment without the spouse's 
knowledge ... . Similar situations would be presented where, because of a 
31 638 F.2d 570 (3n! Cir. 1980). 
32 Ibid., at 578-579 per Sloviter, Circuit Judge. 
33570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977). 
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specialised practice, the disclosure of the patient's identity also reveals the 
nature of the treatment .... Some examples would include the patients of a 
psychiatrist, psychologist or of a physician who specialised in treating sexual 
problems or venereal disease. . .. In emphasising these examples, we reiterate 
that situations involving specialised practice of psychiatry or venereal disease 
present the exception rather than the general rule and that, ordinarily, 
identification as a patient of a general practitioner who also engages in some of 
these functions does not infringe a significant privacy interest. ,34 
The privacy protection of medical information is thus not guaranteed in general, 
but the constitutional protection rather depends on the highly personal character of 
the information with particular emphasis on the protection of information the 
disclosure of which might cause embarrassment to the patient. Another 
consideration can be whether the disclosure of information to the public is at 
stake, or whether the information will only have to be revealed to a limited 
number of health care officials. This was, for example, one of the problems raised 
by the Supreme Court in Whalen v Roe.3S In that case, the Court had to decide on 
the constitutionality of a statute that, responding to the concern that drugs were 
being diverted into unlawful channels, classified potentially harmful drugs and 
provided that prescriptions for the most dangerous legitimate drugs be prepared 
on an official form. One copy of the form which required identification of the 
prescribing physician, dispensing pharmacy, drug and dosage, and patient's name, 
address and age had to be filed with the State Health Department and retained for 
five years. As to the possible violation of a constitutional right to medical 
confidentiality through this procedure, the Court first established that the risk of a 
public disclosure of the medical information was too remote to invalidate the 
statute, given that adequate safeguards against such a disclosure were in place. 
The Court went on: 
'Even without public disclosure, it is, of course, true that private information 
must be disclosed to the authorised employees of the New York Department of 
Health. Such disclosures are not ... meaningfully distinguishable from a host of 
other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of 
health care.,36 
It seems again that the privacy protection concerns the effects of the disclosure 
rather than the patient's interest in non-disclosure as such, as it cannot otherwise 
J.4 Ibid, at 478-480 per Chief Justive Boochever. 
3' 429 U.S. 589 (l977). 
36 Ibid., at 602 per Justice Stevens. 
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be explained why it makes a difference whether or not the disclosure was made to 
the employees of the health department or to the public. 
In Whalen v Roe, the Supreme Court identified two different possibilities for a 
state measure to violate the individual's interests in medical confidentiality as 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: the interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and the interest in making certain kinds of important decisions 
independently. It seems as if the secrecy strand of the privacy right, that is the 
interest in keeping medical information secret, is very closely linked to the 
question, discussed above, of whether or not a matter is private enough so as to 
deserve constitutional protection.37 If this is answered in the affirmative, then the 
individual has a constitutionally protected interest in keeping this information 
secret and in controlling the disclosure of such information. However, the 
constitutional protection is not absolute, but can rather be outweighed by a 
compelling state interest in disclosure. 
The autonomy interest in the protection of medical confidentiality was, for 
example, explained in Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. Dist. Branch v Ariyoshi,38 a case 
which was concerned with the relationship between psychiatrists and patients: 
'The Supreme Court has recognised an individual's right to make decisions 
free from unjustified governmental interference on matters relating to marriage . 
... An individual's decision whether or not to seek the aid of a psychiatrist and 
whether or not to communicate certain personal information to that 
psychiatrist, fall squarely within the bounds of this "cluster of constitutionally 
protected choices" .... The Supreme Court has consistently been concerned 
with protecting individuals against governmental intrusion into matters 
affecting the most fundamental personal decisions and relationships .... No area 
could be more deserving of protection than communication between a 
psychiatrist and his patient. Such communications often involve problems in 
precisely the areas previously recognised by the Court as within the zone of 
protected privacy, including family, marriage, parenthood, human sexuality, 
and physical problems. Constitutionally protected privacy must, at a minimum, 
include the freedom of an individual to choose the circumstances under which, 
and to whom certain of his thoughts and feelings will be disclosed .... This 
right to choose confidentiality is particularly crucial in the context of 
communications between patient and psychotherapist. ... The court holds that 
the constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to an individual's liberty 
to make decisions regarding psychiatric care without unjustified governmental 
interference. ,39 
37 See, for example, Mangels v Pena 789 F.2d 836 (loth Cir. 1986). 
38 481 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979). 
39 Ibid., at 1038-1039 per Byrne, District Judge. 
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In this decision, the main aspect behind protecting patient autonomy through a 
guarantee of medical confidentiality seems to be that the patient can only seek 
meaningful medical, and, in particular, psychological advice and treatment when 
openly disclosing personal information that is subject to the privacy protection. If 
the privacy protection were reduced to protecting the patient's interest in not 
having to disclose this information, it would not go far enough. The patient would 
then only have the choice between keeping confidential information to himlherself 
by not seeking medical advice and treatment, or, alternatively, seeking medical 
treatment and advice, and, as a consequence, giving up any privacy protection. As 
was explained in Mann v University ojCincinnati:4o 
'If patients have a genuine concern that their private medical information will 
become publicly known and may adversely affect their reputations or embarrass 
them, they will be reluctant to seek medical assistance. Thus, patients' interest 
in making decisions vital to their health care may be impaired by unwarranted 
disclosures .... These same reasons support a doctor-patient privilege. Medical 
care providers ... who create and maintain such information have a concomitant 
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. We believe that duty has its roots in the 
Constitution. ,41 
Thus, autonomy in making personal choices means that the individual must be 
given the opportunity to decide whether or not to seek help for medical conditions 
without a fear that his/her secrets may be disclosed to parties outside the 
physician-patient relationship. Both decisions seem to suggest that the autonomy 
strand of the right to privacy is, in the context of medical confidentiality, very 
closely linked to the right to make health care decisions and to the patient's 
interest in bodily integrity. If the patient cannot be sure that medical information 
revealed to the physician will be kept secret, he/she may be inhibited to disclose 
frankly such information to the physician, which may adversely affect the medical 
treatment available to the patient. A patient who can seek medical advice and 
treatment only on the basis that the state may be given access to this information 
can no longer make health care decisions free from state interference, as this 
possibility may affect and influence the decision the patient is going to take. Not 
only informational, but also decisional privacy is thus protected, and the 
argumentation behind such protection is deontological, rather than utilitarian, as it 
40 824 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 
41 Ibid., at 1199 per Steinberg, U.S. Magistrates Judge. 
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concentrates on the value of privacy and autonomy as suc~ rather than on the 
possible consequences of disclosure. 
In US v Westinghouse Electric Corporation.42 the court very briefly touched upon 
another aspect which may explain why medical confidentiality is given 
constitutional protection, when arguing that: 
'The factors which should be considered in deciding whether an intrusion into 
an individual's privacy is justified are ... the injury from disclosure to the 
relationship in which the record was generated .... Since Westinghouse'S 
testing and NIOSH's examination of the records are both conducted for the 
purpose of protecting the individual employee from potential health hazards, it 
is not likely that the disclosures are likely to inhibit the employee from 
undergoing subsequent periodic examinations required of Westinghouse 
employees. ,43 
The physician-patient relationship is thus also regarded as deserving protection, 
but the reasons behind this consideration are not further specified. 
So far, the protection of privacy rights under the Federal Constitution has been 
demonstrated, but it should be noted that some State constitutions explicitly 
recognise a privacy right. This raises the question of whether express 
constitutional protection of privacy rights adds to the constitutional protection 
already existing under the Federal Constitution. The California Constitution is one 
example of a constitution that explicitly protects the right to privacy. The leading 
Californian case in this area is In Re Li/schutz.44 Dr Lifschutz was imprisoned 
after refusing to obey an order directing him to answer questions and produce 
records relating to communications with a former patient. The Court first 
discussed whether or not the forced disclosure of medical information violated a 
privacy right of members of the medical profession, in this case a psychiatrist, and 
rejected this view. With regard to the patient's privacy interest the Court then 
held: 
'A patient's interest in keeping such confidential revelations from public 
purview, in retaining this substantial privacy, has deeper roots than the 
Californian statute and draws sustenance from our constitutional heritage. The 
confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic session falls within the constitutionally 
guaranteed zones of privacy. Even though a patient's interest in the 
42 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
43 Ibid., at 578-579 per Sloviter, Circuit Judge. 
44 85 Cal.Rptr. 829 (Sup. 1970). 
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confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient relationship rests, in part, on 
constitutional underpinnings, all state interference with such confidentiality is 
not prohibited. ,45 
This holding does not seem to add any protection not already existent under 
federal constitutional principles. A similar conclusion could be drawn from 
Division of Medical Quality v Gherardini,46 where it has been argued: 
'While the amendment [to the California Constitution] does not prohibit all 
incursions into individual privacy, any such intervention must be justified by a 
compelling interest ... and any statute authorising invasion of such area of 
privacy must be subject to strict scrutiny. ,47 
However, in Pagano v Oroville Hospital,48 the Court held: 
'California ... has adopted an explicit constitutional right to privacy, and 
recognised application of this right to patient medical records. ... The 
California Supreme Court has interpreted this state constitutional right to be 
inalienable ... and broader than the federal privacy right. ... The right protects 
against invasions of privacy by private citizens as well as by the state. ,49 
This decision is interesting as it specifies that under California law, the 
constitutional right to privacy not only creates a right against state interference, 
but also correlates in a duty of non-disclosure imposed on the physician. This 
surpasses the protection awarded under the U.S. Constitution. However, the court 
at the same time rejected the compelling interest test as too rigid and suggested a 
less stringent test for the justification of intrusions on the privacy right, which 
takes away some of the additional protection. It can be concluded that while the 
privacy right recognised by the U.S. Constitution sets the minimum standard for 
all American States, some State constitutions provide additional constitutional 
protection in certain areas of privacy protection. 
1.2. Statutory obligations 
In US law, a criminal offence penalising a physician's breach of hislher duty to 
maintain medical confidentiality does not exist, so that medical confidentiality is 
not, as such, protected by criminal law. In some States, the disclosure of 
particularly sensitive information, for example the mv status of a patient, 
45 Ibid., at 431-432 per Tobriner, Justice. 
46 IS6 Cal.Rptr. S5 (1979). 
47 Ibid., at 61 per Staniforth, Acting Presiding Judge. 
48 145 F.RD. 683 (E.D.Cal 1993). 
49 Ibid., at 696-697 per Hollows, U.S. Magistrate Judge. 
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amounts to a criminal offence. 50 
1.2.1. Privilege statutes 
In the U.S., privilege statutes are an important means to introduce a statutory 
obligation of medical confidentiality. At the federal level, no statutory medical 
privilege exists. However, forty-one States in the U.S. now have some form of 
statutory physician-patient privilege,51 and in all States, the communication 
between psychiatrists and patients is privileged by statute. The psychiatrist-patient 
privilege is more widely accepted, as it is often argued that the information 
imparted to a psychiatrist is more personal and intimate than the medical 
information disclosed to a physician and therefore more deserving of privacy 
protection. 52 The scope of the physician-patient privilege varies from State to 
State. A few State statutes granting medical privilege will now be introduced to 
give some idea of the nature and scope of such statutes. 
In some States, the privilege statutes are formulated so as to give the patient the 
right to prevent the disclosure of confidential medical information. The Arkansas 
Uniform Rules of Evidence 503 (1976), for example, state: 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and 
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made 
for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional 
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, physician or 
psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or 
treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including 
members of the patient's family. 
And Art.Sl 0 Louisiana Code of Evidence provides as follows: 
C.(I) General rule of privilege in criminal proceedings. In a criminal 
proceeding, a patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another 
person from disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of 
advice, diagnosis or treatment of his health condition between or among 
himself, his representative, and his physician or psychotherapist, and their 
representatives. 
~ See for example §199.21 California Health and Safety Code (West Supp. 1990); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§146.025(9) (West 1989); Idaho Code §39-606 (Supp. 1989). 
5J Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Tennessee 
and West Virginia do not have a statutory physician-patient privilege; see 'Developments in 
r.rivileged communications', (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1532. 
2 Jaffee v Redmont 518 U.S. 1 (1996), at 10-12 per Justice Stevens; In Re Doe 964 F.2d 1325 (2nd 
Cir. 1992), at 1328 per Winter, Circuit Judge; Lora v Board of Education 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N. Y. 
1977) at 574-575. 
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In other States, the privilege statute is, on the other hand, formulated so as to 
impose an obligation on the physician not to disclose confidential patient 
information. D.C. Code Ann. §14-307 (1981), for example, provides: 
(a) In the Federal courts in the District of Columbia and District of Columbia 
courts a physician or surgeon or mental health professional ... may not be 
permitted, without the consent of the person afllicted, or of his legal 
representative, to disclose any information, confidential in its nature, that he 
has acquired in attending a client in a professional capacity and that was 
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, whether the information was 
obtained from the client or from his family or from the person or persons in 
charge of him. 
And Mich. Compo Laws Ann. §600.21S7 (West 1986) similarly states that: 
No person duly authorised to practise medicine or surgery shall be allowed to 
disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient 
in his professional character, and which information was necessary to enable 
him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him as a 
surgeon. 
Privilege statutes thus give the patient control over the disclosure of confidential 
medical information by either giving him/her the right to prevent the physician 
from disclosing such information, or by formulating a prohibition, addressed to 
the physician, to disclose such information without the patient's consent. 
However, the protection awarded by such privilege statutes is not as 
comprehensive as it may seem. First, it must be noted that privilege statutes apply 
only in the context of judicial proceedings, so that they do not impose any 
obligation on the physician not to reveal confidential patient information outside 
of the judicial setting.S3 Also, it must be determined what is meant by 
'communication' that is protected under the different statutes, as that term can be 
defined in an extensive or in a very narrow way. Some statutes expressly define 
the term. The Texas statute, for example, provides in Art.449Sb Public Health 
Act: 
Sec.S.08 - physician-patient communication 
(a) Communications between one licensed to practice medicine, relative to or 
in connection with any professional services as a physician to a patient, is 
n See, for example, Steinberg v Jensen 534 N. W.2d 361 (Wis. 1995), at 370 per Steinmetz. 
Justice. It should be noted, however, that some courts have used the policy expressed in the 
privilege statute to create an obligation of medical confidentiality beyond judicial proceedings. 
See, for example, Saur v Probes 476 N.W.2d 496 (Mich.App. 1991), per Kelly, Judge, at 498; see 
also Berry v Moench 331 P.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. of Utah 1958) per Crockett, Justice; Schaffer v Spicer 
215 N. W.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. S.D. 1974), per Biegelmeier, Chief Justice. 
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confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided in this 
section. 
(b) Records of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by a 
physician that are created or maintained by a physician are confidential and 
privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided in this section. 
Thus, the protection is not only awarded to oral communications, but also includes 
medical records. The Louisiana statute is even broader in providing: 
(b) "Confidential communication" includes any information, substance, or 
tangible object, obtained incidental to the communication process and any 
opinion formed as a result of the consultation, examination, or interview and 
also includes medical and hospital records made by health care providers and 
their representatives. 
With regard to the Louisiana statute, Lottinger, Chief Judge, concluded in Sarphie 
v Rowe54 that when an individual walks into a doctor's office and opens his 
mouth, everything spilling out of it, whether it be his identity or his false teeth (a 
tangible object) is presumptively privileged and beyond the reach of discovery. In 
Matter of Commitment of w.c.,55 however, this rather extreme statement was 
somewhat mitigated. There, the court argued that although the definition of 
confidential communication under LSA-C.E. art. 510 was broad, inherent in the 
definition was the concept of something being expressed by one person to another 
and an intent that this information not be disclosed to others. Consequently, the 
court argued that the definition of "confidential communication" was not broad 
enough to include an observation of the patient's behaviour by health care 
personnel in a situation where the patient was making no attempt to communicate 
with anyone. Thus, if a patient is seen to strike other patients or if the patient's 
. failure to provide for his/her basic physical needs is observed, these observations 
aare not regarded as privileged communication. This holding was based on the 
court's interpretation of the purpose behind the provisions of the privilege statute. 
The court argued that the privilege statute aimed to protect the confidences a 
patient communicates to hislher health care provider and to give heed to the fact 
that disclosure of the patient's confidences could be detrimental to the health care 
provider-patient relationship. 
54 618 So.2d 905 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993), at 908. 
55685 So.2d 634 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1996), at 638 per Whipple, Judge. 
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Another case delineating the scope of medical confidentiality is People v 
Malthia. 56 A driver was arrested for speeding and lost consciousness before he 
was put in the squad car. The officers called an ambulance and the physician, Dr 
Lovell, wanted to analyse the urine of the defendant for the presence of drugs and 
to check the kidneys for an indication of internal injuries. When the defendant's 
underwear was removed in order to insert the catheter, Dr Lovell found a bag 
containing illicit drugs. At that time, no police officers were present. The court 
argued that the discovery of the drugs on the defendant's person resulted from a 
medical procedure necessary to diagnose and treat the defendant, and therefore 
occurred while Dr. Lovell was rendering necessary medical treatment to the 
defendant. Accordingly, the court concluded that the bag and the drugs contained 
therein constituted privileged information within the meaning of section 8-802 
Code of Civil Procedure, stating in subsection (8) that: 
No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or 
she may have acquired in attending the patient in a professional character, 
necessary to enable him or her professionally to save the patient. 
In States the privilege statutes of which do not provide a defInition of the 
communication which is thereby protected, the exact scope of the physician's 
obligation must be determined by the courts, and courts in different States have 
adopted different approaches in so doing. Most courts decided that 
'communication' was not limited to the oral statements of the patient, but also 
included medical records. 57 Another question is whether the protection of 
'communication' includes observations made by the physician in the course of 
exercising hislher profession Most courts have adopted a broad approach. State v 
Schroeder,58 for example, is a case in which this issue had to be decided. In that 
case, a patient was brought to the hospital by the police for treatment of a head 
injury. In the course of the examination of the patient for this purpose, the treating 
physician made the observation that his patient seemed to have been under the 
influence of alcohol and the question arose whether or not this observation was 
protected communication under North Dakota's privilege statute. The court 
argued as follows: 
56 653 N.E.2d 402 (Ill.App. 3 Dist. 1995), at 405-407 per McCuskey, Justice. 
57 See, for example, Behringer Estate v Princeton Medical Centre 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J.Super.L. 
1991), per Crachman, J.S.C.; Comonwealth v Kobrin 479 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1986), per Abrams, 
Judge; In Re Search Wa"ant 810 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1987), per Becker, Circuit Judge. 
58 524 N. W.2d 837(N.D. 1994). 
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'The privilege authorised by N.D.REvid.503 is not limited to verbal 
statements, but applies to communications. Although N.D.REvid.503 does not 
define communications, it defines when a "communication is confidential" to 
include ''the consultation, examination or interview," and ''the diagnosis and 
treatment". That definition suggests that the term has a broader meaning than 
verbal statement. Additionally, Webster's New World Dictionary ... defines 
"communication" as ''the act of transmitting" and "a giving or exchanging of 
information, signals, or messages by talk, gestures, writing, etc." That plain, 
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning of communications is not 
restricted to verbal statements and also supports a broader meaning for the 
term. We follow the ordinary meaning of "communications" and hold that the 
physician-patient privilege authorised by N.D.REvid.503 applies to 
information and observations made by a physician for purposes of diagnosis or 
treatment of the patient's medical condition.59 
This approach was also adopted in Sims v Charlotte Liberty Mutual Insurance 
CO,60 where the court argued that communication, in addition to the patient's oral 
statements, also included any information which the physician or surgeon 
acquired in attending the patient in a professional character, and which is 
necessary to enable him to prescribe for or treat the patient.61 The court based its 
consideration on the purpose behind the privilege statute which it thought could 
only be achieved by a broad interpretation of 'communication'. It has been 
suggested, however, that protected 'communications' should be limited to 
information which is somehow related to the medical treatment. If an accident 
victim seeks medical treatment, those details of the accident that have nothing to 
do with the injuries sustained would then not be protected.62 
In Re The June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury,6J the court took 
a very narrow approach. Eagen, Chief Justice, explained: 
'Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, our case law has drawn a 
distinction between information learned by a physician through communication 
to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and 
observation .... The distinction is rooted in the purpose of the privilege, merely 
to create a confidential atmosphere in which the patient will be encouraged to 
disclose all possible information bearing on his or her illness so that the 
physician may render effective treatment. Much information acquired by the 
physician acting in a professional capacity may relate back in some way to an 
initial communication by a patient, for example, a report of sickness or pain in 
a particular area of the body. However, the privilege is limited to information 
59 Ibid., at 840-842. 
60 125 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1962). 
61 Ibid., at 329-330 per Moore, Justice. 
62 Vilensky, (1994) 66 New York State Bar Journal, at 39. 
63 415 A.2d 73 (Sup. Ct. Pa 1980). 
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which would offend the rationale of the privilege, i.e. information directly 
related to the patient's communication and thus tending to expose it.,64 
The court concluded that information gained from an analysis of tissue samples 
was not 'communication' and therefore not protected by the privilege statute. It 
can thus be seen that the interpretation of the privilege statute largely depends on 
the court's view of the purpose behind such a statute. If the purpose of the statute 
is to encourage frank communication, it seems at first sight sufficient to protect 
oral communication. However, as the other cases cited above have demonstrated, 
this approach is rather controversial. as it could be argued that from the patient's 
point of view, it does not make any difference whether or not the physician 
obtains confidential information the patient wants to keep secret through direct 
communication or through an examination of the patient's body or tissue samples 
etc. A patient who is concerned about secrecy of medical information may not 
allow the physician to examine him/her if only direct communication is 
confidential. but other information the physician acquires in the course of the 
physician-patient relationship is not protected. 
Another question is whether the privilege should only attach to potentially 
embarrassing information.6s In Re The June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating 
Grand Jury,66 the question was answered in the affrrmative when the court argued 
that: 
'To fall within the terms of the statute, communications must tend to blacken 
the character of the patient. Here, the subpoenaed tissue reports contain no 
statutorily privileged communications. While identifYing data such as patient's 
name and address would tend to reveal communications by the patient, such 
communications would in no way tend to blacken the character of a patient. ,67 
Even though far less stringent, a comparable reasoning can be found in other 
decisions. In Falcon v Alaska Public Offices Commission,68 for example, a 
decision already discussed in the context of constitutional privacy protection, the 
court argued that in situations involving specialised practice of psychiatry or 
venereal disease, the identification as a patient of such a specialist could in itself 
64 Ibid., at 76-77. 
6' For a discussion see, for example, Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, 
psychotherapist-patient, and related privileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, 
vol. 2, at 7-24. 
66 415 A.2d 73 (Sup. Ct. Pa 1980). 
67 Ibid., at 77 per Eagen Chief Justice. 
61 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977), per Chief Justive Boochever. 
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constitute protected information, while the same did not apply to patients of a 
general practitioner. Thus, the mere facts that the patient received medical 
treatment and when and where treatment has been administered are normally not 
protected by medical privilege.69 In Weisbeck v Hess'°, the court decided 
differently in stating that the privilege should cover any form of communication 
made as a part of the therapeutic relationship and therefore included name 
confidentiality. However, this was a case in which a husband attempted to 
discover a list of a psychiatrist's patients. As the consultation of a psychiatrist still 
has an embarrassing aspect attached to it, it is difficult to use the statement made 
in this case to support the view that name confidentiality should be protected in 
principle, regardless of the nature of the treatment sought or received. 
The privilege does not include information that is unrelated to medical 
treatment.71 The results of medical examinations that did not take place for 
treatment or diagnostic purposes are not privileged. This general rule refers, for 
example, to cases where the patient seeks a medical examination for insurance 
purposes,72 or where the examination is ordered by a court73 or is performed at the 
request of police officers or prosecutors. Therefore, the results of blood tests 
exclusively taken for a determination of the blood alcohol level, and not for 
diagnosis or treatment purposes are not protected by medical privilege.74 In a 
recent decision, it was even held that the psychotherapist-patient relationship 
between a police officer who was ordered by his employer to attend counselling 
sessions and his psychotherapists who were expected to provide reports and 
recommendations to the employer was not covered by privilege.7s However, the 
results of medical tests performed on a defendant for the purposes of diagnosis or 
treatment, and not at the request of a law enforcement officer or prosecutor, are 
privileged. This applies, for example, to blood alcohol tests obtained as part of the 
69 See also, for example, Benton v Superior Court Navajo County 897 P.2d 1352 (Ariz.App.Div.l 
1994), per Kleinschmidt, Judge; National Stop Smoking Clinic-Atlanta v Dean 190 Ga App 289 
(1989); State v Sypull 304 Ark. 5 (1990). 
70 524 N. W.2d 363 (S.D. 1994), at 366 per Henderson, Retired Judge. 
71 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
r:rivileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-20 to 7-21. 
2 Bouligny v Metropolitan Life Ins Co 133 S. W.2d 1094 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939). 
73 Snyder, (1990) 65 Tulane Law Review, at 172-173. 
74 Collins v Howard 156 F.Supp 322 (1957), State v Erickson 241 N.W.2d 854 (N.D. 1976), per 
Sand, Judge. 
7' Barrett v Vojtas 182 F.R.D. 177 (W.D.Pa. 1998), at 181 per Cindrich, District Judge. 
220 
patient's treatment at a hospital.76 When a treating physician undertakes actions 
for purposes other than treatment, e.g. drawing of a blood sample to be used in a 
police investigation, the privilege may be held to be inapplicable,77 but if the test 
was performed at the direction of the treating physician rather than at the request 
of law enforcement officials, the privilege will generally be found to apply.78 
For the privilege statute to apply the protected communication must be 
confidentia~ a term which again leaves some scope for interpretation. Under some 
privilege statutes,79 a communication is 'confidential' if it is not intended to be 
disclosed to third persons, except persons present to further the interests of the 
patient, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the 
direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient's 
family. In Hinzman v State,80 the court concluded on this basis that if a 
psychiatrist had explained to the patient before the session that he would report 
his findings to the prosecuting attorney's office and the Department of Human 
Services, the communications during those sessions were not privileged. Even a 
clearly professional consultation can lose its privileged status in many States if it 
takes place in the presence of third parties. Even where statutes do not contain a 
confidentiality requirement, courts have often imposed such a rule.8t It is argued 
that when third parties are casually present, their very presence neutralises the 
confidential character and the privilege should not attach.82 In State v George,83 a 
case in which a patient, while in police custody, demanded to be seen by his 
treating physician for a head injury, and then, in the presence of two police 
officers and his treating physician, performed dexterity tests for the purpose of 
establishing whether or not he was under the influence of alcoho~ the court 
distinguished as follows: While the examination for the head injury and the 
observations made as a result of it took place in confidence and were thus 
privileged, the information acquired from observing the test performances was 
not, as it could not only be observed by the physician, but also by the police 
76 State v Smorgola 50 Ohio St.3d 222 (1990). 
77 State v Waring 779 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), at 740-741. 
78 State v Elwell 132 NH 599 (1989); State v McElroy 553 So.2d 456 (La 1989), at 458. 
79 See, for example, Ark.REvid. 503(a)(4). 
80 922 S. W.2d 725 (Ark.App. 1996), per Rogers, Judge. 
81 State v Thomas 78 Ariz. 52 (1954); State v Burchett 302 S. W.2d 9 (Mo. 1957), at 17; People v 
Christopher 101 A.2d 504 (1984), at 530; but see also People v Decina 2 N.Y.2d 133 (1956), at 
138. 
82 State v Thomas 78 Ariz. 52 (1954), at 63. 
83 575 P.2d 51 1 (Kan. 1978). 
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officers. The mere presence of police officers or other third parties, however, does 
not necessarily exclude the confidential character of a medical examination. The 
presence of police officers does, for example, not affect the confidentiality of a 
medical examination the results of which they cannot observe.84 In State v 
Deases8S the court emphasised that the presence of a third person during an 
otherwise confidential communication does not destroy the privilege if the third 
person is present to assist the physician in some way or the third person's 
presence is necessary for the defendant to obtain treatment. Thus, if a person 
under suspicion of having committed a serious crime needs medical treatment and 
police officers are present to protect the treating physician, their presence does not 
negate the privilege. The law is unclear as to whether information received from 
family members of the patient or other persons is privileged.86 In Grosslight v 
Superior Court87 it was held that the privilege established in s.1 0 14 Evidence 
Code Cal. includes all relevant communications to psychotherapists by intimate 
family members of the patient. And the court in Edington v Mutual Life Ins Co88 
held that protected communications include knowledge acquired from the 
statements of others who surround the patient at the time. The rule thus seems to 
be that the privilege extends to information from any source as long as it is given 
for purposes oftreatment.89 
1.2.2. Licensing statutes 
In some U.S. States, the licensing statutes for physicians impose upon the 
physician an obligation to maintain the patient's confidences. The Oregon 
licensing statute, for example, provides for the disqualification of or other 
disciplinary sanctions against a physician for 'wilfully or negligently divulging a 
professional secret,.90 And the Alabama licensing statute provides in Title 46, 
§257(21) Code of Alabama 1940, that: 
84 Ibid., at 516 per Miller, Justice. 
8' 518 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1994), at 788 per Ternus, Justice. 
86 See Grosslight v Superior Court 72 Cal. App. 3d 502 (1977); Edington v Mut Life Ins Co 67 
N.Y. 185 (1876), at 194; State v Parker 149 Vt. 393 (1988). 
87 Grosslight v Superior Court 72 Cal. App. 3d 502 (1977). 
88 Edington v Mut Life Ins Co 67 N.Y. 185 (1876), at 194. 
89 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
~ivileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-18. 
See Humphers v First Interstate Bank 696 P.2d 527 (Sup. Ct. Or. 1985), at 534-535 per Linde, 
Justice. 
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The state licensing board for the healing arts shall have the power and it is its 
duty to suspend for a specified time, to be determined in the discretion of the 
board, or revoke any license to practice the healing arts or any branch thereof 
in the state of' Alabama whenever the licensee shall be found guilty of any of 
the following acts or offences; 
... (14) Wilful betrayal ofa professional secret. 
This means that such licensing statutes impose on the physician an obligation of 
medical confidentiality the violation of which can give rise to temporary 
suspension or even permanent revocation of the license to practice medicine. 
1.3. General obligation of medical confidentiality 
Given that privilege and licensing statutes only create an obligation of medical 
confidentiality under rather limited circumstances, it shall now be examined how 
some courts have used the narrow statutory obligations as a starting point for 
developing a general duty to keep the patient's medical secrets. Courts have used 
both the privilege statutes and the licensing statutes to infer a broader state policy 
favouring medical confidentiality. In Sour v Probes, 91 for example, the court 
discussed the conclusions to be drawn from the privilege statutes existing in 
Michigan for out-of court disclosure of medical patient information by the 
physician. According to the court, while the privilege statutes cannot be applied 
directly, as they only address evidentiary disclosures and do not create civil 
liability for extrajudicial disclosures, they can nevertheless be interpreted as 
exhibiting a public policy of protecting physician-patient confidences absent a 
superseding public or private interest. The court was thus of the opinion that even 
though not directly imposing a general obligation on the physician to maintain 
medical confidentiality outside of legal proceedings, the privilege statutes give a 
strong indication that the State is dedicated to the protection of medical 
confidences. In support of this conclusion, the court, in addition, relied on the 
State licensing statute which also prohibits the disclosure of confidential 
information by the physician. 
91 476 N. W.2d 496 (Mich.App. 1991), at 498 per Kelly, Judge; see also Berry v Moench 331 P.2d 
814 (Sup. Ct. of Utah 1958) per Crockett, Justice; Schaffer v Spicer 215 N.W.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 
S.D. 1974), per Biegelmeier, Chief Justice. 
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It is also interesting to examine the approach adopted in States that do not 
recognise a general medical privilege. In Horne v Patton,92 the Alabama Supreme 
Court argued that the absence of a privilege statute does not indicate that medical 
confidentiality is not protected, as privilege statutes only deal with the limited 
question of disclosure of medical confidentiality in the judicial setting. Given the 
existence of State licensing statutes protecting medical confidentiality, the court 
concluded that a medical doctor is under a general duty not to make extra-judicial 
disclosures of information acquired in the course of the physician-patient 
relationship. In Alberts v Devine,93 the court similarly held that the absence of 
privilege statutes does not indicate that no public policy favouring a patient's right 
to confidentiality exists, as the principle that society is entitled to every person's 
evidence in order that the truth be discovered may require a physician to testify in 
court about information obtained from a patient in the course of treatment, but has 
no application to disclosures made out of court. It can thus be seen that privilege 
statutes have an impact surpassing their direct applicability. While the existence 
of a testimonial privilege can be used as supporting the view that the relevant 
State favours the protection of medical confidentiality, so that the protection is 
then not limited to the judicial setting, the absence of a privilege statute by no 
means implies that the State does not protect medical confidentiality outside the 
judicial setting. It rather only expresses the State legislature's attitude that medical 
confidentiality is outweighed by the state interest in an unhindered administration 
of criminal justice. Privilege statutes and licensing statutes taken together, or 
licensing statutes alone in the absence of privilege statutes, have thus been used as 
a basis for creating a general obligation to maintain medical confidentiality. 
1.4. Obligation under contract law and tort law 
With regard to the question of whether or not the physician is under an obligation 
towards the patient to maintain medical confidentiality the breach of which would 
give rise to a claim in private law, different courts in different States have adopted 
different approaches, so that it is difficult to paint the full picture. However, some 
selected cases will be presented to introduce some of the arguments discussed by 
92 287 So.2d 824 (Sup. Ct. Alabama 1973), at 827-829 and 832 per Bloodworth, Justice. 
93 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985), at 119-120 per O'Connor, Justice; see also South Carolina Board 
of Medical Examiners v Hedgepath 480 S.E.2d 724 (S.C. 1997), per Finney, Chief Justice. 
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American courts. 
In principle, in American law the physician-patient relationship is often based on 
a contract. In MacDonald v Clinger,94 for example, the court held that the 
physician-patient relationship is contractual in nature. It is thus in principle 
possible that the physician is under a contractual obligation to maintain the 
patient's medical secrets. However, such an obligation will usually not be an 
express term of the contract which leaves the courts with the difficulty of deciding 
whether, absent such an express term, the physician can nevertheless be under a 
contractual obligation not to reveal the patient's confidences. Some courts have 
decided in favour of such an obligation. In Hammonds v Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company,95 for example, it was argued that the physician, as an implied condition 
of the medical contract, guarantees that any confidential information gained in the 
course of the physician-patient relationship would not be released. A breach of the 
duty to maintain medical confidentiality is then a violation of the physician's 
obligation under the medical contract. The court inferred this implied condition on 
the ground that the public has a right to rely on the code of ethics adopted by the 
medical profession which imposes on the physician an obligation to keep medical 
confidences, on the privilege statute and on the State Medical Licensing Statute 
which seals the doctor's lips in private conversation. A similar conclusion, based 
on similar considerations was reached in MacDonald v Clinger96 and in Doe v 
Roe.97 There, it has been specified that the physician impliedly covenants to keep 
in confidence all disclosures made by the patient concerning the patient's physical 
or mental condition as well as all matters discovered by the physician in the 
course of an examination or treatment. In the case of breach, the patient has the 
possibility to ask for injunctive relief or for compensation. 
The problem with an action under contract law is that the plaintiff's recovery is 
limited to economic loss flowing directly from the breach and that recovery for 
mental distress, loss of employment etc. would be precluded. Given these 
inadequacies, the Court concluded in MacDonald v Clinger that the physician-
patient relationship contemplates an additional duty springing from but extraneous 
to the contract and that the breach of such duty is actionable as a tort. According 
94 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct 1982), at 802-804 per Denman, Justice. 
9S 243 F.Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965), at 797-802 per Connell, Chief Judge. 
96 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct 1982), at 802-804 per Denman, Justice. 
97 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977), at 674-675 per Stecher, Justice. 
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to the Court, the relationship of the parties was one of trust and confidence out of 
which arose a duty not to disclose. In Hammonds v Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Compan/8 the Court came to a similar conclusion in stating that: 
'If a doctor should reveal any of these confidences, he surely affects an 
invasion of the privacy of his patient. We are of the opinion that the 
preservation of the patient's privacy is no mere ethical duty upon the part of the 
doctor; there is a legal duty as well. The unauthorised revelation of medical 
secrets or any confidential communication given in the course of treatment, is 
tortious conduct which may be the basis for an action in damages. ,99 
In Fairfax Hasp. v Curtis, 100 the court held that a health care provider owes a duty 
of reasonable care to the patient which includes an obligation to preserve the 
confidentiality of patient information which was communicated to the health care 
provider or discovered during the course of treatment. In the absence of a 
statutory command to the contrary, or absent the patient's authorisation, a 
violation of this duty gives rise to an action in tort. The Court then decided that 
the recovery of damages for humiliation, embarrassment, and similar harm to 
feelings, although unaccompanied by actual physical injury, was possible under 
tort law where a cause of action existed independently of such harm. A similar 
reasoning can be observed in McCormick v England, 101 where the court argued 
that although South Carolina does not recognise the physician-patient privilege, 
the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship is an interest worth 
protecting and that a violation of the physician's obligation can give rise to an 
action in tort. An action for damages in tort can also sometimes be based on a 
breach of the general obligation of medical confidentiality inferred from privilege 
statutes and licensing statutes as outlined above. In Schaffer v Spicer,I02 for 
example, the court decided that the breach of this general duty by an unauthorised 
disclosure of confidential information may give rise to liability to the patient for 
reSUlting damages. In Horne v Patton, 103 the Alabama Supreme Court also argued 
that a medical doctor is under a general duty not to make extra-judicial disclosures 
of information acquired in the course of the doctor-patient relationship and that a 
breach of that duty will give rise to a cause of action. 
: 24,3 F.Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). 
Ibid" at 801-802 per Connell, Chief Judge. 
100 492 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1997), at 644-647 per Hassell, Justice. 
101 49 4 S.E.2d 431 (S.C.App. 1997), at 432-438 per Anderson Judge. 102 215 N.W.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. S.D. 1974). at 136 per Biegelmeier, Chief Justice. 
103 287 So.2d 824 (Sup. Ct. Alabama 1973), at 827-829 and 832 per Bloodworth, Justice. 
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Some courts have based the patient's action on the breach of a fiduciary duty. In 
Petrillo v Syntex Laboratories, Inc.,104 for example, the court held that there 
exists, between a patient and his treating physician, a fiduciary relationship 
founded on trust and confidence. According to the Court: 
'The existence of this fiduciary relationship indicates that there is more 
between a patient and his physician than a mere contract under which the 
physician promises to heal and the patient promises to pay. There is an implied 
promise, arising when the physician begins treating the patient, that the 
physician will refrain from engaging in conduct that is inconsistent with the 
good faith required of a fiduciary. ' 
In Brandt v Medical Defence Associates, lOS the court inferred from the fact that 
privilege statutes provide for specific exceptions to the physician's fiduciary duty 
of confidentiality that: 
'In the absence of such an exemption, there would be a breach of this duty, 
which in turn, constitutes a recognition by the legislature of the existence of the 
physician's fiduciary duty of confidentiality. We believe that a physician has a 
fiduciary duty of confidentiality not to disclose any medical information 
received in connection with his treatment of the patient. This duty arises out of 
a fiduciary relationship that exists between the physician and the patient. If 
such information is disclosed under circumstances where this duty of 
confidentiality has not been waived, the patient has a cause of action for 
damages in tort against the physician.' 
The situation can thus be summarised as follows: while American courts agree 
that the physician owes a duty to the patient to keep the patient's medical 
confidences, and that a violation of such duty gives rise to a claim for 
compensation and that, depending on the circumstances, injunctive relief may also 
be available, differences can be observed as to the legal basis for such an action. 
While some courts mainly consider an action for breach of an implied contractual 
duty, some courts concentrate on an action in tort law, either as the only cause of 
action, or as an additional action to the claim under contract law. Other courts 
argue that the breach of medical confidentiality by the physician constitutes the 
breach of a fiduciary duty, and while some courts seem to suggest that this in 
itself gives rise to an action, others support the view that the breach of such a 
fiduciary duty results in a claim under tort law. 
104 499 N.E.2d 952 (I11.App.l Dist. 1986), at 961 per Linn, Presiding Justice. 
10$ 85 6 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.banc 1993), at 470 per Thomas, Judge. 
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1.5. Professional obligation 
The ethical duty owed by physicians is generally set forth in the Hippocratic Oath, 
the American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics, and the Current 
Opinions of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association. This 
ethical duty generally prohibits a patient's treating physician from disclosing 
confidential information without the patient's consent. §S.OS American Medical 
Association Principles of Medical Ethics state to that effect: 
Information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship 
between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree. ... 
The physician should not reveal confidential communications or information 
without the express consent of the patient, unless required by law to do so. 
In some cases, this ethical duty to maintain patient confidences may be broader 
than the legal duty to do SO.106 
1.6. Summary 
While it is uncontested in the United States that a physician is under an ethical 
obligation to keep patient confidences, the legal basis of such an obligation is 
more controversial. To some extent, confidential medical information is protected 
by the U.S. Constitution. Constitutional protection is available under the Fourth 
Amendment which protects an individual's right of privacy against unreasonable 
search and seizure, if the patient justifiably relied on an expectation of privacy, 107 
which will be the case at least where the relevant information is protected by 
medical privilege. This means that the protection available under the Fourth 
Amendment depends on the law of the State in which the case is to be decided. 
More general protection of medical confidentiality is awarded under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its interpretation as protecting substantive due 
process. According to the Supreme Court, the individual's interest in privacy 
embraces an interest in controlling the dissemination of private information about 
himlherself, including the constitutional protection of communications made by 
patients to physicians. The Supreme Court also recognised the individual's interest 
in being free from government intrusion when making important personal 
106 Steinberg v Jensen 534 N. W.2d 361 (Wis. 1995), at 370-371 per Steinmetz, Justice; Falcon v 
Alaska Public Offices Commission 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977), at 478 per Boochever, Chief 
Justice. 
107 'Developments in privileged communications', (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1545-1546. 
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decisions concerning matters relating to marnage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, and child rearing. In addition, the Supreme Court has 
recognised a privacy interest in the inviolability of one's body. Compelled 
disclosure of information concerning one's body, although a less direct intrusion 
than a forced physical violation of the body, also interferes with an individual's 
interest in controlling what happens to his/her body. The right of privacy is thus a 
fundamental personal right, emanating from the totality of the constitutional 
scheme, \08 and it encompasses the right to withhold intimate information and 
communications about oneself: particularly when one's physical condition is at 
issue, and to have the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship 
protected. 
In addition, 41 American States have enacted privilege statutes, guaranteeing, to 
varying degrees, the confidentiality of patient information from disclosure in court 
proceedings. In some States, licensing statutes for the medical profession also 
impose a statutory obligation on the physician to maintain medical confidentiality. 
Some courts have developed a general legal obligation of a physician to respect 
patient confidences, mainly based on existing licensing statutes, and partly also 
based on privilege statutes. While most courts agree that compensation should be 
available where the physician has breached his/her obligation of medical 
confidentiality, different solutions are suggested as to the legal basis for such a 
claim. 
2. Medical privilege 
Given that medical confidentiality is, in principle, legally protected, the question 
arises of whether or not the physician's obligation to maintain the patient's 
confidences even applies in the context of criminal proceedings, that is whether or 
not there is a medical privilege protecting confidential medical information from 
disclosure in criminal court. As there is no uniform American law on the question 
of medical privilege, federal law and the law of different States have to be 
examined independently. 
108 Griswold v State of Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), at 494 per Justice Goldberg. 
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2.1. Federal law 
It has been demonstrated above that the confidentiality of the physician-patient 
relationship receives protection under different principles of the U.S. Constitution. 
This does not, however, mean that medical privilege equally receives 
constitutional protection. Courts have rather always emphasised that the 
recognition of a medical privilege is not based on the Constitution, but is instead 
merely a question of statutory or common law. In Branzburg v Hayes,109 for 
example, the Supreme Court has held that the only testimonial privilege rooted in 
the Federal Constitution was that of the Fifth Amendment. This means that the 
state is not under a constitutional obligation to recognise a medical privilege, but 
that it is at the discretion of the legislature whether or not to introduce a medical 
privilege. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) which are applicable 
in proceedings before federal courts provides that: 
Privileges are to be governed by principles of the common law as they may be 
interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience, except that in civil actions, 
as to claims or defences grounded in state law, the federal courts are to decide 
questions of privilege in accordance with applicable state law. 
As, traditionally, common law did not recognise a medical privilege,110 this 
provision has been interpreted as recognising a medical privilege before a federal 
court only where the court has to apply State law and where the relevant State law 
provides for a medical privilege. In contrast, where a federal court has to apply 
federal law, no physician-patient privilege is recognised: 11 Although FRE 501 
allows the courts to protect information from disclosure if they consider it 
advisable in the light of reason and experience, federal courts have been reluctant 
to introduce any form of physician-patient privilege in cases in which federal law 
109 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also, for example, Felber v Foote 321 F.Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970), at 
87; Pagano v Oroville Hosp. 145 F.RD. 683 (E.D.Cal. 1993), per HolIows, U.S. Magistrate 
Judge; State v Beatty 770 S. W.2d 387 (Mo.App. 1989), at 391 per Greene J; Slate v Boehme 430 
P.2d 527 (Wash. 1967) per Hamilton, Judge. 
110 Benton v Superior Court, Navajo County 897 P.2d 1352 (Ariz.App.Div.l 1994), at 1355 per 
Kleinschmitt J; Brandt v Medical Defence Associates 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.banc 1993), at 669, per 
Thomas, Judge; Fox v Gates Corp. 179 F.RD. 303 (D. Colo. 1998) at 305 per Coan, U.S. 
Magistrate Judge; Galarza v U.S. 179 F.RD. 291 (S.D.Cal. 1998), at 294 per Battaglia, U.S. 
Magistrate Judge; Hancock v Hobbs 967 F.2d 462 (11 Ib Cir. 1992); Pagano v Oroville Hasp. 145 
F.RD. 683 (E.D.Cal. 1993), per Hollows, U.S. Magistrate Judge; State v Hardin 569 N. W.2d 517 
(Iowa App. 1997), at 580, per Vogel, Judge; Slate v Smith 496 S.E.2d 357 (N.C. 1998), at 361, per 
Whichard, Justice. 
III Hancock v Dodson 958 F.2d 1367 (61b Cir. 1992), at 1373 per Contie Senior Circuit Judge; U.S. 
v Bercier 848 F.2d 917 (81b Cir. 1988), at 920 per McMillan, Circuit Judge; U.S. v Burzynski 
Cancer Research [nst 819 F.2d 1301(5th Cir. 1987), at 1311 per Rubin, Circuit Judge; U.S. v 
Meagher 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v Pierce 5 F.3d 791 (51b Cir. 1993). 
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is determinative. Thus, there is no physician-patient privilege in federal court 
proceedings unless the question at issue is to be decided according to State law, 
and the relevant State provides for a physician-patient privilege. 112 In the words of 
the court in Meagher: 'At common law, no physician-patient privilege existed, 
and therefore, we recognise no such privilege in federal criminal trials.' 113 The 
only authorities supporting the existence of a physician-patient privilege in federal 
proceedings are Rosenberg v Carroll, 114 stating in dictum that such a privilege is 
applicable before a federal grand jury, and Mann v University of Cincinnati, 115 in 
which the court stated that: 'The federal courts have also recognised a federal 
common law privilege in the doctor-patient relationship.' 
The situation is rather different when it comes to the question of a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Even though FRE 501 equally applies, the 
considerations of the courts that had to deal with the problem were influenced by 
the fact that the recognition of a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege had been 
recommended by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence.116 
The legislator's failure to enact the recommended provision guaranteeing a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal proceedings did not express a rejection 
of such a privilege. Instead, in Trammel v u.S.,117 the Supreme Court explained 
the legal situation as follows: 
'In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested 
an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege. Its purpose rather 
was to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a 
case-by-case basis.' 118 
Recently, in Jaffee v Redmont,119 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in 
Trammel by stating that: 
'Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorises federal courts to define 
new privileges by interpreting "common law principles ... in the light of reason 
and experience." ... The Rule thus did not freeze the law governing the 
privilege of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our history, but 
112 'Developments in privileged communications', (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1533. 
1\3 U.S. v Meagher 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir), at 753 per Morgan, Circuit Judge. 
114 99 F.Supp. 629 (S.D.N. Y. 1951); see also Klieman, Representation of Witnesses Before 
Federal Grand Juries, at 10.36. . . 
m 824 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993), at 1197, per Steinberg, U.S. Magistrates Judge. 
Jl6 'Ad . C . , . VISOry ommlttee s notes on the proposed Federal Rules of EVIdence', 56 F.RD. 183, at 
242. 
IJ7 445 U.S. 40 (1979). 
Jl8 Ibid., at 47, per Burger, C.J. 
Jl9 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
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rather directed federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of 
testimonial privileges. 120 ••• In rejecting the proposed draft that had specifically 
identified each privilege rule and substituting the present more open-ended 
Rule 501, the Senate Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that its action 
should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-
patient privilege contained in the proposed rules. ,121 
The Court then considered the significance of a psychotherapist-patient privilege 
and argued in favour of such a privilege on the following grounds: 
'That it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognise a psychotherapist 
privilege under Rule SOlis confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the 
District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist 
privilege. We have previously observed that the policy decisions of the States 
bear on the question whether federal courts should recognise a new privilege or 
amend the coverage of an existing one .... Because state legislators are fully 
aware of the need to protect the integrity of the fact-finding functions of their 
courts, the existence of a consensus among the States indicates that "reason and 
experience" support recognition of the privilege. ... The uniform judgment of 
the States is reinforced by the fact that a psychotherapist privilege was among 
the nine specific privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee in its 
proposed privilege rules. . .. Because we agree with the judgment of the state 
legislatures and the Advisory Committee that a psychotherapist-patient 
privilege will serve a public good transcending the normally predominant 
principle of utilising all rational means for ascertaining the truth ... we hold that 
confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her 
patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled 
disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 122 
Until this decision of the Supreme Court, the federal courts had been divided 
between those that accepted a psychotherapist-patient privilegel23 and those that 
did not.124 In U.S. v Corona,125 for example, the court had held that no 
psychotherapist-patient privilege existed in federal criminal trials as neither 
common law nor statutory law provided for any type of physician-patient 
privilege in criminal matters. And the court in Re Grand Jury Proceedingsl26 
expressed the view that it was up to Congress to introduce and define such a 
120 Ib'd I ., at 8-9, per Stevens C J 121 ' .. Ibid., at 15. 
122 Ibid., at 12-15. 
123 Covell v CNG Transmission Corp. 863 F.Supp. 202 (M.D. Pa. 1994), per McClure, District 
Judge; Cunningham v Southlake Ctr for Mental Health, Inc 125 F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Ind. 1989), at 
477; In Re Doe 964 F.2d 1325 (2nd Cir. 1992), per Winter, Circuit Judge; In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena 710 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1989), at 1012-1013; In re Zuniga 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), at 
~239; U.S. v D.F. 857 F.Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1994), per Stadtmueller, District Judge. 
4 Hancock v Hobbs 967 F.2d 462 (l1 th Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 867 F.2d 562 
(9th Cir.), at 565; U.S. v Corona 849 F.2d 562 (11 th Cir. 1988), at 567; see also U.S. v Burtrum 17 
F.3d 1299 (lOth Cir. 1994), per Kelly, Circuit Judge for cases of child abuse. 
12S 849 F.2d 562 (lIth Cir. 1988), at 567. 126 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.). 
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privilege, and not the task of a court. Those courts that accepted the existence of a 
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege did so on the grounds that 'reason and 
experience' (FRE 501) showed that the interests protected by such privilege 
outweighed the interest in the administration of justice. 127 
Given the constitutional protection of medical confidentiality under substantive 
due process principles, it is rather surprising that courts and legal commentators 
almost unanimously subscribe to the view that medical privilege is not mandated 
by the Constitution. As medical privilege is an attempt to resolve the conflict 
between the interests in medical confidentiality and the interests of justice, this 
opinion expresses the value judgment that the Constitution does not stand in the 
way of favouring the interests of justice over the interests in medical 
confidentiality. However, the Constitution does not prevent the statutory 
recognition of medical privilege, either. It can thus be followed that the 
Constitution is neutral with regard to the conflict between the interest in medical 
confidentiality and the interests of justice. In respect of the particular conflict 
between the confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, on the one 
hand, and the interests of justice, on the other hand, the Constitution favours the 
precedence of the interest in confidentiality, as it is thought that in the context of 
the psychotherapist-patient relationship, the patient's privacy interests are affected 
far more than in the context of the ordinary physician-patient relationship. 
2.2. State law 
2.2.1. Statutory recognition of medical privilege 
Forty-one states in the U.S. now have some form of statutory physician-patient 
privilege,128 and in all States, the communication between psychiatrists and 
patients is privileged by statute. The scope of the physician-patient privilege 
varies from State to State. It is first of all important to examine whether or not a 
privilege statute protecting a patient's confidences from disclosure in court 
127 See, for example, In re Grand Jury Subpoena 710 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1989); In re Zuniga 714 
F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), at 639. 
128 Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, South Carolina, 
Tennessee and West Virginia do not have a statutory physician-patient privilege. 
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proceedings is applicable in criminal COurt. 129 In some States, privilege statutes 
expressly provide that there is no privilege in criminal proceedings.130 Other 
States exclude medical privilege in cases of serious crimes. In Kansas, for 
example, medical privilege only applies in cases of a prosecution for a 
misdemeanour. l3l In Illinois, the physician-patient privilege is inapplicable 'in 
trial for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate 
circumstances of the homicide.'132 In the District of Columbia, there is no medical 
privilege in criminal cases where 'the accused is charged with causing the death, 
or causing injuries upon, a human being, and the disclosure is required in the 
interests of public justice.' 133 In other States, the privilege statute expressly 
provides for a privilege in criminal proceedings. Art.510 Louisiana Code of 
Evidence (1993), for example, provides that: 
C.( 1) General rule of privilege in criminal proceedings. 
In a criminal proceeding, a patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent another person from disclosing a confidential communication made for 
the purpose of advice, diagnosis or treatment ofhis health condition between or 
among himself, his representative, and his physician or psychotherapist, and 
their representatives. 
Connecticut and Maryland, two States that do not recognise a physician-patient 
privilege, but only a psychotherapist-patient privilege, expressly provide for the 
applicability of that privilege in criminal proceedings. 134 Other privilege statutes 
award a general privilege and remain silent as to the question of the applicability 
of the statute to criminal proceedings and it is then up to the courts to decide 
whether they will read non-statutory exceptions into the statute. In some of those 
States, the courts refuse to apply the privilege in the criminal context. m But other 
courts136 have held that it is for the legislature to determine exceptions to the 
medical privilege. For example, in People v Reynolds137 the court held that 
129 With regard to this problem, see Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, at 156. 
130 See, for example, §998 Medical Records Act (Cal.) for California; Mo. Ann. State. §337.636 
for Missouri; Pa. State. Ann. §5929 for Pennsylvania. 
131 Kan. State. Ann. §60-427(b). 
132 III. Compo State. Ch. 735 5/8-802. 
133 D 
.C. Code Ann. § 14-307. 
134 Conn. Gen. State. §52-146c; Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Judie. Proc. §9-109(b). 
135 People v Doe, 107 Misc.2d 605 (Sup Ct 1981); People v Lowe, 96 Misc.2d 33 (1978). 
136 See, for example, Clark v District Court 668 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1983); In the Matter 0/ a Grand 
Jury Investigation o/Onondaga County 59 N.Y.2d 130 (1983); People v Murphy 101 N.Y. 126; 
People v Decina 2 N.Y.2d 133 (1956); State v Boehme 430 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1967) at 533 per 
Hamilton J. 
137 People v Reynolds 195 Colo. 386 (1978). 
234 
nothing in the statutory physician-patient privilege138 suggested that the afforded 
privilege did not apply in criminal cases. Absent such language, the court declined 
to infer such a broad and conclusive exception to the statutory privilege. And in 
State v Ross,139 the court explained that the physician-patient privilege had been 
extended to criminal cases pursuant to RCW 10.58.010 which applies the civil 
rules of evidence to criminal prosecutions as far as practicable. 
The privilege belongs to the patient, not the physician, and the patient can 
accordingly waive the protection thus awarded. It has been explained above that 
the practice differs between the States as to whether or not privilege statutes only 
protect oral communications between physician and patient, or whether all 
observations made by the physician during the course of the professional 
relationship are also protected,140 and in some States, only potentially 
embarrassing medical information is protected. 141 
2.2.2. Reasons behind the recognition of privilege 
In States which do not recognise medical privilege, the situation seems to be clear: 
by not enacting a privilege statute the State legislature has expressed the view that 
in the case of conflict between the interests behind medical confidentiality and the 
countervailing interests in the context of criminal proceedings, the latter will 
always prevail, and confidentiality is only protected outside the courtroom. The 
considerations weighing against a recognition of medical privilege were, for 
example, explained in Hague v Williams, 142 where the court argued that the policy 
to expose confidential medical information to view when it is relevant to the 
resolution of litigation is in accord with the general theory that society has a right 
to every citizen's testimony and that privileges of exemption from this duty can 
only exceptionally be granted. However, given the importance of privacy 
protection, it is surprising that the precedence of the interests of justice over 
medical confidentiality absent a privilege statute seems to be universally accepted. 
138 S. 13-90-107(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.). 
139 947 P.2d 1290 (Wash.App.Div.l 1997), at 1292 per Coleman J. 
140 See pp. 215-218. 
141 See pp. 218-219. 
142 181 A.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1962), at 348 per Haneman, J. 
235 
In States with privilege statutes the situation is far more complicated. There, 
conflicts may arise, as privilege statutes are normally not regarded as formulating 
an absolute ban on disclosure under all circumstances.143 It is possible, for 
example, that the disclosure of confidential medical information is relevant for the 
defence of an accused. A balancing approach may then be necessary in order to 
decide which interest should prevail in a given case. It is therefore essential to 
look at the reasons behind the recognition of medical privilege to determine which 
weight should be accorded to this interest in case of a conflict. Furthermore, 
without an analysis of the interests to be protected by privilege, the construction 
of privilege statutes by the courts cannot properly be understood. Freeman, Chief 
Justice explained the problems created by the recognition of a privilege in D.C. v 
S.A.: 144 
'Privileges which protect certain matters from disclosure are not designed to 
promote the truth-seeking process, but rather to protect some outside interest 
other than the ascertainment of truth at trial. ... Thus, privileges are an 
exception to the general rule that the public has a right to every person's 
evidence. Privileges are not to be lightly created or expansively construed, for 
they are in derogation of the search for the truth.' 
As privileges thus constitute a deviation from the normal principles underlying 
court proceedings, their recognition can only be justified if some other, more 
important interest is thereby enhanced. In US v Nixon,14S the Supreme Court held 
that the generalised interest in confidentiality cannot prevail over the fundamental 
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. 
Therefore, in addition to general confidentiality considerations there mU,st be more 
specific reasons to justifY medical privilege. 
Many different arguments have been advanced in favour of protecting medical 
privilege. There is widespread agreement that medical privilege aims to encourage 
the patient to feel free to disclose openly to the physician all facts which may have 
a bearing upon diagnosis and treatment. 146 It is felt that the patient may be 
inhibited to do so unless it is guaranteed that his/her medical secrets are safe with 
the physician and will not be disclosed to third parties. Therefore, it seems 
143 But see People 11 Tauer 847 P.2d 259 (Colo.App. 1993), per Plank, Judge, where it is indicated 
that the privilege is absolute, subject to a waiver by the patient. 
144 687 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 1997), at 1038. 
14' 418 U.S. 683 (1974), at 713. 
146 Berry v Moench 331 P.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. of Utah 1958) at 817 per Crockett, Justice; People v 
Harrison 626 N. Y.S.2d 747 (Ct.App. 1995) per Bellacosa, Judge; Steinberg v Jensen 534 N. W.2d 
361 (Wis. 1995), at 368 per Steinmetz, Justice. 
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necessary to respect the trust existing in the" physician-patient relationship.147 Only 
if such confidence is inspired in the patient, will the physician be able to provide 
effective medical treatment. 148 In the words of Hamilton, Judge in State v 
Boehme: 149 
'The judicially proclaimed purpose of statutes such as ours, establishing the 
privilege, is to surround communications between patient and physician with 
the cloak of confidence, and thus allow complete freedom in the exchange of 
information between them to the end that the patient's ailments may be 
properly treated. ' 
Another consideration is that the privilege helps physicians to avoid a 'Hobson's 
choice ... : choosing between honouring their professional obligation with respect 
to their patients' confidences or their legal duty to testify truthfully.,ISO Some 
courts refer to the constitutional privacy arguments explained above and argue 
that the patient's privacy rights not only mandate the protection of medical 
confidentiality in general, but also the recognition of a medical privilege. In Mann 
v University o/Cincinnati lSI for example, it was stressed that: 
'There can be no question that information such as a person's medical history 
is of such a private nature that a constitutional right to privacy exists. . .. At 
least two privacy interests regarding medical care are implicated. The first, of 
course, is the right to non-disclosure of private information .... The second is 
the right to health care. If patients have a genuine concern that their private 
medical information will become publicly known and may adversely affect 
their reputations or embarrass them, they will be reluctant to seek medical 
assistance. Thus, patient's interest in making decisions vital to their health care 
may be impaired by unwarranted disclosures .... These same reasons support a 
doctor-patient privilege.' 
The court thus recognised that without a physician-patient privilege, the patient's 
privacy and health interests cannot receive adequate protection. In Division 0/ 
Medical Quality v Gherardini, IS2 the court equally emphasised that: 
'A person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more 
personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognised 
and protected .... The patient-physician privilege ... creates a zone of privacy 
whose purposes are (1) to preclude the humiliation of the patient that might 
follow disclosure of his ailments ... and (2) to encourage the patient's full 
disclosure to the physician of all information necessary for effective diagnosis 
147 U.S. v Bein 728 F.2d 107 (2nd Cir. 1984), at 113. 
148 S late v Beatty 770 S.W.2d 387 (Mo.App. 1989), at 392 per Greene, Judge. 
149 430 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1967), at 533. 
150 People v Harrison 626 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Ct.App. 1995), per Bellacosa, Judge. 
m 824 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993), at 1199 per Steinberg, U.S. Magistrates Judge. 
152 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979), at 60-61 per Staniforth, Acting Presiding Judge. 
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and treatment of the patient. ... The matters disclosed to the physician arise in 
most sensitive areas often difficult to reveal even to the doctor. Their 
unauthorised disclosure can provoke more than just simple humiliation in a 
fragile personality. The reasonable expectation that such personal matters will 
remain with the physician are no less in a patient and physician relationship 
than between the patient and psychotherapist. The individual's right to privacy 
encompasses not only the state of his mind, but also his viscera, detailed 
complaints of physical ills, and their emotional overtones.' 
While this court thus held the privacy concerns of the general physician-patient 
relationship to be of equal value to those of the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship, this view is far from being predominant. It has been established that 
at the federal level, only a psychotherapist-patient privilege, but no medical 
privilege is recognised. Similarly, all States have recognised the former, but only 
41 states have also implemented a medical privilege. The reasons brought forward 
for this difference in protection are mainly based on the assumption that the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship concerns a more intimate area of the patient's 
life then the physician-patient relationship. As Justice Stevens argued for the 
Supreme Court in Jaffee v Redmont: m 
'Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed successfully 
on the basis of a physical examination, objective information supplied by the 
patient, and the results of diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, 
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is 
willing to make a frank: and complete disclosure of confidential facts, 
emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems 
for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential 
communications made during counselling sessions may cause embarrassment 
or disgrace. ' 
According to the majority of the Supreme Court, the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege is thus rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust, and even 
the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential 
relationship necessary for successful treatment. The Court then emphasised that 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege serves the public interest in the mental health 
of the citizens by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals 
suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. Given that the federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege does not have a statutory basis, the decision is 
also interesting in that the Court had to perform a thorough balancing of the 
153 5 18 U.S. 1 (1996) at 10; see also In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury 854 F.Supp. 1392 
(S.D.Ind. 1993) at 1397 per Tinder, District Judge; Ceasar v Mountanos 542 F.2d 1064 (9 th Cir. 
1976), at 1167 per Jameson, District Judge ('Psychotherapy is perhaps more dependent on 
absolute confidentiality than other medical disciplines. '). 
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interests promoted by the privilege and those that might be adversely affected 
thereby: 
'In contrast to the significant public and private interests supporting 
recognition of the privilege, the likely evidentiary benefit that would result 
from the denial of the privilege is modest. If the privilege were rejected, 
confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would 
surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances that 
give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation. Without the 
privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants ... seek access ... is 
unlikely to come into being. This unspoken "evidence" will therefore serve no 
greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged. In 
addition, given the importance of the patient's understanding that her 
communications will not be publicly disclosed, any State's promise of 
confidentiality would have little value if the patient were aware that the 
privilege would not be honoured in a federal court.' 154 
This is a very interesting argument. An important criticism of any evidentiary 
privilege is that it inhibits the truth-finding function of judicial proceedings in 
making unavailable information that might be relevant and material. The Supreme 
Court countered that argument by questioning that without privilege, the 
information would be available. Obviously, if privilege is seen to be necessary in 
order to encourage the patient frankly to disclose information to the 
psychotherapist, it can at least be argued that without such privilege, the patient 
will not disclose this information to the psychotherapist, so that even without a 
privilege the psychotherapist would not be available to testify in court about the 
patient's mental condition and intimate thoughts. If this is accepted, the costs of 
recognising a privilege are relatively low and it is very unlikely that much 
evidence will be lost. This is a utilitarian argument that focuses on the costs and 
benefits of privilege and it can only be sustained if there is some proof that 
without psychotherapist-patient privilege, patients would in fact be deterred from 
sharing their intimate thoughts with their psychotherapists. The rejection of a 
physician-patient privilege based on these considerations could equally only be 
justified if it could be shown that the absence of such privilege would not deter 
patients from seeking medical treatment. 
Other courts have argued that even if some relevant information is lost to the 
courts, a patient in psychotherapy who in order to receive help must lay bare 
his/her entire self has a right to expect that such revelations will remain 
IS4S 18 U.S. 1 (1996), at 11-13. 
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confidential.155 an argument which rests on deontological thought. Thus, in case 
of a conflict between the interests in the confidentiality of the psychotherapist-
patient relationship and the interests of justice, the individual's right of privacy 
will be given priority.156 In Re Zuniga,157 the court summarised different 
arguments in favour of the recognition ofa psychotherapist-patient privilege: 
'The inability to obtain effective psychiatric treatment may preclude the 
enjoyment and exercise of many fundamental freedoms, particularly those 
protected by the First Amendment .... The interest of the patient in exercising 
his rights is also society's interest, for society benefits from its members' active 
enjoyment of their freedom. Moreover, society has an interest in successful 
treatment of mental illness because of the possibility that a mentally ill person 
will pose a danger to the community. The court ... finds that these interests, in 
general, outweigh the need for evidence in the administration of criminal 
justice.' 
And In re Grand Jury Subpoenal58 the court similarly stressed that: 
'Society has a discernible interest in fostering the therapeutic treatment of 
those of its members experiencing emotional turbulence. This interest consists 
not only in our altruistic concern for our neighbour'S well-being, but in our 
more selfish interest in the effective treatment of those who may pose a threat 
because of mental illness or drug addiction. The absence of a privilege seems 
to have at least some deterrent effect on those seeking treatment. Equally 
important are the privacy rights of psychotherapy patients.' 
The public interest in the protection of the confidentiality of the psychotherapist-
patient relationship is thus twofold: society has an interest in encouraging 
mentally ill or unstable persons to seek and receive effective psychiatric treatment 
so that they will not pose a danger to society. At the same time, society also has 
an interest in the protection of individual rights and freedoms, such as the privacy 
right and the right to health. It has been argued that the absence of a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege would harm both the constitutionally protected 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in making 
certain kinds of important decisions autonomously.159 With regard to the privacy 
ISS See In re Li/schutz 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Sup. 1970), at 831-832 per Tobriner, Justice; U.S. v 
Doyle 1 F.Supp.2d ll87, (D.Or. 1998), at ll91 per Coffin, u.S. Magistrates Judge. 
156 In Re B 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
IS? 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), at 639. 
IS8 71 o F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1989), at 1009-10tO; see also U.S. v D.F. 857 F.Supp. 1311 (E.D. 
Wis. 1994), at 1320-1322 per Stadtmueller, District Judge. 
IS9 L 
n re GrandJury Subpoena 7tO F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1989), at 10tO. 
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right of the patient, in Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. Disl. Branch v Ariyoshi,160 Byrne, 
District Judge held: 
'Constitutionally protected privacy must, at a minimum, include the freedom of 
an individual to choose the circumstances under which, and to whom certain of 
his thoughts and feelings will be disclosed. ... This right to choose 
confidentiality is particularly crucial in the context of communications between 
patient and psychotherapist. 161 ••• The court holds that the constitutionally 
protected right of privacy extends to an individual's liberty to make decisions 
regarding psychiatric care without unjustified governmental interference.' 162 
It can be seen that the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege is based 
on a mixture of deontological and utilitarian considerations. While there are many 
critics of the physician-patient privilege, all legislators as well as most courts 
agree on the overriding importance of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
However, there are also critical voices with regard to the recognition of a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Justice Scalia, for example, in a dissent to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v Redmonl,163 questioned the likelihood that 
the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege might deter a patient from 
seeking psychological assistance, and he argued furthermore that even if it were 
certain that the absence of the psychotherapist privilege would inhibit disclosure 
of information to the psychotherapist, there was no good reason to protect the 
interest in confidentiality as it seems 'entirely fair to say that if she wishes the 
benefits of telling the truth she must also accept the adverse consequences.' 
It Can be seen that the approach towards the recognition of a medical and/or 
psychotherapist privilege largely depends on the attitude with regard to the 
purposes that are thereby served. In principle, the arguments in favour of a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege are very similar to the arguments brought 
forward in favour of a physician-patient privilege. In both cases, the privacy and 
health interests of the patient, as well as society's interest in the health of the 
citizens are important considerations, and the dividing line between the two 
approaches is mainly the distinction between physical and mental health, a 
distinction that is not always easy to make, as the growing significance of 
160 481 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979). 
161 Ibid., at 1038. 
162 Ibid., at 1041. 
163 S18 U.S. 1 (1996), at 22-23. 
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psychosomatic illnesses shows. But even in cases in which the distinction can be 
made, it can be questioned whether a different legal approach towards the two 
situations is desirable and sound. The main reason for a distinction seems to rest 
on the assumption that the psychotherapist-patient relationship concerns more 
intimate matters than the ordinary physician-patient relationship, but it should not 
be forgotten that if confidentiality is guaranteed to protect the patient's interests in 
making autonomous health care decisions and in controlling the dissemination of 
confidential information, it is difficult to decide on behalf of the patient which 
information deserves the strongest protection. Part of the patient's autonomy 
interest is surely that it should be the patient who decides which information is 
regarded as particularly sensitive. The fact that most patients will attach more 
weight to the confidentiality of information imparted in the psychotherapist 
should not make any difference, as any objective standard regarding the 
assessment of what information is sensitive impairs the patient's autonomy. Thus, 
from a deontological perspective, the distinction between psychotherapist-patient 
privilege and physician-patient privilege seems hardly justified. With regard to the 
Supreme Court's consequentialist argument in Jaffee that not much, if any 
evidence will be lost by introducing a psychotherapist-patient privilege, proof 
would be needed to decide whether this is true and whether the same does not 
apply to the physician-patient relationship, particularly in respect of certain 
sensitive areas such as venereal diseases, HIV infection etc. Only if there is a 
provable difference between the two situations can this argument be used as a 
reason for different legal treatment. If the stronger protection of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is based on society's interest in preserving the 
mental health of the population, this argument also needs some evidence to 
demonstrate that the absence of a physician-patient privilege would then not 
equally endanger society's interest in preserving the physical health of the 
population. 
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2.2.3. Limitations to medical privilege 
(1) General considerations 
A general decision in favour of medical and/or psychotherapist-patient privilege 
does not necessarily include the decision that the privilege should be absolute, 
trumping other interests under all circumstances. Most privilege statutes provide 
for exceptions. While the more specific limitations will be examined at a later 
stage, it should be noted that some privilege statutes provide for rather general and 
broad exceptions. In North Carolina, for example, O.S. §8-53 provides that 
notwithstanding a claim of privilege on the part of the patient, the presiding judge 
of the superior court may compel the physician or surgeon to disclose 
communications and information obtained by him 'if in his opinion the same is 
necessary to a proper administration of justice'. Also, some laws require 
exceptions to the privilege in areas in which the legislature has found certain 
social interests sufficiently important to override the State's general interest in 
protecting confidential patient information from being disclosed to third parties. 
In many States, for example, physicians must report to the police gunshot and 
knife wounds which may have resulted from illegal activity. Contagious or 
infectious diseases must be disclosed to the health department. Even if no 
statutory exception applies, courts have still argued that privilege cannot be 
absolute. In Berry v Moench,164 for example, the court held that the responsibility 
of the doctor to keep confidences may be outweighed by a higher duty to give out 
information if there is a sufficiently important interest to protect. Even where it is 
argued that the recognition of medical privilege is based on the patient's 
constitutional right to privacy, this does not mean that no exceptions to medical 
privilege will be made. Rather, courts have repeatedly decided that: 
'However broad the patients' constitutional privacy interest may be, that 
interest constitutes at most a qualified rather than an absolute privilege .... We 
need not here decide the precise reach of the patients' constitutional privacy 
right. Whatever that reach, the privacy interest must be balanced against 
society's interest in securing information .vital to the fair and effective 
administration of criminal justice.' 165 
164 331 P.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. of Utah 1958), at 817 per Crockett, Justice. 
16S Chidester v Needles 353 N.W.2d (Iowa 1984), at 854 per Wolle, Justice; see also In re Lifschutz 
85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Sup. 1970), at 432 and 438 per Tobriner, Justice; Division of Medical Quality v 
Gherardini 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979), at 61 per Staniforth, Acting Presiding Judge. 
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With regard to the non-statutory federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, courts 
that came to the conclusion that policy reasons mandated the recognition of such 
privilege mostly nevertheless argued that it should be recognised only as long as it 
did not entail undue frustration of other societal interests.166 They claimed that the 
recognition of the privilege must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, as the 
propriety of the privilege as such as well as its scope must be determined by 
balancing the interests protected by the privilege with those advanced by 
disclosure.167 In Re Doe,168 Winter, Circuit Judge even held that the privilege 
amounts only to a requirement that a court give consideration to a witness' 
privacy interests as an important factor to be weighed in the balance when 
assessing the admissibility of psychiatric histories or diagnoses. Important for the 
outcome of the balancing test was the sensitivity of the personal information 
disclosed, and hence the intrusion on the right to confidentiality. The more 
sensitive the information, the higher the burden on the state to justifY 
disclosure.169 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee" Redmont170 may 
change the case-law in this area. Justice Stevens stressed that: 
'We reject the balancing component of the privilege implemented by ... a small 
number of States .... Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a 
trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest 
in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the 
effectiveness of the privilege .... If the purpose of the privilege is to be served, 
the participants in the confidential conversation must be able to predict with 
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An 
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely 
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.' I71 
While this very general statement seems to suggest that qualifications to a 
privilege are unacceptable because they undermine its very purpose, it must be 
borne in mind that the argument was advanced in the narrow context of whether 
or not it was appropriate to make the protection of the patient's interests in non-
disclosure subject to the relevance of the information in the course of judicial 
proceedings. It remains to be seen 'whether this case-law will in the future be 
interpreted as a strict ban on any exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient 
166[, 
n re GrandJury Subpoena 110 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1989), at 1001-1008. 
167 Re Zuniga 114 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), at 639-640. 
168 964 F.2d 1325 (2nd Cir .. 1992), at 1328-1329. 
169 Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. Dist. Branch v Ariyoshi 481 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1919), at 1043 p: Byrne, District Judge. 
70 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
17\ Ibid., at 11-18. 
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privilege, or whether it will be restricted to its narrow meaning of stating that the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege must not yield merely because the information 
the disclosure of which is sought would be relevant in court. 
(2) Interests in criminal prosecution 
In the context of a privilege in criminal proceedings, the patient's interest in non-
disclosure will regularly conflict with the state interest in the prosecution of crime 
and of criminals. To understand the balancing of these interests, it is important to 
be clear about the content and the significance of the interests with which the 
interest in medical confidentiality competes. The discussion of the interests 
involved differs with regard to the different stages of criminal prosecution. 
Confidential medical information protected by medical privilege may be relevant 
in the course of police investigations, in the course of grand jury proceedings in 
which the grand jury decides on the indictment of a suspect, and, finally, in 
criminal court. As privilege is mainly discussed in the context of criminal trials, 
this is where the analysis will start. 
(a) criminal trials 
The interest in unlimited disclosure of information in the course of judicial 
proceedings was best explained by the Supreme Court in US v Nixon. 172 There, 
the Court had to decide whether or not certain presidential communications were 
protected from disclosure in court by the presidential privilege. In that case, the 
Supreme Court delineated the interests in favour of disclosure as follows: 
"'The twofold aim of criminal justice is that guilt shall not escape or innocence 
suffer." ... We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice 
in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to 
develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and 
comprehensive. The ends of justice would be defeated if judgements were to be 
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity 
of the judicial system and public confidence in it depend on full disclosure of 
all the facts within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that 
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts that compulsory 
process be available for the ~roduction of evidence needed either by the 
prosecution or by the defence. ,I 3 
172 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
J73 Ibid., at 709 per Chief Justice Burger. 
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It can thus be seen that evidentiary privileges are regarded as diametrically 
opposed to the interests of justice which require unlimited disclosure of all 
evidence that may be relevant to the case, either from the point of view of the 
defence, or from the point of view of the prosecution. Sissela Bok suggested that 
in addition to the interests outlined in Nixon, the interests in social justice and 
restitution also have a role to play in the context of prosecuting past crimes.174 
In the course of criminal proceedings, potential conflicts between the interest in 
medical confidentiality, on the one hand, and the state interest in criminal 
prosecution, on the other hand, is regulated generally by either the existence or the 
absence of privilege statutes. Where no privilege statutes exist, the courts assume 
that the legislator did not want to make an exception to the principle of the 
overriding importance of the state interest in the administration of justice, 
including the interest in criminal prosecution, so that the physician will have to 
testify about confidential patient information or submit the patient's medical 
records where this is relevant to the proceedings. Where a privilege statute exists, 
on the other hand, the legislator decided the conflict in favour of non-disclosure. 
Therefore, not many cases occupied the courts in which either the patient 
contested disclosure even in the absence of a privilege statute, or in which 
disclosure was sought despite the existence of a privilege statute on the grounds 
that the general interest in criminal prosecution should in the particular case 
outweigh the interest protected by the statutory privilege. However, State v 
Boehme17S seems to suggest that even where a statutory privilege is in existence, 
there is still some room to balance the interests behind the privilege against the 
interest in criminal prosecution, as: 
'The privilege, however, should be fairly limited to its purpose. Absent the 
most cogent of reasons, it should not, by unrealistic or impractical application, 
become a means whereby criminal activities of third persons may be shielded 
from detection, prosecution, and punishment. ... To allow the privilege to thus 
become a device by which the victim of an attempted crime could, without a 
civically paramount reason, thwart the course of a criminal proceeding against 
the perpetrator might well promote greater evils than the privilege was 
designed to avoid. The maintenance of an orderly society, and the 
circumvention of criminal activities, are functions of government which should 
not be subject to casual suppression by the operation of a procedural rule 
primarily designed for the purpose of aiding the healing of physical ailments. ' 
174 S ecrets, at 131. 
175 430 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1967), at 536 per Hamilton, Judge; see also Bryson v Stale 711 P.2d 932 
(Okl.er. 1985). 
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This decision suggests that some courts do not subscribe to the view that the 
existence of a privilege statute demonstrates that the general conflict between 
medical confidentiality and the interests of justice was decided in favour of 
medical confidentiality so that medical confidentiality can then not be outweighed 
by the interests of justice. The court obviously thought that the results of such an 
interpretation of the privilege statute would be too abhorrent to be acceptable. It 
was also argued that 'where confidentiality and privilege are concerned, the rule is 
that a potential wrongdoer will not be able to hide his deeds behind a physician-
patient privilege: crime investigation trumps privilege and confidentiality. ,176 This 
construction, however, undermines the legislative intention behind privilege 
statutes. It is thus submitted that in States where privilege statutes are applicable 
in criminal proceedings, no balancing of the confidentiality interests with the 
interests in criminal prosecution should be permissible. 
The situation is different in cases which rely on the non-statutory federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, as this privilege is a creature of common law 
which was, until the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v Redmont;77 said to 
apply only subject to the outcome of a balancing exercise in each individual case. 
u.s. v D.F178 gives some insight into how the courts performed the balancing test 
in cases in which the interest behind the privilege was in conflict with the interests 
of justice in criminal proceedings: 
'Consistent with the case-by-case approach mandated by Rule 501, the court 
must now consider whether, in the instant case, the privilege should apply to 
D.F. 's statements .... Several aspects of this case suggest that the utilitarian 
gains from the privilege would be minimal. First, the interest in effective 
therapy will only be served to the extent that D.F., a fourteen year-old girl, 
understood the implications of disclosure .... Second, ... there is evidence in the 
regard to suggest that she believed that the staff at the Centre was required to 
disclose her statements .... To the extent that that is the case, the privilege 
would have been irrelevant. Third, to the extent that D.F.'s ''therapy'' at the 
Centre was compelled or coerced ... the existence of the privilege likely 
provided only marginal utilitarian gains. Application of the privilege in this 
case would do little to promote privacy interests. The facts of this case suggest 
that regardless of whether the court finds that D.F. 's statements were 
privileged, her privacy has already been seriously compromised. The 
statements have already been widely disseminated amongst both governmental 
officials and other patients ..... On the other hand, the interests weighing 
against the privilege in this case are considerable. The Government believes 
176 Oppenheim, The Medical Record as Evidence, at 696. 
177 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
178 857 F.Supp. 1311 (E.O. Wis. 1994). 
247 
that the two infants involved were murdered. D.F.'s statements are clearly 
relevant to that charge. In fact, the Government has suggested that that charge 
cannot be sustained without that evidence. Thus, nondisclosure would 
significantly impair both law enforcement interests and a general interest in the 
truth-seeking process. ' 179 
According to the court, the application of the privilege in this case thus depended 
on whether and to what extent the privilege would promote the interests behind its 
recognition. The first consideration seems to suggest that children or other people 
who may not be aware of the privilege will not be protected, as without such 
awareness, privilege will do nothing to enhance the willingness to receive therapy 
and to be frank to one's psychotherapist. Secondly, the psychotherapist's mistaken 
belief that he/she is under an obligation to disclose confidential information seems 
to negate the privilege according to this holding. What is even more worrying is 
the court's remark that the fact that the patient's privacy ha already been widely 
infringed can justify further invasions. The case shows that the case-by-case 
approach adopted in cases of federal psychotherapist-patient privilege gives the 
courts a lot of leeway to do away with the privilege where they think that in the 
specific case disclosure is a better result than non-disclosure. If a court adopts a 
utilitarian approach towards medical confidentiality as did the court in U.S. v D.F. 
the balaricing test can concentrate on costs and benefits for society, while 
neglecting the privacy and autonomy interests of the individual patient. As was 
mentioned above in a different context, it remains to be seen whether or not the 
Supreme Court's holding in Jaffee v Redmont l80 that the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege is absolute and not subject to any exceptions will be interpreted to mean 
that a balaricing of interests is neither required nor permitted when conflicts 
between the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the interests in criminal 
prosecution have to be decided. 
(b) Grand jury proceedings or Attorney General investigations 
Given the special character of grand jury proceedings and of investigations by the 
Attorney General, the question arises whether or not privilege is applicable in 
such proceedings. In Branzburg v Hayes,I81 the Supreme Court explained the 
179 Ibid., at 1320-1322 per StadtmuelIer, District Judge. 
180 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
181 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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function of the grand jury in federal proceedings and the consequences for the 
application of privileges: 
'The grand jury ... has the dual function of determining if there is probable 
cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens 
against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Grand jury proceedings are 
constitutionally mandated for the institution of federal prosecutions for capital 
and other serious crimes (fifth amendment), and its constitutional prerogatives 
are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history. The adoption of the 
grand jury in the Constitution as the sole method for preferring charges in 
serious criminal cases shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice. 
Because its task is to inquire into the existence of possible criminal conduct 
and to return only well-founded indictments, its investigative powers are 
necessarily broad. Although the grand jury's powers are not unlimited and are 
subject to the supervision of a judge, the long-standing principle that the public 
has a right to every man's evidence except for those persons protected by a 
constitutional, common-law or statutory privilege is particularly applicable to 
grand jury proceedings. ,182 
Thus, it seems that the interests in disclosure of all relevant information in grand 
jury proceedings is comparable to the interest in disclosure of all relevant 
information during a criminal trial. There are, however, differences between grand 
jury investigations and criminal trials, an important distinction being that 
information disclosed to the grand jury maintains its confidential status and will 
not be further disclosed. It cannot, for example, be used in criminal court. 
In Chidester v Needles,183 the court held that a subpoena duces tecum, with which 
the attorney general demanded access to patients' records, did not violate medical 
privilege by forcing the physician 'indirectly' to testify, the reasons being that a 
subpoena duces tecum formed part of the county attorney general's investigatory 
power for use in lieu of a grand jury proceeding, that information thereby obtained 
may not be used to perpetuate testimony for trial, and that documents produced in 
response to a county attorney general's subpoena remain confidential unless and 
until a criminal charge is filed. 184 The court then performed a balancing exercise 
and came to the conclusion that: 
'In weighing the patients' privacy interest against the State's interest in 
obtaining a thorough investigation, we are also mindful that the privacy interest 
is partially protected by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(6). The records 
obtained pursuant to a county attorney's subpoena have a confidential status 
before any criminal charge is filed and may thereafter be kept confidential by 
182 Ibid., at 686-688. 
183 353 N.W.2d 849 (Iowa 1984). 
184 Ibid., at 852 per Wolle, Justice. 
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court order .... We conclude that the privacy interest of the clinic's patients 
must yield to the State's interest in well-founded criminal charges and the fair 
administration of criminal justice.' 185 
The outcome in the specific case, that is that privilege was outweighed by the 
interest in disclosure, seems at least partly to rest on the assumption that the 
disclosure does not lead to the use of the information in court, and that the 
confidential character of the information would be upheld. As was explained in 
United States v Rein,186 
'The danger in the use of privileged material is not that a tribunal may be 
misled or a party's litigation position unfairly prejudiced, since the reliability 
of the evidence is not in question. The fear is rather that valued relationships 
may be disrupted by an apprehension that confidential communications may be 
disclosed. Given the fact that grand jury proceedings are normally secret, that 
an authoritative adjudication as to whether material is privileged may have to 
await subsequent proceedings and that dismissal of an indictment is a most 
serious step, courts have declined to dismiss indictments because of the use of 
privileged matter before the grand jury. Such testimony of course is not 
permitted at trial. ' 
The courts' attitude that privileged information should be available to the grand 
jury, given the confidentiality of the proceedings and the special role of the grand 
jury is problematic, as the privileged information is then nevertheless disclosed to 
the investigating authority. Contrast the decision in Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 187 
where the court held that: 
'There is something undoubtedly unseeming about requiring psychotherapists 
to disclose the most intimate of their patient's thoughts and emotions, when 
such communications merely meet the broad relevancy requirements applicable 
to grand jury investigations.' 188 
While most courts seem to favour unlimited disclosure of confidential patient 
information in the course of grand jury investigations, some courts thus seem to 
promote a different approach when suggesting a more stringent test as to whether 
or not the confidential information is in fact relevant to the proceedings, an 
approach which seems more in line with the predominant attitude toward 
disclosure in the context of judicial proceedings. 
185 Ibid., at 853-854. 
186 728 F.2d 107 (2nd Cir. 1984), at 113. 
187 710 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1989). 
188 Ibid., at 1010-1011. 
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(c) Search for and seizure of medical records 
When, in the course of criminal investigations, there is a suspicion that a patient's 
medical records may contain some relevant evidence, it must be determined to 
what extent the police, the attorney general or the grand jury may obtain access to 
these records, and to what extent they are protected by medical privilege. In 
principle, medical privilege not only excludes the physician as a witness in 
judicial proceedings, but also prevents the state from gaining access to medical 
records. 189 Thus, in States with privilege statute medical records are exempt from 
state access. In addition, search and seizure of patient records can raise 
constitutional issues, particularly Fourth and Fifth Amendment considerations. 
A first question, then, is whether and to what extent medical records are protected 
from search and seizure through the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. It has 
been explained above that the Fourth Amendment, rather than protecting the 
privacy interests of the individual as such, only protects individual privacy against 
certain kinds of governmental intrusion.190 In the words of Lucas, Chief Justice, in 
Hill v National Collegiate Athletic: 191 
'The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only 
those that are unreasonable. . .. Under the Fourth Amendment ... the 
reasonableness of particular searches and seizures is determined by a general 
balancing test ''weighing the gravity of the governmental interest or public 
concern served and the degree to which the [challenged government conduct] 
advances that concern against the intrusiveness of the interference with 
individual liberty.'" 
Case-law that has developed mainly in the area of the attorney-client relationship, 
the confidentiality of which is regarded as even more worthy of protection than 
that of the physician-patient privilege, suggests that searches of law offices, and 
therefore probably also searches of surgeries or hospitals as such are not 
unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. 192 In U.S. v Burzynski Cancer 
189 See, for example, Art.4495b Public Health Act Texas; Behringer Estate v Princeton Medical 
Centre 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J.Super.L. 1991) per Crachman, J.S.C.; Comonwealth v Kobrin 479 
N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1986), per Abrams, Judge; In Re Search Warrant 810 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1987), 
p.er Becker, Circuit Judge. 
90 Katz v U.S. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) at 350 per Steward, Justice. 
191 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994), at 650. 
192 Deukmejian v Superior Court/or the Countyo/LA 162 Cal Rptr. 857 (1980), at 862; Klitzman. 
Klitzman and Gallagher v Krut 744 F.2d 955 (U.S. App. 3rd Cir. 1984), at 959; In Re Impounded 
Case (Law Firm), 840 F.2d 196 (3rd Cir. 1988) at 202. 
251 
Research Institute. 193 an action was brought against a physician and a research 
centre seeking to enjoin them from violating Federal Food and Drug Regulations. 
and a criminal search warrant was executed. Some patients whose treatment 
records had been seized. alleged a breach of their Fourth Amendment rights. 
claiming that the seizure had invaded their right to privacy. The court rejected this 
view on the grounds that a seizure of documents that was authorised by a warrant 
can never amount to an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. since a warrant 
issued upon prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate was the time-tested 
means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights. And in Re search wa"ant B-
21778.194 a case ofa law office search, the court held that there are no privileged 
isles beyond the reaches of a properly predicated search warrant, and that 
anywhere and everywhere within the limits of a court's jurisdiction may be 
searched. so that the fact that the warrant was directed at a law office did not 
make the search unreasonable. However. those courts that have allowed the search 
of law offices or surgeries have argued that while the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit searches of such places. privileged information is exempt from seizure. 19S 
Other courts have argued that privilege is sufficiently protected by the procedure 
requiring that the government obtain leave of the court before examining any 
seized items, which gives the parties the possibility to assert privilege. 196 Some 
courts and legal writers argue that rather than issuing a search warrant to search 
law firms or surgeries. a less intrusive means to obtain the material sought would 
be the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. As the argument goes, even the most 
particular warrant cannot adequately safeguard client confidentiality. In 0 'Connor 
v Johnson,197 the court came to the conclusion that: 
'Though this may be seen as limiting the ability of the police to obtain 
information in the early stage of the investigation, we find this measure 
necessary to protect the overriding interest of our society in preserving the 
attorney-client privilege .... Moreover. our decision rests not only on the fourth 
amendment, but also on Art. I S.10 of the Minn Constitution. We hold that a 
warrant authorising the search of an attorney's office is unreasonable and, 
therefore. invalid when the attorney is not suspected of criminal wrongdoing 
and there is no threat that the documents sought will be destroyed.' 
193 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987), at 1310 per Rubin, Circuit Judge. 
194 513 Pa 429 (1987), at 439-440. 
195 Ibid., at 440; see also Cissell, Federal Criminal Trials, at 476. 
:: In Re Impounded Case (Law Firm) 840 F.2d 196 (3rd Cir. 1988) at 202. 
287 N. W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979) at 405. 
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The subpoena is less intrusive than a search warrant and a means to protect 
privileged information, as it enables the physician to gather and produce requested 
documents, thereby eliminating the threat that law enforcement officials will 
examine and possibly seize privileged and irrelevant documents in the course of a 
search authorised by a warrant. 198 Moreover, before producing the evidence the 
physician may obtain a judicial ruling on the applicability of any relevant 
privilege by filing a motion to quash. 199 The subpoena preference rule is therefore 
seen by some as the best practicable accommodation of the legitimate needs of 
law enforcement, on the one hand, and the important values of privileged 
relationships, on the other hand.2oo 
It can be seen that the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by most courts does not 
award much protection against state access to privileged records. Indeed, medical 
records receive additional protection only where the Fourth Amendment is 
interpreted as requiring the subpoena preference rule. However, the true 
protection of privileged material in the course of searches of surgeries seems to 
stem from privilege statutes, so that in States without a privilege statute, medical 
records are less protected than in States in which privilege statutes apply. 
It remains to examine whether the Fifth Amendment adds anything to the 
protection of medical records from search and seizure. The protection of 
confidential medical information under the Fifth Amendment is rather limited, as 
the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination by having to produce 
evidence against oneself: rather than protecting the content of documents as 
suCh.201 Thus, as the Supreme Court made clear in Andresen v Maryiand,202 
information is not exempt from seizure in the hands of the patient simply because 
the contents are private and confidential. Therefore, confidential medical 
documents will only be protected from search and seizure where, in addition to 
198 Bloom, (1980) 69 Georgetown Law Journal, at 26. 
199 Maller of Witnesses before Sp. March 1980 Gr. Jury 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984), at 495. 
200 Bloom. (1980) 69 Georgetown Law J, at 54; Mogill, (1988-1989) 21 Connecticut Law Rev., at 
354; but see Zurcher v Stanford Daily 436 U.S. 547 (1978) where the Supreme Court declined to 
hold that the Fourth Amendment imposed a general constitutional barrier against warrants to 
search newspaper premises, to require resort to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand prior 
notice and hearing in connection with the issuance of search warrants. 
201 See Fisher v U.S 425 U.S. 391 (1976); U.S. v Doe 465 U.S. 605 (1983), at 612 per Powell, 
Justice; In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas 144 F.3d 653 (lOth Cir. 1998) at 663 per Stephen H. 
Anderson, Circuit Judge. 
202 427 U.S. 463 (1976), at 473-476 per B1ackmun. Justice; see also Fisher v U.S., 425 U.S. 391 
(1976), at 402-404. 
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their confidential content, they will incriminate the patient, and even then only if 
they were not voluntarily created. In the hand of the physician, patient records are 
only protected insofar as they would have been protected by the Fifth Amendment 
while in the hand of the patient.203 Given the very narrow scope of Fifth 
Amendment protection, it is therefore unlikely that the seizure of medical records 
will violate the patient's Fifth Amendment rights, and the Fifth Amendment does 
not seem to add much to the protection of medical records under privilege 
statutes. 
(3) A special problem: child abuse 
All States have some form of exception from medical and/or psychotherapist-
patient privilege with regard to child abuse?04 Some have argued that these 
exceptions show the willingness of legislatures to sacrifice confidentiality for the 
administration of justice where the crime is outrageous to society,20S an opinion 
which seems to suggest that in the particular situation of child abuse the state 
interest in the prosecution of the offender outweighs the interest in medical 
confidentiality. Some courts, however, argued differently. In State v Sypult,206 for 
example, the court argued that 'the central purpose of the child abuse reporting 
statutes is the protection of children, not the punishment of those who mistreat 
them' and concluded that child abuse exceptions to a privilege statute must be 
narrowly construed so that the purpose of the reporting statute may be achieved, 
while the benefits reSUlting when those who maltreat children seek confidential 
therapy programs are maintained. According to this view, the protection of 
children from abuse, rather than the prosecution of the offender seems to be the 
main consideration behind such an exception to medical privilege. In Pesce v J. 
Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201,207 a case in which a school psychologist was 
punished for not reporting suspected child abuse of which he learned in the course 
203 In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 1998) at 663 per Stephen H. Anderson, 
Circuit Judge; Camp, Levey, 'The Privilege against Self-Incrimination', in: Stone, Taylor, 
Testimonial Privilege, vol. 2, at 4-10 to 4-11. 
204 See, for example, Neb. Rev. State. §27-504 (1984) ('there is no privilege ... in any judicial 
proceedings ... regarding injuries to children, incompetents, or disabled persons or in any criminal 
f~osecution involving injury to any such person or the wilful failure to report any such injuries.'). 
Domb, 5 Journal of Law and Health 1990-1991, at 236. 
206 304 Ark. 5 (1990). 
207 830 F.2d (7lh Cir. 1987), at 797-798 per Cudahy, Circuit Judge. 
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of confidential communication with a pupil, the court also focused on the element 
of protection when arguing that: 
'Even if there is here a federal right to confidentiality that can be infringed only 
to further a compelling state interest, we conclude that such an interest is 
present in the present circumstances. Of critical importance here is the fact that 
the state is acting to protect one of the most pitiable and helpless classes in 
society - abused children. The Supreme Court has recognised the substantial 
interest of a state in protecting all children.' 
In this case, it is obviously the protection of the child at risk of further abuse that 
is the main reason behind the exception from the obligation to maintain 
confidentiality, not the interest in prosecuting the offender. The difference in 
opinion as to the purpose behind the child abuse exceptions is significant, as it 
may be decisive when courts have to determine whether or not disclosure will be 
ordered in a given case. If the purpose behind the exception is the interest in 
protecting the child, then disclosure will be limited to those persons and 
institutions that will help to prevent further abuse, but disclosure will then 
normally not be justified in the course of criminal investigations or proceedings 
against the offender. 
(4) A special problem: drunk driving 
In some states, there is no privilege in drunk-driving cases. This is partly due to 
statutory exceptions to privilege,208 partly a creation of case-law. In State v 
Dyal,209 for example, the court held that in a matter so deeply imbued with the 
public interest as a case involving a suspected drunken driver, the investigating 
police should not be deprived of blood test results merely because they had been 
made for treatment purposes and were thus privileged. As those results were not 
only relevant, but highly persuasive in determining whether the driver was drunk, 
and as the patient's interest in the confidentiality of hospital records can be 
protected adequately by requiring the investigating police to establish a reasonable 
basis to believe that the operator was intoxicated, medical confidentiality was said 
to be outweighed by the public interest. Similarly, in State v Dress,210 the court 
recognised that the privilege was premised on the calculation that the benefits to 
208 See, for example, California, Montana, Oregan, Utah. 
209 97 N.J. 229, at 238-239. 
21°461 N.E.2d 1312, (OhioApp 1982) at 1316-1317. 
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the protected relationship outweigh burdens thereby imposed and that the 
privilege must yield when the public interest outweighs the policy supporting the 
privilege. This, according to the court, was the case in the context of a prosecution 
for the offence of driving while intoxicated. As the physician attending a 
defendant is frequently the sole or most competent source of very relevant 
evidence, to allow the privilege in such cases would be against the public interest, 
given that the offence of driving while intoxicated has a great potential for serious 
injury or death, so that the public interest in prosecuting such offenders is 
regarded as compelling. This argument is very interesting, as in many States, not 
even the prosecution of serious crimes such as murder gives rise to an exception 
to the privilege. The exception seems to be justified by the specific difficulties in 
prosecuting drunk-driving offences without resort to medical evidence, rather than 
by the seriousness of the offence. However, the same would apply to other 
offences such as sexual offences. The danger to society as a whole by drunk-
driving which is thought to surpass the danger of other, more serious offences 
which mainly affect certain individuals, seems another important consideration 
behind this exception. The drunk-driving exception to medical privilege seems to 
rest mainly on utilitarian considerations, taking account of the particularly high 
costs of a privilege in this context. 
(5) Investigations against the physician 
Another group of cases in which confidentiality problems frequently arise is that 
of criminal investigations against a physician or proceedings in which a physician 
is accused of having committed criminal offences in the context of his/her work. 
This often concerns cases of fraud against health insurance companies, for 
example where a physician is accused of having claimed fees for treatment he/she 
did not administer, or cases in which the physician is accused of prescribing 
controlled substances for improper and illegal purposes. Different courts have 
adopted different approaches to tackle this problem. Several courts have made an 
exception to the application of medical privilege in such cases. The special 
dilemma the prosecution is facing in these cases was, for example, explained in 
State v McGriff:211 
211 672 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1996), at 1075 per Evans Judge. 
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'The defendant doctor should not be permitted to invoke his patient's privilege 
in order to shield himself from prosecution. ... Since the defendant has been 
accused of prescribing controlled substances for improper and illegal purposes 
and of committing fraud against various health insurance companies, if there is 
evidence of wrongdoing it will be contained in notations to his patients' 
medical records. Without these records, the state will be unable to prosecute its 
case.' 
Given the difficulties in investigating and prosecuting such offences, in Re Search 
Warrant,212 Becker, Circuit Judge held that in the case of the investigation of a 
physician for fraud the legitimate interests of the state in securing information 
contained in patient records outweighed the patient's privacy rights, as only the 
patient's medical records could reveal whether the physician had performed the 
specified services at the specified time and whether the services were medically 
necessary. The court thus seemed driven by consequentialist arguments, as it was 
felt that without this exception to medical privilege, the physician could safely 
commit criminal offences under the veil of hislher patient's confidentiality rights. 
It has further been argued that the patient's privacy interests can widely be 
respected in the course of such investigations, as the relevant and incriminating 
information, if any, contained in the patient records would be disclosed only to the 
extent needed to prosecute the defendant. Redaction of the records through 
erasure or concealment of patients' names and addresses and other information 
inapplicable to the prosecution of the charged crimes would ensure that each 
patient's interest in confidentiality and privacy was protected without frustrating 
the state's interest in prosecuting illegal drug activity.213 In Commonwealth v 
Kobrin,214 the court also argued that patient confidentiality should be upheld as 
much as possible and thus distinguished between those portions of a psychiatrist's 
records that recite 'the patient's most intimate thoughts and emotions, as well as 
descriptions of conduct that may be embarrassing or illegal' as it was difficult to 
see how this could be helpful to a determination of whether the psychiatrist had in 
fact furnished a reimbursable service, while the State could properly request that a 
psychiatrist submit those portions of his/her records documenting the times and 
lengths of patient appointments, fees, patient diagnoses, treatment plans and 
212 810 F.2d 65, (3n1 Cir. 1987), at 72-73. 
213 State v McGriff672 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1996), at 1075 per Evans Judge; Schachter 
v Whalen 581 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1978), per Oakes, Blumenfeld, and Mehrtens. 
214 479 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1986). 
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recommendations, and somatic therapies. The court summarised its views as 
follows: 
'Those portions of the records, however, which reflect patient's thoughts, 
feelings, and impressions, or contain the substance of the psychotherapeutic 
dialogue are protected and need not be produced .... In sum, a judge 
confronting the competing demands of the right to privacy ... and the need to 
supervise the disbursement of Medicaid payments for psychiatric services shall 
review the psychiatrist's records. Excerpts of those records which reveal that a 
patient with a given diagnosis saw the psychiatrist on a certain date for a 
certain length shall be released. The psychiatrist's observations of objective 
induce of emotional disturbance may be released. Notations of patient 
prescriptions, blood tests and their results (e.g. lithium carbonate levels), or the 
administration of electroconvulsive treatment shall be released. Indications of 
treatment plans (e.g. a recommendation of continuing psychotherapy or of 
medication) shall be released. The psychiatrist's records of patient 
conversations shall be withheld. ,2105 
This distinction seems problematic, as only the patient's expressed thoughts and 
feelings are protected, but neither the diagnosis nor any other facts related to the 
treatment which may be highly confidential and which are protected under most 
privilege statutes, receive protection. In Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. Dist. Branch v 
Ariyoshi,216 the court tried a different approach by stating that the mere existence 
of a valid 'public interest' would not be sufficient to justifY an intrusion on the 
patient's privacy for the purpose of a fraud investigation against the physician. 
Instead, the court required some showing of an 'individualised, articulable 
suspicion' before access to a psychiatrist's confidential medical records could be 
had. And in State v McGriff,217 Thomas F. Bryant, Judge, criticised the approach 
of placing the state interest in prosecuting the physician above the interest in 
I 
patient confidentiality. In his view: 
'If a patient does not waive the physician-patient privilege, his or her physician 
may not disclose any privileged communications made during that relationship, 
subject of course to any statutory exceptions. ... The state suggests that the 
purpose of the physician-patient privilege statute can be achieved by redacting 
the patient's medical records to delete information that might identifY the 
patients. I deem this suggestion unworkable and an invasion of the privilege as 
well as a blatant attempt to circumvent the application of the statute. To allow 
the state to delete any identifYing information contained in these patients' 
medical records would necessarily breach the physician-patient privilege 
without authority to do so. At least one person ... and more likely three persons 
21S Ibid., at 681-682 per Abrams, Justice. 
216 481 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979), at 1047 and 1050 per Byrne, District Judge. 
217 672 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1996), at 1078-1081; see also Mogill, (1988-1989) 21 
Connecticut Law Rev., at 351 for the case of the attorney-client privilege. 
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... , if not more, would have to examine the contents of each patient's medical 
record to determine what is to be deleted and what is to be shown as evidence. 
Further, any information not deleted and subsequently used at trial by the state 
is still information protected by the privilege .... It is my view that current Ohio 
law requires that if the state seeks to use the medical records of a non-party 
patient in order to prosecute that patient's physician, the state must first obtain 
a waiver of the privilege by that patient. ' 
This approach seems more in line with the purpose behind privilege statutes. 
While it is conceded that without access to patient records, it will often be 
impossible to investigate any fraud allegations against the physician, it must 
nevertheless be respected that in States with privilege statutes that do not contain 
any exception for such a situation, the legislator seems to have been of the opinion 
that the privilege should prevail over the state interest in the prosecution of crime. 
The patient's interests in the confidentiality of his/her medical records is not 
diminished by the fact that the physician abused the professional relationship. In 
case of conflict, therefore, the patient's interests should prevail and access to 
patient records only be allowed with the patient's consent. 
(6) Conflicting defence rights 
Another conflict frequently arising is that between medical confidentiality, on the 
one hand, and defence rights of an accused. on the other. Different scenarios are 
possible for this conflict to occur. It is possible that the prosecution is based on 
privileged evidence which it may want to withhold from the defendant on the 
grounds of privilege. If that is the case, the defence is obviously affected, as the 
accused then does not know against what evidence he/she has to defend 
himlherself. It is also possible that the defence wants to resort to privileged 
evidence either to cast some doubt on the credibility of a prosecution witness, or 
to prove his/her innocence. 
Certain rights of a criminal defendant are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 
The main constitutional principles discussed in this context are the Confrontation 
Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause, both contained in the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the due process clause. 
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(a) Confrontation 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal 
defendant the right physically to face those who testify against hirn/her, and the 
right to conduct cross-examination. A violation of these rights is often alleged in 
cases in which privilege is asserted. Pennsylvania v Ritchie,2lS though not dealing 
with the specific problem of medical confidentiality, but with that of privilege in 
child abuse cases, provides a good example of the conflict that frequently 
materialises. The respondent in that case was charged with various sexual 
offences against his minor daughter. During pre-trial discovery, the respondent 
served the CYS (Children and Youth Services) that had investigated the 
allegations and had conducted interviews with the victim, with a subpoena, 
. seeking access to the records related to the immediate charges, as well as to 
certain earlier records compiled when CYS had investigated a separate report that 
the respondent's children were being abused. CYS refused to comply with the 
subpoena, claiming that the records were privileged under a Pennsylvania statute 
providing that all CYS records must be kept confidentia~ subject to specified 
exceptions, and the trial court confirmed this view. The respondent claimed that 
by denying him access to the information necessary to prepare his defence, the 
trial court had interfered with his right of cross-examination and thereby violated 
his rights under the Confrontation Clause. It was thus not alleged that a witness 
was not available because of a privilege, but rather that pre-trial access to certain 
information was barred, information which the defence thought might have been 
useful for cross-examination purposes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court's decision based on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Davis v 
Alaska,219 In that case, the Supreme Court had had to decide whether or not the 
confidentiality of juvenile records had the effect that a defendant could not cross-
examine a prosecution witness as to the fact that he had such a record. The 
Supreme Court had argued that: 
'Serious damage to the strength of the State's case would have been a real 
possibility had petitioner been allowed to pursue this inquiry. In this setting we 
conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of 
protecting a juvenile offender. Whatever temporary embarrassment might 
result to Green or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record - if the 
218 480 U.S. 39 (I 987), 
219 415 U.S. 308 (1974), 
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prosecution insisted on using him to make its case - is outweighed by 
petitioner's right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of 
a crucial identification witness .... The State's policy interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so 
vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an 
adverse witness. ,220 
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it followed from Davis that a 
statutory privilege cannot be maintained when a defendant asserts a need, prior to 
trial, for the protected information to be used at trial to impeach or otherwise 
undermine a witness' testimony. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this 
interpretation of its decision in Davis by arguing that: 
'Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information that might have made 
cross-examination more effective undermines the accuracy of the truth-finding 
process at trial .... If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the 
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally 
compelled rule of pre-trial discovery.'221 
While the Court confirmed that the right to cross-examine includes the 
opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated 
or unbelievable, the Court nevertheless argued that: 
'The right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper 
restrictions on the types of questions that defence counsel may ask during 
cross-examination .... The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does 
not include the power to require the pre-trial disclosure of any and all 
information that might be useful in contradicting unfavourable testimony. ,222 
It followed, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the 
withholding of the CYS file, and that it would only have been impermissible for 
the judge to have prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the witness. In 
US v Haworth,223 a case in which the defendants sought discovery of records of 
the psychotherapist who had examined the witness, the court similarly argued that 
defendants who equate their confrontation rights with a right to discover 
information that is clearly privileged are mistaken, as their confrontation rights 
permit them to cross-examine the witness fully regarding hislher treatment by the 
psychotherapist, but will not guarantee access to the psychotherapist's records. 
The court distinguished the case in which discovery was sought from that in 
220 Ibid., at 319-320 per Justice Burger. 
221 Pennsylvania v Ritchie 480 U.S. 39, (1987) at 52 per Justice Powell. 
222 Ibid., at 52-53. 
223 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996), at 661-662 per Hansen, District Judge. 
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which defence counsel already had the evidence with which to impeach the 
witness, and held that in the latter case, the defendant's confrontation rights 
require that defence counsel may use that evidence. It can thus be seen that the 
Confrontation Clause does not help the defendant who is seeking access to 
privileged information by the means of pre-trial discovery, not even where the 
defendant alleges that the disclosure may be necessary for an effective cross-
examination at a later trial. 
Even where the defendant contends a violation of the Confrontation Clause 
because the right to cross-examination is restricted at trial, it is not at all clear that 
the courts will find a violation of the Sixth Amendment. In Mills v Singletary,224 
for example, a case in which a violation of confrontation rights under the Sixth 
Amendment was contended, as the trial court had allowed Ashley, a witness, to 
invoke the attorney-client privilege and had accordingly curtailed Ashley's cross-
examination, the court rejected this allegation based on the following 
considerations: 
'During cross-examination of Ashley, Mills' lawyer induced Ashley to admit 
that: (1) he changed his story of the events surrounding the murder, thereby 
implicating Mills, after Florida offered him a deal and deciding that ''there was 
a chance of me getting out and starting a new life"; and (2) the deal that Florida 
offered Ashley gave him complete immunity from prosecution in the burglary 
and murder charges in exchange for his testimony against Mills. We hold that 
this cross-examination exposed Ashley's prior inconsistent statements and 
bargain with Florida to the extent that the jury could judge his credibility and 
Mills could argue effectively that Ashley's testimony was not credible. Mills' 
lawyer engaged in sufficient cross-examination, and the trial judge neither 
abused his discretion nor violated the Confrontation Clause in limiting the 
cross-examination to that which the attorney-client privilege did not protect. ,225 
The court's approach mainly seems to depend on the question of whether or not 
effective cross-examination will be possible without touching upon privileged 
information. Where, as in Mills v Singletary, effective cross-examination is not 
excluded by the restriction of cross-examination to unprivileged information, the 
defendant's confrontation rights are not violated. Other courts confirmed the view 
that the mere fact that access to a witness' medical records was denied does not 
impair a defendant's ability to cross-examine as long as the defendant was not 
restricted in cross-examination and was able to put before the jury the 
224 161 F.3d 1273 (1l Ih Cir.1998). 
m Ibid., at 1288-1289 per Hatchett, Chief Judge, Edmondson and Black, Circuit Judges, Per 
Curiam. 
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psychological and behaviour problems, drug and alcohol abuse, and 
hospitalisation of the witness.226 And in State v Hanninen,227 the court emphasised 
that although a defendant has the right to present evidence in his own defence, he 
does not have a right to introduce evidence that is privileged, irrelevant or 
otherwise inadmissible. If, however, effective cross-examination depends on 
access to privileged information, then the rights under the Confrontation Clause 
seem to prevail. Thus, in People v Adamski,228 where the defendant was convicted 
for sexual intercourse with his daughter and where the defendant's claim for 
privileged statements the victim had made to her counsellor had been denied, the 
court held that the complainant's prior inconsistent statements to her counsellor 
were admissible for impeachment despite the bar of the statutory privilege and 
that the failure of the trial court to allow the defendant to cross-examine the 
complainant with regard to her statement that the defendant had not acted 
inappropriately with her, denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation by limiting cross-examination. With regard to the apparent conflict 
between the right to privilege and the right of cross-examination, the court held 
that: 
'It appears well settled as a matter of constitutional law that common-law or 
statutory privileges, even if purportedly absolute, may give way when in 
conflict with the constitutional right of cross-examination. ... The right of 
cross-examination is not without limit; neither the Confrontation Clause nor 
due process confers an unlimited right to admit all relevant evidence or cross-
examine on any subject. ... Privileges impede the defendant's ability to present 
a defence by limiting the evidence available. Both this Court and our Supreme 
Court have not been hesitant to hold that confidential or privileged information 
must be disclosed where a defendant's right to effective cross-examination 
would otherwise be denied .... In the present case, we recognise the important 
policy underlying the statutory psychologist-patient privilege .... Weighing 
against this policy is defendant's interests in his liberty and receiving a fair 
trial. On its face, the privilege poses an absolute bar to the use of the 
complainant's statements for impeachment. ... We believe that the statute must 
yield to defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. ,229 
In Re Doe,230 the court equally held that: 
'Although appellant's psychiatric files contain material that squarely implicates 
his privacy interests, the balance in this case weighs overwhelmingly in favour 
226 U.S. v Skorniak 59 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1995), at 756 per Hansen, Circuit Judge. 
227 533 N.W. 2d 660 (Minn.App. 1995), at 661-662 per Amundson, Judge. 
228 497 N.W.2d 546 (Mich.App. 1993). 
229 Ibid., at 549-550 per Wah Is, Presiding Judge. 
230 964 F.2d 1325 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
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of allowing an inquiry into his history of mental illness. Appellant is not only 
the person who initiated the criminal investigation against Diamond, but also a 
witness whose credibility will be the central issue at trial. ... We agree ... that a 
preclusion of any inquiry into appellant's psychiatric history would violate the 
Confrontation Clause and vitiate any resulting conviction ofDiamond.,231 
Thus, while the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee unlimited access to 
privileged information merely because this information may be relevant, the 
interest in medical confidentiality is outweighed where without this information, 
effective cross-examination is not possible, the reason being that the defendant's 
interests at stake, i.e. the interest in liberty and in receiving a fair trial, are 
regarded as more important than the interest in medical confidentiality. This view 
was also confirmed in United States v Lindstrom,232 where the court held that the 
interests behind the protection of medical confidentiality could not outweigh the 
defendant's right to examine and use the psychiatric information contained in the 
witness' medical files to attack the credibility of a key government witness. The 
court argued that the desire to spare a witness embarrassment which disclosure of 
medical records might entail was insufficient justification for withholding such 
records from criminal defendants on trial for their liberty. Thus, the defendant's 
right to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses may in some cases 
outweigh a privilege, but only where the probative value of the privileged 
evidence was considered and found sufficient,233 and where without disclosure, 
important interests of the defendant would be impaired. 
(b) Compulsory Process 
Another allegation frequently made by defendants if denied access to privileged 
information is that the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment was 
violated thereby. Under the Compulsory Process Clause, criminal defendants have 
the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of 
favourable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might 
influence the determination of guilt. Thus, the information here is sought either 
for the purpose of identifying potential witnesses, or for the purpose of its 
231 Ibid., at 1329 per Winter, Circuit Judge. 
232 698 F.2d 1154 (11 th Cir. 1983), at 1167. 
233 See, for example, People \I Foggy 521 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. 1988), at 92 per Miller, Justice. 
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presentation to the jury as part of the defence. In Pennsylvania v Ritchie,234 the 
Supreme Court analysed this problem in some detail. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court had concluded that the right of compulsory process includes the right to 
have the state's assistance in uncovering arguably useful information, without 
regard to the existence of a state-created restriction - in that case the 
confidentiality of the files. The Court argued that while it had never squarely held 
that the Compulsory Process Clause guaranteed the right to discover the identity 
of witnesses, or to require the government to produce exculpatory evidence, it was 
well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its 
possession that is both favourable to the accused and material to guilt or 
punishment. The Court then balanced the competing interests and held: 
'Although we recognise that the public interest in protecting this type of 
sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily 
prevents disclosure in all circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute 
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all eyes .... Rather, the 
Pennsylvania law provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain 
circumstances including when CYS is directed to do so by court order .... 
Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of CYS 
records in judicial proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all 
disclosure in criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state policy 
to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe that relevant 
information would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction 
determines that the information is "material" to the defence of the accused .... 
Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine 
whether it contains information that probably would have changed the outcome 
of his trial.,235 
However, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that his attorney should be 
given access to the files to search for exculpatory evidence. Rather: 
'We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in 
ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring that the CYS files be 
submitted only to the trial court for in camera review .... To allow full 
disclosure to defence counsel in this type of case would sacrifice unnecessarily 
the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child-abuse 
information. If the CYS records were made available to defendants, even 
through counsel, it could have seriously adverse effects on Pennsylvania's 
efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child abuse is one of the most difficult 
crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no 
witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and gUilt and 
his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute when the abuser 
is a parent. It therefore is essential that the child have a state-designated person 
234 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
m Ibid., at 57-58 per Justice Powell. 
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to whom he may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. 
Relatives and neighbours who suspect abuse also will be more willing to come 
forward if they know that their identities will be protected. Recognising this, 
the Commonwealth - like all other States - has made a commendable effort to 
assure victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counsellors 
without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth's purpose would be 
frustrated if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a 
defendant charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial court may 
not recognise exculpatory evidence. ... An in camera review by the trial court 
will serve Ritchie's interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to 
protect the confidentiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. ,236 
In Ritchie, the Supreme Court was thus of the opinion that the Compulsory 
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires that all information, even if 
privileged, must be made available to the defendant if it is material to the defence, 
and that the interest in confidentiality is sufficiently protected if the confidential 
information is inspected by the trial court in camera. The materiality standard 
developed in Ritchie has since been adopted by other courts as providing a 
workable balance between the state's interest in the confidentiality of certain 
information and a defendant's potential need for such information. In State v 
Speese,237 for example, the court adopted the approach outlined in Ritchie and 
held that a defendant who is aware of specific information in a confidential file 'is 
free to request it directly from the court, and to argue in favour of its materiality.' 
It should be noted, however, that the courts did not provide detailed reasons for 
the decision that the defendant's compulsory process rights outweigh medical 
confidentiality as soon as it can be demonstrated that the information is material 
to the defence. However, this test only seems to apply to privileged information 
that is already in the hands of the prosecution. 
In U.S. v Doy/e,238 where the court had to weigh the defendant's needs for 
disclosure against the victim's psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court 
disagreed with the defendant's view that his Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process outweighed the victim's right to confidentiality: 
'If such were the law, what privilege could survive a defendant's assertion of 
evidentiary needs? Lawyers, spouses, even priests, presumably, could be 
ordered to cough up their notes or memories about the most private and 
236 Ibid., at 60-61. 
~37 State v Speese 528 N. W.2d 63 (Wis.App. 1995), at 69 per Gartzke, Presiding Judge. 
38 1 F.Supp.2d 1187 (0. Or. 1998). 
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confidential communications in the face of a subpoena from a defendant in a 
criminal case. ,239 
It must be noted, however, that the court relied on the Supreme Courts decision in 
Jaffee v Redmonr4o where the Court had rejected a balancing test based on the 
relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for 
disclosure in a given case. This seems to suggest that the holding in u.s. v Doyle 
is limited to cases of psychotherapist-patient privilege and that the materiality test 
developed in Ritchie will only be applied to the conflict between defence rights 
and medical privilege, but not where the defendant's compulsory process rights 
clash with privileged information stemming from a psychotherapist-patient 
relationship. 
(c) Due process 
Some courts took the stance that the conflict between medical or psychotherapist-
patient privilege, on the one hand, and the defendant's evidentiary needs, on the 
other hand, rather than requiring a Sixth Amendment analysis, was more 
appropriately dealt with by constitutional due process considerations. In State v 
Knutson,241 for example, the court argued that the analysis of a discovery issue 
should start from the premise that due process affords a criminal defendant a right 
of access to evidence that is both favourable to the accused and material to guilt 
and punishment, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defence, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
And in State Ex Rei. Romley v Superior Court,242 the court held that as due 
process of law was the primary and indispensable foundation of individual 
freedom, in case of conflict between due process rights of the accused and the 
rights of the victim due process was the superior right. Therefore, when the court 
is of the opinion that a victim's medical records are exculpatory and are essential 
to the presentation of the defendant's theory of the case, or necessary for 
impeachment of the victim, then the defendant's due process right to a 
fundamentally fair trial overcomes the statutory physician-patient privilege. 
239 Ibid., at 1191 per Coffin, U.S. Magistrates Judge. 
240 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
241 854 P.2d 617 (Wash. 1993), at 620-622 per Brachtenbach, Justice. 
242 836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. App. Div.l 1992), at 452-453 per Grant, Presiding Judge. 
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(d) In camera review 
It can thus be seen that some defence rights of the accused are protected under the 
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment and that, 
in addition, defence rights are more generally protected by the constitutional 
principle of due process of law. Whatever the constitutional principle on which 
the resolution of the conflict between defence rights, on the one hand, and medical 
privilege, on the other hand, is based, most courts decided that while defence 
rights principally outweigh the interests protected by medical privilege, as the 
defendant's liberty may be at stake, it did not necessarily follow that a defendant 
should therefore be given access to all confidential medical and/or psychological 
files of the witness. Rather, most courts argued that a balancing test must be 
performed in each case to decide how the conflicting interests can best be 
protected. While the sensitivity of the information seems to weigh in the balance, 
on the part of the defendant it must be shown that the information sought is 
relevant and material for the defence. This, of course, raises the question of how 
the defendant can be able to meet this requirement before he/she is given access to 
the information. The solution favoured by most courts is that of an in camera 
inspection of the confidential records by the trial court in order to determine 
whether or not the files contain information that meets the materiality and 
relevancy test. However, does this mean that upon the request of the defendant, a 
court will rummage through all confidential files of a witness to see whether there 
is anything of interest to the defence to be found therein? Some courts seem to 
have adopted such a broad approach to in camera inspections of confidential and 
privileged documents. In Gale v State,243 for example, a case in which a defendant 
had issued subpoenas for various records in which the state asserted a privilege, it 
was held that the court would have to review the records in camera for material 
evidence, focusing on the defendant's ability to gather such evidence from other 
sources, and on how the privileged evidence may relate to the defendant's theory 
of the case. Other courts have rejected such a wide review of privileged files by 
the courts and rather required the defendant to make some preliminary showing 
that the information contained in those documents is material to his/her 
243 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1990). at 581 per Golden, Justice. 
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defence.244 According to the court in State v Shifjra,245 this requirement would be 
met under the following circumstances: 
'We conclude that Shiffi'a has met the burden of making a preliminary showing 
of materiality. He presented ample evidence during the hearing on his 
discovery motion that Pamela's psychiatric difficulties might affect both her 
ability to accurately perceive events and her ability to relate the truth. These 
difficulties are relevant because they directly affect Pamela's credibility. They 
also bear directly on Shiffi'a's defence of consent. Shiffra is entitled to an in 
camera inspection of the records. ,246 
In Com. v FuIler,247 the court stressed that it did not intend to establish a standard 
and protocol that would result in virtually automatic in camera inspection for an 
entire class of extremely private and sensitive privileged material, as to do so 
would make the privilege no privilege at all, and would substitute an unwarranted 
judicial abridgement of a clearly stated legislative goal. In the court's opinion, in 
camera review, while less intrusive than public disclosure or disclosure to a 
defendant's attorney, is nonetheless a substantial invasion of the privacy of the 
witness concerned. A judge should therefore undertake an in camera review of 
privileged records only when a defendant's motion for production of the records 
has demonstrated a good faith, specific, and reasonable basis for believing that the 
records will contain exculpatory evidence which is relevant and material to the 
issue of the defendant's guilt. Thus, a privilege should be abrogated only in cases 
in which there is a reasonable risk that non-disclosure may result in an erroneous 
conviction. Consequently, even an in camera inspection of privileged records may 
be denied by the courts without violating the Confrontation Clause if the 
defendant does not specify what information relevant for impeachment purposes 
the privileged records are thought to contain. In US v Doyle248 the court denied the 
defendant's request that the court examine the contents of the confidential files in 
camera in order to determine if there was anything therein that could possibly be 
of assistance to the defendant regardless of any materiality showing, as the court 
took the stance that the privilege was absolute and that the court's review of the 
files would itselfbe a breach of the privilege. 
Some courts only perform an in camera review of confidential files of a witness if 
244 Slate v Speese 528 N. W.2d 63 (Wis.App. 1995), at 69 per Gartzke, Presiding Judge. 
24S 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis.App. 1993). 
246 Ibid., at 724 per Brown, Judge. 
247 667 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1996) at 853-855 per Greaney Judge. 
248 ' , 
1 F.Supp.2d 1187, (D. Or. 1998), per Coffin, U.S. Magistrates Judge. 
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the witness has consented to this inspection.249 In State v Grant,250 the court 
summarised its position as follows: 
'In some instances, a patient's psychiatric privilege must give way to a 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to reveal to the jury facts about a 
witness' mental condition that may reasonably affect that witness' credibility . 
... We have therefore directed trial courts to engage in a specific procedure 
designed to accommodate this inherent tension. "If, for the purposes of cross-
examination, a defendant believes that certain privileged records would 
disclose information especially probative of a witness' ability to comprehend, 
know, or correctly relate the truth, he may ... make a preliminary showing that 
'there is reasonable ground to believe' that the failure to produce the records 
would likely impair his right to impeach the witness." ... If in the trial court's 
judgment the defendant successfully makes this showing, the state must then 
obtain the witness' permission for the court to inspect the records in 
camera. ,25 I 
It can thus be seen that the courts adopt different approaches with regard to the 
question of an in camera inspection of privileged records. While some courts will 
examine such records upon the request of the defence without imposing any 
further conditions, other courts require materiality showings before reviewing 
such files. The approach largely seems to depend on the court's attitude towards 
confidentiality. If a court thinks that confidentiality is not affected by in camera 
review, it will be more willing to inspect confidential files than a court that is of 
the opinion that even an in camera review affects the patient's privacy concerns. 
The question remains of what should be the consequence if upon an in camera 
inspection the trial court finds that the confidential records do in fact contain 
evidence material to the defence. Some courts take the stance that in such a case, 
the defence must be given access to that information, as defence rights will then 
prevail over any confidentiality interests.252 Other courts, however, have argued 
differently and held that in such a situation, the trial court must seek the witness' 
consent for a disclosure of the relevant parts of the files to the defence. If he/she 
refuses to do so, his/her testimony shall be stricken and the trial court is ordered to 
make a redetermination of the respondents adjudications and dispositions based 
upon the remaining evidence at the original hearing.25J The courts are thus of the 
249 S r. 
ee, lor example, Re Robert H 509 A.2d 475 (Conn. 1986), at 482- 485 per Arthur H. Healey, 
Judge. 
250 637 A.2d 1116 (Conn. App. 1994). 
251 Ibid., at 1121-1122 per Frederick A. Freedman, Judge. 
252 State Ex Rei. Romley v Superior Court 836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. App. Div.1 1992), at 452-453 per 
Grant, Presiding Judge. . 
253 Re Robert H 509 A.2d 475 (Conn. 1986), at 482- 485 per Arthur H. Healey, Judge; State v 
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opinion that the privilege bars them from ordering the release of confidential 
records without the patient's consent. In such a situation, the only method of 
protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial is to suppress the witness' 
testimony.2S4 In State v Speese,2SS where the disclosure of the witness' psychiatric 
records for impeachment purposes was denied and where the witness had already 
testified, the court ordered a new trial without the testimony of that witness, as 
otherwise the constitutional defence rights would be undermined. 
The witness whose confidential records are at stake thus has different possibilities 
to influence the disclosure of hislher medical records. First, in some States it is up 
to the patient to decide whether or not the court can inspect the confidential 
records in camera. Secondly, where the patient has given such consent and the 
court has found relevant passages in those records, the patient's consent is needed 
for a further disclosure of the confidential material to the defence. It is submitted 
that this approach provides a good balance of the interests involved. The best 
possibility to protect the patient's confidentiality interests is to give the patient the 
choice as to whether or not the information is disclosed to the defence. Even 
where the defence is thus denied access to relevant confidential records, however, 
defence rights are not seriously affected if the prosecution can then also not rely 
on that evidence. While this approach affects the public interest in criminal 
prosecution, this is the price the legislators that introduced medical privilege were 
willing to pay. 
(e) Evidence favourable to the defence 
The situation may be different, though, where the defendant wants to present 
privileged evidence to prove hislher innocence or to demonstrate mitigating 
factors. Such cases which would fall under the Compulsory Process Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment as well as under the constitutional principle of due process, 
cannot be resolved according to the principles discussed above, as for example 
striking out the witness' testimony if he/she refuses to give consent to the 
disclosure of confidential information would not help the defendant. It has been 
Grant 637 A.2d 1116 (Conn. App. 1994), at 1121-1122 per Frederick A. Freedman, Judge; State v 
Solberg 553 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. App. 1996), at 844 per Dykman, Judge. 
2S4 Slale v Shiffra 499 N. W.2d 719 (Wis. App. 1993), at 721 and 724 per Brown, Judge. 
2SS 528 N. W.2d 63 (Wis. App. 1995), at 71 per Gartzke, Presiding Judge. 
271 
argued that a criminal defendant should be permitted access to medical records 
when he/she needs the information contained therein to mount hislher direct 
defence.256 This seems particularly important where the privileged evidence could 
demonstrate the accused's innocence. Even where the witness is a physician who 
gained hislher knowledge of the accused's innocence through a patient, the 
accused's fundamental right to present his/her defence and to prove hislher 
innocence is considered as more important than the patient's right to preserve 
hislher medical secrets, the physician's concern for his/her professional 
responsibility, or evidentiary rules designed to encourage the seeking of medical 
advice and treatment.257 It can thus be seen that in cases in which the defendant 
would need access to priVileged information to present his/her defence or to prove 
his/her innocence, the defence rights are regarded as overriding the interest in 
confidentiality. 
An alternative approach would be in such a case to dismiss the charge if the 
accused is inhibited by a privilege from adducing favourable evidence.2s8 As the 
argument goes, even though the legislator and not the prosecution is responsible 
for the existence of the privilege, they are both representatives of the same state 
and it is therefore fair to shift the burden of a state created privilege on the 
prosecution rather than on the defence. However, it was suggested that this 
remedy should only be available to the defendant who meets a high standard of 
evidentiary need and can demonstrate a probability that the evidence would be 
exculpatory.259 This raises the problem of where to draw the line. In the words of 
Hill: 
'Shall the defendant go free because the person he accuses of being the true 
criminal has a priest or spouse who is likely to know something that may be 
exculpatory, but who cannot be questioned because of a testimonial 
privilege?,~6o 
Another possibility would be to reduce the remedy to situations in which the 
witness can demonstrate a likelihood of serious injury resulting from the 
disclosure of privileged information. 
2S6 Oppenheim, The Medical Record as Evidence, at 705. 
2S7 See Thomas-Fishburn, (1990) 61 University of Colorado Law Review, at 201-202, for the 
comparable situation of the attorney-client privilege. 
2S8 Weisberg, (1978) 30 Stanford Law Review, at 982-984. 
2S9 See for a detailed discussion Hill, (1980) 80 Columbia Law Rev., at 1189. 
260 Ibid. 
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With regard to the question of whether or not the physician should be allowed to 
disclose confidential patient information if he/she is accused in criminal 
proceedings and that information could assist hislher defence, it has been argued 
that any professional who is bound by confidentiality has the right of 'self 
defence' and that a patient who makes allegations against the physician impliedly 
waives the privilege thereby.261 
(7) Crime prevention 
The conflict between medical confidentiality and cnme prevention has not 
received much attention by American courts. Those cases that touch upon the 
issue usually do not directly focus on considerations of crime prevention, but 
rather on considerations of how to avert risks from third parties. The underlying 
problem is the same, as in most cases the infliction of harm to third parties will 
amount to a criminal offence. This conflict is normally discussed in the context of 
tort law rather than criminal law, and the debate is not so much concerned with 
the question of whether or not the physician is justified when disclosing 
confidential patient information to avert a risk from a third party. Instead, the 
conflict is mostly discussed as a conflict between competing duties, i.e. the duty to 
maintain medical confidentiality and the duty to warn the potential victim. As this 
work concentrates on the question of exceptions to the obligation to maintain 
medical confidentiality, the analysis will not concentrate on the particular 
problems raised by an obligation to disclose as opposed to an authorisation to 
disclose, but will instead focus on the reasons why confidentiality is overridden. 
In the leading case of Tarasoff v Regents of the University of Cali/ornia,262 a 
patient had told his psychotherapist that he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff. Upon 
the psychotherapist's request, the campus police briefly detained the patient but 
released him when he appeared rational, without further action being taken. Two 
months later, the patient killed Tatiana Tarasoff and her parents brought an action 
in tort against the psychotherapist. The court decided that when a psychotherapist 
determines or should determine that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to 
another, the psychotherapist is under an obligation to use reasonable care to 
261 Slovenko. Psychotherapy and Confidentiality. at 252. 
262 17 C.3d 425 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
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protect the intended victim against such danger, either by warning the intended 
vict~ by informing the police or by taking other steps that are reasonably 
necessary to avert the risk. The court recognised the interest in the confidentiality 
of the psychotherapist-patient relationship that might be affected by such a 
disclosure, but argued that: 
'Against this interest, however, we must weigh the public interest in safety 
from violent assault .... We realise that the open and confidential character of 
psychotherapeutic dialogue encourages patients to express threats of violence, 
few of which are ever executed. Certainly a therapist should not be encouraged 
routinely to reveal such threats; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the 
patient's relationship with his therapist and with the persons threatened. To the 
contrary, the therapist's obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a 
confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and 
even then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the 
privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the 
threatened danger .... The revelation of communication under the above 
circumstances is not a breach of trust .... We conclude that the public policy 
favouring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist 
communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to 
avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril 
begins. . .. If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim 
requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those who can 
reasonably be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that 
would protect and justify concealment. ,263 
With regard to the question of whether or not the physician is justified when 
disclosing confidential patient information for the purpose of crime prevention, it 
can thus be concluded that the interest in medical confidentiality is outweighed 
where disclosure is necessary to avert a risk from another. This holding raises 
several problems. First, the decision does not specify the type of risk that justifies 
or even mandates disclosure. In the Tarasoff case, there was a risk to the life of 
the victim, but it is unclear whether or not other risks, for example the risk of a 
minor physical injury, or a risk to property interests would equally justify 
disclosure. Another problem is that of risk assessment. At what point will the 
physician's obligation shift from an obligation of confidentiality to an obligation 
to warn? Billings, Chief Justice, argued in a dissent to Peck v Counseling Service 
of Addison County,264 that it is impossible to predict future violent behaviour and 
accordingly rejected a duty to warn. Others argue that while the assessment of 
dangerousness is difficult, it is not impossible, given that psychiatrists have to do 
263 Ibid., at 440-442, per Tobriner, Justice. 
264 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985), at 427-428. 
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just that when certifying individuals for commitment to a hospital because of a 
danger to themselves or to others.265 Another question is whether or not the risk 
has to be imminent. Given that in Tarasoff, the threat was only carried out two 
months after the counselling session, the court seems to have rejected this 
requirement. However, without such a requirement it is difficult to narrow down 
the cases in which disclosure is justified or even mandated, as it could then be 
argued that the mere threat that a patient might one day be violent towards a third 
party would be sufficient to justify disclosure. If that were the case, how can the 
danger be averted by disclosure? It is submitted that had Tatiana Tarasoff been 
told that the patient uttered the threat to kill her, the protective effect of the 
physician's disclosure would have been rather limited. In the recent case of US v 
Glass,266 it has been held that disclosure could only be required if the threat was 
serious when it was uttered, and if disclosure was the only means to avert the 
danger. Can it really be said that those requirements were met in the Tarasoff 
case? 
However, the holding in Tarasoffwas since accepted by many COurts,267 and the 
main problem discussed in the aftermath of Tarasoffwas whether or not the duty 
to warn was only triggered if the third party at risk was identifiable. In Gammill v 
United States,268 the court stressed that for a duty to warn to apply the physician 
must be aware of the specific risks to specific persons. And in Thompson v County 
of Alameda, 269 the court held that no duty to warn arises where the patient is 
potentially dangerous to a whole community, but where no identifiable victims 
exist. 
The reaction of commentators to this case-law was far from unanimous. While it 
was welcomed by some, at least in cases of a danger to the life of others, as life is 
regarded as more important than the interests of the patient that might be affected 
by disclosure,27o others voiced concern. It was feared, for example, that in the 
light of such a duty psychotherapists and physicians might be reluctant to explore 
265 Bok, Secrets, at 128; Siovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, at 300-301. 
266 133 F.3d 1356 (loth Cir. 1998), at 1359-1360 per Porfilio, Circuit Judge. 
267 S 
ee, for example, McIntosh v Milano 168 N.J.Super. 466 (1979), at 489-490; Peck v 
Counseling Service of Addison County 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985), at 426; Petersen v State 671 P.2d 
230 (Wash. 1983), at 237; but see, on the other hand, Hasenai v U.S. 541 F.Supp. 999 (D. Md. 
1982), in which the court rejected the TarasojJ doctrine. 
268 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984) at 954 269 ' • 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1980), at 734. 
270 Watson, (1992) 71 Nebraska Law Review, at 1133-1144. 
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the possibility of dangers to others if a duty to warn is the consequence. If this 
were the case, then a duty to warn might increase rather than reduce the danger to 
society. It has been suggested that the potential harm such a duty would inflict 
upon the physician-patient or psychotherapist-patient relationship might be 
averted if the doctor informed the patient at the outset that such a duty to warn 
third parties exists. It is argued that patient autonomy could thus be protected, as 
the patient will then know that the physician or psychotherapist will disclose this 
information, and, if he/she still reveals such information, this is interpreted as 
informed consent to the physician's disclosure.271 This argument, however, is not 
very convincing. First of all, patient and therapist may have different perceptions 
of what constitutes a real risk to a third party and what, on the other hand, is just 
an expression of aggressive tendencies that will never be translated into action. 
Also, medical confidentiality is protected to spare the patient the choice between 
seeking health care at the risk of potential disclosure of confidential information, 
or preserving his/her secrets by not seeking medical treatment, as both alternatives 
undermine the patient's autonomy. The patient's autonomy can only be protected 
if the patient's consent is sought in every situation in which the physician wants to 
disclose confidential patient information. A different question is whether patient 
autonomy deserves protection where it conflicts with important interests of third 
parties, particularly where these interests are endangered by the patient 
himlherseIt: and many would argue that in such a case, the patient's autonomy 
must yield?72 
In some States, a statutory duty to warn was introduced. In Louisiana, for 
example, psychiatrists have a duty to warn when a patient has communicated an 
immediate threat of physical violence against a clearly identified victim. 273 
2.3. Summary and conclusion 
Given the difference in approach to almost all questions raised in this chapter 
throughout the U.S., to present a conclusion is not an easy task. First, it is 
important to stress that while medical confidentiality is protected by the U.S. 
Constitution, this protection is not extended to medical privilege, i.e. the 
271 H G I· ( . ermann, ag lano, 1989) 48 Maryland Law ReView, at 75. ~~ See. for example. Bok, Secrets. at 128. 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.2(A) (West Supp. 1990). 
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protection of medical confidentiality in judicial proceedings is not mandatory 
under the tenets of the Constitution. It is rather left to the States whether and to 
what extent to recognise medical privilege. 
At federal level, no statutory medical privilege exists, and the relevant provision 
of FRE 501 was interpreted so as not to grant a medical privilege in federal 
proceedings. A statutory federal psychotherapist-patient privilege does not exist, 
either, but some federal courts as well as recently the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
that such a privilege should be recognised in federal courts, given the particular 
sensitivity of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. This approach partly rests on 
utilitarian considerations. It has been argued that the benefits of that privilege for 
society are great, as without its recognition, the mental health of the population 
could not be preserved. At the same time, the loss of information was said to be 
negligible, as without privilege, no sensitive information would be imparted in the 
psychotherapist and such information would consequently not be available 
through the psychotherapist's testimony. 
At State level, the main distinction is that between States with and States without 
privilege statutes. In States without privilege statutes, the interests of justice are 
regarded as more important than the interests in medical confidentiality, so that in 
case of a conflict, medical confidentiality must yield to the interests of justice. In 
States with privilege statutes, the situation is more complex. Privilege statutes are 
not regarded as absolute, but are rather subject to statutory and common law 
exceptions. While some privilege statutes are not applicable to criminal 
proceedings, others contain exceptions for certain criminal offences. Surprisingly, 
some courts have restricted privilege statutes that do not contain any such 
exceptions so as to be applicable in criminal proceedings only subject to a 
balancing exercise, an opinion which circumvents the intention behind privilege 
statutes. 
With regard to the conflict between medical confidentiality and the interest in 
criminal prosecution, in States without privilege statutes, the interest in criminal 
prosecution prevails, while in States with privilege statutes, the legislator decided 
the conflict in favour of medical confidentiality. With regard to the search for and 
seizure of confidential patient records, the most far-reaching protection is 
provided by privilege statutes which mostly protect medical records from 
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disclosure. In addition, some limited protection is available under the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but courts normally do not find searches that 
are based on search warrants unreasonable. In States without privilege statutes, 
therefore, patient records can be seized without a violation of the Constitution as 
long as a search warrant was first obtained. 
In some specific cases, even in States with privilege statutes the conflict between 
medical confidentiality, on the one hand, and the interest in criminal prosecution, 
on the other hand, has been decided in favour of the latter. For child abuse cases, 
it should be noted, however, that while all States have exceptions to their privilege 
statutes for this particular situation, many courts have argued that the exception 
exists not in the interest of criminal prosecution, but rather in the interest of 
protecting children from further abuse. Another situation in which exceptions 
often apply is that of prosecuting drunk-driving offences. This exception, which is 
recognised in some States with privilege statutes, is aimed at the prosecution of 
offences that are regarded as dangerous for society as a whole and the prosecution 
of which largely depends on medical evidence. The exception for investigations 
against and the prosecution of physicians is partly based on similar considerations, 
as particularly fraud regarding the fees for medical treatment can only rarely be 
detected without resort to confidential medical records. However, as the 
investigations are here not directed against the patient, some courts try to optimise 
the interests at stake by restricting disclosure to those parts of medical records that 
are relevant for the investigation, or by requiring the patient's consent before the 
records can be used for that purpose. It is interesting to state that in the case of 
drunk-driving offences and of investigations against physicians, the exceptions 
seems to be based mainly on pragmatic reasons, as they are not justified by the 
overriding importance of the competing interests, but rather by the difficulties in 
prosecuting certain offences without access to medical evidence. 
The conflict that has received most attention in the academic and judicial 
discussion is that between medical confidentiality and defence rights. Defence 
rights are guaranteed by the Confrontation and the Compulsory Process Clauses 
of the Sixth Amendment as well as by due process considerations. It can be seen 
that, in principle, defence rights seem to outweigh confidentiality, as the 
individual's liberty is at stake. However, this does not mean that otherwise 
privileged information is automatically available for defence purposes. Rather, 
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access to privileged information is limited to situations in which effective cross-
examination would otherwise be impossible, or cases in which the information is 
material to the defence. Where the defence meets the materiality requirements, 
this will only lead to an in camera inspection of the relevant material by the court, 
and some courts decline even in camera review without the patient's consent. If 
the court, upon in camera inspection, finds that the material is in fact relevant for 
defence purposes, some courts make the material available to the defence. Other 
courts, however, will do so only with the patient's consent. If the patient refuses 
to consent, the interests of the defence are safeguarded by striking the evidence 
altogether or, where this is impossible, by ordering a re-trial. No case-law exists 
with regard to the question of whether or not the same principles should be 
applied to the situation that the defendant seeks access to the information in order 
to demonstrate his/her innocence or to present favourable evidence. Some 
commentators suggest that in such a case, defence rights outweigh confidentiality 
interests, while others argue that the charges against the defendant should be 
dropped if the patient refuses to give consent to the disclosure of confidential 
medical information. 
With regard to crime prevention, American courts focus on the aversion of a risk 
to third parties and hold that a physician is not only authorised to disclose 
information, but is even under a duty to do so, where the disclosure is necessary to 
avert a risk from an identifiable third party. This approach raises many problems, 
the most significant of which is that of risk assessment. 
The situation in the U.S. gives a good indication that even in the light of a 
constitutional guarantee of privacy interests, the state has broad leeway in shaping 
the scope and limits of the protection of medical confidentiality, and is, in 
particular, not prevented from giving important state interests precedence over the 
privacy rights of the individual. 
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Chapter 8 - Medical confidentiality and medical privilege from a 
comparative perspective 
The results presented in the preceding chapters show that in all of the legal 
systems that have been examined, the protection of medical confidentiality raises 
problems which are sometimes difficult to resolve. The potential conflicts 
between medical confidentiality, on the one hand, and the interests in criminal 
prosecution, defence rights and crime prevention, on the other, cause particularly 
difficult problems shared by all legal systems. The resolution of conflicts arising 
in this context requires value judgments to be made and must, therefore, be 
approached with caution, as convincing criteria to decide difficult cases are 
frequently lacking. As the constraints and conditions existing in each legal system 
will necessarily narrow down domestic perceptions of the problems and possible 
solutions, a comparative study may help to broaden the perspective by 
demonstrating different ways of identifYing and resolving problems. A 
comparative analysis will be used as a tool to extract general principles from the 
different approaches in order to develop workable, consistent and morally 
justified criteria for the resolution of these conflicts. The attitudes of different 
legal systems towards medical confidentiality will also be compared at a general 
level to see which factors might influence the different approaches and whether 
and how fundamental differences between the legal systems will limit the 
transferability of principles and solutions from one legal system to another. Of 
course, a comparative analysis can only be of limited practical value. Its purpose 
is not to propose one universally valid solution to a given problem which should 
then be adopted by all other systems. After all, different legal systems start from 
completely different premises, and have considerably different legal as well as the 
cultural traditions. Accordingly, a solution which may be totally compelling for 
one legal system may be unsuitable for adoption by another legal system. 
1. General reflections 
This detailed examination of four different systems has brought to light many 
similarities as well as many differences. It is common ground in all legal systems 
that medical confidentiality is a principle worth protecting. However, every legal 
system has developed its own ways of guaranteeing such protection. While 
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constitutional protection of medical confidentiality plays an important role both in 
Germany and the U.S., it is of only minor significance in France, and does not 
exist in the UK. Neither the German, I nor the U.S.2 Constitution require a 
decision in favour of medical confidentiality in case of a conflict, and many States 
in the U.S. do not recognise medical privilege. Moreover, in the U.S; with its 
constitutional protection of privacy as a fundamental right, courts only protect 
medical confidentiality when in conflict with important public interests where this 
protection is required by statute. In Z v Finland, 3 the European Court of Human 
Rights similarly decided that despite the protection of the individual's private life 
under Art.8 ECHR, States are free to accord overriding importance to competing 
state interests. In France, on the other hand, medical confidentiality and medical 
privilege receive extensive protection which is mainly achieved by means of 
ordinary law. It follows that the existence of a constitutional guarantee of medical 
confidentiality is not decisive for the scope of protection accorded to medical 
confidentiality, and that the protection of privacy by ordinary statutes is more 
important than constitutional protection. 
Constitutional protection of an interest indicates its fundamental significance. 
However, this is only one way of expressing a principle, and not the only way to 
do so. Particularly where the interests conflicting with a constitutional principle 
are of equal constitutional rank, as in the case. of conflicts between medical 
confidentiality and the interests behind criminal prosecution, defence rights and 
crime prevention, constitutional protection would not automatically afford 
medical confidentiality overriding status. In the U.S. as well as in Germany, 
constitutional protection nevertheless plays an important role. Reference to 
constitutional principles is made both by the legislators and the courts when 
guaranteeing or even extending the protection of medical confidentiality, 
particularly where other interests are thereby impaired. However, while 
constitutional principles can thus deliver valid arguments supporting a protection 
of medical confidentiality and facilitating the introduction of medical privilege, 
the protection through ordinary law is far more influential in the context of 
I See BVerfDE 33, 367, 383 (1972) regarding a social worker privilege. 
2 See, for example, Felber v Foote 321 F.Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970), at 87; Pagano v Oroville 
Hosp. 145 F.RD. 683 (E.D.Cal. 1993), per Hollows, U.S. Magistrate Judge; State v Beatty 770 
S.W.2d 387 (Mo.App. 1989), at 391 per GreeneJ; State v Boehme 430 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1967), per 
Hamilton, Judge. 
3 (1998) 25 E.HRR 371. 
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specific conflict resolution, as ordinary legislation provides the main point of 
reference for the courts. With regard to the potential effect of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 on the protection of medical confidentiality in the UK, it follows that 
even though the Act for the first time recognises a general right to privacy, it will 
not in itself lead to dramatic changes in the legal protection of medical 
confidentiality, and will not require a recognition of medical privilege. 
All four legal systems have in common that medical confidentiality is, in 
principle, protected by ordinary law, and that private law remedies are available 
for a breach of medical confidentiality. In none of the systems is this protection 
expressly guaranteed by statute. Rather, courts in all systems have to apply 
general legal principles to the specific situation of a breach of medical 
confidentiality by the physician. In Germany, France, and partly also in the U.S., 
the physician-patient relationship is based on a contract so that a breach of 
medical confidentiality would amount to a breach of contract, giving rise to a 
claim for compensation. Where no such contract exists between patient and 
physician, courts in all jurisdictions have not hesitated to provide other remedies. 
Thus, in Germany, a breach of medical confidentiality is actionable as a tort under 
s.823(I) Civil Code, and in France, the same result is reached pursuant to 
Art.1382 Civil Code. In the U.S., courts have awarded compensation under tort 
law4 or for breach of a fiduciary duty. S English courts, absent a general action for 
a breach of privacy, have developed a common law duty to maintain 
. 
confidentiality, the contravention of which gives rise to a claim for 
compensation. 6 It can thus be seen that regardless of conceptual differences, in all 
legal systems the courts have recognised the need to protect medical 
confidentiality under private law. The existence or rejection of general privacy 
protection does not affect this outcome. 
With regard to the scope of protection medical confidentiality enjoys, France, 
Germany, the UK and some U.S. States have adopted widely similar approaches, 
even though the means of protection differ. Medical confidentiality covers not 
only what the patient expressly confides in the physician, but also all observations 
4 See, for, example, McCormick 11 England 494 S.E.2d 431 (S.C.App. 1997), at 432-438 per 
Anderson, Judge. 
5 Petrillo 11 Syntex Laboratories, Inc 499 N.E.2d 952 (Ill.App.1 Dist. 1986), at 961 per Linn, 
Presiding Justice; Brandt 11 Medical Defence Associates 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.banc 1993), at 470 
fer Thomas, Judge. 
Attorney General \I Guardian Newspapers Ltd and others (2) [1988] 3 All ER 545. 
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the physician makes in connection with the physician-patient relationship. While 
in Gennany, this result is reached by the express wording of s.203 Criminal Code, 
and some U.S. privilege statutes contain express provisions to this effect, the same 
result has been reached in France, the UK and some U.S. States, either by judicial 
interpretation of statutes (France and the U.S.), or by interpreting the scope of the 
common law duty to maintain medical confidentiality (UK). However, some U.S. 
courts have given their privilege statutes a very narrow meaning when holding 
that communication protected by a privilege statute is limited to oral 
communication.7 The similarities of the outcome in Germany, France, the UK and 
some U.S. States confirm the view that differences in legal method and the 
question of whether medical confidentiality is mainly protected by constitutional 
law, criminal law, or private law do not have a great impact on the scope of 
protection of medical confidentiality. 
It nevertheless makes a difference whether medical confidentiality is mainly 
protected under private law or under criminal law. Criminal law protection is 
usually stricter, and the possibilities to justify a breach are far more limited. 
Furthermore, as the discussion of private law remedies for a breach of medical 
confidentiality in the U.S. and the UK has shown, criminal law provides stronger 
protection, as there is no need to establish and quantify the damage caused by 
disclosure. Instead, unauthorised disclosure is regarded as harmful, regardless of 
its consequences. The very limited number of criminal cases in this area, both in 
France and Gennany, may indicate, however, that breaches of medical 
confidentiality are rarely prosecuted, and hardly ever lead to a criminal 
conviction. 
It is surprising that courts in all legal systems have held that the protection of 
medical confidentiality lies in the public interest, and not solely in the private 
interest of the individual. In France and Germany, the existence of the criminal 
offences of breach of professional confidences sends a clear statement that 
medical confidentiality is protected not merely in the private interest of the 
patient, but also lies in the public interest. Where medical confidentiality is 
protected as part of the constitutional right to privacy, this constitutional guarantee 
7 See, for example, Re The June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury 41 S A.2d 73 
(Sup. Ct. Pa 1980), at 76-77 per Eagen, Chief Justice. . 
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implies that privacy protection lies in the public interest, as the state has an 
interest in protecting the fundamental liberties of the citizens. However, the same 
result has been achieved by English case-law,S even though medical 
confidentiality is only protected by private law provisions and remedies, and even 
though privacy as such is not protected. 
Important differences in approach can nevertheless be observed. In France and 
Germany, the restriction of the criminal offence of breach of confidence to 
members of certain professions emphasises that the respective legal systems 
accord special protection to the confidentiality of relationships between the 
individual and necessary confidants.9 U.S. privilege statutes are based on similar 
considerations. lo The protection of medical confidentiality by English courts, in 
contrast, does not focus on this concept of the necessary confidant, but emphasises 
instead the general desirability of protecting information that was imparted in 
confidence, no matter what the relationship between the parties might be. II This 
difference in perspective may be more important for the approach towards the 
conflict between medical confidentiality and the interests of justice than the 
recognition or rejection of a general right to privacy. If the relationship between 
physician and patient is not protected because of the particular needs of the patient 
to entrust himlherself in the physician, but rather because confidences between 
private parties in general deserve the protection of the law, on the balance, those 
aspects of medical confidentiality that justify its special treatment, such as the 
close link to autonomy and to bodily integrity, are lost. Given its broad nature, the 
general interest in the protection of information imparted in confidence is less 
likely to prevail over the interests of justice. 
An interesting question is whether or not it is possible to identify fundamental 
differences in approach between common law and civil law countries. It is 
submitted that with regard to the protection of medical confidentiality arid medical 
privilege, the differences in style are not insignificant, but should at the same time 
not be over-emphasised, as the results achieved in the various systems are not 
8 Xli Yand others [1988] 2 All ER 648 (QBD), at 656 per Rose J; WlI Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835 
~CA), at 846 per Stephen Brown P. 
See supra, at 55 and 108. 
10 See supra, at 236. 
11 See supra, at 155, 156. 
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necessarily affected thereby. It was already mentioned that both common law and 
civil law countries broadly achieve the same results when it comes to the 
protection of medical confidentiality as such. With regard to the specific problem 
of medical privilege, common law courts, in the absence of a privilege statute, 
tend to accord overriding importance to the interests of justice and are not willing 
to recognise medical privilege based solely on case-law authority. The adoption of 
privilege statutes by many u.s. States, and their rejection by other U.S. States, as 
well as by the UK, highlights fundamental differences between different common 
law countries. 
There are also differences between common law and civil law countries. Where a 
common law system recognises medical privilege, this is achieved by the means 
of privilege statutes specifically drafted for the situation of the physician's 
testimony in judicial proceedings, providing detailed regulations regarding the 
scope and limits of medical privilege. Accordingly, these statutes give the 
,physician, as well as the courts, comprehensive guidance for their decisions. 
Because of this statutory foundation, courts are rarely willing to allow for 
exceptions to medical privilege that are not outlined in the statute. The main 
advantage of these statutes is that they are especially formulated to deal with the 
specific conflicts surrounding medical privilege, and it is usually unnecessary to 
refer to other provisions or general legal principles when interpreting the statute. 
Here, U.S. type privilege statutes differ considerably from the relevant statutory 
provisions in France and Germany. 
In France and Germany, the starting point for a legal discussion of medical 
privilege is that any breach of medical confidentiality by the physician amounts to 
a criminal offence. Consequently, in the context of medical privilege the main 
question must be whether the obligation extends to the physician's testimony in 
criminal court. To decide whether or not an exception from the obligation to 
maintain medical confidentiality applies, reference must be made to general legal 
justifications, such as the necessity defence, which are not specifically drafted to 
deal with the situation of medical privilege. This means that the situation is 
governed by an interplay of different provisions to be found in different codes. 
Courts are then faced with the problem of how to apply these different provisions 
coherently. Although the starting point is the same in France and Germany, the 
conflict resolution nevertheless differs quite considerably. In Germany, conflicts 
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will always be resolved by a strict application of the relevant legal justification, 
which poses difficulties, as the situations in which breaches of medical 
confidentiality most frequently occur might not fit neatly into the framework of 
existing legal justifications, and the German system thus considerably limits the 
availability of defences for a breach of medical confidentiality. Also, even though 
legal justifications provide broad criteria for the resolution of a given conflict, 
their application still requires extensive interpretation and often a balancing of 
interests. French courts seem to overcome the problem of the narrow scope of 
application of legal justifications by referring to general thoughts and interests, 
rather than to legal justifications when resolving cases of conflict in the area of 
medical confidentiality. The French approach is thus far more pragmatic than the 
German approach, and it can be seen that the similarities in written law may be 
qualified by different ways of applying the law. Accordingly, the impact of 
differences in legal style between the two civil law countries should not be 
underestimated. 
It should be added that privilege statutes are normally restricted to regulating the 
physician's testimony in court, and will therefore not provide regulations with 
regard to questions of disclosure in favour of crime prevention. Even the most 
precise U.S. style privilege statute will thus leave some problems unanswered, and 
will make a balancing exercise in individual cases necessary. Outside of the realm 
of the specific problem of the physician's testimony in criminal court, the 
differences between the u.S. approach and the French and the German approaches 
are thus less dramatic. 
2. Conflict between medical confidentiality and the interests of justice in 
criminal proceedings 
2.1. Medical privilege in criminal courts 
With regard to the conflict between medical confidentiality, on the one hand, and 
the interests of justice in the context of criminal prosecution, on the other, all legal 
systems under examination have found a clear approach at least in respect of the 
basic issues involved. In France and Germany, under the provisions of the 
respective Codes of Criminal Procedure, the physician is exempt from the 
obligation to give testimony in court. Medical confidentiality is thus valued more 
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highly than the interest in criminal prosecution. In the U.S., the situation depends 
on whether or not a privilege statute exists in the State in which the case has to be 
decided. In States where privilege statutes apply to criminal proceedings, the 
physician does not have to give testimony, while in States without such a statutory 
privilege, it is generally felt that the interest in criminal prosecution outweighs the 
interest in medical confidentiality,12 so that the physician has to testifY. Equally, 
in England there is no physician-patient privilege in judicial proceedings, so that 
the physician has to testifY, unless the testimony is not relevant and material to the 
proceedings. In that case, English courts have a discretion to exclude evidence to 
uphold the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. 13 
It is interesting to note that all legal systems that recognise medical privilege in 
judicial proceedings introduce the privilege on a statutory basis. As far as the 
Continental legal systems, France and Germany, are concerned, this is hardly 
surprising, as a privilege introduced by the judiciary would be alien to the legal 
culture, at least as long as the general obligation to give testimony is regulated by 
statute. With regard to the common law systems, however, it is more note-worthy 
that where a statutory privilege is missing, the judiciary does not seem willing to 
introduce medical privilege by case-law. This suggests that the interest in criminal 
prosecution is, in principle, seen by the jUdiciary as more important than the 
interest in medical confidentiality. This result is reached by courts in the UK as 
well as in the U.S., even though in the U.S., medical confidentiality is protected as 
part of the constitutional privacy protection, 14 while the UK at present does not 
recognise any general right to privacy. IS This supports the conclusion presented 
above that the existence of a constitutional right to privacy does not necessarily 
influence the approach to medical privilege. In common law systems, the 
reluctance to recognise medical privilege is frequently explained by reference to 
the adversarial system governing criminal proceedings. It is often argued that an 
adversarial system is particularly dependent upon all evidence being made 
available to the court.16 But is this really a distinctive feature of the adversarial 
12 See Peiris, (1984) 33 ICQL 301-330, at 326-327. 
13 Hunter v Mann [1974] 2 All ER414 (QBD), at 420 per Widgery, U. 
14 See, for example, U.S. v Westinghouse Electric Corporation 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980); 
Wha/en v Roe 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
15 See, for example, Kaye v Robertson (1991] FSR 62 (CA). 
16 See, for example, U.S. v Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974), at 709 per Chief Justice Burger; Hogan, 
(1989) 30 Boston College Law Review 411-476, at 418. 
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system? A detailed analysis of the differences between the adversarial and the 
inquisitorial systems is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is 
submitted that an inquisitorial system pursues the same purpose as an adversarial 
system, that is to establish the truth in the course of judicial proceedings in order 
to come to a fair and just solution of the case before the court}' As can be seen 
from the example of the U.S., where States with and without medical privilege 
function side-by-side, in the setting of the same adversarial system, medical 
privilege is not alien to an adversarial system and does not undermine its 
functioning. This seems to suggest that the difference between an adversarial and 
an inquisitorial system cannot be seen as the decisive factor influencing the 
recognition or rejection of medical privilege. 
Any privilege is based on the value judgment that the interests behind the 
privilege are regarded as more important than the interests of criminal justice. It is 
submitted that the judiciary, as it is mainly concerned with ensuring the purposes 
of judicial proceedings, is unlikely to make a value decision to the detriment of 
the interests behind criminal prosecution. The judiciary is more likely to attempt 
to maximise the interest in an unhindered administration of justice. This view is 
supported by the courts' attitude towards legal professional privilege, which is, at 
least in England, not recognised to protect the privacy interests of the patient, but 
rather serves the interests of justice which, according to the courts, would suffer if 
clients did not feel confident to seek comprehensive legal advice and assistance. IS 
This is also in line with the discretionary approach adopted by English courts 
which are willing to consider the exclusion of confidential medical information 
from judicial proceedings as long as this information is not relevant and material 
for a just decision of the cases at hand. Confidential information will thus only be 
protected if its costs for an effective administration of justice are relatively low. 
This shows that the courts, absent a legislative decision in favour of medical 
privilege, take a consequentialist approach and give the interests in criminal 
prosecution precedence over the interests in medical confidentiality. It follows 
that it is unlikely that a comprehensive medical privilege will be introduced by 
case-law. 
17 Shuman, (1985) 39 Southwestern Law JoumaI661-687, at 686. 
18 Reg. v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parle B [1996] AC 487 (HL), at 507 per Taylor, U. 
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It is understandable that courts are reluctant to introduce medical privilege where 
this would lead to the exclusion of relevant and material evidence. In such a 
situation, the recognition of a privilege would constitute an interference with the 
smooth functioning of the very system that the judiciary is there to represent. 
However, it is interesting to note that some federal courts in the U.S. have 
recognised a psychotherapist-patient privilege, even though such a privilege is not 
based on a privilege statute. 19 The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence had explicitly recommended the introduction of such a privilege which 
is recognised by all U.S. States.20 In some U.S. States in which a privilege statute 
exists but is ambiguous as to its applicability in criminal proceedings, courts have 
adopted a broad approach and extended the privilege statute to criminal 
proceedings.21 This shows that once a legislative statement, or at least a 
recommendation in favour of a privilege exists, courts appear to be more willing 
to accept its underlying value and to protect it even by means of a broad 
interpretation. However, there are also examples to the contrary, again from the 
U.S., where the courts' mistrust of privilege statutes has been such that on 
occasion they have given them as narrow an interpretation as possible.22 
Given the differences in approach, it is useful to assess which approach is more 
convincing. Two main questions arise when assessing different approaches to 
medical privilege. First, is medical privilege desirable as such, that is, is medical 
confidentiality, in principle, important enough to outweigh the interests behind 
criminal prosecution? Secondly, if the first question is answered in the 
affirmative, how can medical confidentiality best be protected in the context of 
criminal proceedings? 
19 Covell v CNG Transmission Corp. 863 F.Supp. 202 (M.D. Pa. 1994), per McClure, District 
Judge; Cunningham v Southlalee Ctr Jor Mental Health, Inc 125 F.RD. 474 (N.D. Ind. 1989), at 
477; In Re Doe 964 F.2d 1325 (2nd Cir. 1992), per Winter, Circuit Judge; In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena 710 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. ]989), at 1012-]013; In re Zuniga 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), at 
639; U.S. v D.F. 857 F.Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1994), per Stadtmueller, District Judge. 
20 'Advisory Committees notes on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence', 56 F.RD. 183, at 242. 
21 See, for example, Clark v District Court 668 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1983); In the Matter oj a Grand Jury 
Investigation oJOnondaga County 59 N.Y.2d 130 (1983); People v Murphy 10] N.Y. ]26; People 
v Decina 2 N. Y.2d 133; People v Reynolds 195 Colo. 386 (1978); Slate v Boehme 430 P.2d 527 
(Wash. 1967) at 533 per Hamilton J; State v Ross 947 P.2d 1290 (Wash.App.Div.l 1997). 
22 See, for example, People v Doe 107 Misc.2d 605 (Sup Ct 1981); People v Lowe 96 Misc.2d 33 
(1978). 
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With regard to the first question of whether or not medical privilege should, in 
principle, be recognised, the answer depends on the outcome of a value judgment 
as to the significance of medical confidentiality, on the one hand, and the interests 
of justice in the context of criminal prosecution, on the other. It was seen in the 
second chapter that neither the utilitarian nor the deontological approach to 
medical privilege were entirely convincing, so that the question cannot be 
answered simply by referring to the solutions offered by philosophers or medical 
ethicists. Given the practical problems of a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, 
particularly in the light of the ambiguity of the notion of utility, the utilitarian 
approach is unhelpful when it comes to deciding the principal conflict of interests. 
It may only be of use as a corrective once a decision has been made, to assist with 
an evaluation of the consequences of the promoted value judgment. 
The main problem of the deontological approach is the difficulty of establishing a 
ranking of the competing interests. As was seen, most deontologists seem to 
favour medical confidentiality over the interests of justice.23 The outcome of the 
balancing test in favour of medical confidentiality seems so obvious that no need 
is perceived to justify this result by reference to ethical arguments. However, 
although the philosophical as well as the legal studies have demonstrated the close 
link between medical confidentiality, privacy and autonomy, interests of a very 
high rank, it should not be forgotten that the public interest in the administration 
of criminal justice which involves such important issues as the trust in the 
criminal justice system, and the investigation of past crimes and the punishment 
of criminal offenders, is also of great importance. While both of the competing 
interests are of high value, none of them is regarded as absolute. Rather, they can 
both be outweighed by interests of overriding importance. Consequently, it does 
not seem sufficient simply to state that one of them prevails over the other, as it 
does not seem obvious at first sight which of the two interests outweighs the 
other. However, this seems to be the approach most of the promoters and 
opponents of medical privilege are satisfied with. 
To interpret the approach of a given legal system once a privilege statute has been 
enacted is not too difficult a task, as the value judgment of the legislature is then 
clear. It is immeasurably more difficult to assess whether or not medical privilege 
23 Krattenmaker. (1973) 62 Georgetown Law Journal, at 90; Louisell, Crippin. (1956) 40 
Minnesota Law Review, at 414. 
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should be introduced, given the differences in approach to be found among 
different legal systems as well as among different philosophical schools. Most 
legislators seem to agree that the interest in medical confidentiality can be 
outweighed by a public interest, for example the interest in preserving public 
health, as they impose on physicians obligations to disclose information about 
patients infected with certain contagious diseases.24 Equally, most legislators 
seem to agree that the interests of justice can sometimes be outweighed by the 
rights of individuals. Thus, while the truth-finding function of criminal 
proceedings is highly valued, certain ways of establishing the truth are 
nevertheless prohibited, such as the extraction of a confession by means of torture, 
or forced self-incrimination of the accused. It could be argued that the two 
examples given cannot be compared to the situation of medical privilege. Both 
prohibitions could be said to promote the interests of justice, rather than 
undermining them. Evidence resulting from torture bears a very high risk of 
unreliability, as does evidence which emerges owing to a disregard for the 
privilege against self-incrimination. It could thus be argued that both prohibitions 
are necessary in order to avoid miscarriages of justice. However, it is submitted 
that both prohibitions at the same time serve other purposes. Thus, confessions 
induced by torture, or forced self-incrimination would seem unacceptable, 
regardless of whether or not the reliability of the evidence thus obtained could be 
established in the individual case. Even if it could be demonstrated with certainty 
that the confession made under torture was in fact correct, its admissibility would 
nevertheless be unacceptable, as the use of torture constitutes a blatant disregard 
for human dignity as well as autonomy and bodily integrity.2S To force a person to 
incriminate himlherself in the course of criminal proceedings against himlher 
similarly violates human dignity as well as personal autonomy. It can therefore be 
seen that evidence or certain means of collecting evidence are not merely 
excluded on the grounds that they may harm the interests of justice, but that they 
are also excluded for extra-judicial goals such as the protection of basic human 
rights. At the same time, it could be argued that it is not in the interest of justice 
24 F or France, see Le Roy, 0.1963.280; Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234; for Germany, see ss.3-5 Bundes-
Seuchengesetz (Federal Epidemic Act); for the UK, see s.2 NHS (Venereal Diseases) Regulations 
1974; for the U.S., see, for example, A.R.S: §36-621 (Arizona); Simonsen v Swenson 104 Nebr. 
224 (1920), at 228; Ensor, (1988) 47 Maryland Law Review, at 682-683. 
2~ KleinknechtIMeyer-Go/3ner, 3 to s.136(a); Stefani, Levasseur, Bouloc, Procedure Penaie, at 34; 
Rogers v Richmond 365 U.S. 534 (1961) for confessions obtained through police trickery. 
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that truth be established at all costs. Rather, while truth-finding is one important 
goal, the criminal justice system also strives to guarantee a fair trial and achieve 
just results. These latter concepts may sometimes conflict with and outweigh the 
truth-finding function of judicial proceedings. 
It could then also be argued that if the interests of justice require that adequate 
consideration be given to the rights and interests of individuals,26 medical 
privilege, like legal professional privilege, though for different reasons, could be 
regarded as serving the interests of justice rather than undermining them. This 
approach might be tempting as it seems at first sight as if a conflict of interests 
can be avoided and a balancing exercise be made unnecessary by specifying the 
interests of justice so as to include the interest in medical confidentiality. 
However, it is submitted that this approach does not present a way to circumvent 
the problem of effectively weighing these two competing interests against each 
other. It merely shifts the focus from a conflict between the interest in medical 
confidentiality and the interests of justice to a conflict between two competing 
aspects of the interests of justice. Therefore, no matter how one looks at it, the 
problem comes down to ajudgment as to which of the two interests should prevail 
in case of a conflict. 
If it is so difficult to reach a final decision on which of the two conflicting 
interests deserves to override the other, does it follow that a generalised approach, 
deciding the conflict in a general and abstract way for all actual and potential 
cases is indefensible, and that the outcome of the balancing test should instead be 
left to an assessment of the particular circumstances of each individual case? 
All legal systems under examination have opted for the first approach and decided 
the conflict of interests in a general and abstract way. Where a privilege statute 
exists, it reflects the legislative decision that medical confidentiality is generally 
more important than the interests in criminal prosecution and will therefore 
prevail in every case in which the two interests are in conflict with each other. 
Where no such statute exists and the question had to be decided by the courts, 
they equally decided the conflict in an abstract way by principally rejecting 
medical privilege, thus expressing the judgment that the interests behind criminal 
prosecution generally outweigh the interests in medical confidentiality. Room for 
26 Karlsruher Komentar-Boujong, 1 to s.136(a); Stefani, Levasseur, Bou\oc, Procedure Penaie, at 
34. 
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discretion is left only where the confidential information is not relevant and 
material to the proceedings, and the interests of justice are therefore not seriously 
affected. Peiris, calls the English approach discretionary and argues that this 
approach has the benefit of according 'equal recognition both to the privacy of 
professional relationships and the public interest in maintaining that privacy, and 
to the countervailing issue in respect of reception of the fullest evidential material 
facilitating the administration of justice. ,27 Yet this analysis is not entirely 
accurate. As has already been demonstrated, the English approach very clearly 
favours the interests in an effective administration of justice over the interest in 
medical confidentiality.28 The discretionary approach as applied by English courts 
does no more than respect medical confidentiality once it has been established that 
the loss of information is comparatively small. In contrast, a case-by-case 
approach would start from the assumption that the interests are, in principle, of 
eqUal weight, and would look at the particularities of each case to decide whether 
factors are present in the light of which the balance should shift to one side or the 
other. 
What, then, are the benefits and disadvantages of a generalised approac~ on the 
one hand, and of a case-by-case approac~ on the other? The main advantage of a 
case-by-case approach could be flexibility. None of the competing interests would 
have to be given a principal precedence over the other, and an attempt could be 
made to optimise both interests as far as possible in any given case. For example, 
it would be possible to develop criteria, such as the relevancy and materiality of 
the evidence, the unavailability of alternative evidence to establish the same facts, 
the seriousness of the criminal offence at issue, to operate in favour of the interest 
in criminal prosecution, and the sensitivity of the information, the degree of trust 
that was placed in the physician, the harm to ensue from disclosure, to operate in 
favour of a preservation of medical confidentiality. This approach to some extent 
resembles the case-by-case approach suggested by some utilitarians.29 
It must be noted that such flexibility is achieved at the cost of uncertainty and of 
unpredictability of results. None of the purposes behind the protection of medical 
confidentiality can properly be accomplished this way. Insofar as medical 
27 Peiris, (1984) 33 ICQL, at 309. 
28 See supra, at 170-171. 
29 See chapter 2, 3.1.1. 
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confidentiality serves the purpose of encouraging the patient to seek medical 
advice and treatment and to disclose all relevant information to the physician, this 
purpose can hardly be achieved if the patient cannot be certain whether in his/her 
individual case the balance will come down in favour of or against disclosure.3o If 
medical confidentiality is protected to guarantee the patient's autonomy and 
privacy, this goal will equally not be achieved. A patient who cannot be sure that 
the information confided in the physician will be protected in the context of 
judicial proceedings is hardly in a position to make an autonomous decision when 
deciding whether or not to seek medical advice and treatment and what 
information to disclose to the physician. This shows that the interest in medical 
confidentiality is not only adversely affected by forced disclosure,31 but that the 
mere possibility that disclosure may be required is sufficient to undermine the 
purpose behind medical confidentiality. 
It should now be evident that the interests at stake are of a very different quality. 
The interest in criminal prosecution is not equally endangered by a case-by-case 
approac~ but is amenable to a balancing of the interests at stake in every 
individual case. The completely different impact of the case-by-case approach on 
the two interests to be balanced can also be explained by a rather practical 
observation. The interests of justice are directly related to judicial proceedings, so 
that their determination by the judiciary would be relatively easy and 
straightforward. The interests behind medical confidentiality, on the other hand, 
are far more complex, as they do not stand in a direct relationship to judicial 
proceedings, but have many different facets which lie outside of the scope of a 
trial. Their exact determination in an individual case will thus be considerably 
more difficult than the definition of the interests of justice. More importantly, to 
determine the value of medical confidentiality in an individual case would require 
some knowledge of the content of the information in order to assess its sensitivity, 
the particular features of the physician-patient relationship etc. To obtain such 
knowledge, medical confidentiality would have to be impaired to some extent. At 
least where the interests to be balanced against the interest in medical 
confidentiality are as broad as the interests in the administration of criminal 
30 Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and related 
privileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-10; Thomas-Fishburn, 
(1990) 61 University of Colorado Law Review, at 194 regarding the attorney-client privilege; 
Gurfein, (1981) 49 Fordham Law Rev., at 733 also regarding the attorney-client privilege. 
31 See also Weisberg, (1978) 30 Stanford Law Review, at 979-980. 
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justice, and the criteria as broad as relevancy of information to a criminal trial, 
medical confidentiality can hardly be promoted by a case-by-case approach. 
This leads neatly on to an assessment of the suitability of the generalised 
approach. When it is argued that such an approach is too inflexible to 
accommodate unforeseen circumstances or nuances of a given case,32 this 
disadvantage may be outweighed by the benefits deriving from predictability. If 
the interests in medical confidentiality cannot easily be determined in every 
individual case, and if the case-by-case determination presupposes a breach of 
medical confidentiality, the interest in medical confidentiality is much better 
served by a generalised judgment of its value. Furthermore, given the bias of the 
jUdiciary towards the interests of justice, a generalised approach seems the only 
meaningful way to protect medical confidentiality. At the same time, the interests 
of justice can easily be determined in a generalised way, as they are of a general 
and abstract nature and largely independent from the individual case. To adopt a 
generalised approach does not necessarily mean that no room is left for discretion. 
Rather, as the English example shows, a generalised approach rejecting medical 
privilege leaves some discretion for the protection of medical confidentiality 
where this only marginally affects the interests of justice. Equally, a generalised 
approach favouring medical privilege does not exclude exceptions to the general 
rule in certain cases in which factors are present that might shift the balance 
towards disclosure.33 
Of course, a generalised approach rejecting medical privilege harms the patient's 
interest in medical confidentiality more than a case-by-case approach. However, 
several factors might mitigate this judgment. First, if the materiality and relevance 
of the information is a decisive factor to be weighed on the balance when a case-
by-case approach is adopted, medical confidentiality does not receive much 
additional protection by such an approach as contrasted with a generalised 
approach which allows for judicial discretion to exclude confidential evidence 
where it is neither relevant nor material. And with a generalised approach, the 
patient knows where he/she stands and that, in principle, medical confidences will 
not be protected from disclosure in court. The patient can then decide whether or 
32 Peiris, {I 984) 33 ICQL, at 328. 
33 'Developments in privileged communications, (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review, at 1548 and 
1553. 
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not to disclose confidential information under such circumstances. A generalised 
approach in favour of medical privilege, on the other hand, obviously provides for 
much stronger protection of medical confidentiality than a case-by-case approach. 
It seems that better arguments point towards the introduction of medical privilege. 
Where the state infringes the fundamental rights or interests of an individua~ or, 
to put it differently, violates its prima facie obligation to respect these interests, 
such an intrusion or violation requires a thorough justification. Usually, an interest 
can only be outweighed by another if it can be demonstrated that the prevailing 
interest is of overriding importance, and the violation of the overridden interest is 
the best and least intrusive course of action in the light of such a confliCt.34 This 
means that the state would have the burden of showing that the interests of justice 
override the fundamental interest in medical confidentiality, privacy and 
autonomy. This also means that there is a presumption in favour of a protection of 
individual freedom, absent a showing that these interests have to yield to 
overriding interests. When looking at the nature of the different interests that are 
at stake, it is obvious that the interest in medical confidentiality directly affects 
individual freedom and only indirectly affects the public interest in preserving 
such freedom, while the interest in criminal prosecution directly affects the public 
interest and only indirectly affects the interest of individuals. This means that a 
predominantly public interest conflicts with an interest that is primarily granted to 
protect the freedom of the individual. As such interests are of a fundamentally 
different nature, their value cannot easily be compared. 
To resolve such a conflict, much depends on the view of the relationship between 
the rights and interests of the individual and the public interest. Dworkin's 
argument that individual rights only make sense if they cannot be routinely 
outweighed by public interest considerations, but rather, in principle, only where 
they conflict with overriding third party interests,3S seems compelling. If 
fundamental rights, such as the right to autonomy and privacy, could be 
overridden whenever they affect a public interest, they would be at the disposition 
of the state and would only have to be granted as long as their protection does not 
cause any inconvenience. Such an approach would undermine the very idea of 
34 See, for example, Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical EthiCS, at 34. 
35 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 194-200. 
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fundamental rights. Coming back to the problem of medical privilege, this means 
that medical confidentiality as a fundamental right cannot be routinely outweighed 
by the interests of justice. Only if medical privilege is recognised can the patient's 
privacy interests as well as the patient's autonomy in the health care setting be 
adequately safeguarded. No case was made by the opponents of medical privilege 
to demonstrate that medical privilege results in costs that go beyond the costs that 
always arise where fundamental individual rights must be respected. The 
experience of France, Germany, and the U.S. with privilege statutes shows that 
the administration of criminal justice is not markedly impaired by a generalised 
medical privilege. 
It is thus submitted that if one accepts that medical confidentiality is closely 
linked to privacy and autonomy, medical privilege should be recognised, as the 
individual right then outweighs the state interest in criminal prosecution. 
However, it was seen above that an opposite approach is adopted by the English 
and American judiciary who, in the absence of privilege statutes, seem to find it 
self-evident that the public interest in the administration of justice outweighs the 
privacy interests of the individual. 
2.2. Psychotherapist-patient privilege 
Would it make a difference if a psychotherapist, rather than a physician, were 
called as a witness in criminal proceedings? In France, Germany and England, the 
legal situation would be the same as in the case of a physician's testimony in 
criminal court. In France and Germany, the provisions governing medical 
confidentiality and medical privilege include both physicians and 
psychotherapists,36 so that both professional groups have similar rights and 
obligations. As medical privilege is comprehensively recognised, there is no need 
to award any additional protection to the psychotherapist-patient relationship. In 
England, while some commentators argue that there is a much stronger case for an 
introduction of a psychotherapist-patient privilege than for the recognition of a 
general physician-patient privilege,37 a psychotherapist-patient privilege is no 
more recognised than medical privilege in general. This demonstrates that the 
36 In Germany, s.53 Code of Criminal Procedure only applies to psychological psychotherapists. 
Psychological psychotherapists are psychologists with a specific degree in psychotherapy. 
37 See, for example. McHale. Medical Confidentiality and Medical Privilege, at 133. 
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interests of justice are regarded even as overriding the confidentiality of the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship. While the three European systems for 
different reasons thus treat the psychotherapist-patient relationship similar to the 
physician-patient relationship, this is not the approach adopted by all American 
States. In the U.S., all States recognise a psychotherapist-patient privilege, while 
only 41 States provide for a physician-patient privilege. And at federal level. no 
physician-patient privilege exists, but a psychotherapist-patient privilege has 
nevertheless been recognised.38 What, then are the reasons behind the preferential 
treatment of the psychotherapist-patient relationship in parts of the U.S.? From a 
utilitarian standpoint, the main argument would be that psychotherapy depends 
even more on patient frankness than the ordinary physician-patient relationship, 
and that a psychotherapist-patient privilege is consequently even more important 
than a physician-patient privilege to guarantee that professional advice is sought 
and effective treatment given. 39 In addition, it is sometimes argued that patients in 
need of psychotherapy have less incentive to seek treatment, so that an active 
encouragement by the way of guaranteeing absolute confidentiality is particularly 
important in this area of medical practice.40 Deontological arguments mainly 
focus on the particularly private, intimate and sensitive nature of psychological 
information which is said to increase the patient's privacy interest.41 
It is submitted that any distinction between the physician-patient and the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship is problematic.42 First, from a practical 
perspective, the distinction will often be very difficult to make. Psycho-somatic 
illnesses, which demonstrate the close link between the body and the psyche, are 
on the increase. For the distinction to be workable it would have to be determined 
whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be tied to the qualification of 
38 Jaffee v Redmont 518 U.S. 1 (1996); Covell v CNG Transmission Corp. 863 F.Supp. 202 (M.D. 
Pa. 1994). per McClure. District Judge; Cunningham v Southlake Ctr for Mental Health, Inc 125 
F.R.D. 474. 477(N.D. Ind. 1989); In Re Doe 964 F.2d 1325 (2od Cir. 1992). per Winter. Circuit 
Judge: In re Grand Jury Subpoena 710 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1989). at 10 12-1 0 13; In re Zuniga 714 
F.2d 632 (6tb Cir.). at 639; U.S. v D.F. 857 F.Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1994). per Stadtmueller. 
District Judge. 
39 Kendrick. Tsakonas. Smith. 'The physician-patient. psychotherapist-patient, and related 
Erivileges·. in: Stone. Taylor (eds.). Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2. at 7-9 to 7-10. 
o Kendrick. Tsakonas, Smith. 'The physician-patient. psychotherapist-patient. and related 
privileges'. in: Stone. Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-10; Kottow. 'Stringent and 
predictable medical confidentiality', in: Gillon. Principles of Health Care Ethics. at 478. 
41 Kendrick. Tsakonas. Smith. 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient. and related 
privileges', in: Stone. Taylor (eds.). Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2. at 7-9 to 7-to; Slovenko. 
Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, at 49. 
42 See. for example. Saltzburg. (1980) 66 Virginia Law Review. at 621. 
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the professional as a psychotherapist, or whether it should attach to the content of 
the information revealed. If a patient seeks medical treatment for a psycho-
somatic illness, would all psychological information the patient may reveal to the 
physician be protected under a psychotherapist-patient privilege? Equally, if a 
patient in the course of psychotherapy revealed physical problems, would the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege apply? 
In addition to such practical problems, the distinction seems unconvincing for 
other reasons. The utilitarian gains of a psychotherapist-patient privilege cannot 
be specified, and therefore cannot be compared to the similarly uncertain gains of 
a physician-patient privilege. From a deontological view, which values 
confidentiality highly because of its close link to privacy and autonomy, it seems 
inconsistent to make an objective assessment as to the degree of privacy attached 
to certain information. Rather, a patient's privacy and autonomy can only be 
safeguarded if this judgment is left to the patient, and is not made on the patient's 
behalf. For all these reasons, it seems undesirable to treat the physician-patient 
and the psychotherapist-patient relationships differently. McHale's suggestion for 
the UK to introduce a psychotherapist-patient privilege, but to leave questions of 
medical privilege to the discretion of the COurtS43 is thus not convincing. 
2.3. Medical privilege at the discretion of the physician? 
What is the status of privilege should the physician wish to give testimony in a 
criminal court, for example because he/she feels that his/her duties as a citizen 
demand that he/she assist the court with the proceedings? In the U.S., the situation 
is clear. The privilege is that of the patient,44 so that without the patient's consent, 
the physician is not allowed to give testimony in court, at least not for the 
purposes of criminal prosecution. Thus, the physician's attitude towards giving 
testimony is irrelevant. If the physician testifies in court despite the existence of a 
privilege statute, the physician will thereby breach the obligation to medical 
confidentiality and be subjected to private law and disciplinary sanctions. In 
France, the situation appears, at first sight, to be equally clear. As art.226-13 
Criminal Code imposes upon the physician the obligation to maintain medical 
43 McHale, Medical Confidentiality and Medical Privilege, at 133. 
44 Gellman, (1984) 62 North Carolina Law Review, at 272. 
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confidentiality, and art. 109 Code of Criminal Procedure exempts the physician 
from the obligation to give testimony in criminal court, it seems as if the legislator 
has made a clear decision in favour of medical confidentiality.45 However, some 
legal writers argue that the physician should be given the choice between the two 
conflicting obligations.46 In Germany, s.53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is 
interpreted by the courts as well as by the pre-dominant opinion among legal 
writers so as to give the physician the right to refuse to testify, without imposing 
upon hirnlher an obligation to that effect.47 However, when choosing to give 
testimony, the physician will commit the criminal offence of a breach of 
professional confidentiality under s.203 of the Criminal Code, and no legal 
justification will apply in cases in which the testimony merely serves the purposes 
of criminal prosecution. 48 
What, then, is the more convincing approach? Should a physician, where a 
privilege statute applies, nevertheless be allowed to give testimony in criminal 
court? The answer to these questions seems to rest entirely upon the purpose to be 
served by the existence of the privilege statute. If a decision in favour of the 
overriding importance of medical confidentiality in the context of criminal 
prosecution is taken, it is difficult to conceive of any reasons which may justify 
giving the physician the choice between respecting or disregarding this decision. 
On the other hand, there is a possibility that the privilege statute could be 
primarily aimed at protecting the physician against a potential ethical dilemma. If 
so, it would make sense to give the physician the choice between an obligation to 
maintain medical confidentiality and a civic duty to give testimony in a criminal 
court, and to accept whichever choice the physician makes in the individual case. 
There are, however, no convincing arguments in support of the view that medical 
privilege exists mainly to protect the interests of the physician. While the 
physician may indirectly benefit from medical privilege, in that it facilitates the 
45 Mazen, Le Secret Professionnel des Practiciens de la Sante, at 130; Vouin, Droit Penal Special, 
at 367. 
46 Chomienne, Guery, ALD. 1995.comm.85; Rassat, Droit penal Special, at 381. 
47 See, for example, BGHSt 9,59,61 (1956); 15,200,202 (1960); 42, 73, 76 (1996); Karlsruher 
Kommentar-Senge, 7 to s.53 with further references; Kleinknecht/Meyer-GoJ3ner, 6 to s.53; 
LaufslUhlenbruck-Ulsenheimer, at 511. 
48 Baier, Strafprozessuale Zeugnisvenveigerungsrechte au,Perhalb der Strafproze,Pordnung als 
Ergtinzung der §§ 52 ffSIPO, at II 7; Haflke, GA 1973, at 69; Kramer, NJW 1990, at 1763; 
Ostendorf: DRiZ 1981, at 11; Schilling, JZ 1976, at 620; Steinberg-Copek, Berufsgeheimnis und 
Aufteichnungen des Arztes im Strafverfahren, at 60; Sydow, Kritik der Lehre von den 
"Beweisverboten". at 115. 
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exercise of hislher profession, medical privilege is nevertheless mainly aimed at 
the protection of the patient's privacy and autonomy in the health care setting. The 
patient's interests are of a very high rank, whereas the physician's interests in 
medical confidentiality do not touch upon any fundamental values, and can 
therefore not be regarded as interests that outweigh the public interest in criminal 
prosecution. Consequently, if medical privilege aims mainly at protecting the 
patient's interests, it is difficult to conceive of convincing reason to give a 
physician the right to disregard medical confidentiality without the patient's 
consent. 
While the French, German and American approaches, despite their apparent 
differences, will in most cases lead to similar results, the American and the French 
approaches are much more convincing than the solution favoured in Germany. In 
U.S. States with privilege statutes, the physician is under a clear and unequivocal 
obligation to maintain medical confidentiality even in the course of criminal 
proceedings. The same is true in France, where the law unmistakably states what 
the physician's obligations are. In Germany, on the other hand, the physician is 
given a choice between testifYing and refusing to testifY, and evidence thus 
obtained is admissible in criminal proceedings, even though the physician's 
testimony will almost certainly amount to a criminal offence.49 Given that medical 
privilege is mainly aimed at protecting the interests of the patient, this purpose can 
only fully be achieved if the physician is not allowed to testifY in court about 
confidential medical information. Furthermore, it is submitted that a physician is 
in a much better position if the law clearly states hislher obligations. 50 To let the 
physician choose between keeping the patient's confidences and testifYing in 
criminal court in the presence of a privilege statute is inconsistent, as the 
physician is then under a legal obligation to maintain medical confidentiality in 
criminal court, and it does not seem desirable to provide himlher with the choice 
of orientating hislher behaviour at an ethical, rather than a legal obligation. In 
addition, it should be borne in mind that the interests behind criminal prosecution 
are public interests the protection of which lies in the exclusive responsibility of 
the state. Therefore, if the state has waived this interest for the physician's 
49 BGHSt 9, 59, 62 (1956); 18, 146, 147 (1962); BGHR-Schweigepflicht I zu StPO §53 (1995); 
Karlsruher Kommentar-Senge, 9 to s.53; LOweIRosenberg-Hans Dahs, 11-14 to s.S3; for a further 
discussion see Alternativkommentar-KOhne, 3-6 to s.S3. 
50 Gellman, (1984) 62 North Carolina Law Review, at 272. 
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testimony in criminal court by the means of medical privilege, it would not be 
appropriate to give the physician any discretion to question this judgment. 
The differences between the three approaches rest, at least partly, on the different 
ways of implementing medical privilege. In the U.S., privilege statutes are 
specifically drafted for the situation of the physician's testimony in judicial 
proceedings, and they clearly state the physician's obligation not to testifY in 
criminal court without the patient's consent. France and Germany, on the other 
hand, guarantee medical confidentiality by criminal law provisions. Accordingly, 
the main function of medical privilege is to clarifY that the obligation of medical 
confidentiality equally applies to criminal proceedings. It then seems sufficient to 
formulate medical privilege as an exemption from the obligation to give 
testimony, rather than as an additional obligation of the physician. It was already 
discussed in great detail that, properly interpreted, the interplay of all relevant 
provisions of the French and German codes, respectively, leads to the same 
unequivocal result as the application of a U.S. privilege statute. However, the 
practice has shown that the Continental solution leaves considerable scope for 
confusion and inconsistencies. Therefore, while a U.S. style privilege statute 
would not fit into the French and German systems, the French and German 
approaches are not exemplary and a look to the U.S. may help avoid problems of 
interpretation. An interesting solution that may be feasible for all legal systems is 
that to be found in the Arizona privilege statute, providing in A.R.S. section 13-
4062(4) that: 
A person shall not be examined as a witness in the following cases: ... 4. A 
physician or surgeon without consent of his patient, as to any information 
acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to 
prescribe or act for the patient. 
Here, the privilege statute is addressed to the court, prescribing a prohibition to 
examine the physician as to confidential patient information. This may be a better 
way to protect the patient's privacy interests in court than imposing an obligation 
upon the physician not to testifY, as the court will then have to ensure that the 
physician does not violate hislher obligation, and as the physician's testimony in 
violation ofthe privilege statute is then clearly inadmissible. 
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2.4. Voluntary disclosure of information to the police 
In none of the legal systems under examination is the physician under a general 
obligation to report to the police confidential information that may assist with the 
prosecution of a criminal offence. Given that, where a privilege statute exists, the 
disclosure of confidential patient information for the purposes of criminal 
prosecution is not at the discretion of the physician, it follows that the physician 
should not be justified when disclosing confidential patient information to the 
police. Even in England, where no medical privilege is recognised, the 
organisations of the medical profession advise their members only to disclose 
confidential patient information to the po lice if directed to do so by a judge. S I This 
seems justified, given that the conflict between medical confidentiality and the 
interest in criminal prosecution is not the same in the context of police 
investigations as in the context of criminal proceedings. In the context of police 
investigations, the interest in guaranteeing the truth-finding function of the courts, 
in upholding the trust in the effective functioning of the judicial system and in 
avoiding miscarriages of justice is not affected, so that there is less reason for a 
breach of medical confidentiality than in the course of a criminal trial. 
2.5. Medical privilege only for minor offences? 
Should it make a difference whether the physician's testimony is sought in a case 
of murder, rather than in a case of minor assault? In the U.S., much depends on 
the privilege statute that is in operation in a given State, and also on the courts' 
interpretation of the relevant privilege statutes. In some States, privilege statutes 
contain express exceptions for cases of serious crime.S2 Other States do not make 
such a distinction, and it is neither made in France nor in Germany. In both France 
and Germany, it is generally accepted that the introduction of medical privilege 
contains a decision of the legislator in favour of medical privilege, regardless of 
the seriousness of the crime. Even if the physician wanted to testify in the course 
of a murder trial, this would only be lawful if a legal justification applied, but no 
such justification exists for the purposes of criminal prosecution, not even if the 
51 BMA, 'Interim guidelines on confidentiality for police surgeons', no.8. 
52 See, for example, D.C. Code Ann. § 14-307; Ill. Compo State. Ch. 735 5/8-802; Kan. State. Ann. 
§60-427(b). 
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trial concerns the most serious criminal offences.53 In the ~ on the other hand, 
medical privilege is not even recognised for the prosecution of minor offences. 
What, then, is the better and more convincing approach? Does the seriousness or 
the nature of the criminal offence shift the balance in favour of the interest in 
criminal prosecution? 
In some U.S. States, this question is obviously answered in the affirmative. 
Exceptions to privilege statutes regarding the prosecution of serious criminal 
offences seem to suggest that the costs of the privilege are deemed higher where it 
could obstruct the prosecution of a more serious criminal offence, and that a 
decision in favour of medical confidentiality is regarded as less acceptable if it 
stands in the way of convicting a person who committed a serious crime. 54 From a 
utilitarian standpoint, this argument may have some force. However, it is 
submitted that if there is a danger that the offender may commit future crimes, this 
would have to be considered in the context of crime prevention. If there is no such 
danger, the state interest in criminal prosecution does not change sufficiently 
where a serious, rather than a less significant offence is concerned, so as to shift 
the balance from a decision in favour of medical confidentiality to a decision in 
favour of the interests of justice. To make a generalised judgment that some 
offences are so serious that their prosecution deserves special treatment in the 
context of evidentiary privileges and outweighs fundamental individual rights and 
interests, would require a careful justification. However, no such justification has 
yet been presented by the promoters of such an exception to medical privilege. 
When balancing the competing interests, it must be borne in mind that the interest 
in truth-finding in criminal proceedings, and the interest in the effective 
administration of criminal justice are not affected by the seriousness of the crime 
at trial. While other interests behind criminal prosecution, such as the interest in 
retribution, may be altered by the seriousness of the offence, it is questionable 
whether those interests are important enough so as to override the interests behind 
medical confidentiality. However, it must again be stressed that all depends on a 
complex value judgment, and that it seems impossible to achieve a general 
consensus on this question. Consequently, if one disagrees with the approach 
promoted here, one will have to perform the difficult task of delineating which 
53 See chapter 4, 2.2., and chapter 5, 2.1.3, respectively. 
54 See, for example, Kendrick, Tsakonas, Smith, 'The physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, 
and related privileges', in: Stone, Taylor (eds.), Testimonial Privileges, vol. 2, at 7-35. 
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crimes are serious enough to justify an exception from an otherwise existing 
privilege statute. 
In some countries, two types of criminal offences have received special attention: 
child abuse and drunk driving offences. All American States make exceptions 
from their privilege statutes for cases of child abuse. and in France. child abuse 
has also received special legislative treatment. In France, art.434-3 Criminal Code 
makes it a criminal offence not to infonn the relevant authorities of cases of child 
abuse, but physicians are exempted from this obligation. However, art.226-14 
Criminal Code contains an exception from the criminal offence of breach of 
confidence for cases of child abuse. Thus, in France the physician is not under any 
obligation to infonn the authorities if he/she comes across a case of child abuse in 
the course ofhislher profession, but neither is the physician under an obligation to 
maintain medical confidentiality in such a situation. In the U.S .• on the other hand, 
the situation is mostly regulated by enacting an exception to the privilege statute 
for cases of child abuse, so that the physician is not given a choice, but he/she 
rather has to testify or otherwise to disclose the information, depending on the text 
of the statute. In Germany, no exception exists for cases of child abuse, which 
demonstrates that in the realm of criminal prosecution, child abuse is not given 
any special attention. A physician would accordingly commit the offence under 
s.203 of the Criminal Code when disclosing information on child abuse for the 
purposes of criminal prosecution. 
An evaluation of the different approaches seems to depend to a large extent on the 
purpose to be served by the child abuse exception. In some U.S. States. it is clear 
that the child abuse exception serves at least partly the purpose of criminal 
prosecution. The Nebraska privilege statute,55 for example, clearly states that: 
There is no privilege ... in any judicial proceedings ... regarding injuries to 
children, incompetents, or disabled persons or in any criminal prosecution 
involving injury to any such person or the wilful failure to report any such 
injuries. 
However, in other States the emphasis very clearly lies on the prevention of 
further abuse. 56 In France, the place of the provision in the context of provisions 
on the prevention of crimes and of hann to individuals seems to suggest that the 
55 Neb. Rev. State. §27-504 (1984). 
56 See, for example, Siale v Sypu/1304 Ark. 5 (1990). 
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provision primarily aims at the protection of the child from further abuse. rather 
than at the prosecution of the offender. As questions of crime prevention will be 
discussed below, it suffices here to state that a child abuse exception for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution seems undesirable. Though regarded as a 
particularly abhorrent offence, child abuse nevertheless covers a wide range of 
cases and does not necessarily refer to serious offences. From a utilitarian 
standpoint, it must be taken into account that the treatment of the offender as well 
as the situation of the victims may be adversely affected if confidential 
information received by the physician can be used for the purposes of criminal 
prosecution. The offender might then be reluctant to undergo therapy, and may be 
equally hesitant to seek medical treatment for the abused child. The child, too. 
may be reluctant frankly to reveal abuse if it cannot be guaranteed that the 
information will not be used to prosecute the abuser.57 On the other hand, it is 
sometimes argued that the child abuse exception is necessary, as medical evidence 
is particularly essential for the prosecution of the offender. given that other 
evidence will often not exist, or not be sufficient for a successful prosecution. ~8 
Again, therefore. the utilitarian analysis does not lead to a conclusive result 
regarding the problem of whether or not to recognise a child abuse exception for 
the purposes of criminal prosecution. From a deontological perspective. all seems 
to depend on the attitude towards the problem discussed above of whether or not 
the seriousness of the offence affects the outcome of the balancing test. and if so, 
whether or not child abuse offences are serious enough so as to participate in the 
exception to medical privilege. 
With regard to drunk: driving cases, it seems as if only some U.S. States provide 
for an exception,s9 while this is neither recognised in France nor in Germany. 
Looking at the reasons given for the drunk-driving exception in some U.S. States. 
it mainly seems to be based on practical considerations. Thus, it is argued that the 
prosecution of drunk-driving offences without medical evidence will frequently 
not be possible and that this should be reason enough to justify an exception to 
medical privilege. Another argument relates to the particular dangerousness of 
such offences to the public~6o However, it is submitted that these arguments are 
57 Pennsylvania v Ritchie 480 U.S. 39 (1987), at 60 per Justice Powell. 
58 U.S. v Burtrum 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994), at 1302 per Kelly, Circuit Judge. 
59 See, for example, California, Montana, Oregan, Utah. 
60 State v Dyal97 N.J. 229, at 238-239; State v Dress 461 N.E.2d 1312, (Ohio App 1982) at 1316-
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unconvincing. If a blood test was made by a physician for the purpose of 
determining the blood alcohol level of a driver, an obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality does not arise, as there is then no confidential relationship between 
the patient and the physician. The drunk-driving exception would thus only apply 
to cases in which a blood test was made for treatment or diagnostic purposes, for 
example after a road accident, and an increased blood alcohol level was 
detected.61 It is difficult to see why in a case in which the evidence clearly derives 
from a confidential physician-patient relationship, the practical difficulties 
encountered when prosecuting drunk-driving offences should weigh in favour of 
the interests in criminal prosecution. The only consistent justification for a drunk-
driving exception would therefore be, for those who allow for exceptions to 
medical privilege for the prosecution of serious crimes, to include these offences 
in the list of exceptionally serious offences. However, it is submitted that similar 
to the case of child abuse, to classify all drunk-driving offences as particularly 
serious would stretch the notion of seriousness. 
2.6. Effect of the patient's consent 
Should the physician be allowed to maintain medical confidentiality where the 
patient has consented to the physician'S testimony in criminal court? In such a 
case, both in the U.S. and in Germany, the physician would have to give 
testimony. In the U.S., this purpose is partly achieved by express regulation in the 
privilege statute,62 partly by judicial interpretation. As the privilege belongs to the 
patient, the patient can waive it and the physician will then be under an obligation 
to give testimony. Thus, the physician can invoke the privilege only in the 
interests of the patient, and loses this prerogative once the patient has made it 
clear that he/she is in fact interested in disclosure. In Germany, the same result is 
achieved by s.53(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the French approach 
differs dramatically, as the patient's consent does not have the effect of relieving 
the physician from the obligation to maintain medical confidentiality. The fact 
that the patient has consented to the disclosure would thus neither lead to an 
obligation of the physician to give testimony, nor would it justify a breach of 
1317. 
61 Collins v Howard 156 F.Supp 322 (1957), State v Erickson 241 N. W.2d 854 (N.D. 1976), per 
Sand, Judge. 
62 See, for example, D.C. Code Ann. §14-307(a) (1981). 
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medical confidentiality. The French approach not only leads to inconsistencies 
within the French legal system, 63 but is also undesirable. As the reasons for a 
rejection of the French approach were already discussed in some detail above,64 
they need not here be repeated. It should be sufficient to state that there is no need 
to protect confidential patient information where the patient has waived such 
protection. A protection of a patient's confidence against the patient's wishes can 
neither be in the patient's, nor in the public interest, as the patient's privacy is not 
violated if the patient opted for disclosure, and the public interest to protect the 
trust in the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship is equally not 
affected if the physician discloses a patient's confidence with the patient's 
consent. 
2.7. Medical records 
With regard to the problem of state access to medical records for the purposes of 
criminal prosecution, should the rules governing the physician's testimony in 
criminal court apply, or should this specific question be treated differently? In the 
U.S., medical records and the physician's testimony are, to a large extent, 
governed by the same rules. Thus, where a privilege statute exists, it usually not 
only excludes the physician's testimony in criminal court, but also bars state 
access to medical records.6s In Germany, the prohibition to seize medical records 
of the accused is seen as a necessary supplement to the physician's right to refuse 
to give testimony in criminal court, which could otherwise be circumvented by 
introducing the patient's medical records where the physician's testimony is not 
available.66 A distinction is made between medical records of a person who is 
accused in criminal proceedings which are exempt from search and seizure, and 
those of all other patients to which the prohibition of s.97(1) Code of Criminal 
63 MazeD, Le Secret Professionnel des Practiciens de la Sante, at 90; Waremberg-Auque, Rewe de 
science criminelle et de droit penal compare 1978, at 246; Legal, JCP.l948.II.4141; Savatier, 
Auby, Savatier, Pequignot, Traite de Droit Medical, at 303; Savatier, JCP.II.15126; Fenaux. 
D.1988.106; Honnorat, Melennec. JCP.1979.1.2936; Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234; Merle, Vitu, Traite 
de Droit Criminel, at 183. 
64 Chapter 4, 2.4. 
65 See, for example, Art.4495b Public Health Act Texas; Behringer Estate v Princeton Medical 
Centre 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J.Super.L. 1991). per Crachman, J.S.C.; Comonwealth v Kobrin 479 
N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1986), per Abrams, Judge; In Re Search Warrant 810 F.2d 65 (3n! Cir. 1987), 
per Becker, Circuit Judge. 
66 BVerflJE 32, 373, 385 (1972); BVerflJE 44, 353, 373 (1977); BGHSt 38,144, 145 (1991); OlG 
Frankfurt StV 1982, 64, 65; Karlsruher Kommentar-Nack. I to s.97 
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Procedure does not apply. However, it has already been discussed earlier that the 
German approach is unsatisfactory and inconsistent,67 and that the courts have 
developed ways to protect medical records of non-accused patients by reference to 
constitutional principles.68 In France, medical records can be seized by the 
examining magistrate, and medical privilege only requires that certain protective 
procedures are adhered to, but does not restrict access to con£dential medical 
records as such. 69 In England, access to medical records can be had in the course 
of criminal proceedings. However, in the course of police investigations, medical 
records receive far-reaching protection from search and seizure by the provisions 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.70 It is nevertheless almost 
unanimously accepted that the physician will be justified when voluntarily 
submitting con£dential patient material to the police for the purpose of criminal 
prosecution. 
It can thus be seen that the situation varies from systems in which medical records 
and the physician's testimony are treated similarly (U.S. and partly Germany), and 
a system where the police or the examining magistrate can have access to medical 
records, while the physician cannot be forced to testify in court about the same 
facts (France), to a system in which access to medical records in the course of 
police proceedings is almost completely excluded, yet the physician would have 
to give testimony about the same fact when called as a witness in criminal court 
(England). 
How can these differences be explained, and which system seems most 
appropriate? The French approach seems to be based on the thought that the 
examining magistrate can only adequately perform hislher tasks of investigating 
criminal offences and deciding whether or not criminal proceedings should be 
initiated against a suspect if given full access to all evidence. However, the 
decision that the physician does not have to give testimony in criminal court is 
based on a legislative assessment that medical con£dentiality is more important 
than the interests in criminal prosecution. This decision is circumvented if access 
67 Chapter 5, 2.2.1.; see also Krekeler, NStZ 1987, at 201; Muschallik, Die Befreiung von der 
lirztlichen Schweigepflicht undvom Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht im Strafprozep, at 138; Schmitt, 
Die Beriicksichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§ 52,53 StPO bei den auf 
Beweisgewinnung gerichtelen Zwangsmapnahmen. at 128. 
68 BGH NStZ 1997, 562; LO Hamburg NJW 1990, 780, 781. 
69 24 April 1969, JCP 1970.11.16306; see also Chappart, D.1969.637. 
70 See chapter 6, 2.2.1. 
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to medical records is possible in the course of investigations into a criminal 
offence, or can be introduced as evidence in criminal court. If the differential 
treatment is based on the thought that the interest in medical confidentiality is 
more seriously affected when the physician is forced to testifY in court, as this 
involves the physician's active participation in the disclosure, whereas in the case 
of a seizure of medical records, the state obtains access to pre-existing records by 
the use of compulsion, this argument is not very convincing. Medical privilege 
primarily aims at protecting the patient's private sphere which is no less violated 
where the physician discloses confidential facts in the course of oral testimony, 
than where confidential medical records come to the knowledge of persons who 
stand outside of the physician-patient relationship, with or without the physician's 
active participation. The French approach accordingly protects the physician 
rather than the patient, as the physician does not actively have to breach the 
medical secret, while the patient's medical information is not given 
comprehensive protection from state access. The decision of the English legal 
system to protect information more comprehensively in the course of police 
investigations than in the course of judicial proceedings can be more easily 
explained. Once a case must be decided by a court, the interests to be balanced 
against medical confidentiality are not reduced to the interest in criminal 
prosecution; the interests of justice as such are equally affected. If those interests 
are regarded as more important than medical confidentiality, it is consistent to 
deny medical privilege in court while protecting medical confidentiality outside of 
judicial proceedings. It: on the other hand, medical confidentiality is regarded as 
outweighing the interests of justice in the context of criminal proceedings, the best 
approach would be to exclude state access to confidential medical information 
altogether, be it in the form of the physician's oral testimony or in the form of 
medical records. 
With regard to the question of whether or not the physician can be justified in 
voluntarily handing over confidential patient records to the police or the court, it 
is submitted that the principles outlined in the context of the general conflict 
between medical confidentiality and the interests behind criminal prosecution 
apply, as medical records and the physician's oral testimony should receive the 
same legal treatment. Therefore, where a medical privilege exists and the 
physician is not allowed to testifY in court for the purposes of criminal 
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prosecution, he/she would equally not be justified in voluntarily handing over 
confidential patient records to the police or the court. 
2.S. Prosecution of the physician 
A last point to be discussed in the context of criminal prosecution is that of 
whether it makes a difference if the investigation or the prosecution is directed 
against the physician. The problem is mainly discussed in the context of the 
search of surgeries and the seizure of medical records in the course of 
investigations against the physician for fraud. In Germany, s.97 Code of Criminal 
Procedure does not apply to records of persons who are not accused in criminal 
proceedings, so that no provision stands in the way of a seizure of confidential 
patient records. In the U.S., the opinions among different courts are split. While 
some courts argue in favour of disclosure in such a case,71 some try to find a 
compromise by allowing for disclosure, but accepting that individualised patient 
data can be anonymised as far as practicable.72 This seems to be in line with the 
approach suggested in France, where the courts came to the conclusion that 
confidential patient records could be seized, particularly where a physician had 
unnecessarily included identifiable and confidential patient information into his 
book-keeping records and then argued that they could not be submitted without a 
breach of medical confidentiality.73 In England, the specific problem did not find 
any attention of the courts or oflegal writers. 
How can the different approaches be assessed? The arguments brought forward in 
favour of and against disclosure of confidential patient records in this context are 
very similar in the different legal systems. In favour of disclosure, it is argued that 
the physician-patient relationship does not deserve protection if the physician 
abuses it to cover criminal activity.74 However, the practical difficulties in 
prosecuting the physician without access to patient records would seem to be the 
decisive argument. It is feared that without the power to seize those documents, 
physicians could use the patient's privilege as a cover for the commission of 
71 In Re Search Warranl810 F.2d 65, (3n1 Cir. 1987), at 72-73 per Becker, Circuit Judge. 
72 State v McGriff672 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1996), at 1075 per Evans Judge; Schachter 
v Whalen 581 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1978), per Oakes. Blumenfeld, and Mehrtens. 
73 11 February 1960, JCP.1960.l1.11604. 
74 Melennec, Gaz. PaI.l980.doct.145; Schlilchter, Das Strafverfahren, at 289. 
311 
criminal offences without having to fear discovery.75 However, none of these 
reasons are convincing. The physician's abuse of the confidential professional 
relationship can hardly negate the protection owed to the patient's medical 
confidences, as only the patient, but not the physician has the right to waive 
medical confidentiality.76 And practical difficulties alone cannot justifY a 
disregard for the patient's fundamental privacy interests.77 At least where an 
anonymisation of patient records is not a feasible option or will, in the individual 
case, not lead to an adequate protection of medical confidentiality, the only 
appropriate solution will be to seek the patient's consent to the seizure of hislher 
medical records,7s which will in many cases probably be forthcoming, particularly 
if a considerate use of these data were guaranteed. 
3. Defence rights 
A problem for which no legal system seems to have found a consistent and 
convincing solution is that of the conflict between the interest in medical 
confidentiality, on the one hand, and defence rights, on the other. Different 
problems have to be distinguished. It is possible that the patient is accused in 
criminal proceedings and that the physician's testimony or records may be 
favourable to the defence. In that case, the problem of the effect of the patient's 
consent to disclosure becomes relevant. In Germany, the U.S. and the UK, no 
problem arises, as the physician has to testify once the patient consented to 
disclosure in court. In that case, no conflict between medical confidentiality and 
defence rights would ensue. The situation is different in France where the 
patient's consent does not have the effect of obliging the physician to testify 
where the patient wants to rely on this testimony for hislher defence.79 It has 
already been discussed that the French approach is not convincing, as it is 
inconsistent with the goals behind the protection of patient confidences to deny 
75 In Re Search Warrant 810 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1987), at 72-73 per Becker, Circuit Judge; State v 
McGrifJ672 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1996), at 1075 per Evans Judge; Weyand, wistra 
1990, at 6. 
76 Lorenz, MDR 1992, at 316; Savatier, Commentary to 11 February 1960, JCP. 1960.II. I 1604. 
77 Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. Dist. Branch v Ariyoshi 481 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979), at 1047 
and 1050 per Byrne, District Judge. 
78 State v McGrifJ672 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1996), at 1078-1081 per Thomas F. Bryant, 
Judge, dissenting. 
79 See, for example, Cour de Cassation 22 December 1966, D.1967.122; 5 June 1985, Bull n° 218. 
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the patient the possibility to waive medical confidentiality, particularly where this 
conflicts with the patient's defence rights.80 
In addition, it is possible that the patient the disclosure of whose medical 
information is sought in a criminal court is not the accused, but the victim or a 
witness. In such a case, a conflict may arise between the patient's interest in 
medical confidentiality, on the one hand, and the defence rights of the accused, on 
the other. Defence rights mainly involve the interest of the accused to present a 
defence against the case of the prosecution, for example by impeaching 
prosecution witnesses, or by presenting evidence that is favourable to the defence. 
This interest is protected regardless of the accused's guilt or innocence, as no one 
should be convicted in criminal proceedings unless he/she was given the 
possibility adequately to present hislher version of the event. Defence rights serve 
the private interests of the accused, but their protection lies also in the public 
interest. In all legal systems under examination, defence rights are regarded as 
interests of very high rank. The U.S. Constitution protects certain specific defence 
rights, the right to compulsory process and the right to confront witnesses, by the 
Sixth Amendment, and defence rights in general are also protected by the due 
process clause. The German Constitution equally protects certain defence rights, 
such as the right to be heard in judicial proceedings (Art.103(1) Basic Law), and 
the fair trial principle which follows from the principle of the rule of law.8! In 
France, defence rights are also regarded as fundamental rights.82 The European 
Convention on Human Rights which, to varying degrees, influences the law in 
France,83 Germany and the UK guarantees certain aspects of fair trial and defence 
rights in Art.6. To understand the significance of defence rights, it is important to 
realise that for a person who is accused in criminal proceedings, important 
individual rights and interests, such as personal freedom, financial interests, but 
also hislher reputation, are at stake. In a criminal trial, the accused is faced with 
the superior power of the state. Defence rights therefore serve the purpose of 
mitigating the inequalities inherent to the situation, and it should not be left to the 
state to abrogate them easily. 
80 Chapter 4, 2.4. 
81 Karlsruher Kommentar-Pfeiffer 27 to Introduction. 
82 ' Champeil-Desplats, D.1995.chron.323. 
83 For a discussion of the influence of the ECHR on the French approach toward defence rights see 
Stefani, Levasseur, Bouloc, Procedure Penale, at 86-87. 
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However, defence rights are nevertheless far from absolute. They are, for 
example, restricted by exclusionary rules and privileges, such as the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and testimonial privileges. Every decision to limit the 
access to or admissibility of certain evidence in a criminal trial may adversely 
affect defence rights, and the very existence of medical privilege in criminal 
proceedings expresses the view that medical confidentiality is, in principle, more 
important than the defence rights of the accused. Defence rights are guaranteed 
only within the framework of a given legal system, that is they are subject to 
certain restrictions, and do not go as far as awarding a right of access to evidence 
regardless of its content or the methods through which it came about. The 
principal guarantees of defence rights or of a fair trial thus do not give the accused 
the right to demand that all evidence must be produced in criminal court, even if a 
privilege applies. Given the fundamental importance of defence rights, the 
legislators are, however, not entirely free in restricting defence rights, but rather 
have to pay respect at least to the fundamental guarantees contained in the 
respective Constitutions, or in international documents such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
Does it follow from the widespread agreement that defence rights can be restricted 
by privileges, that the recognition of medical privilege is morally justified even if 
it conflicts with defence rights? Different answers to this question seem possible. 
It could be argued that, as long as confidential evidence the disclosure of which is 
sought, is neither available to the prosecution nor the defence, the defence rights 
of the accused are not unduly prejudiced. There is no inequality of arms, as the 
prosecution does not deny the defence access to evidence in its possession. 
However, the validity of this argument is no longer obvious where the defence 
seeks access to privileged evidence in order either to impeach a prosecution 
witness, or to present a favourable defence. If: for example, the prosecution 
presents a key witness, and confidential medical information may cast some doubt 
on the reliability of the witness, it can no longer be said that the defence is not 
prejudiced merely because this information is equally unavailable to the 
prosecution. 
It is interesting to note that the general conflict between medical confidentiality 
and defence rights has only been discussed in the U.S., but not in the other two 
systems with privilege statutes. In France and Germany, it seems to be accepted 
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that defence rights are restricted by medical privilege. Even if the defence rights 
of an accused person appear to be adversely affected by medical privilege in an 
individual case, the court does not have the discretion to order the physician's 
testimony, which is barred by privilege. The German Federal Supreme Court 
recently rejected to order disclosure of a witness' psychological records for 
impeaclunent purposes, even though s.97 Code of Criminal Procedure does not 
protect the medical or psychological records of witnesses from seizure and from 
use in criminal court, as this measure was regarded as an unconstitutional 
intrusion upon the witness' private sphere, at least absent a sufficient showing of 
materiality.84 The Court thus protected medical confidentiality even beyond the 
scope of the privilege statute. When access to medical records is sought in France, 
the procedure sometimes followed by the courts is that of appointing an expert to 
make a report of the witness' psychological condition, and to grant this expert 
access to the confidential medical records of the treating physician.8s However, 
the relevant French case-law is not concerned with the conflict between medical 
confidentiality and defence rights and is therefore, in this context, of only very 
limited value. 
In the U.S., the rights of the accused under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the u.S. Constitution are not violated by medical privilege as long 
as the accused or his/her defence lawyer are given the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness effectively. If the credibility of a key witness is at stake and 
the defence wants access to the files of the witness' psychotherapist in order to 
use them for impeaclunent purposes, this is not mandated by the accused's 
confrontation rights, as long as the witness can be cross-examined about the 
psychotherapeutic treatment, and the witness' psychological problems may thus 
be introduced and put before the jury.86 However, if effective cross-examination is 
not possible without access to confidential and privileged information, access to 
this information is required by the Confrontation Clause.87 Compulsory process 
rights are violated if a defendant is denied access to favourable information in the 
possession of the prosecution, even where the information is privileged, as long as 
84 BGHNStZ 1997,562. 
8' 20 January 1976, Bull n° 23; 16 November 1976, Bull n° 327. 
86 See, for example, U.S. v Haworth 168 F.RD. 660 (D.N.M. 1996), at 661-662 per Hansen, 
District Judge; U.S. v S1corniak 59 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1995), at 756 per Hansen, Circuit Judge. 
87 People v Adamski 497 N. W.2d 546 (Mich.App. 1993); In Re Doe 964 F.2d 1325 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
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the materiality of the information can be demonstrated.88 Thus, in the U.S., 
constitutional principles are infringed if access to confidential medical 
information which is material either for impeachment purposes or for its 
assistance with the direct defence is denied, and without it, an effective cross-
examination, or the effective presentation of a direct defence is not possible. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that the physician or psychotherapist is 
required to hand over material but privileged information to the defence. Many 
U.S. courts instead resort to the method of in camera review of confidential files. 
This is based on the assumption that while the defence should not be denied 
access to potentially favourable information because of medical privilege, medical 
privilege should not be completely abrogated by the evidentiary needs of the 
defence. As a compromise, once an initial materiality showing has been made, the 
court will review the confidential files in camera, and they will only be handed 
over to the defence if they contain information that is material for defence 
purposes.89 This procedure raises several problems. First, it can be argued that the 
court may not be in the best position to assess the materiality of information for 
the defence, so that defence rights are not adequately protected by in camera 
review. At the same time, in camera review of confidential files in itself 
constitutes a breach of confidentiality, so that the interest in medical 
confidentiality is adversely affected by in camera review.90 Thus, while this 
procedure gives more weight to both interests than an all-or-nothing approach 
which, in favour of one of the interests, would completely disregard the other, it is 
nevertheless harmful to both interests involved, so that it must be asked whether a 
more convincing approach is available. 
An approach adopted by some U.S. courts is that of resorting to in camera review 
only where the consent of the patient to this procedure was first obtained.91 Once 
the court's in camera review establishes that the files would, in fact, be favourable 
to the defence, some courts decided that defence rights will then override medical 
88 Pennsylvania v Ritchie 480 U.S. 39 (1987), at 57-58 per Justice Powell. 
89 State v Speese 528 N.W.2d 63 (Wis.App. 1995), at 69 per Gartzke, Presiding Judge; State v 
ShifJra 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis.App. 1993), at 724 per Brown, Judge. 
90 See U.S. v Doyle F.Supp.2d 1187, (D. Or. 1998), per Coffin, U.S. Magistrates Judge, where in 
camera review of confidential psychological files was rejected. 
91 See, for example, Re Robert H 509 A.2d 475 (Conn. 1986), at 482- 485 per Arthur H. Healey, 
Judge; State v Grant 637 A.2d 1116 (Conn. App. 1994), at 1121-1122 per Frederick A. Freedman, 
Judge. 
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confidentiality,92 while others argued that even under such circumstances, the files 
can only be passed on to the defence with the patient's consent.93 The 
consequence would be that the testimony of the witness concerned must either be 
stricken, or a new trial directed.94 The same applies where the patient refuses to 
consent to in camera review as such. 
Looking at the situation in the three different jurisdictions, it is striking that in all 
three countries, confidential medical records of a witness cannot routinely be used 
in criminal court at the request of the defence, not even in Germany, where the 
witness' records are not protected by ordinary statutes. However, while in the 
U.S., the inadmissibility of such records has far-reaching consequences and can 
even result in striking the witness' testimony or ordering a re-trial, no such 
consequences are envisaged in France or Germany. How can this difference in 
approach be explained, given that in France and Germany, defence rights are also 
protected as fundamental rights? First, the protection of defence rights as 
fundamental individual rights in France and Germany is less specific and less 
comprehensive than the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Moreover, the differences in criminal procedure may have a 
significant impact on the solution favoured in each legal system. In camera 
review is alien to the French and German legal systems. One reason for this may 
be the fact that the decision about the guilt or innocence of the accused is made by 
the court. If, in such a system, the court could scrutinise confidential material and 
then deny the defence access to it, either on the grounds that the information was 
not favourable to the defence, or on the grounds that the patient did not consent to 
the disclosure, the court would have obtained knowledge of evidence which might 
influence its later decision, but which is unknown to the defence and to which the 
defence can therefore not respond. In Germany, such a procedure would violate 
the constitutional principle that the accused must have the opportunity to be heard 
before a judicial decision is made. This principle, which aims to prevent that the 
court can make use of facts that are unknown to the accused to his/her 
92 State Ex Rei. Romley v Superior Court 836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. App. Div.l 1992), at 452-453 per 
Grant, Presiding Judge. 
93 Re Robert H 509 A.2d 475 (Conn. 1986), at 482- 485 per Arthur H. Healey, Judge; State v 
Grant 637 A.2d 1116 (Conn .. App. 1994) at 1121-1122 per Frederick A. Freedman, Judge; State v 
Solberg 553 N.W.2d 842 (Wis .. App. 1996), at 844 per Dykman, Judge. 
94 State v ShifJra 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. App. 1993), at 721 and 724 per Brown, Judge; State v 
Speese 528 N.W.2d 63 (Wis .. App. 1995), at 71 per Gartzke, Presiding Judge. 
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disadvantage,95 applies to all decisions of the court and would therefore include a 
decision about disclosure after in camera review of information. While, from the 
point of view of the defence, in camera review is always problematic, it is far 
more dangerous to the defence where the reviewer is the fmal decision-maker 
over guilt and innocence. 
In the U.S., all of the different approaches used by the courts point towards a 
precedence of defence rights whenever it can be established that the confidential 
information the disclosure of which was sought might be relevant and material. In 
that case, courts either come to the conclusion that, after in camera review, the 
information should be disclosed to the defence, despite the existence of medical 
privilege, or they uphold confidentiality, but seek to protect defence rights by 
ordering that the testimony of the witness, who cannot be impeached because of 
medical privilege, be disregarded. In France and Germany, on the other hand, 
none of these drastic measures is taken, Rather, the only consequence of an 
impahment of defence rights by medical privilege is that the court, when making 
its decision on the guilt or innocence of the accused, will have to consider the fact 
that the defence has been denied access to certain potentially favourable evidence 
because of medical privilege. This difference in approach may be explained by the 
thought that courts are in a better position to take account of the fact that certain 
evidence was not available for impeachment purposes than is a jury. This would 
even apply to the French 'Cour d'Assize' in which nine jurors deliberate and 
decide together with three professional judges. Therefore, Continental legal 
systems may not perceive the same need for strict evidentiary rules as common 
law systems with jury trials. 
While this analysis shows that it would be difficult to transfer solutions from 
Continental to common law systems, and vice versa, it nevertheless seems 
appropriate to assess whether it is, in principle, more justifiable to resolve the 
conflict between medical confidentiality and defence rights by deciding in favour 
of disclosure,96 by refusing disclosure and making allowances for the impairment 
of the defence when reaching the final decision, or by respecting medical 
confidentiality and striking the evidence affected by medical privilege. Disclosure 
against the patient's wishes does not seem an adequate solution to the problem. 
9' Karlsruher Kommentar-Pfeiffer. 26 to Introduction. 
96 See Allan, [1988] NU 668-669 for cases of legal-professional privilege. 
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Where a privilege statute exists, a legislative decision was made in favour of 
medical confidentiality in the context of judicial proceedings, leaving no room for 
an abrogation of the privilege where it conflicts with defence rights, absent a 
statutory exception to the privilege statute for that purpose.97 Such an exception 
leading to disclosure without the patient's consent does not seem to be a 
satisfactory solution, even where the defence could establish that the privileged 
evidence was material and relevant. Given that medical confidentiality, similar to 
defence rights, serves the protection of fundamental individual rights and 
interests, medical confidentiality should only have to yield to defence rights if no 
less intrusive means are available for a satisfactory resolution of the conflict. 
What, then, could be a less intrusive alternative to disclosure, given that the 
compromise of in camera review without the patient's consent has already been 
dismissed as inadequate, and also as untenable for Continental legal systems? 
Where the patient refuses to consent to disclosure of information sought for 
impeachment purposes, to strike the testimony of the witness concerned would 
protect the interests of the accused as effectively as disclosure. At the same time, 
this would protect the interests of the patient comprehensively. To strike the 
witness' testimony is thus a less drastic means to protect the interests of the 
accused than an exception to the privilege statute. The objection that such a result 
would unduly undermine the case of the prosecution is not convincing. The 
existence of the privilege statute is attributable to the state, and the prosecution is 
the representative of the state in criminal proceedings. Therefore, if defence rights 
are guaranteed in order to ensure a fair tria~ and if the state impairs the defence by 
implementing a privilege that hinders defence access to potentially favourable 
evidence, it seems only fair that the state rather than the accused will have to 
suffer the adverse consequences of a privilege statute.98 
Given that the striking of a witness' testimony, though the best available option in 
cases of a conflict between medical confidentiality and defence rights, 
nevertheless considerably affects the state interest in criminal prosecution, 
particular attention must be given to the determination of the circumstances under 
which such a remedy should be made available to the defence. It is submitted that 
the defence should have the burden of demonstrating that the privileged evidence, 
97 Hill, (1980) 80 Columbia Law Review, at 1180. 
98 Ibid., at 1184-1185; Weisberg, (1978) 30 Stanford Law Review, at 983. 
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if admissible, would have cast some doubt on the credibility of the prosecution 
witness. This requires some showing that there is at least a probability that the 
evidence the disclosure of which was sought contains favourable information, and 
that the defence has some idea of the content of the information sought. To trigger 
such a drastic remedy, it would not be sufficient to base a request for a witness' 
psychotherapeutic records on the knowledge or the assumption that the witness 
received psychotherapy and that there is the remote possibility that these records 
contain evidence that might be useful for defence purposes. In such a case, it can 
hardly be said that the defence is disadvantaged by medical privilege, as this is not 
different from other cases of 'fishing expeditions' in which access to evidence 
will also be denied. 
It could be argued that defence rights are sufficiently protected if the assessment 
of the potentially adverse effects of medical privilege is left to the court or the 
jury, respectively, based on the showing of the probable content of the evidence 
and of its materiality. While this may be a possibility in Continental legal systems, 
it is not equally tenable for jury trials.99 However, even where the court and not 
the jury decides on the question of guilt or innocence, the accused will be better 
protected where the evidence is disregarded altogether. 
To strike evidence only constitutes a useful remedy for an interference with 
defence rights where the defence was denied access to information to be used to 
refute the case of the prosecution. In that case, the loss of this evidence by the 
prosecution would provide effective protection of the accused. However, the same 
would not be true where the evidence was sought as part of the direct defence of 
,the accused. In that case, the only effective remedy apart from disclosure would 
be either to infer that the evidence, if admissible, would have been favourable to 
the defence,lOo or to drop the charges altogether. 101 It is submitted that in such a 
case, an inference is the less drastic measure, and would protect the interests of 
the accused as effectively as a dismissal of the case. Such an inference is also less 
intrusive than disclosure, as the interests of the accused and of the patient can both 
be protected this way. With regard to the interests of the prosecution, the same 
argument advanced in the context of evidence sought for impeachment purposes 
99 Hill, (1980) 80 Columbia Law Review, at 1182. 
100 Ibid., at 1184-1185. 
101 Weisberg, (1978) 30 Stanford Law Review, at 982-984. 
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applies, as it seems the best possible solution that the state will have to suffer the 
adverse consequences of a privilege statute. 
The discussion takes a slightly different turn if the focus no longer lies on the 
general conflict between medical confidentiality and defence rights, but the 
emphasis rather shifts to the conflict between medical confidentiality and the 
interests of a person who is wrongly accused. Would disclosure be justified if the 
physician were in possession of information that would clearly establish the 
innocence of the accused? It could be thought that the conflict of interests 
emerging in such a situation differs from the general conflict analysed thus far, in 
that account not only has to be taken of the interests of an accused in having a fair 
trial. Instead, the interests of a citizen not to be wrongly convicted, thus the 
interests in liberty, financial interests in cases of an impending fine, or the loss of 
reputation, also need to be considered. However, it is submitted that all of these 
interests are integral parts of the interest in presenting an effective defence. 
Defence rights not only aim at the protection of the rights of the guilty to be 
convicted only after a fair trial that was conducted in accordance with procedural 
safeguards, but they also aim at protecting the interests of the innocent not to be 
convicted at all. Given the presumption of innocence, any distinction between the 
interests of the guilty and of the innocent seems artificial and unacceptable, as 
prior to the verdict, every accused person must be regarded as innocent. The rights 
of the accused to demand access to confidential material are thus the same, be 
he/she guilty or innocent. 
However, the question of guilt or innocence nevertheless had some impact on the 
legal debate regarding the question of whether or not a physician's voluntary 
disclosure of information would be justified. In France, art.434-11 Criminal Code 
makes it a criminal offence not to disclose information establishing the innocence 
of a person who has either wrongly been convicted for a criminal offence, or is 
wrongly under arrest for investigation. However, physicians are exempt from this 
obligation and can therefore only lawfully disclose such information where a legal 
justification applies. 102 While no provision comparable to art.434-11 French 
Criminal Code exists in any of the other countries, the problem has nevertheless 
102 Rassat. Droit Penal Special. at 381. 
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been discussed, and many seem to agree that where the innocence of a person who 
is wrongly charged with a criminal offence can be established, the physician's 
disclosure will be justified. A similar suggestion has been made in the U.S. 103 In 
Germany, these cases are resolved by an application of the necessity defence. This 
raises several problems. First, it must be decided at what point in time a present 
danger to the interests of the wrongly accused person materialises. Such an 
assessment is difficult to make, particularly for a physician who may not be 
familiar with all the details of criminal procedure and may therefore not be in the 
best position to evaluate at what moment disclosure would be adequate. Another 
problem is that of a balancing of interests, as it is controversial whether medical 
confidentiality is outweighed by the interest in personal freedom, by financial 
interests, and by interests in a good reputation. 104 In the UK, defence rights are 
usually given precedence over other interests. lOS However, a different decision has 
been taken in respect of the conflict between defence rights and legal professional 
privilege, the only professional privilege recognised in the UK. 106 
Given the importance of the interests behind medical confidentiality, it does not 
seem to be sufficient simply to state that the interests of an accused person not to 
be convicted for an offence he/she did not commit have to prevail over the 
interests in medical confidentiality. The criteria advanced in Germany in the 
context of the necessity defence similarly do not provide an acceptable and 
workable solution. In France, an alternative way is suggested. Where the 
physician holds evidence regarding the innocence of a person who is accused in 
criminal proceedings, he/she should forward this evidence without exposing the 
identity of the real perpetrator. 107 While this way, the competing interests could 
widely be reconciled, the decision on guilt or innocence would then exclusively 
rely on the physician'S averment which may frequently not be amenable to any 
proof, unless corroborative evidence exists in the individual case. However, it is 
submitted that this would be a less intrusive way to resolve the problem than a full 
disclosure by the physician. This solution is also in line with that proposed for the 
103 See Thomas-Fishburn, 61 University of Colorado Law Review 1990, at 201-202, for the 
comparable situation of the attorney-client privilege. 
104 See supra, at 125. 
lOS See, for example, Taylor v Serious Fraud Office (HL (E» [1998] 3 WLR 1040, at 1049 per 
Hoffinann LJ 
106 R v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parte B [1996] AC 487 (HL). 
107 Anzalec, Gaz. Pal. 1971.113. 
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general conflict between medical confidentiality and defence rights. Where the 
physician has declared to be in the possession of evidence that may exculpate the 
accused, he/she should therefore merely be allowed to reveal this fact, without at 
the same time disclosing any confidential patient information. It could then either 
be inferred that the physician's testimony, if not barred by privilege, would have 
been favourable to the accused, or the revelation of the physician could be 
assessed by the court when deciding on the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
Should it make a difference whether the real offender is the patient or a third 
party? A distinction between the two situations is sometimes promoted, as it is felt 
that a stronger case for medical confidentiality exists where the physician would 
have to inform on the patient, rather than a party not protected by the physician-
patient relationship. lOS However, this distinction is not convincing. First, the 
patient's privacy interests are not diminished by the fact that the confidential 
medical information the physician is going to disclose does not incriminate 
himlher, but rather a third party. Furthermore, the patient may be as interested in 
protecting a close friend or relative from criminal prosecution as in his/her own 
protection, so that the harm to the physician-patient relationship ensuing from 
disclosure may be the same regardless of whether the disclosure refers to the 
patient or a to a third party. 
Finally, where the criminal proceedings or investigations are directed against the 
physician, and the physician could exonerate hirnlherself by revealing confidential 
medical information, the conflict is, in principle, similar to the general conflict 
between medical confidentiality and defence rights and should be dealt with 
accordingly. However, courts and legal writers mostly promote the idea that in 
such a case, the physician's violation of medical confidentiality should be 
justified. l09 This may be based on the view that the physician is in a different 
position than other persons who are accused in criminal proceedings. If the 
physician could exonerate hirnlherself with confidential patient information, this 
means that the physician has favourable information in his/her possession. 
108 Pradel, JCP.1969.I.2234. 
109 See, for example, Cour de Cassation 20 December 1967, D.1969.309; Damien, Le Secrel 
Necessaire, at 36; Decheix, D.1983.chron.133; Mazen, Le Secrel Professionnel des Practiciens de 
la Sante, at 147; Pradel, JCP.1969.I.2234; Rassat, D. 1989.chron. 107; Reboul, JCP.1979.1.825; 
Thouvenin, Le Secrel Medical ell'In/ormation du Ma/ade, at 99-100; BGHSt 1,366,368 (1951); 
KG JR 1985, 161, 162; Trl5ndleIFischer-Trl5ndle, 31 to s.203; Leipziger Kommentar-Jlihnke, 83 to 
s.203; ScMnkelSchr&ler-Lenckner, 33 to s.203. 
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Accordingly, medical privilege would not bar access to privileged material that is 
not already in the possession of the defence, but would rather bar the admissibility 
of evidence the physician could easily produce. It is nevertheless submitted that 
accused physicians should not be treated different from other accused persons. 
The production of confidential medical information for defence purposes would 
violate the procedural prohibition of introducing privileged material as evidence. 
Therefore, to deny the physician the possibility to introduce such evidence is not 
different from generally denying the admissibility of evidence that was created in 
ways that violate procedural provisions, such as the introduction of conversations 
that were recorded without the consent of the person concerned. I 10 An exception 
only seems mandated in cases in which the patient accuses the physician of 
criminal conduct in the course of the physician-patient relationship, as in such a 
case, no meaningful defence would otherwise be possible, and it can be argued 
that the patient in that case waived medical privilege by making a public 
accusation against the physician. III 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that defence rights will not necessarily 
be adversely affected by a recognition of medical privilege, as the two competing 
interests can widely be reconciled in the case of a conflict. Consequently, the 
conclusion of the British Criminal Law Revision Committee ll2 that medical 
privilege should not be introduced in the light of the importance of the rights of 
the defence is not compelling. 
4. Crime prevention 
A breach of medical confidentiality for the purposes of crime prevention raises 
particularly difficult problems. While all legal systems as well as the different 
philosophical approaches seem to agree that in some circumstances, medical 
confidentiality may be outweighed by the interest in crime prevention, it is not at 
all clear how to delineate these cases and which criteria to apply when balancing 
the conflicting interests in an individual case. This is a problem shared by all legal 
systems. Even the English system which does not recognise medical privilege has 
110 For the inadmissibility of such evidence in Germany see KleinknechtIMeyer-GoBner, 43 to 
s.163. 
111 Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, at 252. 
112 Eleventh Report, Cmnd 4991, para.272-276. 
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to find a solution to the problem, as medical confidentiality is protected outside 
the courtroom, and the physician who breaches medical confidentiality to prevent 
a criminal offence may be held liable for compensatio~ unless the disclosure is 
justified. None of the legal systems have succeeded in presenting a coherent 
approach to this problem, and the same must be said aoout the philosophical 
discussions of the problem. A thorough analysis of the different approaches and 
the results thereby achieved is thus necessary to see whether a convincing 
approach c~ in fact, be developed. 
A first problem consists of defining the dividing line between crime prevention 
and criminal prosecution. While Continental legal systems usually sharply 
distinguish between the two situations, the same is not true for common law 
systems. There, ooth problems are often discussed together, apparently because it 
is felt that the prosecution of a criminal or a crime will at the same time prevent 
future crimes. However, it is submitted that such a view is not entirely convincing. 
It is, of course, possible that a person who has committed a crime in the past may 
continue to do so in the future. In that case, investigations aimed at prosecuting 
the perpetrator may at the same time serve the purpose of preventing future 
crimes. But this is not necessarily the case. Frequently, criminals will not commit 
more than one crime, and their prosecution can then not be said to be motivated 
by purposes of crime preventio~ apart from the general idea that the prosecution 
of crime will deter the public from committing criminal offences, an interest that 
is one feature ofthe interest in criminal prosecution. 
Crime prevention pursues the purpose of preventing harm to potential victims of 
potential criminal offences. Many uncertainties are involved, as frequently neither 
the potential victim nor the potential criminal offence are amenable to further 
specification. This lack of clarity complicates any assessment of the weight to be 
given to the interests in crime prevention in the course of a balancing exercise. Is 
it necessary that the potential victim can be identified, or is at least identifiable, in 
order for the interest in medical confidentiality to be outweighed? Furthermore, to 
what extent does the plan to commit a criminal offence need to be specified? Is it 
sufficient that a person has dangerous, aggressive or violent tendencies which 
may, at an indeterminate time, turn into criminal activity? What possible crimes 
may justify a breach of medical confidentiality? The balancing exercise involves 
so many indeterminable factors that it seems very difficult to develop workable 
325 
criteria. Should it follow that the interests in crime prevention can never justify a 
breach of medical confidentiality, as hypothetical dangers cannot be weighed 
against a real breach of medical confidentiality?113 
This is certainly not the solution promoted by any of the legal systems under 
investigation. In France, art.434-1 Criminal Code imposes an obligation on every 
individual to inform the relevant authorities of criminal offences the commission 
of which can be prevented or the effects of which can be limited, regardless of the 
seriousness of the offence. However, physicians are exempted from this 
obligation. This means that a physician who learns, in the course of his/her 
profession, that a criminal offence will be committed, is not faced with conflicting 
legal obligations. He/she is under an obligation to maintain medical 
confidentiality, from which he/she is not exempted even if disclosure would help 
to prevent a criminal offence, while there is no obligation for the physician to 
disclose confidential information for the purpose of crime prevention. 
In Germany, s.138 Criminal Code imposes an obligation on every individual to 
disclose information about the criminal offences listed in that provision if their 
commission or consequences can still be averted. S.139(3) Criminal Code 
somewhat mitigates this obligation for physicians. Physicians are only under the 
obligation to report those offences that are listed in s.139(3) Criminal Code, and 
are, with regard to the offences listed in s.138 Criminal Code, exempted from the 
obligation to disclose if they made a serious effort either to prevent the 
commission of the offence or to avert its consequences. 
Both France and Germany thus introduced an obligation to disclose criminal 
offences if their commission or their consequences can be averted, and both legal 
systems provide for exceptions to this obligation where physicians would 
otherwise have to disclose confidential patient information. However, there are 
also some important differences between the two approaches. In France, the 
general obligation to disclose refers to all criminal offences, regardless of their 
seriousness, while the German legislator has opted for an obligation that is limited 
to certain offences regarded as particularly dangerous. In France, the physician is 
completely exempted from the general obligation to disclose and is therefore 
under no obligation even to report the most serious criminal offences in order to 
113 This solution is promoted by Kottow, 'Stringent and predictable medical confidentiality', in: 
Gillon, Principles of Health Care Ethics, at 477. 
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prevent their commission. The French system thus makes a general statement that 
medical confidentiality is regarded as more important than the prevention of 
criminal offences. The German legislator, on the other hand, adopted a more 
differentiated view in distinguishing between different criminal offences. The 
exception for physicians only applies where the physician has tried to avert the 
danger, but is not at all applicable to the offences listed in s.139(3) Criminal 
Code. This shows that the exception is based on the view that medical 
confidentiality has to yield where the prevention of the most serious criminal 
offences could be achieved by a breach of confidence. At the same time, it is clear 
that medical confidentiality is valued so highly that apart from the most serious 
crimes, the legislator protects medical confidentiality by allowing the physician to 
resort to less intrusive means of trying to prevent the criminal offence without 
breaking his/her obligation to medical confidentiality. Here, to achieve the 
protection of medical confidentiality, the legislator is even willing to take the risk 
that these less intrusive measures might fail, as it requires no more than that the 
physician seriously tries to avert the risk, but does not impose an obligation to 
disclose where such an attempt remained unsuccessful. 
So far, it has only been explained whether and under what circumstances 
physicians may be under an obligation to disclose confidential patient information 
in order to prevent a criminal offence. However, this does not necessarily answer 
the question under what circumstances the physician may be justified to breach a 
patient's confidence for the purposes of crime prevention. It is interesting to note 
that in both Germany and France, this problem has not occupied the courts and 
has received only little attention from legal writers. In France, the discussion 
mainly focuses around the question of whether or not the legislative provisions in 
this area leave the physician a choice between maintaining confidentiality and 
disclosure for the purposes of crime prevention. 1 14 For a Continental legal system, 
the French discussion is surprisingly unsystematic. Given that the physician is 
under an obligation to maintain medical confidentiality, but under no obligation to 
disclose information for the purpose of crime prevention, it is inconsistent to 
argue that the physician can be justified when committing a criminal offence 
merely on the grounds that he/she has chosen to do so. This certainly contravenes 
the principles of criminal law, as a criminal offence can only be exceptionally 
114 S h ee c apter 3, 2.5.1. 
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justified where the state has decided that the obligation to follow the criminal law 
is outweighed by overriding considerations. In that respect, it seems more 
consistent to follow the German example which allows for a justification of the 
offence of breach of confidence only where the physician is either under an 
obligation to disclose the information, or where a legal justification applies. 
However, the German approach, while formally in line with legal principles, also 
encounters many problems. As the question of whether or not the physician can be 
justified when disclosing confidential patient information in order to prevent the 
commission of a criminal offence is governed by the principles of the necessity 
defence pursuant to s.34 German Criminal Code, it must be established whether 
there is a present and imminent danger to another which cannot be averted 
without disclosure, and whether the impaired interest is significantly outweighed 
by the interest protected through disclosure. If these requirements are fulfilled, the 
justification will depend on the showing that disclosure was an appropriate means 
to avert the danger. 
In the U.S., the problem is mainly discussed in the context of whether or not the 
physician is under an obligation to disclose information necessary for the purpose 
of crime prevention. Since the influential TarasoJ/ 15 decision, many States have 
adopted the approach that a physician is under a duty to disclose confidential 
patient information where this would help avert the risk of harm to another. 116 
With regard to the specification of criteria which might help to decide whether or 
not a disclosure may be justified for the purpose of crime prevention, the holding 
in Tarasoff is rather vague, as it does not define what kind of danger is required, 
and how specific the threat must be. In Louisiana, where the Tarasoff duty has 
been enacted by statute, I 17 an imminent danger of violence to a specified person is 
required. Other States reject an obligation to disclose altogether,118 but they are 
then still faced with the problem of whether, absent such an obligation, disclosure 
for the purpose of crime prevention can be justified, and if so, under which 
circumstances. In England, the Court of Appeal's decision in W v Egdell1l9 
115 Tarasoffv Regents of the University ofCaii/ornia 31 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
116 See, for example, McIntosh v Milano 168 N.J. Super. 466 (1979), at 489-490; Peck v 
Counseling Service of Addison County 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985), at 426; Petersen v State 671 P.2d 
230 (Wash. 1983), at 237. 
117 L R a. ev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.2(A) (West Supp. 1990). 
118 See, for example, Hasenai v U.S. 541 F.Supp. 999 (0. Md. 1982). 
119 [1990] I All ER 835. 
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suggests that disclosure for the purpose of crime prevention is justified where 
there is a real risk of danger to the public. 
While in France, no criteria for a justification of a disclosure of confidential 
medical information for the purpose of crime prevention are discussed, the criteria 
suggested in Germany, the U.S. and England are rather ill-defined and need 
further specification, before their workability can be assessed and a critical 
evaluation be made. Given that the disclosure of confidential medical information 
by the physician violates the patient's privacy rights, and constitutes a breach of a 
professional obligation to medical confidentiality as well as, depending on the 
legal system concerned, a criminal offence, a tort, a breach of contract or a breach 
of a fiduciary duty, it seems fair to limit instances of justified disclosure to 
situations in which a compelling case for disclosure can be made. 
The three systems seem to agree that there must be some risk of danger to another. 
This raises several questions. It must, for example, be decided what kind of 
danger should be required in order to justifY disclosure. Does a danger to any 
interest of a third party provide sufficient justification for disclosure? Given the 
high value of medical confidentiality as promoting privacy and autonomy, it is 
submitted that disclosure can be justified only in order to avert a danger to an 
interest that is of even higher value than medical confidentiality. This, of course, 
immediately raises the problem of how to rank the competing interests. The 
German discussion suggests an orientation at the list of offences contained in 
ss.138, 139 Criminal Code, which are all offences that are either directed against 
weighty public interests, or offences involving some serious form of violence 
against third parties. 120 In the U.S., it is sometimes required that the danger must 
involve a threat of physical violence against another. 121 While English and 
American courts did not expressly specify this requirement, all case-law existing 
in this area involves either a threat to the life of third parties, or at least a threat of 
physical violence or abuse. A requirement of a danger of physical violence is also 
promoted by legal writers. 122 It seems fair to conclude that there is wide-spread 
agreement that in cases of a danger to the life or physical integrity of a third party, 
medical confidentiality may sometimes be outweighed. 
120 ScMnkelSchrlXler-Lenckner, 31 to s.203; MaurachlSchroederlMaiwald, Besonderer Tei/I, at 
293. 
121 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.2(A) (West Supp. 1990). 
122 See, for example, Kennedy, Grubb, Medical Law, at 657. 
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Is this agreement based on morally justifiable considerations? Most utilitarians 
seem to agree that the preservation of medical confidentiality in cases of a danger 
of violence would be more costly than disclosure. However, others disagree and 
argue that it is difficult to assess how many lives might be saved in the long run 
by maintaining medical confidentiality.123 Again, therefore, the utilitarian analysis 
is not helpful for the development of consistent criteria. From a deontological 
perspective, there seems almost universal agreement that the interest in privacy 
and personal autonomy is outweighed by the interest in life and physical 
integrity.124 However, it should be borne in mind that there may be many cases in 
which the risk is slim, or in which the injury to be feared might be so minor that it 
cannot be said to outweigh disclosure. Also, it does not seem right to reduce the 
balancing exercise to weighing the potential victim's interests in physical integrity 
against the patient's interests in autonomy and privacy, as on the patient's side, 
decisional autonomy indirectly serves the patient's health interests and therefore 
the patient's interests in bodily integrity. 
It has been argued that where the risk to a third party emanates from the patient, 
the patient's interests do not deserve protection, as the patient's autonomy finds 
its limits where its exercise interferes with the autonomy of a third party.125 
However, it should not be overlooked that this argument, if at all valid, only holds 
for the patient, but fails where the risk emanates from a person who is not party to 
the physician-patient relationship. It could be argued to the contrary that medical 
confidentiality weighs more heavily where the threat emanates from the patient, as 
in such a case the breach of the confidential relationship may be regarded as more 
serious. 126 
Given the variety of factors influencing the balancing process in the context of 
crime prevention, it is difficult to agree on a general ranking of the interests 
involved, apart perhaps from cases in which the life of a third party is at risk, or 
where there is a threat of serious violence. This difficulty is reflected in the 
approaches adopted by the different legal systems. Different from the conflict of 
interests to be resolved in the context of criminal prosecution, none of the legal 
systems under examination opts for a generalised way of resolving the conflict 
123 Moore, (1985-86) 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review, at 193. 
124 Ibid., at 194-195; Beauchamp, Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 426. 
12S S S'. ee, lor example, Jones, [1990] 6 PN, at 22. 
126 Pradel, JCP.1969.1.2234. 
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between medical confidentiality and cnme prevention, apart from a few 
exceptional situations. Rather, all systems adopt a case-by-case approach and 
make the resolution of the conflict dependent upon the facts of the individual case. 
How can such a difference in approach be explained? In most cases of crime 
prevention, there will be a danger to a third party, while in the case of criminal 
prosecution, there is a danger to a public interest. Furthermore, the interests 
behind crime prevention vary from case to case, as crime prevention relates to 
many completely different potential offences which can have manifold 
consequences. This means that in every individual case, the outcome of the 
balancing test will vary, depending on the specific features of the case. This is 
different from the situation of criminal prosecution where the interests to be 
weighed against medical confidentiality are the interests of justice, interests of a 
general and abstract nature, the content of which is largely independent from the 
individual case. Given the imponderabilities of cases of crime prevention, it seems 
adequate to regulate the conflict by giving some leeway to the physician's 
judgment, as the prevention of harm to third parties involves a situation in which 
the risks in a given case must be assessed and balanced against competing 
interests. While criteria for the balancing of interests in the individual case are 
necessary, it is thus not appropriate that the conflict between the interest in 
medical confidentiality and the interest in crime prevention is resolved on a 
generalised basis. 
Does it make a difference whether or not the danger is present or imminent, and 
whether there is a danger to the public at large, as opposed to a danger to a 
specific person? If information can be disclosed whenever there is a risk of danger 
to another, regardless of whether there is any probability that the risk might 
materialise in the foreseeable future and whether or not the potential victim is 
identiftable, this arguably leads to the possibility of disclosure in a large number 
of cases. Whenever a person shows aggressive or violent tendencies, this could 
then lead to disclosure, as with such persons there is always at least a slight 
possibility that the tendencies may one day turn into actual violence. Should it 
really be said that this in itself can give rise to a justification of a breach of 
medical confidentiality? Given the lack of thoroughly defmed legal criteria, the 
situation is not at all clear. In Germany, the predominant opinion interprets the 
'present danger' requirement of the necessity defence to demand a risk that the 
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danger might materialise at any time, and that immediate action is therefore 
required in order to avert the danger. 127 The application of this criterion is 
problematic, as a prediction of the time at which the patient might commit a 
criminal offence is difficult, if not impossible. The German discussion, for 
example, raises the problem of whether there is a present danger merely because 
the permanent dangerousness of a person could at any time lead to the 
commission of a criminal offence. 128 It is submitted that the determination of the 
presence of the danger as an isolated criterion is not very helpful, and that it can 
achieve no more than exclude disclosure in cases in which no immediate action is, 
in fact, required. This would, for example, apply to the British case of W v 
Egdell,129 where the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that the dangerous 
disposition of a patient as such can be sufficient to justify disclosure under the 
public interest defence. The result in Egdell was reached even though the patient's 
release from a secure unit was far from imminent. While the Court of Appeal 
argued that the disclosure was necessary as otherwise the patient's release may 
have progressed without adequate information being available to the relevant 
authorities, this seems to be a clear case in which there was no present danger. and 
in which disclosure should already have been excluded on those grounds. 
Is it more meaningful to focus on the question of a specific threat exceeding the 
general risks of life?I3O This consideration can be found in the American decision 
of Thompson v County of Alameda, 131 and the British decisions in Re V (Sexual 
Abuse: Disclosure); Re L (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure).132 In the American case, the 
court held that no duty to warn arises where the patient is potentially dangerous to 
a whole community, but where no identifiable victims exist. In the British case, 
the Court of Appeal was not prepared to hold that a risk the existence of which 
was mainly inferred from the past behaviour of the person concerned, and the 
potential victims of which were not specified, was sufficient to justify the 
disclosure of confidential information. Is the identifiability of the victim a 
sustainable criterion for the disclosure of confidential medical information? 
Imagine the case of a physician who is told by a patient that (1) he will go to a 
127 Trijndle1Fischer-Trijndle, 4 to s.34. 
128 SchOnkeiSchrMer-Lenckner, 17 to s.34. 
129 [1990] 1 All ER 835. 
130 For Germany, see Jakobs, Allgemeiner Teil. at 415. 
131 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1980), at 734. 
132 [1999] 1 FLR 267 (CA), per Butler-Sloss, U. 
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club that evening to shoot a friend (a clearly identified person), (2) that he intends 
to shoot the first person to enter the club (an identifIable person), or (3) that he 
intends to shoot one person in the club which he will select at the spur of the 
moment. While it may be argued that the degree of risk is different for the clearly 
identified or the identifiable person, the significance of the interest to be protected 
by disclosure is exactly the same in all three cases. Even if one were prepared to 
agree that in the third case, the victim will only have to tolerate a general risk of 
life, this would then equally apply to the second case. 
The main problem may be described as a problem of the avoidability of the risk, 
or the suitability of disclosure as a means to avert the danger, a criterion which 
can be found in the German necessity defence, and which was similarly promoted 
in the recent decision of US v Glass.133 Seen this way, the three scenarios look 
slightly different, as disclosure to the potential victim may be a possibility to avert 
the risk in the fIrst two cases, but to avert the risk is more difficult in the third 
case, as it will not be possible to warn a non-identillable victim. The possibilities 
to avert the danger through a disclosure to the police are also uncertain, as the 
police does not have many preventive measures at its disposal to avert an 
unspecified risk. All would depend on the enormously difficult problem of risk 
assessment. In the American case of Peck v Counseling Service of Addison 
County,134 Billings, Chief Justice, for example, argued in his dissent that it is 
impossible to predict future violent behaviour. Others argue that while the 
assessment of dangerousness is difficult, it is not impossible, given that it is the 
normal job of psychiatrists who certify individuals for commitment to a hospital if 
it is felt that they cause a danger to themselves or to others. I3S This introduces an 
interesting thought. Cases of potentially dangerous patients who do not pose a 
danger to another that is specffic enough to be averted by disclosure either to the 
potential victim or the police, may more appropriately be dealt with by the 
respective regulations regarding the commitment to psychiatric hospitals. This 
solution would be consistent with the fact that a preventive arrest by the police is 
usually neither legitimate, nor acceptable.136 If, in the individual case, disclosure 
133 133 F.3d 1356 (lOth Cir. 1998), at 1359-1360 per Porfilio, Circuit Judge. 
134 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985), at 427-428. 
135 Bok, Secrets, at 128; Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, at 300-30 I; Emson, (1988) 
JME, at 90. 
136 Kottow, 'Stringent and predictable medical confidentiality', in: Gillon, Principles o/Health 
Care Ethics, at 417. 
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would not help to avert the danger, as no protective measures could be taken, or 
the potential protective measures are disproportionate to the danger, such as 
preventive arrest of all persons with aggressive tendencies, or the disclosure of 
such tendencies to the world at large, then disclosure cannot be justified, 
regardless of the weight of the interests stake. 
Assessing case-law according to the criteria thus developed shows that disclosure 
would not have been justified in the Tarasoff case. The victim was killed two 
months after the threat had been uttered in a therapeutic session. It is submitted 
that it is very doubtful whether disclosure to the victim would have averted the 
danger, and the campus police had been informed but had to release the patient! 
Coming back to the cases of Re V (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure); Re L (Sexual 
Abuse: Disclosure),137 the decisions against disclosure seem correct. In both 
cases, the risk was so vague that disclosure would only have had a chance of 
preventing a potential danger if drastic measures would have been adopted, to 
which the degree of risk did not give rise, and which, therefore, would have been 
disproportionate. 
It can thus be seen that in cases of a disclosure of confidential medical 
information for the purposes of crime prevention, a comprehensive analysis of all 
the factors involved is necessary in order to come to a well-reasoned decision as 
to whether or not disclosure can be justified. The outcome of the balancing test 
does not depend on an abstract evaluation of the interests at stake, but instead on a 
detailed analysis of the value of the competing interests, the degree of danger, 
and, most importantly, the suitability of the disclosure for the prevention of harm. 
It is submitted that disclosure to the potential victim or the police cannot be an 
appropriate means of crime prevention, unless the risk is specific enough to give 
preventive measures at least a chance of success, which would exclude all cases in 
which the threat merely emanates from potentially dangerous characteristics of an 
individual. 
This leaves, as a last problem, the case of a patient who has committed past 
crimes, perhaps of a very serious nature, but, though eventually likely to commit 
future crimes, does not at present have any specified plans to commit criminal 
137 [1999] 1 FLR 267 (CA), per Butler-Sloss, U. 
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offences. In Germany, disclosure in such a case would not be justified, as there is 
then no 'present' danger to another. If: however, the main focus of the debate lies 
on the question of avoidability of hann and the suitability of preventive measures, 
this case must be distinguished from the above examples, as the patient's arrest in 
such a case would clearly be an option, awaiting further investigations and a 
possible trial. The measures to be taken to avoid further danger are means of 
criminal prosecution, rather than methods of crime prevention, which suggests 
that disclosure, though potentially, but uncertainly, also preventing the 
commission of future crimes, mainly serves the purposes of criminal prosecution 
of the offender. Disclosure for this purpose, however, is not justified where a 
privilege statute exists. Even if the physician's disclosure were justified, and the 
patient could be arrested, the physician's evidence would not be available in 
criminal court, so that the patient's conviction would be far from certain. The case 
is thus not different from that of a patient who is on trial for a criminal offence, 
and in the proceedings against whom medical privilege bars certain evidence. This 
is the price to be paid if one values medical confidentiality enough to protect it 
even in the context of criminal prosecution. 
5. Conclusion 
Given the complexity of the subject matter and of the methodology used, it is fair 
to say that the thesis mainly demonstrates that there are no easy answers to the 
problems raised. It has been established that there is surprising unanimity 
regarding the significance of medical confidentiality among all legal systems as 
well as the different philosophical schools. While every legal system has its own 
ways of guaranteeing the protection of medical confidentiality, the scope of 
protection does not differ significantly, regardless of whether the protection is 
awarded by the Constitution, by criminal law or by private law. The existence of a 
fundamental right to privacy thus does not necessarily influence the protection of 
medical confidentiality. 
However, this unanimity evaporates as soon as medical confidentiality conflicts 
with the interests in criminal prosecution, crime prevention or with defence rights. 
In this area of law, all comes down to value judgments, and the ethical analysis 
indicates that there are no universally valid principles at which such judgments 
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could be orientated. This result was confirmed by the comparative legal study 
which demonstrates that, apart from a few similarities, different legal systems not 
only differ in style and legal method, but also in the value judgments promoted 
and in the results achieved. The approach towards the resolution of conflicts 
between medical confidentiality and the competing interests depends to a large 
extent on the value accorded to medical confidentiality, and on the interests 
medical confidentiality is aimed to protect. 
With regard to the interests behind medical confidentiality, it has been shown that 
the two main ethical approaches to medical confidentiality, that is utilitarian and 
deontological approaches, are also reflected in the value judgments made by 
different legal systems. Thus, medical confidentiality is regarded in all legal 
systems as important to promote the patient's privacy and autonomy. All legal 
systems also accept to different degrees the consequentialist argument that 
medical confidentiality is important in order to enhance patient frankness in the 
context of the physician-patient relationship, which is considered to be important 
for the preservation of individual and public health. The German and the French 
system also take account of the physician's interests behind medical 
confidentiality. 
Courts and legislators in all systems seem to combine different justifications 
behind the principle of medical confidentiality intuitively, but mostly, one 
approach will be given precedence over the other. Thus, the German debate, while 
occasionally referring to utilitarian ideas, is primarily influenced by deontological 
thought, while the debate in the UK is predominantly based on utilitarian theory, 
and deontological justifications are only of secondary importance. The 
comparative study leads to the conclusion that where medical confidentiality is 
primarily based on consequentialist thought, it will, in case of conflict, often have 
to yield to other interests. Particularly with regard to the conflicts examined in this 
thesis, the consequences of decisions to the detriment of the interests in criminal 
prosecution, defence rights and crime prevention will frequently be more obvious 
and graphic than the consequences of decisions to the detriment of the interests 
behind medical confidentiality. Where medical confidentiality is protected as 
promoting privacy and autonomy, the protection will be far more comprehensive, 
as there is then an increased willingness to accept that such protection may 
sometimes result in harm to other important interests. As soon as conflicts 
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between medical confidentiality and other interests have to be decided, the 
significance attached to privacy thus gains importance. 
The comparative analysis confirms that values are relative, and that alternative 
ways of approaching a problem are not only possible, but also practised. It can be 
seen that different systems function quite well even though taking diametrically 
opposed approaches to the same problem. This helps to put domestic attitudes into 
perspective. Thus, the English debate which fears the recognition of medical 
privilege because of its possibly adverse consequences for an effective 
administration of justice can draw from a comparative study that other legal 
systems have made a fundamentally different value decision, and that the 
administration of justice has nevertheless not ceased to be efficient. While the 
comparative analysis shows that difficulties in balancing competing interests, 
another reason why medical privilege is rejected in the UK, do, in fact, arise, it 
nevertheless demonstrates that other legal systems have developed ways to 
address this problem. Consequently, the rejection of medical privilege no longer 
appears to be the only logical response to this dilemma. On the other hand, the 
German debate which is imbued with the overriding importance of privacy 
protection, can infer from the comparative analysis that without medical privilege, 
patients will not necessarily feel that their privacy and autonomy is fundamentally 
impaired, as neither the British example nor the example of American States 
without privilege protection give any indication for such an assumption. 
It has been demonstrated that each legal system has to face inherent inadequacies 
and inconsistencies. From a German perspective, for example, the regulation of 
medical privilege through different provisions of different codes, and the solution 
of conflicts by the means of general legal justifications seems inevitable, even 
though many difficulties are thereby created. Looking at other approaches, such as 
the fundamentally different U.S. style privilege statutes, or the French approach 
which is closely related to the German approach, but more pragmatic, indicates 
that the specific problems encountered in Germany are caused by the 
particularities of the German system, rather than by the complexity of the subject 
matter as such. In areas in which the solutions adopted by different legal systems 
are not too far apart, but where consistent criteria for an adequate conflict 
resolution are lacking, the comparison helped to develop more stringent criteria by 
learning from the strengths and weaknesses of other approaches, and by 
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combining elements of different approaches to a more coherent system This was 
demonstrated in the context of the conflict between medical confidentiality and 
crime prevention, where an analysis of the different legal systems led to an 
identification of criteria that can be used by alI legal systems. 
Some gripping issues necessarily remain unmentioned, as they lie beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It may, for example, be interesting to examine whether it is 
compatible with the rationale behind medical confidentiality and medical 
privilege that the patient can be examined about confidential medical facts, where 
the physician's testimony about the same information is barred by privilege. 
Indeed, Shuman's observation made in 1985, that with regard to medical 
privilege, much work remains to be done,138 is still valid. 
138 Sh 
uman, (1985) 39 Southwestern Law Journal, at 687. 
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